"Going back in time" is incoherent unless the entire universe is going in reverse. Any particular process undergoes changes at a frequency relative to other processes. What is the observable difference between a process oscillating between two states and a process going forwards and backwards in time?

Walking forwards and then backwards is changing my state, but I'm still moving forward in time because the change in state is relative to the change going on in the rest of the universe. I didn't move backwards in time relative to you, I just changed my spatial state relative to you. Only if the entire universe reversed its process would it make sense to say that "time" is reversed.

If the mathematical entity -- the wavefunction -- is doing its job in yielding accurate predictions of statistical outcomes, it corresponds to something real. — Kenosha Kid

Only in the very limited scope of the quantum, not in making predictions in the macro world. The wavefunction is useless in predicting what trajectory to take when aiming a rocket at the Moon or predicting the identity of who committed a crime. What role could the wavfunction play in a "theory of everything"? Why is classical physics still useful in yielding accurate predictions? Does that not mean that classical physics is doing its job? Then why are they incompatible?

Then don't describe it as empirical. What it is is a strongly held belief — Kenosha Kid

And the output of the detectors only becomes known when it is consciously observed by a person. The hypothesis of a measurement before this conscious observation lacks compelling theoretical or empirical grounding.
After all, QM offers no reason why the whole system—electrons, slits and detectors combined—wouldn’t be in an entangled superposition before someone looks at the detectors’ output.

The particle-like behaviour evident in measurement is not that the electron ceases to be a wave at all, but that the wave somehow reduces to a single Eigenstate of the measurement operator. — Kenosha Kid

"Somehow"? So if its always a certain state, and only changes its state when interacting with a measuring device, which would also be made of waves, then what is so special about a measuring device (which is just a large group of electrons) that changes the nature of an electron? And how do you know that what you are talking about isn't the measurement, but what is actually measured, if the end result is an effect of electrons interacting with a measuring device which you dont get when the electron isn't measured?

If the voltage of the cathode is reduced such that only one electron fires out, say, per ten seconds, eventually the same pattern builds up. From this we deduce that each electron is a wave. — Kenosha Kid

Her you talk about single electrons, as if they are a particle before going through the slits.
And I don't see whet you addressed the issue where a single wave can interfere with itself after passing through double-slits, but a single electron, which you claim is a wave, cannot. What makes an electron wave different in that it cannot interfere with itself, but a wave of electrons (a wave of waves?) can interfere with itself? And if a wave can consist of smaller waves, then what does say about electron waves?

What prevents the electron waves in the beam from interfering with the electron waves that make up the board with the slits and the electron waves that make up the screen? Why does the wave only interfere with itself if all the other parts of the experiment are an assortment electron waves?

Progressives? Who are they - the ones voting for an old racist white guy that has been in politics for nearly 50 years?

The REAL progressives are the ones that are sick and tired of the two-party status quo and looking for and voting for alternatives. It can be lonely being a progressive in 2020.

45% think it is necessary to have faith in a God in order to be moral. — Banno

Another 45% think it is necessary to be a registered Democrat, or believe in the myth of white privilege, in order to be moral.

Politics... :roll:

To be moral, you don't have to be anything, except moral,

Genes cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous,
elephants abstract or biscuits teleological.

"Nat Dyer looks at the humanity of a philosopher who tried to make philosophy more human"

Nor is philosophy more or less human.

If time is a loop, what about space?

With time as a loop, the distinction between cause and effect becomes irrelevant as every cause is also an effect, even the "first" cause, and asserting a first or last effect would be incoherent. If time is a loop then declaring one cause or another as the first cause would be arbitrary.

This would apply to space as well, as there would be no real "fundamental" aspect to space. This means that the macro world is just as "fundamental" as the quantum world.

This means that the distinction between top down versus bottom up processing would be arbitrary. They would be part of the same loop and designating part of the loop as top or bottom would be based on one's view In the process.

There is no cutoff, which is fine as I am not exploring the realm of the classical limit. It is sufficient to know that a classical limit exists. The relevance of the macroscopic screen is merely that it explores microstates, nothing more. — Kenosha Kid

The back screen is a macroscopic object that cannot be treated precisely with quantum mechanics — Kenosha Kid

Yet the screen, double slits and the electron emitter are all macro objects composed of electrons and all have an effect on the outcome of the experiment.

Looks like QM has limits as well.

