Yes, I agree with you. To the extent that I'm aware, this comes from my acquaintance with detective work, the effect contains telltale signs of the cause. How else is a detective supposed to operate? Working backwards from the crime scene to the crime itself is how a detective earns his keep. — TheMadFool

Yes, that is an example that I like to use, too. I also like to use the example of a tree stump with tree rings. The tree rings carry information about the age of the tree. The tree rings were caused by how the tree grows throughout the year. The meaning of the tree rings is not in the mind of an observer. It is in the process that created the tree rings. This implies that meaning and information exists independent of observers and their minds.

Note, however, that you used information in a sense that suggests that it has to do with more than just causality. If the two were identical you wouldn't/shouldn't have said, "...all effects carry information about all prior causes", right? I would like you to expand on the non-causality aspect of information. — TheMadFool

What I mean is that information is that relationship between cause and effect. Causes and effects are epistemological snapshots of the entire process. Causes and effects are the objects and events that we talk about.

Our words are caused by our ideas and our intent to communicate them. That is what some string of words mean. Meaning and information are the same thing. So you could say that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect, too.

Not All Belief Can Be Put Into Statement Form — Antony Nickles

All you have to do is use some sounds of your choice to refer to your belief. Does it matter that no one else understands the sounds?

If meaning were use, then wouldn't you need to be able to observe someone's belief to know how to use those words?

You seem to have something going on with causality from what I've gathered from your posts. What is it about causality that interests you? Anyway, you mean to say that information is data understood (apprehended)? Pray tell, what is data then as information seems to supervene on data. — TheMadFool

What interests me is how effects are about their causes and how causes are about their effects. It is also interesting to note that every effect is also a cause of some subsequent effect and that all effects carry information about all prior causes.

The division between data and information is epistemological, just like order and chaos. They are distinctions made based our current understanding of some process. An understood process appears orderly and contains information, while a process that is not well understood appears as random data.

Information" Is an ambiguous term which allows the modern materialist, or physicalist, through the use of illusion, to escape the need for God in metaphysics — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It's not.

First, I'm not a materialist. Second, I'm not trying to escape the need for anything except unnecessarily complex assertions using terms that you don't even understand what they mean, and can't be consistently or properly be used.

It is directly related to time in the second law of thermodynamics, and this allows the premise that if there is time, there is information. The problem though is that under this definition "information" is necessarily the property of a system, as entropy is defined as the property of a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, causality is related to time, however I don't see how it follows that that would mean it is a property of a system. Again, here you are using words that are vague or superfluous. "God" and, "time" are two examples. What is "time"? Isnt time just another word for change? Is change fundamental, or is the substance that changes fundamental? Can you assert that one is more fundamental than the other? Does it even make sense to separate one from the other?

Shannon believed that information is anything that stands out - the more novel, the more unexpected, the more shocking something is, the more information there is. This understanding of information squares with what unenlightened once said viz. that to make universal claims has a downside to it viz. the loss of meaning: if everthing is red then redness becomes meaningless - redundant and useless. — TheMadFool

The more complex something is, the more information there is.

If information only exists in minds and data exists everywhere else then meaning would be arbitrary and imaginary. If there are reasons some data exists, then those reasons would be the meaning of the data. Those causal relationships are already there prior to some mind apprehending them. So information appears as data when the causal relationship is not apprehended, and it appears as information when it is apprehended.

When science scans the universe for SETI, then it’s looking for the biochemical signature of life (or signals sent by an advanced culture). Nothing has been found to date. But the point is, during this search the instruments collect billions of terrabytes of data, none of which contains information specifically denoting the existence of life. — Wayfarer

Correction. They collect billions of terabytes of information, but none of it pertains to the existence of extra terrestrials, or was CAUSED by extra terrestrial activity. It was still caused so there is information there in the data, just not the type of information NASA is looking for.

When a deer smells a wolf and runs the other way, does the deer have beliefs about the smell and that it means a wolf is nearby, and that if a wolf is nearby then it is a good idea to run in the opposite direction?

Does a bee have a belief that a porch light is the Moon and then uses it to navigate its way back to the hive?

Does a cat believe that the sound of a can opener indicates lunch is about to be served?

