Never heard of yellow snow? You can certainly have polluted snow which is brown or black. You could also pour food coloring on it. Snow cones are a thing.

It's like saying, "Water is H2O", which is only true in the pure sense. Water often has other things mixed in. It's something to keep in mind in these philosophical discussions. The real world is messy — Marchesk

LOL. Its not the snow that is yellow. Notice how you said there are other things mixed in. Those other things mixed in isnt snow. "Yellow snow" is simply lazy use of language. The snow wasn't yellow before you mixed something that isn't snow in.

Notice how yellow snow has more information than white snow because the former isn't redundant and the latter is.

Must we insist that explaining consciousness at a mechanistic level any easier than explaining the subjective first-person experience aspects of consciousness? My hunch is that the so-called easy problem of consciousness at a mechanistic level is equally as difficult as the so-called hard problem at the subjective level. They might even be the same problem. — Wheatley

The hard problem for dualism is to explain how these two opposing substances (material vs. immaterial) interact. Essentially dualism creates the problem by asserting that there are two opposing substances.

It arises as a result of thinking that you see both the world as it truly is and that you see your mind as it truly is. How they both appear is irreconcilable if you actually believe that how you see to world and mind is actually how they actually are.

Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction — unenlightened

Yet A=A+1 still has meaning to both a computer and human being. Such statements produce real outcomes in both computers and human beings. Programmers often define instructions in a computer program as functions. Basically computational logic and propositional logic are just different sets of rules for using symbols. We can translate one set of rules to another. We do it all the time with different languages.

In this case, we have a statement/function that changes the definition of A, which is just a scribble that can mean anything at any moment we define it.

A=A+1 actually doesn't work in a computer program. You have to have A defined prior to this line in order for it to work. The A between the = and + actually means something else, so it's not a contradiction if you write the function correctly. So A=A+1 is actually only part of a statement/function, therefore is meaningless without A=1 before A=A+1.

Snow. If I assert that the snow outside is white, then I am (purportedly) referring to snow outside and saying something about it. If there is no snow outside then that is a failure of reference. Hence, on Strawson's view, my assertion is neither true nor false (i.e., it's not truth apt). — Andrew M

Asserting that the snow outside is white isnt useful, as it is basically redundant information -as if snow could be another color. I don't know anyone that says such things, except in a philosophy forum.

But if you had said, "There is white snow on the ground outside", would that be any different? If there were no snow, then your sentence would be false, regardless of the color. Statements are either true (useful) or false (useless), not somewhere in between.

it may not be interesting to you, but I find it interesting that there isn't agreement on the issue. — Coben

But if the source of disagreement is that we are just talking past each other, then that isn't really a disagreement is it?

I tend to agree, but some things are much harder to put into words than others. Like 'the meaning of a dream'. — Coben

What do you mean, "meaning of a dream"? How are you using "meaning"? How is the meaning of a dream different than the meaning of a drunken stupor?

If your sense of the proposition is like: so long as there exists a string of words which states the belief content at some point in time *** then the belief content is propositional because it can be stated, then yes of course it's propositional.

But if your sense of the proposition has the modality associated with that italicised "can" be temporal - IE there are some beliefs in some organism, or some beliefs at some points in time which cannot be stated at that* time, then no of course belief contents aren't always propositional.

I do not expect creativesoul and @Banno to ever argue this crucial point regarding the modality of expression of belief statements in their debate, so I expect it to be a clash of worldviews without any interfacing - an exchange characterised by attempting to shift frames of interpretation for belief than regarding any thematisation of belief ** — fdrake

But words are just scribbles and sounds. Does a dog's bark or a dog's wagging tail qualify as a proposition?

Why "process"? Do you deny the possibility of a static relationship? Are not the relationships between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, etc., static? — Metaphysician Undercover

Here, I would just say that static relationships are less complex than dynamic relationships, therefore static relationships have less information than dynamic ones. I do prefer to use "information" for the prior reasons I've stated. As I said, Process Philosophy is similar, not exactly the same as my "Information philosophy".

How is Joe's weight, or Ron's weight causal? That's what I don't understand. If a thing's weight is the product of a measurement, then this information is caused. But how would you account for the information within the thing itself? Clearly there must be some sort of information within the thing itself which is called "Joe", to validate the measurement as true. Isn't it the case that this information is there within Joe whether or not it acts as a cause in the case of Joe being measured? — Metaphysician Undercover

Measurement are just comparisons, just like Joe being heavier than Ron. What is measured is the relationship between their body's mass and the Earth's gravity.

