But they are different. Again, I said quite the opposite. — Kenosha Kid

How do you know? Isn't what you said prior to your present experience of what you said? Can't you only infer what you previously said since it happened prior to your present statement of what you previously said?

Precisely because you seem confused by it. — Kenosha Kid

If confusing me is your intent, then you have succeeded.

No. You decided to define it as "isn't water". I decided to include water. Anyways I won't bother with this pointless line anymore. — khaled

No, I didn't. Go back and read what I said. I said that it is a relationship between water and something else. It's not my fault that you aren't paying attention.

I don't "experience eggs in the fridge". That's word salad no offence. I see eggs in the fridge. I cannot be wrong that I am seeing eggs in the fridge (Assuming I'm not blind of course). But I can be wrong about whether or not there are eggs in the fridge (could have been an elaborately placed cutout so as to make it seem like there are eggs there). — khaled

Sure. Let's just say "experiences" then. Do you get what that means? — khaled

No, because I thought that seeing is a type of experience, but you are saying that it isn't. Care to clarify?

How do you know that you are experiencing something? — Harry Hindu

Because there is an experiencer (me) who is aware (conscious) of these experiences. And that is the definition of "having an experience" — khaled

This is circular. What is an experiencer? Are you referring to a homunculus?
Also, you previously said this:

Saying "aware that you are conscious" is like saying "wet water" — khaled

...but now you are saying that you can be aware (conscious) of experiences. How is an experience different from awareness/consciousness?

Your question implies that it is possible to have an experience but think you're not having an experience. Can you give an example of that? — khaled

"Experience" is just a word. You've been trained to refer to this event as an "experience". But what is it that we are referring to really? Telling me that it's an "experience" just tells me what scribble I can use to refer to this event, but what is this event? Is it the only event (solipsism)? Is it an event among many others (realism)? If the latter, how does this event relate to, and interact with, the other events? You might say that all this is unimportant and that we can use a computer without knowing how it works, but you still have to know what a computer is to use it. The amount of detail that you know about the computer is relative to what you want to do with it, and I troubleshoot them so I know more than just how to use them. That is the level of detail I want when it comes to "experiences" and "consciousness" because then we can learn how to fix them and maybe even improve them.

No, you might infer it. I do not imply it. By explicitly stating that we don't, there is no implication that we do. "My name begins with J and is not John" does not imply "My name is John and is not John." — Kenosha Kid

That wasn't the type of argument I was making. If your "indirect" description of events that cause experiences is no different than a "direct" description then what is the point of even using the terms "direct" and "indirect" when it comes to awareness/knowledge of some event preceding the experience?

All direct experience is of phenomena. — Kenosha Kid

What is an indirect experience of phenomena? If there is no such thing, then why use the term, "direct" in the first place? All experience is of phenomena. Then I would ask, Is there anything else, other than experience, that can be of phenomena? For instance, could effects be of their causes?

By all means, point out where I suggested that I have direct awareness of, say, stabilising my field of view or whiteshifting the colours I see. — Kenosha Kid

You imply that you have "direct" awareness by describing these facts. What is missing from your explanation of the facts of the causes of our experiences? My point was that "direct" and "indirect" are meaningless if you are still able to know the facts, which you just reported, unless you are saying that you don't know what you are talking about.

My statement was that abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience. For instance, I am not aware of turning the retinal image upside down; I am only aware of the transformed image (which is why I am happy to talk about qualia at all). The fact that I can be extremely confident that this transformation occurs does not rely on subjective experience, or divine revelation for that matter, but on scientific progress and study. It might yet transpire that science and books and research journals are a conspiracy to mislead us or some such, but I'm happy that that's a vanishingly small likelihood. — Kenosha Kid

If you aren't aware of the cause, then how can you even say anything about it? What is missing from your report of the state-of-affairs that precede our experience of something? How would someone who has direct awareness of these states-of-affairs describe them compared to someone who has indirect awareness of those same states-of-affairs? If they both say the same things, then what is the difference between indirect and direct awareness? If the person that had direct awareness says something different, then does that not mean that you don't know what you are talking about because you are only aware indirectly?

I know that I am experiencing something. I later call this ability to experience something "consciousness". — khaled

How do you know that you are experiencing something?