We only conceived of atoms in order to explain observations of macro-sized objects and QM was conceived of to explain the behavior of atomic sized objects. Seems to me that if the theories were compatible they would seamlessly integrate, like genetics and evolution (micro vs macro explanations of the same process).

Why would there be limitations if this is suppose to be a theory explaining the fundamentals of reality, if it's not that both classical and QM are explaining different views/measurements of the same thing?

Random examples I can think of are voting to take away the rights of a demographic like gender, sexual orientation, religion, place of birth, race, etc.. — coolguy8472

I'm looking more for an example of what "voting to take away the rights of others" actually entails. What would such an item on the ballot say?

No, I did something that has apparently never occurred to you: I got an education. — Kenosha Kid

Looks more like you got an indoctrination, a process of teaching a person or group to accept a set of beliefs uncritically.

Any theory that doesnt attempt to explain the role of the observer/measurer in an event involving observation/measurement is missing half of the explanation, especially when we observe changing measuring devices changes the observed outcome.

I think rather that how a language is learned, and that it may be learned, is the source of the habit of taking people at their word, but itself is not an example of taking people at their word. — Srap Tasmaner

Then I'm not clear on what you mean by "taking people at their word".

I don't think a child learning the names of the colors is called on to believe that we are telling them the truth, neither in the sense that we are not lying about what we believe the names to be, nor in the sense that these are indeed the real names of the colors. I want to say that the question of truth just does not arise here at all. — Srap Tasmaner

The truth is that this scribble or sound, red, is used to point to, or communicate something that isn't that scribble or sound, namely a particular color.

Learning how to use scribbles and sounds to communicate requires that the thing you are pointing to exists in the same frame as the scribble or sound being seen or heard. The child hears "red" and observes the teacher pointing to a red square. How does the child know that she's pointing to the color rather than the shape? The teacher points to another red object that isn't a square and the child begins to understand the relationship between the sound and what it points to.

This is how we learn a language, yet how we end up using it is different.

We don't keep going around imitating the teacher's use of the sound. We don't look for red and then point to it, as that would be redundant information being communicated. The listener can see that the square is red and doesn't need to be told, unless the listener was learning the language. Instead, we use language to point to things and events that are somewhere else, or that have already happened, or haven't happened, because the whole point of language use is to communicate ideas, not what is observed right in front of you. If we talked about something happening right in front of you, that would be redundant information and a waste of time and energy to communicate.

A sports announcer is useful on the radio, when you can't see the plays the players are making, or the score, etc., but provides redundant information if you were watching on TV. There is an expectation that the sound I hear coming from the radio speaker is about some game in another city, and that the relationship is one of truth - that the sound carries information about some football game in a city hundreds of miles away - that I can get at the state of the game by correctly interpreting the sound coming from the speaker, and correctly interpreting the sound can only be done by learning how others learned to point states-of-affairs with those sounds.

I only want to say that you don't need a reason to take someone at their word — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that we start off, as children learning a language, taking others at their word, and only when we experience them use words in a way that they don't mean what they say (they lied), that we question whether or not we should take them at their word in the future.

We have to learn how to lie and detect lies and that only comes after learning how to take people at their word.

If humans are inclined to learn and use a language, thanks to natural selection, it seems to me that we instinctively take people at their word until we learn to do otherwise.

Language use evolved from our evolutionary ancestors observing and interpreting the involuntary behaviors of other organisms. Involuntary behaviors cannot lie.

So meaning is causal, as in words mean what they were intended to mean. The existence of some idea and the intent to communicate it is what caused the words to be heard or seen.

Can you offer an example of "language processing"? Understanding language seems to be more ad hoc and associative than algorithmic. Sure language has it's conventions but they are more like habits, well-beaten paths, than they are like well-defined procedures. — Janus

https://becominghuman.ai/a-simple-introduction-to-natural-language-processing-ea66a1747b32

The key word here seems to be "context", but then context is simply integrating all sensory information at once - the sound of someone's voice and the environment they are speaking, etc. - all which require senses to acquire and a brain to process, both of which a human being and a robot have. The only difference is how the brain is programmed - the algorithm, or implementation.

Learning a language is hard for a robot because they don't possess the physiological basis for language use that evolved over millions of years in humans. Humans are programmed by natural selection (and other humans are part of natural selection as humans have an effect on what utterances make it to the next generation based on how useful at communicating some idea they are). Computers are programmed on a much shorter time scale and their programming is updated when an error occurs, just as our programming is updated when an error in understanding or communicating occurs.