Did Ildefonso have beliefs before he learned language?
https://vimeo.com/72072873

Language is means of consolidating complex configurations of sensory information into one sound or scribble. Think of how high level computer languages make it easier to talk to a computer than using complex machine code. It allows the mind to take shortcuts in thinking by using placeholders for these complex concepts.

Well, in my humble opinion, the question has its roots in the perceived difficulty in coming to terms with material-immaterial interaction but that's just another way of saying that the two don't/shouldn't interact and that's physicalism in disguise.

If one is a non-physicalist, there's the material body and the immaterial mind, and going by how things are, they do interact. How else does everybody get around?

I maybe a mile off the mark but that's how I fee. — TheMadFool

Maybe the physicalist is humbly asking how opposites interact? If the dualist is going to use terms that are opposites to describe the world, then it is incumbent upon them to explain how they interact. The monist - whether they are a physicalist, idealist, or something else (like me) - doesn't have that problem because they are not using opposite terms to describe the world.

Essentially, the dualists' problem is language-use - using words in antiquated ways that stem from the religious notion that mind can exist apart from the body.

Have you studied any physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I certainly have, and no where have I seen the word, "immaterial" used to describe waves. As I have already pointed out, material and immaterial are opposites. The OP is basically asking how opposites interact. Well MU, how do opposites interact?

Science holds that waves are patterns of motion within a material substance composed of parts. They are a change in the relations between the parts of the material substance. As such, the substance is material and the wave is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is the same as saying that pattern and the substance are one and the same as you can never have one without the other - ontologically. The distinction you are talking about only exists in your mind as language concepts.

What are you talking about Harry? Wave-particle duality is a description supposed to be concerning the reality of what is, therefore it is ontological. It refers to two distinct aspects of the same situation being described, the wavefunction, and the particle. It is not two distinct descriptions of the very same thing, therefore not an epistemological distinction. Failure to recognize that the "wavefunction" and "the particle" refer to two distinct things assuming that they both refer to the very same thing, would create many contradictions. Epistemology does not allow contradiction therefore we must maintain that the distinction is ontological. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's missing the critical component of consciousness as an observer and how the mind is only a representation of what is happening, not a clear window to what is actually happening.

I am now wondering if part of the problem is that dualists seem to think that they see the world as it is (naive realists), and how it appears is different than how it is thought about - hence dualism. You think that the duality exists ontologically, and are unwilling to ponder the possibility that the way it appears in the mind may be different than how it actually is (but that isn't necessarily saying that we can never know about how it actually is). What I'm basically arguing is that particle-wave duality is like a mirage or a bent straw in a glass of water with ice. - an illusion. Illusions, however, are ontological. Their interpretation is epistemological. Epistemology is about the ontology of knowledge. All dualisms resolve to a monism.

It's clearly not unwarranted. Something must constitute the separation between minds. If what was between your mind and my mind was the same thing as what's in my mind, and the same as what's in your mind, there would be no separation between our minds. However, we experience separation. We cannot posit a real boundary between one thing and another, unless there is a different sort of substance which constitutes the boundary. A boundary is only real (substantial) if there is a difference of substance. If it is all water, within my mind, and yours, and everywhere between us, then there is no separation between us. If it is evident that there is a separation, as it is, then we need to posit another substance which forms the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pay attention to the bolded part: This can be said about earth, water, fire and air, so why dualism? Your focus on mind and body being special and fundamental would simply be a personal fetish with the two.

You're assuming that there can't be different kinds of one "substance" (again, you haven't even explained what you mean by the word, or what qualifies as a "substance", so until you do, I'm assuming that you don't know what you're actually talking about when you use that word). Just as we have all the different elements that are just different configurations of atoms, we can have different configurations of one "substance". There are different configurations of the same "substance" between the configurations that are our minds.

My first encounter with dualism was precisely with this question: how does an immaterial mind interact with the material? Frankly speaking, the question perplexed me then as it does now. I now know why. The question has a hidden assumption - the assumption that the immaterial can't/shouldn't interact with the material. Why else the question, right? But, from a physicalist's point of view, that's presupposing the very thing that they want to, perhaps desperately, prove. — TheMadFool

The assumption was never hidden. The assumption is the basis for dualism. If dualists are just going to start asserting that mind and body aren't so different after all, then what is the difference between a dualist and a monist?