No because I cannot be wrong about the fact that I'm experiencing something. — khaled

You cannot be wrong that eggs are in the fridge if you experience them in the fridge? If your aren't wrong that you have experiences and you have experiences of eggs in the fridge, then how can you say that you can be wrong about eggs in the fridge, but not about having experience of eggs in the fridge?

Or I could define "wet" as "in contact with water" in whichcase water would be wet unless it is just one molecule. Again, this is pointless. — khaled

Exactly. You need something else that isn't water to be in contact with water. Contact is a type of relationship between water and something else. You haven't said anything different than what I just said.

What sounds redundant? — khaled

First-person experiences. If all experiences are first person then it is redundant to even use first person as a qualifier to describe experiences.

I was not doing some reductio ad absurdum here. I was implying that this point of contention is useless. No one cares whether or not water is wet and it doesn't help in whatever discussion you decide to have about water. In the same way I don't think "are you aware of being conscious" is important. — khaled

Then how do you know that you are conscious? Its important to know how you know that you are conscious, or any other fact for that matter. Do you know that there are eggs in the fridge in the same way that you know that you are conscious?

Water isn't wet. Wet is a relationship between water and something else. An object that is not water is wet when water interacts with it.

is just a different location of the first person experience.
— Harry Hindu

Oh so you understand what it means now all of a sudden? You just used it to form a correct sentence. Congratulations! — khaled

No. I was simply reiterating your explanation and showing you how your distinction between first and third person is nonsensical. So, no. I still don't know what you mean by first person experience. It sounds redundant.

Not necessarily — bongo fury

What else could it be? Where does the observation of shivering brains reside? In what form does the knowledge that brains shiver take if not a visual of a shivering brain?

Surely, anyone with sufficient flair for metaphor who had experienced shivering, e.g. with cold, could apply the term appropriately to sound events just as well as to illumination events? — bongo fury

Using metaphors is part what it means to be poetic.
Does my brain shiver when its cold, or is it my body that shivers?

Saying "aware that you are conscious" is like saying "wet water" — khaled

I don't think so. Can you report anything that you aren't aware of, like being conscious? By what means do you know things, like that an apple is on the table and that you are conscious?

Can't remember a point where I possessed no knowledge so I can't tell you if you need to know things to be conscious. — khaled

Do you know anything when not conscious?

Zero person doesn't make sense. Second person also doesn't make sense in this context. Third person is your view of something from a distance. First person is the view from my perspective. I'm just saying the same things over and over again because this definition cannot be simplified. Maybe check what the difference is between "first person shooter" and "third person rpg" — khaled

third person and first person seem to be the same thing as "from a distance" is just a different location of the first person experience.

You're saying the same things over and over because you seem to be unwilling to even try to make any sense and be consistent.

I propose "shivering qualia". This is a harder problem, because one cannot just quine the shivering away. Actually, I kind of like the term "shivering" now. — Marchesk

"Shivering" is itself a particular type of qualia. "Shivering" is a term that only an entity with visual experiences could use in the appropriate way.

No, I'm saying that no one is conscious of the causes of our phenomena: we have no knowledge of objects that cause phenomena except indirectly through phenomena; we have no awareness of light lensing through the eyeball and being projected onto the retina; we have no consciousness of outline detection occurring, of images being turned upside down, of colour being whiteshifted, or any of the other processes of the brain that create qualia: the objects of experience and their properties. What we get is, if not an *end* result, a late iteration of a metaview of the data. That is immediacy of qualia. — Kenosha Kid

How can you not see the contradiction here? How can someone claim that we can't be aware of the causes while at the same time explaining the causes as if they had "direct" knowledge of the causes? :chin:

If you aren't aware of any of this then how is it that you are able to report it and explain it? "Indirect" and "direct" are meaningless terms if you are asserting facts about the world. The way you are asserting these things makes me think that you are perfectly aware of how your experiences are caused.. How did you come to know about these causes and report them if you dont have any awareness of them?

I can be unaware of my surroundings and still be conscious. And idk what informed has to do with it. — khaled

But you are aware that you are conscious and you being conscious is part of your surroundings, no? Informed, as in possessing knowledge. Are you conscious, or aware, of your knowledge?

as in only you have this view and no one else does?
— Harry Hindu

I don't know. Will get back to you after I become someone else and compare. — khaled

Then what did you mean by "first-person"? You still haven't clarified what that even means, or how ti compares to zero-person or second-person experiences.