The OP is not deriving QM, merely summarising it. Conversation would be pretty limited in scope if you have to re-derive from first principles everything that you intend to discuss every time. — Kenosha Kid

Then either QM is flawed in how it goes about showing that an electron is a wave, or your summarization of QM is flawed. I never asserted that electrons are or are not waves, merely that you didn't show that they were.

Something wherein electrons are not waves, i.e. something that is not quantum mechanics. And by all means, but elsewhere. — Kenosha Kid

You're confused. Its your OP that fails to show that electrons are waves. You've only been able to show that the beam is a wave. So if a requirement of QM is a belief that electrons are waves, then your OP isn't about QM either. That's all I'm saying.

As stated previously, the OP is regarding QM, and nothing outside that framework. Feel free to start a thread on the subject you'd obviously prefer to discuss. — Kenosha Kid

What is it that i obviously want to discuss, KK? The only thing that I've been discussing is the faulty assertions in your OP, but you can believe that I'm talking about something else if it makes sleep better tonight.

This idea of the absolute square is important. It is how we get from the non-physical wavefunction to a real thing, even as abstract as probability. Why is the wavefunction non-physical? Because it has real and imaginary components: u = Re{u} + i*Im{u}, and nothing observed in nature has this feature. — Kenosha Kid

Seems to me that you've admitted that consciousness is involved in some way to say that it has imaginary components, or where else in reality do imaginings exist? Is it me, or are scientists getting really lazy with their use of language?

If the wavefunction represents a fundamental characteristic of nature, then how can you say that nothing else observed in nature has this feature, when observing is what collapses the wavefunction? It's like saying that nothing else has the features of atoms when everything is made of atoms. You're simply talking about different views of the same thing - a view of atoms, waves and electrons from the macro-scale vs the micro-scale vs the quantum-scale. Each theory is simply a description made from one of these views.

Maybe, but that does not fall within the scope of the OP, which concerns quantum mechanics, not alternative theories to quantum mechanics. — Kenosha Kid

Sure it does. It shows that your OP is unfounded in asserting that electrons are waves, and is not the rest of your OP built upon that faulty premise?

Definition of malapropism

1 : the usually unintentionally humorous misuse or distortion of a word or phrase especially : the use of a word sounding somewhat like the one intended but ludicrously wrong in the context "Jesus healing those leopards" is an example of malapropism. (my emphasis) — Janus

Looks like the definition supports my assertion. Thanks.

Similarity of sound and shape are not the only associations; there are many other associations of ideas; that's why I thought the analogy unhelpful, because too simplistic. — Janus

Sure, but that is the type of association that was being talked about and that I was responding to. All I was saying is different associations require different algorithms to resolve the errors made in using them.

Everyone here likely has different goals, so again you're thinking too simplistically. Philosophy is the search for wisdom, not truth, according to my view. Truth is an empirical matter. — Janus

:roll: ...and what is "wisdom" if not applying knowledge that is true? How do you know whether or not you are wise if not empirically? Is not the difference of being wise or not an empirical matter? Maybe if you'd stop trying to be artful with your language use and get more to the point, then we would all be wiser.

You're still missing the point.

All you did was reduce the interval between electrons being emitted and you get the same pattern. The beam is still there, just at a lower voltage, so it is still the beam that is the wave, and not individual electrons.

The second experiment doesn't show that each electron is a wave. It shows that electrons don't appear to move through, or are governed by, space-time like other particles, or maybe it is our view of space-time that is skewed.

I'm afraid not. If there are no other electrons to interfere with, and the electron does not interfere with itself, there is no possibility of interference effects. — Kenosha Kid

LOL. Just read what you wrote, bro.

A brief reminder: when a cathode fires electrons at a screen with two slits, beyond which is another screen, the pattern that builds up on the back screen is bands of light and dark, the dark bands being where few or no electrons strike, the light bands being where more strike. From this we deduce that the electron beam coming from the cathode is a wave.

If the voltage of the cathode is reduced such that only one electron fires out, say, per ten seconds, eventually the same pattern builds up. From this we deduce that each electron is a wave. — Kenosha Kid

You're saying the "beam" is wave and interferes with itself, so if an electron is a wave, then it can interfere with itself.
A wave interfering with itself is how the pattern is created.

The "beam" is the relationship between the individual electrons and according to you is a wave. If the same pattern is created no matter how long the interval between each electron, then it isnt the electron that is a wave because one electron would create the pattern if it were a wave like the "beam" of electrons.