Your objection appears to be why is there supposed to be two fundamental substances rather than a different number. This is the result of previous metaphysics, which sees the need for a distinction between material substance and immaterial. And as I explained, it is supported by modern physics with wave (immaterial), particle (material) duality. Clearly, the physics of waves is distinct from the physics of particles, as the substance of each is different, yet there is some form of interaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

What scientific theory says that waves are immaterial?

The wave-particle duality is an epistemological distinction, not an ontological one.

How do you know that there are two fundamental substances when all you know about one substance is by the way it appears in the other? Are material objects in your immaterial mind? Is the material world represented immaterially?
— Harry Hindu

I don't quite get this question, but I'll try to answer what I apprehend that you are asking. There is immaterial substance within my mind. And, I infer that there is immaterial substance in your mind. But there is something which separates our minds, a medium between us, which is evidently material substance. You might wish to call it something else, but I think it's acceptable and customary to refer to this medium which separates our minds as material substance. Do you not agree that it is also acceptable and customary to refer to the ideas and concepts within your mind and my mind as immaterial substance? If not, I think that you are attempting to force a definition of "substance" which is unacceptable. What are your epistemic standards for "substance" then? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making an unwarranted assertion that the medium between minds is different than the medium of your mind - hence you create the problem of dualism that you are attempting to fix, and the way you are fixing it is to assert that the mediums are not so different after all, which is more like what monism is saying. So you keep going back and forth between the mediums being distinct, yet similar. Which is it, and how much do the mediums need to share before you agree that they are the same type of substance?

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

If we can't see the world as it is, then can we know the world as it is? For instance, you seem to know that we can't see the world as it is, but how did you find that out if not by reading words on a page - by seeing words as they are?

Once you start typing a reply are you seeing the words that you typed as they are? If not, then how do you know that what is on the screen is what you intended to type?

No, the amount of heat is a measurement, and all that is determined with this measurement is the object's temperature. That measurement does not determine the state of the object. You could apply some logic though, to say if it's H2O, and it's below 0 degrees Celsius it's likely in a solid state, but the amount of heat does not determine the object's state. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course the measurement doesn't determine the state of the object. I never said that it did. What is measured determines the state of the object.

These are the two types of substance which are philosophically interesting, as ontologically fundamental, that's why I focus on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you find them interesting has no bearing on whether or not they are ontologically fundamental. In fact, your interest implies that they are epistemological in nature rather than ontological. You need to define "substance" to explain why only two things qualify as a substance and not all the other things that interact.

How do you know that there are two fundamental substances when all you know about one substance is by the way it appears in the other? Are material objects in your immaterial mind? Is the material world represented immaterially?

Sorry I didn't see that question. If you're really interested, then study some philosophy. Plato is a good place to start. But learning that distinction is a long process and I'm not a paid professor. So, sorry again, but I won't oblige. — Metaphysician Undercover

It wasn't just that question you skipped over. But if you are just going to cite some long-dead human without acknowledging that they would probably not say the same thing if they were alive today knowing what we know now, then I'm not going to find your reply very interesting.

Duh, the thawing ice adds to the quantity of liquid. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does this mean? The amount if heat determines the state of some object.

Well, I think if monists are ready to accept that there are two distinct substances, material and immaterial, which are not completely incompatible because they are both actual substances, and interact, then I think the better description is that monism is actually dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it means to declare material and immaterial as "substances"? It seems to me that immaterial would be the opposite of material. There are many substances that interact, so why focus on only two types?

The "point" is that these questions remain unanswered, — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't address my question. What is the distinction between immaterial and material? There are more than two types of substances that interact. You need to explain what a substance is and why being a substance allows interactions with other things that are substances.

I can't see your point Harry. If we have liquid water and solid ice, and someone argues that ice is never liquid, and liquid is never ice, therefore the two can never interact, we must explain freezing and thawing in order to understand the interaction. It's just the way that reality is. Sometimes adding more to the mix is the only way to understand. Reality is complicated, and denying the complications is not the way to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just dumb. We don't use thawing as an explanation to explain the interaction between ice and liquid. Why do we need "thawing" to explain how a glass of liquid behaves when ice cubes are dropped inside it. Thawing doesn't explain how the liquid gets displaced then the glass overflows. Physics is what explains that.