The thing itself is information in that it is caused. The thing being the effect, and it's reasons for existing here and now in the way that it does being the cause. So an organism carries information about it's parentage, it's eating habits, it's understanding of a native language, it's life and ancestral history essentially.

When we acquire information to compare, like two people's weight, then that is the cause of the inference that Joe is heavier than Ron. In other words, reasoning is causal. You point to reasons (causes) for your beliefs (effects), and point to your beliefs as causes for your actions (effects). Your actions carry information about your beliefs, which is how many of us can interpret what one believes based on their actions.

By their behavior, just as I do with animals. And yes, through non-verbal communication also, which is a subset of behavior. Of course with animals we are dealing with a serious cross-'cultural' divide, so I might make errors. But with mammals say, I share a lot in common with them. So, I do think I can work out many of their beliefs and put those in statements.

And since I was responding to someone who it seemed was saying 'they have beliefs that cannot be put into statements' they seem to recognize beliefs in animals, but have deciding that these beliefs they recognize, some of them, cannot be put into statements. Well, I don't think that makes any sense. If they recognized a belief in an animal, then it can be put into words. The animal may not, but they are, without seeming to acknowledge it, now capable of it. — Coben

Having a belief and being able to symbolize it with scribbles and sounds are two separate things. We can symbolize anything, not just beliefs, so asking whether or not we can symbolize beliefs isn't a very interesting question. Non-language users have beliefs that they cannot put into statement form, but language users can put beliefs, as well as facts (like the fact that others have beliefs), into statement form. This just means that those that have established a symbol system can use that system to symbolize other events and processes. A symbol system can be expanded to represent new events and processes. So languages can be adapted to represent virtually anything - beliefs or otherwise.

Well, not for me. I think anything I consider as something an animal believes can be put into a statement. They don't do that, but that's another story. I don't believe all of my beliefs, for example, have been put into statements. But a belief is an idea about how things are/work/cause/will be/have been. Those can all be put into words.

When drinking water at the watering hole it is good to be ready to run. Other places and positions are safer.

To me anything I would attribute as a belief to an animal could be formulated in language. Otherwise I would not call it a belief. Like the way the skin might pulsate if you poked a baboons skin. I wouldn't call that a belief, I'd call that a response.

Something leads him to believe 'those phenomena indicate a belief'. He can tell me the phenomena. I would likely then show how it could be put into a statement. Not a statement describing the phenomena, but a statement of the underlying belief. — Coben

I'm not quite sure that I'm getting you here.

Words and statements are just visual scribbles and audible sounds. Writing or speaking are actions. So why would it be so difficult to acknowledge that animals and babies have beliefs if they can make noises with their mouths, or perform actions?

Being that words are just visuals and audibles, then any visual or audible could be made into a word. The symbols that are used to communicate can be arbitrary, and even unintentional. A dog barking or wagging it's tail communicates something. What that may be - only other dogs may know, and maybe some humans if they have been around dogs long enough. I find it difficult to believe that only particular human made visuals and sounds are indicators of possessing beliefs.

If you hear a person speaking a different language that you don't know, how do you know that they are using words or just making noises? How would you know that they have beliefs?

Are you saying that all relations are causal? What about something like Joe is heavier than Ron? Isn't that information which is not a matter of causality? — Metaphysician Undercover

Excellent question. Thanks.

No. I'm not saying that all relations are causal. Causality is a kind of relationship. So, if you are saying that there is information in the comparison of Joe's weight with Ron's, then information is actually in all relationships. That is fine with me. I sometimes use "relationships" and "process" instead of "information" to define the fundamental layer of reality. My "Information Philosophy" is very similar to Process Philosophy.

On the other hand, it seems to me that both Joe and Ron's weight is information, and Joe being heavier than Ron is a comparison of those two bits of information that then creates more information by inference - that Joe is heavier than Ron. So could you get the information that Joe is heavier than Ron without first having the information of Joe and Ron's weight, or Joe and Ron's physical appearance? In a sense, Jon being heavier than Ron is an inference, or an effect, of comparing the information of Joe and Ron's weight or physical appearance.

It doesn't matter if you didn't understand the question. — TheMadFool

Now, not only do I not understand the question, but I don't understand your reason for asking it if you're just going to say that it doesn't matter if I understood the question or not.