If the voltage of the cathode is reduced such that only one electron fires out, say, per ten seconds, eventually the same pattern builds up. From this we deduce that each electron is a wave. — Kenosha Kid

If the pattern is something that "builds up" then the pattern isn't the result of one electron, but many over time. One electron going through every ten seconds makes one dot on the screen every ten seconds that eventually builds up the pattern over time. So each electron behaves like a particle and the relationship between all the electrons is a wave, not that each electron is a wave, or else you'd get the pattern with the first electron. There would be no "building up" if each electron was a wave.

I didn't mean it as a joke. I was simply pointing out how its impossible for meaningful language to not be about the nature of something.

Any time you intend to say something meaningful, or the way something is or is not, you are committing to an ontology.

the ontology of ontology?

You'd have to ask him. But it certainly looks like DNA is getting copied a lot. — Olivier5

You're the one that made the analogy with DNA. Does DNA intend to copy itself correctly? Copy machines make lots of copies, but where is the intent to make copies - in the copier or in the mind of the human using the copier? The copy machine just does what was designed to do. If something goes wrong, then that was part of the design. You have to call a tech to change the design (replace a part).

Was some use of language "wrong" if the reader or listener understood what was meant to be said?

Is this a relevant consideration though? Does the source of the error matter? And if yes, 1) why does it matter; and 2) what evidence do you have that this is indeed always the case?

My point is: any code replicated long enough WILL at some point get wrongly copied, whatever the cause of the error. In practice, there is no such thing as a perfect information replication system that can always get it right. — Olivier5

To say that an "error" occurred, or that some information replication system got something "wrong", is saying that this system had intent to do it one way and it worked out a different way. Does DNA possess intent?

It seems to me that any system does something based on the design of that system. Nature doesn't do anything wrong or right. It just does whatever prior conditions dictate.

I again find your thinking incomprehensible. — Banno

The only time you find my thinking incomprehensible is when I apply YOUR theory to other uses of language, like plagiarism. If integrating your theory with other uses of language makes it incomprehensible then that means your theory is incomprehensible.

If not, then you are the only one here that seems to find my posts incomprehensible. How convenient for you.

Creating new theories...

Novelty.

That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful. — creativesoul

Indeed. I propose that malapropisms are the random mutations of human languages. DNA too is a language, though a chemical one, and what I find interesting is how replication error (mutations) can be a strength in that they introduce novelty. — Olivier5

But there are still causes that result in mutations and malapropisms. They aren't random. They only appear that way because of our ignorance. If they were ultimately random, then there would be no way for someone to understand what was meant.

Novel intentions, or goals, are what create novel uses of some tool. Unique experiences can lead to novel intentions.

Conscious processes would be those we experience the stages of, sub-conscious processes would be those we experience only the results of, and infer the stages from experimental investigation (such as lesion studies, fMRI scanning in various forms of aphasia, etc). That's how I'd separate them, anyway. — Isaac

Where, or what, is the "we" in this explanation? Is it a human body, a human brain, a human mind or what?

If conscious processes are stages that we experience and sub-conscious process results are what we experience, then are you saying that the stages are the results that "we" experience? What is the relationship between the stages and the results that we experience? How does the sub-consciousness interact with the consciousness to create results that "we" experience? And then what is an "experience"?

So we can use the word. It does not follow that it is the name of a thing. — Banno

Saying that you're using a word is only getting at a fraction of what is going on. How are you using it - to what end - if not to name your ideas?

That they point to things, yes. Davidson is pointing to HIS idea and his intent to communicate it, not yours, creativesoul or Janus ideas or else we'd be getting at what you meant, not Davidson.

Think about it, Banno. If I copy what you said, word for word, you might cry, "plagiarism!" But if words meant different things then my word for word duplication could mean something else, so what place does plagiarism take in your theory?

Not getting this at all I'm afraid. Not sure it's relevant to the discussion though so unless it is you can leave off answering my query, but - how can you use what you're consciously aware of to judge what does or does not happen in your sub-conscious? I really don't understand this "you can only compare what appears in consciousness". Why? What prevents neuronal networks from comparing things without your conscious awareness but allows then to when they involve conscious awareness? — Isaac

Yes. I thought the same when Srap Tasmaner mentioned "awareness". We'd need to nail down what we mean by "awareness" and conscious vs subconscious.

This looks like the same transcendental argument you have used before: There is a thing called "what was actually meant", that is shared by multiple individuals; the only way this could occur is if we were all doing the same thing - following the same rules; hence interpretation is algorithmic.