I have a better example that we can use. How does software interact with hardware? Do we need to assert the existence of spirits to account for how software and hardware interact in your computer?

Why do you think that dualism makes the two substances incompatible? That's the strawman representation which allows the monist to insist that the two substances cannot interact. But clearly they do interact, and dualism respects that fact. In another sense of the word "substance" for example, iron and gold are distinct substances, but they both have protons, neutrons, and electrons, so they are not incompatible. Why would you suppose that in substance dualism "substance" is used to represent two incompatible things? As I implied in my last post, the fact that the two are both called by the same name, "substance" indicates that they are not incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

LOL. All you are saying here is that dualism is actually monism. If the dualist is saying that the two "substances" aren't incompatible, then that is monism. What is the point of asserting two "substances" if you aren't asserting that there are only two fundamental substances that are distinct from each other? What properties do these "substances" share. What properties differ? What percentage of properties differ versus what percentage they share? At what point do we say that the substances differ enough to qualify as dualism being the case vs. monism?

I think you're just not getting what I'm saying. We can represent two things as distinct, hydrogen and oxygen for example, but the fact that they are described as distinct does not create a problem of interaction. There is only a problem of interaction if the two distinct things are represented as incapable of interacting with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but WHO is saying that they are distinct and incompatible? Its obviously isn't the monist.

The third named thing is not another substance though, it's more like a name for the zone of interaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I'm getting what you're saying. Are you saying that spirit is the medium that this interaction takes place? Wouldn't that already be covered by the actual substance? I'm just not seeing a need to complicate things by adding more to the mix.

That's not what I meant. All you are saying, is that by naming them both as "substance", they are therefore more similar than dissimilar. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're the one that used the term, "substances". I was merely reiterating your point that it is faulty to think of the two "substances" in such a way that makes them incompatible. That is precisely what dualism does. Monism is more like an endeavor to do exactly what you were proposing - in understanding that:

The appearance of a problem is a result of representing one of the two substances as necessarily passive, by being eternal, outside of time. This indicates that the understand of time which is involved with the concept of "eternal forms" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its just a paraphrasing of my assertion that dualism creates the problem of interaction by representing mind and body as distinct - one being passive and eternal, and the other temporal - unless I'm just not getting what you're trying to say.

Ever since Plato introduced the "tripartite soul", there hasn't really been an interaction problem, because the principles are there to resolve it, for anyone who wants to. "Spirit" is the third feature which accounts for the interaction between body and mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Introducing another substance just adds fuel to the fire.

The interaction between "substances" is a problem for naive realists who believe that the world is as they see it, rather than symbolizing how the world is. It's as if they think that the symbols (the brain) are distinct from the symbolizing (the mind).

It is argued that eternal forms could not interact with temporal bodies. But as Aristotle showed, so long as the two distinct substances are represented as actual, therefore active, there is no problem with interaction between dual substances. The appearance of a problem is a result of representing one of the two substances as necessarily passive, by being eternal, outside of time. This indicates that the understand of time which is involved with the concept of "eternal forms" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

What this is basically saying is that two substances are more similar than dissimilar, something that leans more towards monism. The point being is that you have to represent the substances as being more similar in order to explain how they interact.

So instead of introducing the supernatural (the eternal) to account for the natural. It's all natural, including gods and where they live, if they were to exist.

To return to the original issue, an experience is a relation between yourself and the things in your environment (say, the coffee). Experience is a term that applies to humans but not to robots. Not because humans have Cartesian minds (where they have internal experiences), but because humans have different capabilities to robots. A human's practical contact with the world instantiates differently to a robot's. — Andrew M

A robot has a relationship with its environment as well. Humans are part of the environment. To assert that humans are somehow special in this regard, is unwarranted.

The practical contact with the world for both humans and robots is via the physical senses.

Experience is information.

My hypothesis is that we currently don't know what is conscious or not because we don't know what makes brains special equipment in that regard.

When you have stories like this:



I tend to lean more toward the idea that information processing is related to consciousness.

Is the computer reading the woman's thoughts or brain signals? What's the difference?

What is the difference between computer memory and human memory?

Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof?
— creativesoul

Not if you're a BIV. — Marchesk

How is that different than a brain in a skull (BIS)?

Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof?
— creativesoul — Marchesk

I wonder when we train neural networks to recognize cats on mats, what does that amount to? Or when AlphaZero learns to play superhuman chess. Can we say it has representational knowledge of chess strategy? — Marchesk

Is the visual of a brain a representation of a brain or something that isn't a brain? If its a representation then how does the visual differ from the actual?

I also wonder whether we could pursue an eliminativist view of computing. When you look at the actual hardware, it's just moving electrons around. Where are the software programs in that? Where is the data? — Marchesk

The same can be said of brains.

Maybe just looking at neurons firing is missing the higher level view of what all that adds up to, such as belief formation. After-all, it's kind of hard to explain how humans are so adept at navigating and manipulating the environment without positing some knowledge of the world. In fact, that's an ongoing issue for improving AI. The lack of common sense understanding is one of the big remaining obstacles to a more general purpose AI. Somehow biological neural networks are able to handle that. — Marchesk

Or maybe looking at neurons firing is a naive realists view of what is happening.

I would say communication exists in bodylanguage, there is a empathic bond between people that makes us see bodily expressions as atleast as important as words. — Equinox

I would say that communication exists in all causal relations. Effects communicate their causes and vice versa. Behaviors communicate intent. Behaviors inform us of intent.

None of these "everything is X" explanations are any good Harry. As I said before, an explanation needs to tell us what is different about different aspects of the world. Suppose you want to explain vision. A good explanation will tell us that it uses rods and cones on the retina, and so on. Suppose you want to explain hearing. A good explanation will tell us that it uses hair cells in the cochlea, and so on.

If we take your approach, all we can say is "vision is causal, hearing is causal". — Daemon

:confused: Saying that a dog or a cat is a pet isn't saying that they aren't different, only that they share a property of being a pet.

I do wonder what motivates you to think of things in this way. Are you a fan of Fritov Capra, like Pop? Is it mysticism? — Daemon

No. It's just logic and the principle of Occam's Razor.

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first. — Marchesk

No, our ancestors evolved to respond to wavelengths of light, prior to language. Had they not then they would not all have picked the ripe berries (which are united in the wavelength the reflect, not the experience they produce). If you want to have wavelengths of light as 'colours' I'm happy with that, but qualia aren't required here either. — Isaac

Hmm. It seems like wavelengths of light aren't necessarily required either. Maybe we should consider the implications of what Sara Walker was saying in Marchesks other thread in that biology is ontological and physics is epistemological. Colors would be ontological and wavelengths epistemological. After all, wavelengths of light is an explanation for the experience of colors, mirages, bent straws in water, etc.

Being a man or a woman is understood by many to be psychological/behavioural, not genetic. If I were to somehow have my mind transplanted into someone else's body, die and become a ghost, or turn myself into a pickle, I'd still identify as a man despite not having XY sex chromosomes. — Michael

That's a mighty big IF.

Anyway, the reason you'd still identify as a man is because your memories are of being a man, and that you were born male. But if you could have your mind transplanted into a woman's body, then your memories of being a man would eventually become less prevalent because they are no longer useful in your present form.

And my question was, "what is it that transpeople are claiming?" Are you saying that their minds were secretly transplanted at birth?

As explained by WHO, "gender refers to the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed. This includes norms, behaviours and roles associated with being a woman, man, girl or boy, as well as relationships with each other. As a social construct, gender varies from society to society and can change over time." — Michael

In other words, gender refers to the characteristics of the sexes. The characteristics (gender) are socially constructed, not the sexes. The characteristics include the norms, behaviors and roles associated with the sexes as well as the relationship between the sexes. As a social construct, the characteristics vary from society to society and can change over time.

It seems to me that the sexes, which are not socially constructed, play a pivotal role in determining gender. Not only that, but there are behaviors and norms that are specific to the sexes, so can't be socially constructed. Sexual selection plays a key role in the evolution of a species - the peacock being a great example.

One could say that the characteristic expectations that groups have of the sexes IS sexual selection.

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.
— Harry Hindu

That's correct. — Daemon

Then we at least agree on something.

Instead of "information", what if I said that everything is causal?