I get synonyms but information, last I checked, isn't synonymous with causality. They're treated as distinct concepts. To add, you said

all effects carry information about all prior cause
— Harry Hindu

and that threw me off. In what sense would effects "carry information" if not in ways distinct and separate from causation itself? For instance, running with my detective example, if Sherlock Holmes sees the tables and chairs overturned in a room, he concludes that there had been a scuffle in the room. The information that there was a scuffle in the room is distinct from the scuffle itself right? is the inference of a scuffle identical to the scuffle itself? if it is then every time I gather causal information, whatever it is that I inferred should actualize in reality too, no? — TheMadFool

That's weird to say that information isn't synonymous with causality when you were the one that provided the example of a detective at a crime scene observing the aftermath of a crime and garnering information about the crime from the crime scene. I agreed with you. Would you agree that others would agree that that is a good example of how effects carry information about their causes? You're the one throwing me off.

The scuffle is the cause, the overturned chairs is the effect. The relationship between them is information. You basically have three separate things, but really those three things can't exist on their own ontologically, except in our minds.

See the ambiguity in your usage? You start out by saying information is in the complex thing. Then you end up saying that this is really "data", and it only appears to be information when apprehended by a mind. So which is it, is information in the thing as what we call "data", or is it how the data appears to the mind when apprehended? You do understand that there is a difference between these two don't you? And to switch back and forth is to equivocate. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I said that the more complex something is, the more information there is. There is information in simple systems, just not as much as in complex systems. The system being the causal process that leads to the effect that we are talking about.

Information is the relationship between causes and their effects. Apprehending that relationship is the act of syncing our knowledge with the way things are. Many people use the term information interchangeably with knowledge. If you have knowledge, you have information. We have terms that have more than one definition, so I don't understand this sudden aversion to different words meaning the same thing, or words that have more than one definition. It would only matter if the definitions contradicted each other, and they don't.

I wasn't talking about "causality", I was talking about "information". Why change the subject? — Metaphysician Undercover

I wasn't. They are the same thing.

Nothing to add/subtract although the most pressing concern regarding information being sought, given the teleological slant of many of our predecessors, seems to be WHO...is...behind...all...this? [the questioner takes his last breath, his eyes glaze over, and then his body goes limp] — TheMadFool

I don't understand the question. "WHO" is behind what?

Too, what exactly do you mean by "relationship" between cause and effect. The only relationship that exists between these two is causality. Are you suggesting information = causality? If you are then that brings us back to the question I asked, what's the point of the whole exercise of inventing the word "information"? — TheMadFool

Yes, causality = information = meaning. However, I don't understand your aversion to synonyms. Do you not use some words interchangeably? Also, I think "information" provides that sense of aboutness that "causality" does not seem to imply.

Can you give us an example? — Coben

If creative could give an example then it wouldn't be an example of a belief that can't be put into statement form, rather it would be an example of a belief put in statement form.

The first question should be, "What is a belief?" If you can show that animals and pre-language babies (or adults as in the case of Idelfonso - The Man Without Words) have beliefs, then is that not enough to show that there are beliefs that cannot be put into statements? What if there are words to refer to the belief, but the person doesn't know the words - does that mean that they don't have the belief until they know the words to refer to it?

Yes, I agree with you. To the extent that I'm aware, this comes from my acquaintance with detective work, the effect contains telltale signs of the cause. How else is a detective supposed to operate? Working backwards from the crime scene to the crime itself is how a detective earns his keep. — TheMadFool

Yes, that is an example that I like to use, too. I also like to use the example of a tree stump with tree rings. The tree rings carry information about the age of the tree. The tree rings were caused by how the tree grows throughout the year. The meaning of the tree rings is not in the mind of an observer. It is in the process that created the tree rings. This implies that meaning and information exists independent of observers and their minds.

Note, however, that you used information in a sense that suggests that it has to do with more than just causality. If the two were identical you wouldn't/shouldn't have said, "...all effects carry information about all prior causes", right? I would like you to expand on the non-causality aspect of information. — TheMadFool

What I mean is that information is that relationship between cause and effect. Causes and effects are epistemological snapshots of the entire process. Causes and effects are the objects and events that we talk about.

Our words are caused by our ideas and our intent to communicate them. That is what some string of words mean. Meaning and information are the same thing. So you could say that meaning is the relationship between cause and effect, too.

