The differences of opinion concerning naive realism, direct realism, indirect realism and so on gain traction from failure to adequately set out the various claims. — Banno

The ideas of direct vs indirect realism themselves are problematic. What type of access do we have to our own conscious minds? It seems to me that we have direct access to our mind and indirect access to the world via the mind - the one and only way we have access to and know about the world. We have direct access to our mind because we are our minds. Minds are a part of the world, so in a sense we have direct access to part of the world and indirect access to the rest of it. Now the boundary between indirect and direct realism becomes blurred and meaningless.

Intentinalist explanations potentially show how a neurological account and an intentional folk-account can both be true.

Intentionalism is a form of direct realism. While other direct realists might say one sees a cup, an intentionalist would more accurately say that one sees it as a cup.

More duck-rabbits, of course. And this needs filling out. But it fits fairly neatly with the neuroscience, avoids the silliness of qualia and shows that we refer to flowers and not perceptions-of-flowers. — Banno

Avoiding the "silliness" of qualia is ignoring the way the intentionalist sees the world. It fails to explain how one can confuse a hallucination, or a dream, for the real thing. How can they be confused for the same thing if they didn't appear similarly (their form and behavior is identical as qualia).

Is the intentionalist referring to flowers, or what they see as flowers? Mirages and hallucinations show that what the intentionalist sees something as isn't always what it is. Using the behavior of others as a means to determine what one is seeing is part of the shared world and not a figment of the mind is just as problematic as your only means of observing others is by the same means that the doubt is attributed to. There is also the issue of different levels of subjectivity - on the level of the individual and on the level of species. Not only are there differences in how individual humans perceive the world, but also a difference in how different species perceive the world. Which species has direct access to the world?

I'm talking about how people usually talk: they usually present their own opinion of a matter of objective fact, even when it is an opinion. They externalize. — baker

Sure, it could simply be a matter of communicating more efficiently. When someone says that the cherry tomatoes are good, it is short for "I feel that the cherry tomatoes are good". For some, using the short-hand version could make a listener think that they are projecting when they actually aren't. I expect you to know I'm talking more about my feeling when eating the cherry tomatoes, and less about the cherry tomatoes. Ripeness would be an attribute of the cherry tomatoes that I wouldn't be projecting as ripeness is a property of cherry tomatoes, not feelings.

Can't help you with that, Harry. Unlike you (seem to be), I'm neither a subjectivist nor a introspection illusionist. — 180 Proof

"The introspection illusion is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly think they have direct insight into the origins of their mental states, while treating others' introspections as unreliable."
-Wikipedia

If you're claiming that brains are the origin of experiences and asserting that all others who disagree are unreliable, then you're as much a introspective illusionist as anyone.

who [...] has had a clearer understanding of what mind is and its relationship to brains [...] why what someone else thinks about this relationship could be better than mine or anyone else's? — Harry Hindu

Call it what you will, Harry, but your "informationalist" position as expressed here suggests introspective illusionism (i.e. naive platonism) to me. — 180 Proof

Don't know how you interpreted skepticism of other people's introspective illusions as me being an introspective illusionist myself. Wouldn't that mean you're one too?

Is your experience of brains an illusion? How else do you or anyone know anything about brains if not by experience?

Kind of like having a map of the territory without including the map's location on the map. The map is as much a part of the territory (the world) as the rest of the world. Why exclude the map when making a map of the territory - if you want an accurate representation of the territory? — Harry Hindu

I should add that when you attempt to include the map as part of the territory when making a map of the territory, it involves jumping down a never-ending rabbit hole where your map includes itself and the territory in an infinite regress - kind of like looking down an never-ending corridor when two mirrors are placed opposite of each other - and kind of like what it is like when contemplating the self - and turning thinking upon itself in thinking about thinking.

From within this experiential world, we manage to conceive of the world scientifically, in such a way that it fails to accommodate the manner in which we find ourselves in it. Hence the real problem of consciousness is that of reconciling the world as we find ourselves in it with the objective world of inanimate matter that is revealed by empirical science. It should not simply be assumed from the outset that a solution to the problem will incorporate the view that science reigns supreme.” — Joshs

Kind of like having a map of the territory without including the map's location on the map. The map is as much a part of the territory (the world) as the rest of the world. Why exclude the map when making a map of the territory - if you want an accurate representation of the territory? There are some that think the map isn't important to represent on the map, as we aren't interested in the map - just the territory. Now, if we were talking about cartography and not geography, then the map would be more important than the territory. The same goes if we are talking about psychology vs physics.