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't.
— Harry Hindu
— Daemon

It just seems like crazy talk Harry. You must know something about the complexity of the brain, it's the most complex thing we know about. And you must know something about the highly specific, highly sensitive mechanisms that make it work, and how they can be affected by injury, disease. I sometimes think you young people nowadays don't take enough drugs. — Daemon

So your answer to the question: "What makes brains special from other things that allows it to possess feelings?" is that the brain is the most complex thing that we know? I don't think this is a very good answer to the question, if you don't mind me saying.

For instance, isn't the universe the most complex thing we know? After all it is composed of billions of brains, and an unknown number of other things, possibly other universes, etc. Does that mean that the universe, or multiverse has feelings? Does the Earth have feelings since it is where all these complex brains reside? What about dark matter and energy? Is that more complex than a brain, and what about when we find processes more complex than brains that aren't brains?

Under what domain? Philosophically, the subjective is private, private taken to mean inaccessible to an observer. — Mww

Yes, but the question now is, why is it inaccessible to an observer? And what does it mean to be inaccessible to an observer? Isn't it indirectly accessed via observation of behavior and neural activity? In other words, is the subjective accessible objectively?

I don't like it because it doesn't explain anything. What we need is to find the differences between things. Waves on the sea, footprints on the beach, a piano, a digital computer, a biological brain. — Daemon

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.

You do realize that different causal relations would be different information? Of course you would if you had been paying attention to anything I have said.

It isn't like the machinery in a computer. If we wanted to make a conscious machine, we would need to make something with the same capacities as a brain. — Daemon

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't. When you look at an image of someone's brain, do you see feelings and consciousness, or a mass of neurons? What about when you look at a computer - any difference in seeing a mass of circuits?

The fact that we can feel is what makes meaning. — Daemon

I have no idea what this means. How do brains feel? When you look at brains do you see feelings?

You don't worry about hurting the beach by walking on it — Daemon

Who said the beach is bothered by someone walking on it? It could be that the beach likes being walked on.

That's because transgenderism isn't concerned with genotypes. — Michael

Then why do many transpeople have sex changes?

People who are transgender do not claim to have sex chromosomes that they don't have. — Michael

Then what are they claiming? That is the question.

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you.
— Harry Hindu

The specific word or exclamation here is obviously completely irrelevant. We don't need to be taught to experience pain. — Mijin

You said that you are able to determine that something has subjective experiences by its behavior - by exclaiming, "Ouch!", yet now you are saying that the word or exclamation is completely irrelevant. If they exclaimed, "Yippee!", would you say that they are having a subjective experience of pain?

All these arguments over consciousness might as well take place inside a simulation. — Marchesk

Daydreams could very well be simulated subjective experiences, or views of some process or event. The only difference between daydreams and nightdreams is that you don't have the real world imposing itself on your senses. Daydreams are like an overlay of the real world subjective experience. When sleeping, there is nothing but the simulation so the mind assumes it is reality.

I think it's become a moral/political issue only because it's a metaphysical/epistemological issue that hasn't ever really been solved. — McMootch

Yes, and there are many that don't want to solve the metaphysical aspect because they want to keep it a moral/political issue so that they can use it as a weapon against their moral/political opponents.

Gender is performative, a matter of behaviors and traits that find themselves somewhere on the masculine/feminine spectrum, which has nothing to do with one's body (sex). — McMootch

All this does is re-enforce the idea that there are only two genders (masculine and feminine). When a trans-person claims to be one or the other, they too are re-enforcing the two gender idea. Not only that, but they re-enforce those biases that women wear dresses and men wear pants by claiming to be one or the other by simply dressing a certain way. If they claim to be a woman because they dress like one, then that just re-enforces the idea that to be a woman, you need to wear a dress. They continue to put people in one of two boxes based on how they dress or behave.

Human sexes have a wide range of behaviors that overlap. These behaviors, then, shouldn't be defined as masculine or feminine. They are simply human behaviors, and have nothing to do with sex/gender. There are behaviors and physiology that we can point to that are masculine or feminine, like giving birth and being able to stand an urinate without getting urine all over your legs and pants.