Not All Belief Can Be Put Into Statement Form — Antony Nickles

All you have to do is use some sounds of your choice to refer to your belief. Does it matter that no one else understands the sounds?

If meaning were use, then wouldn't you need to be able to observe someone's belief to know how to use those words?

You seem to have something going on with causality from what I've gathered from your posts. What is it about causality that interests you? Anyway, you mean to say that information is data understood (apprehended)? Pray tell, what is data then as information seems to supervene on data. — TheMadFool

What interests me is how effects are about their causes and how causes are about their effects. It is also interesting to note that every effect is also a cause of some subsequent effect and that all effects carry information about all prior causes.

The division between data and information is epistemological, just like order and chaos. They are distinctions made based our current understanding of some process. An understood process appears orderly and contains information, while a process that is not well understood appears as random data.

Information" Is an ambiguous term which allows the modern materialist, or physicalist, through the use of illusion, to escape the need for God in metaphysics — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It's not.

First, I'm not a materialist. Second, I'm not trying to escape the need for anything except unnecessarily complex assertions using terms that you don't even understand what they mean, and can't be consistently or properly be used.

It is directly related to time in the second law of thermodynamics, and this allows the premise that if there is time, there is information. The problem though is that under this definition "information" is necessarily the property of a system, as entropy is defined as the property of a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, causality is related to time, however I don't see how it follows that that would mean it is a property of a system. Again, here you are using words that are vague or superfluous. "God" and, "time" are two examples. What is "time"? Isnt time just another word for change? Is change fundamental, or is the substance that changes fundamental? Can you assert that one is more fundamental than the other? Does it even make sense to separate one from the other?

Shannon believed that information is anything that stands out - the more novel, the more unexpected, the more shocking something is, the more information there is. This understanding of information squares with what unenlightened once said viz. that to make universal claims has a downside to it viz. the loss of meaning: if everthing is red then redness becomes meaningless - redundant and useless. — TheMadFool

The more complex something is, the more information there is.

If information only exists in minds and data exists everywhere else then meaning would be arbitrary and imaginary. If there are reasons some data exists, then those reasons would be the meaning of the data. Those causal relationships are already there prior to some mind apprehending them. So information appears as data when the causal relationship is not apprehended, and it appears as information when it is apprehended.

When science scans the universe for SETI, then it’s looking for the biochemical signature of life (or signals sent by an advanced culture). Nothing has been found to date. But the point is, during this search the instruments collect billions of terrabytes of data, none of which contains information specifically denoting the existence of life. — Wayfarer

Correction. They collect billions of terabytes of information, but none of it pertains to the existence of extra terrestrials, or was CAUSED by extra terrestrial activity. It was still caused so there is information there in the data, just not the type of information NASA is looking for.

When a deer smells a wolf and runs the other way, does the deer have beliefs about the smell and that it means a wolf is nearby, and that if a wolf is nearby then it is a good idea to run in the opposite direction?

Does a bee have a belief that a porch light is the Moon and then uses it to navigate its way back to the hive?

Does a cat believe that the sound of a can opener indicates lunch is about to be served?

Did Ildefonso have beliefs before he learned language?
https://vimeo.com/72072873

Language is means of consolidating complex configurations of sensory information into one sound or scribble. Think of how high level computer languages make it easier to talk to a computer than using complex machine code. It allows the mind to take shortcuts in thinking by using placeholders for these complex concepts.

Well, in my humble opinion, the question has its roots in the perceived difficulty in coming to terms with material-immaterial interaction but that's just another way of saying that the two don't/shouldn't interact and that's physicalism in disguise.

If one is a non-physicalist, there's the material body and the immaterial mind, and going by how things are, they do interact. How else does everybody get around?

I maybe a mile off the mark but that's how I fee. — TheMadFool

Maybe the physicalist is humbly asking how opposites interact? If the dualist is going to use terms that are opposites to describe the world, then it is incumbent upon them to explain how they interact. The monist - whether they are a physicalist, idealist, or something else (like me) - doesn't have that problem because they are not using opposite terms to describe the world.

Essentially, the dualists' problem is language-use - using words in antiquated ways that stem from the religious notion that mind can exist apart from the body.

Have you studied any physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I certainly have, and no where have I seen the word, "immaterial" used to describe waves. As I have already pointed out, material and immaterial are opposites. The OP is basically asking how opposites interact. Well MU, how do opposites interact?