The thing to remember though, is that all great theories can be integrated with the conclusions discovered in other fields. All knowledge must be integrated. The way we talk about brains shouldn't come into conflict with how we talk about minds and vice versa. Any good theory will be able to account for them both without the need to assert that one is an illusion to make their own explanation work.

Normally, when people communicate, the implicit assumption is that the person who holds a position of more power is objective, while the one in the position of power is not objective. For example, when your boss reviews your work, he does it in a language of providing an objective image of your work performance, as opposed to just his opinion of your work. — baker

I'm assuming the boss is using statistics that were produced by a computer, not feelings the boss has about their performance. The computer statistics would be more objective because the computer doesn't care, or bears no responsibility, if the employee is fired or not. The boss could have ulterior motives, or even subconscious biases that they could be applying to the decision to fire or hire.

The distinction between subjective and objective is simply where unrelated reasons and assumptions are used in the process of interpreting sensory data compared to not using unrelated reasons and assumptions to interpret sensory data. Computers don't seem to have that problem of using unrelated reasons to reach a conclusion because they are programmed with a strictly defined and limited work flow and access to information, as well as no goals to use the data they display for personal reasons.

It's unclear is this example would hold, but perhaps mathematics. Or, consider the following thought experiment: suppose a baby is put in a complete sensory isolation chamber, it's not inconceivable to me that they would have internal self stimulation of some kind. Of course, I can't say if this would happen, but it's possible. — Manuel

What is mathematics composed of if not the visual of black scribbles on white paper? If you're talking about what the scribbles represent, then I would still assume that you mean something real and observable, for if you didn't mathematics wouldn't be of much use.

What is internal self stimulation and would the baby be considered "thinking" when in this state? If so, what OF? Does hallucinating and dreaming qualify as thinking? If anything this latter example is evidence that the brain needs sensory input to function properly enough for the entire organism to survive long enough to be meaningful.

Can't help you with that, Harry. Unlike you (seem to be), I'm neither a subjectivist nor a introspection illusionist. — 180 Proof

I think that if you were actually paying attention then you'd know I'm neither of those, too. I'm an informationalist, or relationship/process philosopher. I'm trying to argue that your mind is an objective part if the world because it is information, or process, like everything else. You seem to be a naive realist if you think the world is composed of physical objects, like brains, instead of processes like minds, like the one you have direct access to right now and of which brains and other physical objects that you experience are models of other processes.

Maps are not the territory, but they are made of the same substance as the territory. For maps and their corresponding territory, it is easy to see the similarity because we are neither map nor territory and both map and territory can only be modeled as part of our mental processes. So the similarity has to do with how they are modeled, and the difference between mind and the "phyisical" objects is that one is the modeler (processor) and the others are what is being processed (models).

Perhaps at some point "down the system" these things actually converge, in very primitive organisms but then they develop differently. The one thing that keeps coming to mind is that sense alone, is poor when compared to the intellect alone, in as much as we can separate them in actuality. — Manuel

I just don't see how that could be. My point is that you can't have one without the other. What could you be intellectualizing about if you had no sense? What form does your intellectualizing take if not sensory data (qualia)‽

I actually don't mind labels much. As in, you can be a total idealist and say that we create the world with our minds. Or you can be a metaphysical dualist. If the arguments are interesting and persuasive, that's what matters. I only dismiss "eliminitative materalism", because it's just very poor philosophy. — Manuel

I don't mind labels either as long as they are used in such a way that makes sense when parsed.
If "we" create the world with our minds, then where is the we in relation to our minds, and if the we, the world and mind are synonymous, then I don't see much use for the word, "mind", as there would only be a world and no mind and no we. Minds and we would simply be part if this strange world.

Yeah but "over here" and "over there" are just as much mental attributions as colours are.