No, "the subjective experience of thinking" is a poetical description of the thoughts, I say. — bongo fury

And the observation of brain shivers is the same thing - a poetical description of another's thoughts.

Then we're probably not talking about the same thing. Consciousness is more fundamental than "red" and "square". Without consciousness "red" and "600 nanometer electromagnetic wave" would be synonymous, but they're clearly not (or else we would need to teach children about electromagnetic waves before they understand what "red" means). I don't see consciousness as a complex entity at all.

I'm curious how you would define it now. — khaled

"Synonymous" isn't the word I would use. I would say that without consciousness, there would be no red - only 600 nanometer electromagnetic waves (and there is even question as to whether there is actually 600 nanometer EM waves, as 600 nanometers and waves are conscious constructs). Something cannot be synonymous with something else that doesn't exist.

I thought you were on the right track with "first person experience". It's just that this is the trope most people use, and I wanted you to try and paraphrase what it means to you. Are there other words that you might use, like "awareness", or "informed"? Does "first person" refer to the uniqueness of what you are aware of, or what you are informed of, as in only you have this view and no one else does?

All of these are questions you already know the answers to. By trying to ask for more and more precise definitions all you end up doing is muddying things that are perfectly clear. It's like if I asked you to define "Red" or "Run" how would you? These concepts are too basic so as to require much definition.

I made a topic about this years ago but basically I think there are some concepts that don't need definition only "assignment". An "assignment" is when you already know the meaning of a word but just need to assign a word to the already present meaning. These concepts include: Color, Space, Shape, Time, Consciousness and many others. You can't define "color" or "shape" or "consciousness" in simpler terms, all you can do is assign a word to a concept that you come pre equipped with. At least that's what it seems like to me. If you want to disagree then by all means try to define "Space" or "Shape" in simpler terms. — khaled

I understand what you mean. If you want to know what "red" means, I'd simply point to things that are red. But the same cannot be said about consciousness. Consciousness is not as simple as "red" and "square". Consciousness is a more complex entity that is composed of those things and much more. The goal for a proper definition and theory of consciousness would include how it interacts with, and relates to, the rest of the world, and defining it simply as a "first-person experience" just doesn't do that.

Good question. The answer presumably is "Because I am me and no on else is." — bert1

But that doesn't really answer the question. What is "you"? It goes back to my question before...Are "you" one neuron, a group of neurons, a brain, a body, or what? And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness?

"theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". I am bad at defining things but if I were to define consciousness it would be "Having a first person view" or something like that. I definitely have a first person view, but I can't tell if you do or not. I may not know what conditions produce consciousness as I defined it but I definitely know I have it. It's like how I can know that I am typing on a PC right now but not understand how a PC works or how the internet works. — khaled

The theory and the definition need to integrate well. You can't have a definition that contradicts the theory. And your definition has to make sense enough to be explainable in the first place.

You define consciousness as a "first person experience". But what does that really mean? What is an experience? What does it mean for an experience to be first person? Is there such a thing as second or third, or zero (views from nowhere) person experiences?

What term do you suggest? — bongo fury

A term that explains why from your vantage point it appears that my brain is shivering and from my vantage point it appears that the world is shivering colors and shapes and sounds, etc.

Because the causes of our human experience are not part of that experience — Kenosha Kid

Hmm. I wonder, if this were the case, how could we imagine anything at all. What causes one to experience unicorns and dragons?

And if this were the case then how can we ever say that our experience is about a non-experienced cause? Are you saying that we can only talk about our experiences and not about what caused them? How can we ever talk about things that are not part of the experience, like electrons being waves and how they move through holes?

Your questions are all good ones and need answers from the panpsychist. — bert1

The ultimate question that needs to be addressed by any "substantial" theory would be, "why is the evidence that I have for my consciousness different than the evidence others have for my consciousness?".

If panpsychists are anthropomorphic, everyone else is anthropocentric, or at least neurocentric. — bert1

No. There are other theories other than "everything is mental' and "everything is physical".