Science holds that waves are patterns of motion within a material substance composed of parts. They are a change in the relations between the parts of the material substance. As such, the substance is material and the wave is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is the same as saying that pattern and the substance are one and the same as you can never have one without the other - ontologically. The distinction you are talking about only exists in your mind as language concepts.

What are you talking about Harry? Wave-particle duality is a description supposed to be concerning the reality of what is, therefore it is ontological. It refers to two distinct aspects of the same situation being described, the wavefunction, and the particle. It is not two distinct descriptions of the very same thing, therefore not an epistemological distinction. Failure to recognize that the "wavefunction" and "the particle" refer to two distinct things assuming that they both refer to the very same thing, would create many contradictions. Epistemology does not allow contradiction therefore we must maintain that the distinction is ontological. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's missing the critical component of consciousness as an observer and how the mind is only a representation of what is happening, not a clear window to what is actually happening.

I am now wondering if part of the problem is that dualists seem to think that they see the world as it is (naive realists), and how it appears is different than how it is thought about - hence dualism. You think that the duality exists ontologically, and are unwilling to ponder the possibility that the way it appears in the mind may be different than how it actually is (but that isn't necessarily saying that we can never know about how it actually is). What I'm basically arguing is that particle-wave duality is like a mirage or a bent straw in a glass of water with ice. - an illusion. Illusions, however, are ontological. Their interpretation is epistemological. Epistemology is about the ontology of knowledge. All dualisms resolve to a monism.

It's clearly not unwarranted. Something must constitute the separation between minds. If what was between your mind and my mind was the same thing as what's in my mind, and the same as what's in your mind, there would be no separation between our minds. However, we experience separation. We cannot posit a real boundary between one thing and another, unless there is a different sort of substance which constitutes the boundary. A boundary is only real (substantial) if there is a difference of substance. If it is all water, within my mind, and yours, and everywhere between us, then there is no separation between us. If it is evident that there is a separation, as it is, then we need to posit another substance which forms the boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Pay attention to the bolded part: This can be said about earth, water, fire and air, so why dualism? Your focus on mind and body being special and fundamental would simply be a personal fetish with the two.

You're assuming that there can't be different kinds of one "substance" (again, you haven't even explained what you mean by the word, or what qualifies as a "substance", so until you do, I'm assuming that you don't know what you're actually talking about when you use that word). Just as we have all the different elements that are just different configurations of atoms, we can have different configurations of one "substance". There are different configurations of the same "substance" between the configurations that are our minds.

My first encounter with dualism was precisely with this question: how does an immaterial mind interact with the material? Frankly speaking, the question perplexed me then as it does now. I now know why. The question has a hidden assumption - the assumption that the immaterial can't/shouldn't interact with the material. Why else the question, right? But, from a physicalist's point of view, that's presupposing the very thing that they want to, perhaps desperately, prove. — TheMadFool

The assumption was never hidden. The assumption is the basis for dualism. If dualists are just going to start asserting that mind and body aren't so different after all, then what is the difference between a dualist and a monist?

Your objection appears to be why is there supposed to be two fundamental substances rather than a different number. This is the result of previous metaphysics, which sees the need for a distinction between material substance and immaterial. And as I explained, it is supported by modern physics with wave (immaterial), particle (material) duality. Clearly, the physics of waves is distinct from the physics of particles, as the substance of each is different, yet there is some form of interaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

What scientific theory says that waves are immaterial?

The wave-particle duality is an epistemological distinction, not an ontological one.

How do you know that there are two fundamental substances when all you know about one substance is by the way it appears in the other? Are material objects in your immaterial mind? Is the material world represented immaterially?
— Harry Hindu

I don't quite get this question, but I'll try to answer what I apprehend that you are asking. There is immaterial substance within my mind. And, I infer that there is immaterial substance in your mind. But there is something which separates our minds, a medium between us, which is evidently material substance. You might wish to call it something else, but I think it's acceptable and customary to refer to this medium which separates our minds as material substance. Do you not agree that it is also acceptable and customary to refer to the ideas and concepts within your mind and my mind as immaterial substance? If not, I think that you are attempting to force a definition of "substance" which is unacceptable. What are your epistemic standards for "substance" then? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making an unwarranted assertion that the medium between minds is different than the medium of your mind - hence you create the problem of dualism that you are attempting to fix, and the way you are fixing it is to assert that the mediums are not so different after all, which is more like what monism is saying. So you keep going back and forth between the mediums being distinct, yet similar. Which is it, and how much do the mediums need to share before you agree that they are the same type of substance?