A different thing, in that it likely applies to the external world, are some aspects of mathematics. — Manuel

Mathematics are as much mental attributions as colors are. After all, the symbols of math are made up of shapes and colors. Any alien species would probably use different symbols.

It's the relationships/processes that mathematics represent that are real (again it's processes all the way down, of which minds are a type of process). Mathematics is just a way to quantify these relationships/processes into useful objects of thought. It is the processes that are real and what the external world is like more so than the solid, stable, "physical" objects of the process of perceiving and thinking.

What good is cogitation without the senses? Well, not entirely senseless, but look at, say, deaf-blind people, they can read by only pressing their fingers over bumps on a page and get an extremely rich story out of that.

So the senses can be extremely poor compared with the cognitive reply. — Manuel

We know that the brain is adaptable and can repurpose processing power that was used for visual and auditory perception for tactile perception.

A better example would be what happens to people in a sensory deprivation chamber. After a while the brain creates its own input.

Nerve nets eventually started to group together in tighter clusters, which brains evolved from. Brains were selected for their ability to bring information from different sources (multiple senses) into a consistent whole creating a more fault-tolerant system where the information from one sense is used to confirm the information coming from another. Brains were also selected for their ability to attend to these sensory impressions focusing the attention from one part of the mind to another (think of continuing to look straight ahead while focusing your attention on the limits of your peripheral vision).

So it seems to me that primitive minds existed prior to the existence of fully evolved brains, with more complex brains adding to the functionality of the pre-existing mind.

I may sound like I'm leaning towards idealism or panpsychism, but I'm not. Supposing mind is the fundamental component of reality is just as much of a projection as supposing the world is "physical" - whatever that means. The mind is a process, and process is the fundamental component of reality.

Ah, yes, another tabula raza know-nothing. Lazy is as lazy does, Harry. You prove my point. — 180 Proof

Yet it would have been less typing for you and more educational for me and others had you simply used the time you had in forming these snarky replies to just quote his explanation here, in this thread. :roll:

Tell me, 180: who in the world, or in all of history, has had a clearer understanding of what mind is and its relationship to brains, and how did they obtain this clearer understanding, so as I might understand why what someone else thinks about this relationship could be better than mine or anyone else's?

It seems to me that we are all stuck in this same predicament of only having access to our own minds and the world as we perceive it through our own minds, so one is just as likely as any other to have a clear understanding of this relationship.

Please don't bother saying they are neurologists and it's their job to study brains. Studying brains is only studying your perception of brains without acknowledging the fundamental problem of how the mind appears compared to how brains appear and all of their knowledge of brains is only a result of how they appear via the mind. When science itself implies that "physical" objects are made up of the processes of smaller objects, which are in turn made up of smaller objects interacting, etc. ad infinitum, and that objects are mostly empty space, then our perception of "physical" objects doesn't match up to our explanation of the objects we perceive, and that includes brains and their neurons.

Well the senses themselves don't cogitate. So there's no puzzle by itself here. — Manuel

What use are the senses without cogitation? What use is cogitation without senses? Brains evolved later from nerve nets. Feelings existed before integrating them into the whole of the brain.

I said "reading", not "watching videos". I come here to discuss with fellow well-read members, Harry, not to teach anyone what they can learn themselves. There's just too much 'idle (uninformed) speculation driven by intellectual laziness' going on lately. — 180 Proof

Not sure how reading what other people write can shed light on your own mind. Seems to me that the mind is fundamental and anyone that has one can reflect on its properties themselves without being influenced by what other people write. I come here to discuss with fellow free-thinkers that can think for themselves and come to their own conclusions, and not only about what other people write.

To those asserting that there are "physical" brains that model, are at least admitting that there are models, but can't seem to explain where their modeling of other "brains"(?) ends and real "brains"(?) begin. Why is modeling your own brain and body states (first-person perspective) different than you modeling other people's brains and bodies (third-person perspective)?

If the brain models, what you call a brain is a model, but of what exactly? How do you know that the brain you refer to isn't the model rather than what the model is of? If brains model body states then how do you know that the brain you are seeing isn't just the way your mind models other people's minds? What they are essentially saying is the brains of others that they perceive is their own mental model of other people's mental modeling. It must be models all the way down?