So in a sense, yes there are male and female souls (and souls in between), in that humans have psychological pre-dispositions (biologically and culturally influenced) causing them to exhibit behaviors that are mostly what we would call "masculine," mostly what we call "feminine," or anywhere in between.) But because this disassociation is awkward and takes time, people are revolting against the thing that seems most immediately to hold it together (gendered language). — McMootch

I don't believe in the idea of souls. For me, it's more of an issue of how they were raised. Parents have a tendency of projecting their expectations onto their children. For instance, telling your daughter that she thinks like a man, or dressing your boy in dresses. As children, they adopt these behaviors as norms, so when they become adults they become confused because the expectations of society is different than their parents'.

They claim that gender is a social-construction, but a social construction is a shared idea - meaning that members of some society mutually agree that these ideas are good and useful. But if a person claims to be something else, then they are not agreeing with the rest of society. Therefore, their disposition doesn't qualify as a gender. Either gender is a social construction, a feeling, or the same thing as sex.

I said no such thing — Mijin

I quoted you:

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

:roll:

you were asking me about the mechanism by which physical neurology causes subjective experience. That's what we don't know. — Mijin

That's part of the problem - dualism. You're left with the impossible task of explaining how physical processes cause subjective processes.

It's like I am saying we don't know exactly what dark matter is, and you're repeatedly saying "If you don't know what dark matter is, how can you use the word?". The word still has meaning in referring to a specific phenomenon, even if we have no concrete scientific model yet. — Mijin

No one has ever observed dark matter. Dark matter is just an idea to account for the observed behavior of real matter, just like how subjective experiences is an idea to account for the observed behavior of human beings.

Well the program PRINT "Ouch!" has an exclamation of pain as part of its programming, so does not fulfill the requirements. — Mijin

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you. If you were born in another country with a different language, you would have been programmed differently. Your genetic code is a program defining the limits of your behaviors and logic defines the limits of your ideas.

What if we designed a robot to program itself (teach itself), or learn from it's mistakes?

You assume that other humans have [subjective experience] because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it.
— Harry Hindu

Note that this single quote from you has two issues: firstly chastizing me for assuming that p-zombies don't have subjective experience, when this is true by definition. But also secondly, saying I would not believe a computer that claimed to have subjective experience, when the post you are quoting actually says the precise opposite. — Mijin

My point was that you had already claimed to not know what a subjective experience is, yet you go on to claim that you know what has it and what doesn't. I already went over this in my last post, which you ignored. I'm done going back and forth with you.

I defined pain. I've answered all your questions about pain. I've told you I can elaborate on the mechanisms of pain as much as you like, because it's a topic I've studied at postgrad level.
The only one of your questions I couldn't answer, was how physical mechanisms within the brain give rise to subjective experience because no-one can.

So drop this nonsense about me not knowing what pain is, unless you also mention that you're defining "knowing pain" in such a way that no living human knows what pain is. — Mijin

You said:

I didn't claim to know what pain is — Mijin

Then you said:

I feel pain. — Mijin

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

So what you seem to be defining pain as is a unpleasant subjective experience, and then go on to say that you don't know what a subjective experience is. If pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is, then you don't know what pain is. You aren't saying anything useful about pain by asserting that pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is. It's really that simple.

I have defined pain without the use of the phrase, "subjective experience", because it's a meaningless term, as you point out. Pain is information. What is information? The relationship between cause and effect. Pain informs you of injury. Injury informs you of the cause of the injury, etc. If it's causal, it's information.

Your response to that post, was to then say I would not believe an AI could be conscious even if it claimed it was i.e. the exact opposite of what I said. — Mijin

My response was a question trying to confirm what you had said. I often paraphrase what people say, and they often recant what they said because the paraphrasing gives them a different look on what they said. But this is beyond the point. The point being that if you don't know what subjective experiences are, then you aren't in any position to make judgements about who, or what has them, or not. It's like saying a blind person doesn't know what polka-dots are, but then they can pick out what has them and what doesn't have them. It's illogical.

With regards to computers, yes, if an AI were able to freely converse in natural language, and it repeatedly made the claim that it felt pain, despite such sentiments not being explicitly part of its programming, and it having nothing immediate to gain by lying...then sure, I'd give it the benefit of the doubt. I wouldn't know that it felt pain, but I'd start to lean towards it being true. — Mijin

What do you mean, "not explicitly part of its programming"?