What does it even mean for an atom to have a mind and how does that contribute or integrate with a molecule's mind? Does an atom experience depth because most sensations (visual, auditory, tactile) have an element of depth, or distance relative to the sensory organ used to make an observation. How does an atom experience another atom? Does an atom possess knowledge (memory), or intent? What are the necessary components of mind some entity needs to posses to define it as having a mind?

That one day we may develop a "consciousness-o-meter" which measures consciousness the same way a thermormeter measures temperature. But we've slowly given up on that view, it seems that consciousness is not approachable by scientific method. Heck I can't tell if YOU'RE conscious, or if my couch is conscious, much less come up with a theory for consciousness. — khaled

Then how can you say the YOU are conscious if you can't tell if anyone else is conscious, and there is no theory of conscious?

Given what you said, it seems just as likely that consciousness is a myth kept alive by spiritualists and the religious.

But isn't our brain in our heads?
— Harry Hindu

It should be. — bongo fury

But how do you know that? Is knowing that your brain is in your head the same as your brain being in your head? Is there a stat of affairs where both are true - that there is a knowing your brain is in your head and a state where a brain is inside a physical head? If so, are the two states of affairs causally related in any way?

Emergence becomes tricky when moving from a third-person view of forces and matter to a first person perspective. Emergence can inadvertently become dualistic when trying to remain monistic. Panpsychism kind of says "fuck it" if we want to be monistic, ditch the emergence of mental events and keep it from the beginning. — schopenhauer1

I don't see the difference between the 3rd and first person perspective. Which part of some perspective is 3rd person vs first person? The information within any perspective is always from, or relative to, a particular point.

The problem is that panpsychism doesn't ditch emergence, rather it applies it by positing degrees of consciousness at varying levels of reality that equate to the same levels of emergence in the physical sense - i.e. neurons to brains, to bodies, to social structures.

Mind, with all of its intricate parts, cannot be fundamental. The parts, the sounds, colors, smells, sensations, urges, etc. would be more fundamental as mind is made up of, or emerges from, those things.

Information is what is fundamental and mind would is just a complex arrangement of information.

Actually, they see with their skin. They question is, how does what they see with their skin integrate with what they see with their eyes, smell with their nose, feel with their skin, taste with their tongue, hear with their ears, and the intent to tease out useful information from this sensory data, into a whole that we refer to as a conscious experience?

Does each of my eyes have a seperate conscious experience? What about the lenses in each eye, what about each cone and rod, etc.? Does the upper layers if consciousness emerge from the lower layers? How do the various layers integrate? What is a fundamental mental layer compared to a non-fundamental mental layer?

Why would by big toe be conscious when my brain is conscious of the state of my big toe? Is it my brain that is conscious or my neurons? Are you the consciousness of your whole brain or just one neuron? Panpsychism is just another type of anthropomorphic projection.

The Presocratics were struck by a dilemma: either mind is an elemental feature of the world, or mind can somehow be reduced to more fundamental elements. If one opts for reductionism, it is incumbent upon one to explain how the reduction happens. On the other hand, if one opts for the panpsychist view that mind is an elemental feature of the world, then one must account for the apparent lack of mental features at the fundamental level." --SEP — frank

This is a strange quote. What do mental features look like compared to physical features at any level, fundamental or not?

Thoughts are "about" things in that they are the brain so shivering its neurons as to adjust its readiness to act on those things. Conscious thoughts, in particular, adjust its readiness to select among symbols for pointing at those things. This kind of thought is thus (whether online or off) thought "in" symbols, and consequently prone to making us think (mistakenly, though often harmlessly) that the symbols are in our heads. — bongo fury

But isn't our brain in our heads? Your brain shivers are meaningless. Where are the scribbles you are reading now - in your head, in your brain, on the screen? Where is the scribbles' meaning - in your head, in your brain or on the screen?

"Everyone should learn a computer language - to learn how to program a computer - because it teaches you how to think."
-Steve Jobs

Songs are sound events. Having them "in your head" is practicing brain (and general neural and muscular) shivers that refine your readiness to engage with and participate in the sound events. — bongo fury

Then its brain shiver events all the way down? If not, then the brain shivers represent events that are not brain shivers. If not, then how are brain shiver events about events that are not just other brain shivers?