Like I said before, third-person perspectives are simulated first-person perspectives. So if you are going to assert that the first-person perspective is an illusion, then you've just undermined all of your third-person perspectives and knowledge you've acquired by them - which is everything you know.

Another strange inconsistency that I've noticed on the part of the Modelers is that they make the assertion that the self is only a model, and not also what is modeled, yet a brain isn't just a model, but also what is modeled.

As I understand it, the moment of the singularity can't be known because time and space themselves started along with it. But the technicalities are beyond my ken. — Wayfarer

This is interesting topic. How would the "beginning of time" appear to measuring instruments and to brains interpreting those measurements?

If time is the comparison of relative change (all measurements are comparisons of relative differences and similarities), then the beginning of time would be when things went from not changing to changing - when change started happening in the universe. But then one must ask the question if the universe is all there is and if there wasn't other change going on outside of the universe that may have caused the universe to come into being - which is just more change - in other words there could possibly be no beginning of time because there has always been change.

If there was no change at all at one point in the multi-verses history, then how can that state of non-change cause change? It's the old question of how something can come from nothing. How can space-time come from a state of no space and no time?

Try actually reading Metzinger. — 180 Proof

I don't see how watching videos of his lectures would be any different, unless me means different things with the same words when he writes them as opposed to speaking them. I don't see why you couldn't just summarize his explanation on this particular question, if he (or you for that matter) really had one.

"According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience."

How on earth is this supposed to suggest that there's no qualia? Qualia is conscious experience. — frank

What on Earth does he mean by "self" anyway? Is he saying that there are no such things as individual organisms? If there are individual organisms that make up a particular species, then does a self exist even if those organisms don't have the mental capacity to model states of their body? The theory of evolution by natural selection is based on the idea of competing individuals (selves) with the winner successfully passing their genes down the subsequent generations, thereby improving the specie's chances of persisting through time. Ideas are just as real as physiological traits and they both are used to compete, and selected for or against, in the game of survival.

I didn’t say you can’t see code. I said you can’t see code by simply looking at a computer. You can bust open the motherboard and look at it all you want (like looking at a brain) and you won’t see what’s happening in there. — khaled

What is it that you're looking for that you say you can't see? You'll need to define "computer program" because now it seems that you're just moving goalposts. Also, explain what a "computer program" is independent of someone observing it and then what it looks like when someone looks at it and how they would know that is what they are looking at.

With the right software I can see what you’re feeling generally well. Whether it’s fear, anger, etc. Brain scans exist. They don’t show everything, but they are showing more and more. — khaled

That's the point I'm trying to make - what is a "feeling" when looking at it through software or a brain scan as opposed to experiencing it? Why is there a difference at all? Why is there an experience of a feeling in the first-person and also a coinciding experience of neural activity in the third-person? Which perspective is of the feeling as it actually is? In other words, which perspective has more direct access, or knowledge, to the "feeling" and why?

Knowledge is conceptual, both qualitative and quantitative, so it is does consist in qualia. — Janus

The point being that at the most fundamental level, knowledge is composed of sensory impressions: colors, shapes, sounds, etc., aka qualia. Your experience of the words on this screen are composed of shapes and colors, not neurons firing in a certain sequence. Neurons and brains themselves are composed of particular shapes and colors. It is these varying shapes and colors that are used to compare and differentiate other shapes and colors, not a comparison of neural electrical currents.

Your perspective on anything is your perspective of course, not mine. General knowledge of publicly available phenomena is not merely your perspective, even if your perspective accords with it. — Janus

I'm not sure what you mean by "perspective" then if you seem to be attributing it to something independent of a sensory information processing system. There can be no such thing as a perspective independent of some sensory information processing system. In a sense, there are only first-person perspectives with perspectives being a informational structure composed of information about the world relative to the self. Third-person perspectives are simulated first-person perspectives.

lmost two decades ago when by chance I came across the neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger's magisterial Being No One (I highly recommend the less technical, much condensed summary version The Ego Tunnel). — 180 Proof

All he does is talk about how the brain models the world without addressing how the model relates to the brain itself - why the model is composed of entirely different stuff from the first person perspective (the mind and its qualia) as opposed to the third person (the brain and its neurons).