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

If we can't see the world as it is, then can we know the world as it is? For instance, you seem to know that we can't see the world as it is, but how did you find that out if not by reading words on a page - by seeing words as they are?

Once you start typing a reply are you seeing the words that you typed as they are? If not, then how do you know that what is on the screen is what you intended to type?

No, the amount of heat is a measurement, and all that is determined with this measurement is the object's temperature. That measurement does not determine the state of the object. You could apply some logic though, to say if it's H2O, and it's below 0 degrees Celsius it's likely in a solid state, but the amount of heat does not determine the object's state. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course the measurement doesn't determine the state of the object. I never said that it did. What is measured determines the state of the object.

These are the two types of substance which are philosophically interesting, as ontologically fundamental, that's why I focus on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that you find them interesting has no bearing on whether or not they are ontologically fundamental. In fact, your interest implies that they are epistemological in nature rather than ontological. You need to define "substance" to explain why only two things qualify as a substance and not all the other things that interact.

How do you know that there are two fundamental substances when all you know about one substance is by the way it appears in the other? Are material objects in your immaterial mind? Is the material world represented immaterially?

Sorry I didn't see that question. If you're really interested, then study some philosophy. Plato is a good place to start. But learning that distinction is a long process and I'm not a paid professor. So, sorry again, but I won't oblige. — Metaphysician Undercover

It wasn't just that question you skipped over. But if you are just going to cite some long-dead human without acknowledging that they would probably not say the same thing if they were alive today knowing what we know now, then I'm not going to find your reply very interesting.

Duh, the thawing ice adds to the quantity of liquid. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does this mean? The amount if heat determines the state of some object.

Well, I think if monists are ready to accept that there are two distinct substances, material and immaterial, which are not completely incompatible because they are both actual substances, and interact, then I think the better description is that monism is actually dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it means to declare material and immaterial as "substances"? It seems to me that immaterial would be the opposite of material. There are many substances that interact, so why focus on only two types?

The "point" is that these questions remain unanswered, — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't address my question. What is the distinction between immaterial and material? There are more than two types of substances that interact. You need to explain what a substance is and why being a substance allows interactions with other things that are substances.

I can't see your point Harry. If we have liquid water and solid ice, and someone argues that ice is never liquid, and liquid is never ice, therefore the two can never interact, we must explain freezing and thawing in order to understand the interaction. It's just the way that reality is. Sometimes adding more to the mix is the only way to understand. Reality is complicated, and denying the complications is not the way to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just dumb. We don't use thawing as an explanation to explain the interaction between ice and liquid. Why do we need "thawing" to explain how a glass of liquid behaves when ice cubes are dropped inside it. Thawing doesn't explain how the liquid gets displaced then the glass overflows. Physics is what explains that.

I have a better example that we can use. How does software interact with hardware? Do we need to assert the existence of spirits to account for how software and hardware interact in your computer?

Why do you think that dualism makes the two substances incompatible? That's the strawman representation which allows the monist to insist that the two substances cannot interact. But clearly they do interact, and dualism respects that fact. In another sense of the word "substance" for example, iron and gold are distinct substances, but they both have protons, neutrons, and electrons, so they are not incompatible. Why would you suppose that in substance dualism "substance" is used to represent two incompatible things? As I implied in my last post, the fact that the two are both called by the same name, "substance" indicates that they are not incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

LOL. All you are saying here is that dualism is actually monism. If the dualist is saying that the two "substances" aren't incompatible, then that is monism. What is the point of asserting two "substances" if you aren't asserting that there are only two fundamental substances that are distinct from each other? What properties do these "substances" share. What properties differ? What percentage of properties differ versus what percentage they share? At what point do we say that the substances differ enough to qualify as dualism being the case vs. monism?

I think you're just not getting what I'm saying. We can represent two things as distinct, hydrogen and oxygen for example, but the fact that they are described as distinct does not create a problem of interaction. There is only a problem of interaction if the two distinct things are represented as incapable of interacting with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but WHO is saying that they are distinct and incompatible? Its obviously isn't the monist.

The third named thing is not another substance though, it's more like a name for the zone of interaction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I'm getting what you're saying. Are you saying that spirit is the medium that this interaction takes place? Wouldn't that already be covered by the actual substance? I'm just not seeing a need to complicate things by adding more to the mix.