You were saying I was wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experiences. This showed that it is you that do not understand what a word (p-zombie) means. — Mijin

Where did I say that? I have only been questioning your use of the phrase, "subjective experience" because you use the phrase without knowing what it means. Why use terms that you don't know what they mean, especially if there are alternative ways of describing pain with words we do understand? :chin:

Seeing the world through the eyes of a child is to try and look at the world as if for the first time - without the biases and the things we take for granted. That is how most discoveries and revelations are made - in thinking about things differently.

Don't you already know what pain is? Are you one of those rare individuals who can't feel pain? What's that like? — Marchesk

I already said that its information.

Mijin is the one that doesnt know what pain is.

Are you asking what pain feels like, or asking what pain is? Is it the same thing?

So why are you challenging the idea that humans learn things at all? — Kenosha Kid

I wasnt. I'm challenging how the information about unconscious processes got into the book we are learning about unconscious experiences from.

What pain is, how pain sensation works, what we mean by subjective experience and how much we (don't) know about how exactly subjective experience works. — Mijin

If you can't tell me what pain is then how do you expect to tell me how it works? Can you use a word when you don't know it's meaning?

And I note that you still haven't said why your argument is not a shift of the burden of proof. i.e. The whole reason you and I are in this exchange in the first place. — Mijin

You haven't provided a consistent method of determining what type of system is conscious and which type of system isnt.

I said that under certain conditions I could gain belief that a computer was experiencing pain, and I mentioned what those conditions were. Does the program PRINT "Ouch!" fulfill those conditions?
If you read what I wrote, you would know the answer to this. — Mijin

What were those conditions?

This response is a complete non sequitur. — Mijin

No. If a pzombie is defined as having no subjective experiences and you can't define subjective experiences, then You haven't properly defined P zombies much less subjective experiences. How can you use words when you don't know what they mean?

Yes, and I'm not sure whether Sara was arguing epistemology or ontology. It sounded like she wanted to expand physics to incorporate the emergent biological information. — Marchesk

It sounded like she was saying that biology is ontological and physics is epistemological.

Physics, biology and chemistry are different views of the same thing. Each view is dependent upon the present goal, so I think that the emerging levels and scales are epistemological in nature.

An amalgam of physical states IS a chemical state. An amalgam of certain chemical states IS a biological state.

All this started from me suggesting that your argument was a subtle shift of the burden of proof.
Call me naive, but I honestly expected a simple response like "oh, you're right, let me rephrase that" or "I don't believe it is, because..."

But instead of that we get this bizarre freakout of you claiming I don't know what "pain" means.
Well I just gave a definition of pain, in the very post you are replying to.
But, since pain sensation was a core part of my postgraduate degree I can actually talk a lot about it. At the end of that, would you respond to the point? — Mijin

I didn't claim to know what pain is, — Mijin

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. — Mijin

You keep contradicting yourself. You go back and forth between knowing what pain is and not knowing what pain is. You call it a subjective experience and then claim to not know what a subjective experience is. You aren't being very helpful.

Nobody knows. There is no scientific model (meaning: having explanatory and predictive power) for that part. If this is a "gotcha" consider yourself, and every other human, "got". — Mijin

I'm not playing "Gotcha". The fact that you think that I am just shows how you aren't even attempting to think about what you are saying. I am simply trying to get you to clarify the terms that you are using.

Possibly I am losing you because you don't read my posts? I just said I could believe that a computer could experience subjective states if it were to claim it i.e. the exact opposite of the thing you're accusing me of saying. — Mijin

Then all I have to do is program a computer to produce some text on your screen, "I have subjective states" and you would assume that the computer has conscious states?

But on p-zombies, think through what you're saying. You're suggesting that I am wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experience? Their definition is that they do not have subjective experience. — Mijin

Yet, you claim that no one knows what subjective experiences are. :roll:

Nope. Your reply doesn't address how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

Around 57:45, Sara tells Sean that she doesn't think the Standard Model is up to the task of explaining life, because at the scale of chemistry, the physics of information emerges. Sean mentions a paper by Mark Bedau which argues that the weak emergence is when the higher level properties of whatever systems like life could have been in principle simulated by a computer prior to life. — Marchesk

She says the desire is to reduce biology to physics, but physics (as a field of human knowledge) emerges from biology. — Marchesk

Seems like you could say the same thing about biology. The question is whether or not the scales and levels of the universe are epistemological or ontological.