What are qualia, according to you? — Janus

The components of knowledge. What form does your knowledge take? When you say that you know something what are you pointing to? How do you know you know something?

When I look at your brain, is my perspective of your brain first person or third person? Is my perspective of your mind first person or third person?

Basically he argues that the first-person nature of experience (awkwardly termed 'what-it-is-like-ness') is something that cannot be described in objective, third-person terms — Wayfarer

That's only if you think the world is as you experience it (naive realism) while at the same time believing the idea that the experience itself is causally segregated from the world itself. It's an inconsistent position.

It just amazes me that people are still asserting that qualia are an illusion when the only way they know of the existence of brains in bodies and their behaviors is via their subjective experience of such things. If the way you know the world is an illusion, then your observations, understanding and explanations of the world are an illusion.

You take walking for granted. Learning to ride a bike or drive a car is a science as much as learning that you can walk and then learning how.

How is observing yourself any different than observing nature? Are you not part of nature? Any explanations you come up with about what you are and your relationship with everything else is a product of your scientific thought processes that allow you to make predictions which is basically the only reason we produce explanations in the first place.

We all try to be consistent. If we didn't then no one would understand anything we say or write. It's usually when some of us find that our observations and logic conflict with our feelings is when we throw consistency out the window for the sake of our feelings.

When I observe that I have mind or two legs or two arms am I doing science?? That makes me a scientist? — dimosthenis9

Sure. Anytime you attempt to integrate your observations into an consistent explanation of reality, you're doing science.

Why can't you see a mind when you look at a brain, like you can see walking when looking at legs? — Harry Hindu

You can, just not with your naked eye. Brain scans etc with instruments of science. — DingoJones

When I look at your brain I see a grey, squishy mass. Is your mind a grey, squishy mass? Are you saying the entirety of your experience of the world is just various quiverings of a grey squishy mass?

My mind is not made up of jittering neurons and electric currents. My mind is made up of colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings.
— Harry Hindu

I don't think anyone disagreed with that. — khaled

DingoJones just did.

Why can't you see a mind when you look at a brain
— Harry Hindu

For the same reason you can't see a program when looking at a computer. — khaled

How do programmers write programs that they can't see? I think you're thinking about the output of the program, like the webpage you see on your screen right now. But there is code that creates this webpage and that is written by programmers and you can see if you have the right software. You can't do this with your mind. Your mind is of a different category - of which you only know of brains and bodies and their behaviors via your mind composed of colors, shapes, smells, sounds, and feelings.

So if anyone wants to assert that the mind, or qualia, is an illusion then they pull the rug of reality out from under themselves as they have just declared that their only way of knowing the world is an illusion, yet they want to cling to the idea of the existence of brains in bodies with accompanying behaviors even though they are only aware of those things by the very thing they assert is an illusion.

like you can see walking when looking at legs?
— Harry Hindu

I doubt you see all legs walking. If they belong to a sleeping person for example, it is very likely you can't see walking in those legs. — khaled

This doesn't make a difference, if you want to talk about sleeping legs then I could just point to looking at your sleeping brain and seeing a sleeping brain rather than your dream you are experiencing.

To the same extent that a program is identical to a computer. — khaled

To the extent that the wood is identical to the camp fire. — DingoJones

walking is to legs so mind is to brain. — TheMadFool

None of this helps at all. My mind is not made up of jittering neurons and electric currents. My mind is made up of colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings. Walking legs, burning wood, and functioning computers are all composed of these components of mind. Brains are no different. Why can't you see a mind when you look at a brain, like you can see walking when looking at legs?

Everything is process. Minds, as a process, objectify other processes thereby creating objects from processes. When you observe an object engaged in a process, like legs walking, you are actually observing a relationship between processes. Walking is a relationship between legs and the ground, both of which are processes themselves. Processes all the way down.

Brains are the way minds model the process of other minds. Brains are objectified minds.

I don't think either of us disagree with whether we are speaking to one another intelligibly. The disagreement is whether there has to be a common point of reference in order to do so. — Hanover

Then you haven't determined if either one of you is speaking intelligibly if you haven't determined if a common point if reference is needed. What would a common point of reference even look like and how would you both agree that one exists?