That's not what I meant. All you are saying, is that by naming them both as "substance", they are therefore more similar than dissimilar. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're the one that used the term, "substances". I was merely reiterating your point that it is faulty to think of the two "substances" in such a way that makes them incompatible. That is precisely what dualism does. Monism is more like an endeavor to do exactly what you were proposing - in understanding that:

The appearance of a problem is a result of representing one of the two substances as necessarily passive, by being eternal, outside of time. This indicates that the understand of time which is involved with the concept of "eternal forms" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Its just a paraphrasing of my assertion that dualism creates the problem of interaction by representing mind and body as distinct - one being passive and eternal, and the other temporal - unless I'm just not getting what you're trying to say.

Ever since Plato introduced the "tripartite soul", there hasn't really been an interaction problem, because the principles are there to resolve it, for anyone who wants to. "Spirit" is the third feature which accounts for the interaction between body and mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Introducing another substance just adds fuel to the fire.

The interaction between "substances" is a problem for naive realists who believe that the world is as they see it, rather than symbolizing how the world is. It's as if they think that the symbols (the brain) are distinct from the symbolizing (the mind).

It is argued that eternal forms could not interact with temporal bodies. But as Aristotle showed, so long as the two distinct substances are represented as actual, therefore active, there is no problem with interaction between dual substances. The appearance of a problem is a result of representing one of the two substances as necessarily passive, by being eternal, outside of time. This indicates that the understand of time which is involved with the concept of "eternal forms" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

What this is basically saying is that two substances are more similar than dissimilar, something that leans more towards monism. The point being is that you have to represent the substances as being more similar in order to explain how they interact.

So instead of introducing the supernatural (the eternal) to account for the natural. It's all natural, including gods and where they live, if they were to exist.

To return to the original issue, an experience is a relation between yourself and the things in your environment (say, the coffee). Experience is a term that applies to humans but not to robots. Not because humans have Cartesian minds (where they have internal experiences), but because humans have different capabilities to robots. A human's practical contact with the world instantiates differently to a robot's. — Andrew M

A robot has a relationship with its environment as well. Humans are part of the environment. To assert that humans are somehow special in this regard, is unwarranted.

The practical contact with the world for both humans and robots is via the physical senses.

Experience is information.

My hypothesis is that we currently don't know what is conscious or not because we don't know what makes brains special equipment in that regard.

When you have stories like this:



I tend to lean more toward the idea that information processing is related to consciousness.

Is the computer reading the woman's thoughts or brain signals? What's the difference?

What is the difference between computer memory and human memory?

Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof?
— creativesoul

Not if you're a BIV. — Marchesk

How is that different than a brain in a skull (BIS)?

Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof?
— creativesoul — Marchesk

I wonder when we train neural networks to recognize cats on mats, what does that amount to? Or when AlphaZero learns to play superhuman chess. Can we say it has representational knowledge of chess strategy? — Marchesk

Is the visual of a brain a representation of a brain or something that isn't a brain? If its a representation then how does the visual differ from the actual?

I also wonder whether we could pursue an eliminativist view of computing. When you look at the actual hardware, it's just moving electrons around. Where are the software programs in that? Where is the data? — Marchesk

The same can be said of brains.

Maybe just looking at neurons firing is missing the higher level view of what all that adds up to, such as belief formation. After-all, it's kind of hard to explain how humans are so adept at navigating and manipulating the environment without positing some knowledge of the world. In fact, that's an ongoing issue for improving AI. The lack of common sense understanding is one of the big remaining obstacles to a more general purpose AI. Somehow biological neural networks are able to handle that. — Marchesk

Or maybe looking at neurons firing is a naive realists view of what is happening.

I would say communication exists in bodylanguage, there is a empathic bond between people that makes us see bodily expressions as atleast as important as words. — Equinox

I would say that communication exists in all causal relations. Effects communicate their causes and vice versa. Behaviors communicate intent. Behaviors inform us of intent.

None of these "everything is X" explanations are any good Harry. As I said before, an explanation needs to tell us what is different about different aspects of the world. Suppose you want to explain vision. A good explanation will tell us that it uses rods and cones on the retina, and so on. Suppose you want to explain hearing. A good explanation will tell us that it uses hair cells in the cochlea, and so on.

If we take your approach, all we can say is "vision is causal, hearing is causal". — Daemon

:confused: Saying that a dog or a cat is a pet isn't saying that they aren't different, only that they share a property of being a pet.