How apples look like is how they participate in person-sees-fruit events, which are illumination events, which we learn to differentiate among through practice: active participation in such events. — bongo fury

Sounds like you have person-sees-fruit events in your head which contradicts your assertion that it is "neither".

defining the concept of intelligence in non-mentalistic terms
— Ned Block

Isn't this impossible? The essence of thinking is mentalistic if I understand the term correctly. — TheMadFool

I guess it depends on one"s assumption that intelligence and thinking are not necessarily mental processes.

It seems to me that Block is simply assuming everything is "physical" and that there is no "mental" component to reality.

Are you quite sure you are sticking with the premise?... — bongo fury

You obviously didn't understand the question. If its neither, then you haven't said anything useful. I'm asking what it is that is in our heads, not what is not in our heads.

And I asked about songs. How are songs different than apples. Unenlightened asserts there are no apples in our heads, but I'm sure that you've heard the expression of having a song in your head.

Do we have direct access to our mind or our brain? And what is the "we" that has this direct or indirect access? Personally, i think the use of the terms, "direct" and "indirect" are the cause of the problem. As usual, the problem is language use.

If its neither then how do you know that what you experience has anything to do with apples at all? What is it about the experience that makes it about apples?

And this is what the indirect realist is continually pretending to do — unenlightened

What is the difference between indirect realism and direct realism? Is your mind part of the world? Do you directly or indirectly experience your brain or your mind?

I assume your argument would something along the lines of needing some kind of representation in the brain in order to recognise an apple in the world? I don't think brains work like that, but even if they did, such representations would be used to recognise apples out there in the world, and not more representations in the brain. I mean what would be the point of that? — unenlightened

How are you defining representation? Representations are an effect of a cause. Being that the cause is not the same as the effect, you don't have the cause in your brain, you have the effect. Its just that the representation is causally related to what it is about. So, thanks to causation you can represent an apple and that experience informs you of the reality. You can only talk about your thoughts and perceptions, but those perceptions are causally related with the world, hence you can talk about the world by talking about your thoughts.

Computer facial recognition is comparing an image of your face, not your actual face, with information stored in memmory - which is just another representation of your face. Its just that the representation is an effect of the cause, which is you putting your real face in front of your Webcam and taking a picture. If that first cause did not happen there would be no information in the computer to compare.

How are apples different than songs? If you don't have apples in your head, can you have song in your head? Where do songs exist?

And then what? does the representation of the eye examine the representation of the apple and feed the information to the representation of the brain? Where the representation of the representation of the eye in the representation of brain in the brain examines... — unenlightened

Its either representations in our brains, or the real objects in our brains. Do we have real apples in our brains or representations of them in our brains? How does the representation differ from the real thing yet inform you of the state of the real thing, as in the apple is ripe? Isnt the knowing that the apple is ripe more useful than knowing the apple is red?

We do not find that we see in our brains. — unenlightened

I don't think that was ever said or implied. We represent, or model, in our brains.

It's not all the same. Color blind people either have a defect in their eyes or in their brains. — Marchesk

Right, so we continue troubleshooting. If we take one of each type of patient and prod their brains with a metal rod, does either one experience red? If the patient with a defect in their eyes experiences red but the latter patient does not, than that seems to imply that colors are generated in the brain, not by the eyes.

Agreed. So where does the red come in to play? I agree that information comes into the brain from the senses interacting with the world. But then what? — Marchesk

I'm not sure I understand your question. If everything is information, then the way we think about red apples as physical objects is wrong. Physical objects, like colors, exist only in the brain as digitized representations of an analog world.

We realists call that 'an illusion'. It's not a real red visual cortex, the way a red apple is a real red apple. This is a very useful distinction for a philosopher, that allows us to admit the possibility of error. Sometimes, one might mistake a stick insect for a stick, or a mirage for an oasis, or a bang on the head for a red glow in the sky. — unenlightened

How does one distinguish between the illusion of red and red that is not an illusion. Red appears the same way to me.