What is a common point of reference if not a view from everywhere which both of your perceptions would be part of? So it seems that only upon agreeing on what it is that you both perceive has a common point of reference been achieved.

A common point of reference implies space-time and every point in space-time is relative to another. But by merging the information from different points do you end getting a better understanding of what it is that is perceived. But you'd have to assume that your perception of others with senses is accurate to be able to assert that there are other points of reference other than your own.

Then why don't they clarify it like that?

Moreover, it is sometimes (often) not possible to describe the level of one's injury because one simply doesn't know it. For example, you may have sharp pains in your abdomen on the right side. You don't know what is causing those pains. You could have gallstones, intestinal spasms, a number of things. That's why you went to the doctor so that they can examine you and find out what it is. — baker

Exactly. Your description of your pain indicates where the doctor should narrow his search and reasons for your pain. If it turns out you don't have an injury where you say you have pain then the problem might be more in your head.

We are almost always talking about the causes of our experiences rather than the experience itself. It is the world we share and not each others heads, so it is the shared world that our shared language is about, and not what is going on in our heads.

Why would it be that similar causes lead to similar effects in the world but that not be the case for the causal relationship of perceptions with what is perceived? Why wouldn't similar sensory organs and brains have similar perceptions and when they don't we can always point to some cause that is different (being located in a different point in space-time, different lighting, abnormal brain function, etc.)

I don't think either of us disagree with whether we are speaking to one another intelligibly. The disagreement is whether there has to be a common point of reference in order to do so. I don't see why there must be, considering we speak of pain to one another, yet there is no pain outside the phenomenal state to point to to be sure we're speaking of the same thing. — Hanover

That's because pain is the phenomenal state. The injury that triggers the pain is outside the phenomenal state and is what you're talking about when talking about your pain. What use is talking about your pain if you're not really referring to your injury?

When a doctor asks you to describe your level of pain they are asking for a description of your injury.

Do either of you disagree on the concept of space-time and the fact that you both occupy different locations RELATIVE to the thing be talked about and then account for the distinction when talking the thing your taking about?

To say that there needs to be a common point of reference is to say that you have to be the same observer to be able to understand each other, but that is nonsensical in a world of time and space where we each occupy different points. Something that humans have been able to figure out is that the same object looks different from different points in space-time. You don't need another observer to figure that out for yourself. Just move around the object, change the lighting, etc. and you can see for yourself how the your perspective changes. You know that you are the one that changed,, and not the thing being perceived,, so you deduce that the change in the perspective is a result of you changing,, not ta change in the object being perceived. We understand that it's not the object that changes, rather it is the information of the object relative to our position in space-time that changes. We then assume others have these various views given the same sensory organs observing from different points in space-time. If not, then we can usually point to causes outside the phenomenal state as reasons for the discrepancy (the person's eye-brain system is abnormal).

We both look at a cup and we may have no idea what part of the cup is descriptive of the cup and what are things we impose in order to better navigate our world. It's likely we see the cup the same way, but not necessarily so, and it's not required in order for us to speak of the cup. — Hanover

Seems like descriptions are the things we impose in order to better navigate the world. They are both the same thing. We have multiple senses. Maybe each sense provides a different description of the same property of the thing we're talking about and objects seem more complex than they are given we're using more than one different sense to describe/impose.

Think about how a cup feels in your hand vs how it sounds when it is dropped on the floor. Two very different experiences of the cup are descriptive of the just one property of the cup - the material it is made of.

What are the chances that you are both able to carry on this conversation so long without experiencing the words of this screen in similar ways? What are the chances that each post follows the arguement of the other without having a similar experience of the words on this screen? Are we always talking past each other when talking with anyone but ourselves?

When a professor gives you an exam, what are you being tested on if not whether your interpretation of the professor's lectures is accurate and that you interpret the professor's words the same way they do ?

If I were to ask you to copy and post everything that I said here, would you be able to do it? Why or why not? What are the chances you'd be able to do it if you weren't experiencing the same words on the screen? Even if you copy and paste the words you'd still need to interpret the scribbles, "copy and paste" the same way I do.