I do wonder what motivates you to think of things in this way. Are you a fan of Fritov Capra, like Pop? Is it mysticism? — Daemon

No. It's just logic and the principle of Occam's Razor.

Just want a point out that our ancestors evolved the ability to see color prior to language and public models. You can't quine color away without consulting evolution first. — Marchesk

No, our ancestors evolved to respond to wavelengths of light, prior to language. Had they not then they would not all have picked the ripe berries (which are united in the wavelength the reflect, not the experience they produce). If you want to have wavelengths of light as 'colours' I'm happy with that, but qualia aren't required here either. — Isaac

Hmm. It seems like wavelengths of light aren't necessarily required either. Maybe we should consider the implications of what Sara Walker was saying in Marchesks other thread in that biology is ontological and physics is epistemological. Colors would be ontological and wavelengths epistemological. After all, wavelengths of light is an explanation for the experience of colors, mirages, bent straws in water, etc.

Being a man or a woman is understood by many to be psychological/behavioural, not genetic. If I were to somehow have my mind transplanted into someone else's body, die and become a ghost, or turn myself into a pickle, I'd still identify as a man despite not having XY sex chromosomes. — Michael

That's a mighty big IF.

Anyway, the reason you'd still identify as a man is because your memories are of being a man, and that you were born male. But if you could have your mind transplanted into a woman's body, then your memories of being a man would eventually become less prevalent because they are no longer useful in your present form.

And my question was, "what is it that transpeople are claiming?" Are you saying that their minds were secretly transplanted at birth?

As explained by WHO, "gender refers to the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed. This includes norms, behaviours and roles associated with being a woman, man, girl or boy, as well as relationships with each other. As a social construct, gender varies from society to society and can change over time." — Michael

In other words, gender refers to the characteristics of the sexes. The characteristics (gender) are socially constructed, not the sexes. The characteristics include the norms, behaviors and roles associated with the sexes as well as the relationship between the sexes. As a social construct, the characteristics vary from society to society and can change over time.

It seems to me that the sexes, which are not socially constructed, play a pivotal role in determining gender. Not only that, but there are behaviors and norms that are specific to the sexes, so can't be socially constructed. Sexual selection plays a key role in the evolution of a species - the peacock being a great example.

One could say that the characteristic expectations that groups have of the sexes IS sexual selection.

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.
— Harry Hindu

That's correct. — Daemon

Then we at least agree on something.

Instead of "information", what if I said that everything is causal?

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't.
— Harry Hindu
— Daemon

It just seems like crazy talk Harry. You must know something about the complexity of the brain, it's the most complex thing we know about. And you must know something about the highly specific, highly sensitive mechanisms that make it work, and how they can be affected by injury, disease. I sometimes think you young people nowadays don't take enough drugs. — Daemon

So your answer to the question: "What makes brains special from other things that allows it to possess feelings?" is that the brain is the most complex thing that we know? I don't think this is a very good answer to the question, if you don't mind me saying.

For instance, isn't the universe the most complex thing we know? After all it is composed of billions of brains, and an unknown number of other things, possibly other universes, etc. Does that mean that the universe, or multiverse has feelings? Does the Earth have feelings since it is where all these complex brains reside? What about dark matter and energy? Is that more complex than a brain, and what about when we find processes more complex than brains that aren't brains?

Under what domain? Philosophically, the subjective is private, private taken to mean inaccessible to an observer. — Mww

Yes, but the question now is, why is it inaccessible to an observer? And what does it mean to be inaccessible to an observer? Isn't it indirectly accessed via observation of behavior and neural activity? In other words, is the subjective accessible objectively?

I don't like it because it doesn't explain anything. What we need is to find the differences between things. Waves on the sea, footprints on the beach, a piano, a digital computer, a biological brain. — Daemon

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.

You do realize that different causal relations would be different information? Of course you would if you had been paying attention to anything I have said.

It isn't like the machinery in a computer. If we wanted to make a conscious machine, we would need to make something with the same capacities as a brain. — Daemon

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't. When you look at an image of someone's brain, do you see feelings and consciousness, or a mass of neurons? What about when you look at a computer - any difference in seeing a mass of circuits?

The fact that we can feel is what makes meaning. — Daemon

I have no idea what this means. How do brains feel? When you look at brains do you see feelings?

You don't worry about hurting the beach by walking on it — Daemon

Who said the beach is bothered by someone walking on it? It could be that the beach likes being walked on.