Bite the fucking bullet man. How do everyone's eyes get to signal the same apples as red? Is it telepathy , or is there something about the apples that tells the eyes to signal red? Or come up with another explanation that actually explains. — unenlightened

Dude, you know it's the wavelength of the photons. I don't know what telepathy has to do with anything. The difficult thing to account for is the redness, not the causal chain. — Marchesk

But as enlightened pointed out before, not everyone's eyes get the signal because we have color blind people. Where does the "physical" difference between those that are color blind and those that are not lie? If all else us the same, the apple, the light, etc, then why are there color blind people?

The apple isn't red. It is ripe. The light isn't red. Its an EM wave that has a 650nm wavelength.

The color is the effect, and effects are not their causes. The "difficult thing" is resolved by thinking of everything as information, not "physical" objects. Red is causal information about the ripeness if the apple, the level of light, and the state of your eyes and brain. The difficult part comes in trying to discern what part of red gives us information about just one of those things. We can't because red is single product of multiple interactions and all we have access to is the single final product.

A little bit of highschool physics brought to bear on the set and the "color" black sticks out like a sore thumb - unlike the rest of the colors in the set which are reflected light, black isn't, black is the absence of all reflected light. In simpler terms, for all colors except black there are photons emanating from the colors that strike our retina. Isn't this a fundamental difference in property? Doesn't it mean black, in being so unique, isn't a color or if one doesn't take kindly to such a proposal, that black needs its own subcategory under the rubric of colors?

What say you? — TheMadFool

What I say is that if the existence of colors is not dependent upon the existence of light in the environment, rather colors always occur when there is an eye-brain system, then colors are a product of some state of an eye-brain system, and not necessarily a product of light.

As I have mentioned before in other threads, we cannot sever the part of our experience that is about the world from how the world relates to the body. Every experience is both about the world and about the body. In other words, we cannot experience the world as it is independent of our observations of it. Our observations always include a bit of information about ourselves. This is why the eye doctor is able to get at the state of your eye-brain system by asking you to report the contents of you mind when observing an eye chart. The doctor isn't concerned about the state of the chart. That is constant. The variable is the patient and their visual experiences, and that is what the doctor is getting at. Does this mean that our experiences are objective in that they can be talked about, predicted and tested?

Buyer's remorse already, and you haven't even received the item you bought through the mail. :joke:

I suppose Timothy Mcveigh was a weak mind, then. — Olivier5

Yep.

The difference is that the Reps had already established a principle about “too close to the election” that had denied the Dems their rightful appointment, so the Reps then denying their own principle was a naked power grab.

You have to consider the two events together. If the Dems had been that hypocritical I would be just as critical of them, but I really don’t think they would have been, since Dems are all about the process and civility and compromise even when the Reps are making naked power grabs in response. (That’s a criticism of the Dems there, BTW; I think that’s a weakness, you don’t respond to cheaters by playing extra fair yourself). — Pfhorrest

Like I said, the principle is established in the Constitution. The Congress has the power to determine the organization and constituents of the SC. You don't seem to understand that it is within the power of the Legislative branch to establish new precedents and abolish old ones with new laws and rules. They have done this many times. It is only because we citizens have allowed it to become a partisan issue that we now have fights over which side has more justices, or which way the court leans. The SC is suppose to be a non-partisan body, but thanks to the polarization of the Congress which has the power to basically design the SC any way they see fit, the SC has become an extension of this partisanship that exists. I think the Constitution should be amended to allow us citizens to vote for Supreme Court justices, and they and all members of Congress need to have term limits.

They were both power-grabbing. You are just showing you bias. The bold part just makes me laugh. I mean, where do you get all of your political news - from the DNC? You sound like a religious fanatic. "God is good. Devil is bad."

I’m explicitly arguing AGAINST black and white thinking here. You act like the only alternative to naked partisanship is “they’re all equally bad”. That’s thinking the only alternative to white is black. I’m arguing that that’s not the case, that there are shades of grey between partisanship and “they’re all equally bad”, that you can recognize the faults of both parties and still see that one has more faults than the other. To deny that is lazy black-and-white thinking — Pfhorrest

No. You're not. You are arguing for more of the same TWO-party system. Two-party = Black and White. No parties = No black or white. You seem to think that one's religion or political party makes one more moral than others with a different religion or political party. My point is that politics and religion are inherently immoral as they are both a limitation on personal liberties and freedom of thought. They are essentially a form of group-think. There are good and bad in every group, and that is simply human nature.