How much do you weigh? — praxis

Are you in the East or the West?

Not al all, nor is that an implication of my position — Tobias

If the rapist is killed it would be manslaughter. If the rapist kills the husband I think you can define that as 'provocation' (raping his wife) so claims to self-defense would be very hard to call but I am sure there are some other mitigating circumstances (convoluted even!) that could warrant a claim of 'self-defense' - state depending if we're talking about US in general here. — I like sushi

First, how does the husband know that his wife is being raped and not a masochist cheating on her husband?

It seems obvious that in the act of committing a violent act, you have no right to defense from others trying to stop your violent act.

The fact that this example is being used in a thread which has nothing to do with the Rittenhouse case or circumstances is an example of a red herring.

In the East it mean the realization of emptiness. In the West it means weight loss. — praxis

Then what enlightenment is is subjective?

Wrong — praxis

:grin:
Then enlighten me about enlightenment. Am I enlightened now when I'm "wrong", or when I change my mind and agree with you?

Well now Harry, think, think.... what could those circumstances be.... Ohh I know. Say you are in the process of brutally raping my wife, choking her (I am divorced by the way, but that's beside the point, it is nota real scenario, but a hypothetical you see) and I come to her rescue wielding a lead pipe. You out of fear for your life stab me in the eye with the long hair pin conveniently located on my wive's night stand. The pin penetrates my eyeball, enters the brain which sibsequently causes my legs to quake and I collapse to the floor.... dead! — Tobias

Then your position is that all rapists deserve to be killed by their victim's (X-)husband?

By the way, it is not my duty to tell you anything useful. You frame it as a demand, but normally I get paid to provide legal education. You could have found this information in the thread. — Tobias

Strange that you interpret a factual statement as a demand. Maybe the information in this thread is inaccurate, biased, or doesn't take into consideration all facts that have been given. There is no problem in asking questions. You didn't have to answer.

If the name "Janus" for me can only refer to Banno's-peception-of-Janus, but for you "Janus" refers only to Hanover's-perception-of-Janus, then when we each talk about Janus, we are talking abut different things. — Banno

That depends on what you mean by "perception". Perceptions are about the things being perceived. If not then your perception of others perceptions is one of your own making and there is no "external" world that is perceived. There would actually be no perceptions, just solipsistic imaginations.

Yes, “obviously” that has to be true. — Xtrix

If it walks, talks, and acts like a duck...

And the answer to that question as offered up so often in this thread is sometimes you have and sometimes you do not. — Tobias

This doesn't tell me anything useful. What are the circumstances in which it is OK to defend yourself vs not being OK to defend yourself?

It seems to me that if you have the right to life, liberty and happiness, then you have the right to defend yourself from others trying to take these things away from you.

Libertarianism is a cover for plutocracy. Most are just corporatists. All are capitalists through and through.

But if you want to go on believing the standard lines about “freedom,” you’re welcome. — Xtrix

You've obviously never met an Libertarian and only understand Libertarianism as it has been provided to you by others that don't understand it either. Plutocracy is plutocracy. Libertarianism is libertarianism. They are two distinct ideas.

Most people don't really know enough about what it is they are talking about when defining their political stances. Just look at the authoritarian socialists that label themselves as "liberal progressives", and are the same ones that mis-identify libertarians and their stance. Even self-proclaimed libertarians still try to dictate to others how to live their lives, so by definition they aren't libertarians.

If you are equating libertarianism with plutocracy, then what is the label you assign to those that believe individualism trumps collectivism and that everyone should be able to live their lives the way they want as long as it doesn't restrict others from doing the same?

What is it to be Enlightened?

To be enlightened is to find out that you were wrong in thinking a particular thought and instead of doubling down you change your mind.

No, neither deserved death if justice were served in a deliberate way. That is, had they not been shot, they would have faced some charges, not none deserving terribly long sentences, and certainly not death.

Saying the self defense was justified is not equivalent to saying he got his just dessert. — Hanover

Did R deserve to be chased down by a mob and assaulted?

It's not a matter of what someone deserved. It's a matter of do you have the right to defend yourself from being killed?