But of course there is not one thing that is what was actually meant, and which is shared by multiple folk. — Banno

Strange, considering that this thread seems to be dedicated to what Davidson meant. If Davidson didn't mean one thing with his use of words, then it appears that he didn't mean anything, or at least it would be impossible for you to ever get at what he meant.

Rhyming or similarity of sound are kinds of association and association of ideas is another. That's obvious to anyone who thinks about it for a few moments. — Janus

Exactly, so now I'm confused as to why my analogy didn't work for you if you're now admitting that similarity of sound and shape are the associations that are used to solve the problem of what is actually meant to be said but wasn't? How would you solve the problem of interpreting someone's improper use of a hammer as a meat tenderizer? How would you interpret what they intend if not by the similar shape if the tool that they are using and the similar action in using it? How do you interpret what was meant when someone utters an unintentional word that sounds like the intended word if not by comparing the similarity of sound and use with the intended word?

The question is can you come up with anything more interesting or enlightening to say about it than that? Does the paper we are supposed to be critiquing manage to come up with any such thing? Not as far as I can tell. — Janus

Finding something interesting isn't the goal here. Finding the truth is. Philosophy is in the habit of questioning the trivial things that we might be taking for granted. Its just that some, like Banno, keep questioning trivial things - like the idea that brains are algorithmic and perform computations to solve problems, like malapropisms.

According to Harry a malapropism must sound like or rhyme with the word it has replaced. — Janus

It's not just me. Look it up in a dictionary or Google it.

Processing information is an algorithmic process.
— Harry Hindu

What should one understand by this?

An algorithmic process is one that follows explicit rules; I'm suggesting that the rules must be explicit, since in order to recognise that he process one is following is algorithmic, one must recognise the rules one is following.

What's the rule one follows in recognising the joke ‘We need a few laughs to break up the monogamy’? Is it the very same rule we follow when we laugh at ‘We’re all cremated equal’?

Or are we to say that in recognising the joke, one is not processing information?

Experience is information, I'm told; processing information is algorithmic; an algorithm is a method for solving a malapropism.

So what, exactly, is the algorithm being used?

Or is Harry's use of "algorithm" itself a malapropism? — Banno

You're simply describing the same problem, but with different variables.
A calculator, for instance, can solve addition problems no matter what numbers you are adding. Brains solve grammar and vocabulary problems no matter what words are being used.

Computer programs run the same algorithm on different data, thanks to the use of variables in the program. The algorithm uses the variables and the variables can contain different data, but the same rule is being run and used to solve the same problem.

The algorithm to put out a fire is to smother it. You might use water and I might use dirt. We are using the same algorithm, but with different variables, and accomplishing the same thing - putting out the fire - thanks to using the same algorithm, not thanks to the different variables, because if neither of us used the dirt or water to smother the fire, the problem doesn't get solved.

Words not only point to things, and what they point to is compared in the mind, but words are seen and heard and their shapes and sounds are compared in the mind as well. Those associations are created and stored in long-term memory over time and are recalled when some word is read or heard. The associations might be different because each person will have unique experiences with the rules and vocabulary of some language, but overall the associations are fairly consistent or else there would be a great deal less accuracy in communicating. This is why children would have trouble getting your jokes, where adults would have less trouble.

The difference in how different individuals might solve the problem or not is related to what information different individuals have access to - like that there is a dance called the Flamenco in the first place. A person that has never heard of the Flamenco will come to a different conclusion (probably not the correct one) of what the speaker meant than one that has heard of the dance. Because they aren't aware that there is a dance called the Flamenco, they would not interpret it as an error in speech but would believe that there is an actual dance called the Flamingo. For them, there would be no problem to solve.

If we weren't using the same algorithm to solve the same problem, then you have your work cut out for you in explaining how we can come to the same conclusion of what was actually meant. How is it that you and I understand not only why those are errors, but what was actually meant, if we aren't following the same rules?

To better understand what someone is getting at when they use language is to ask that person what they meant. You'd have to go to Davidson.

Part of the process of understanding what others are getting at when they use language is to paraphrase what they said, or what you think they meant in the case of a malapropism, and they either agree or rephrase, but that would have to come from from the original user of the words. Anything else could only be second-hand guessing as to what they were getting at.

Threads such as this tend to squabbling minutia towards their demise. We might all agree on the resilience of language in the face of apparent error and misuse, and the impossibility of an algorithmic account of how one understands what has been said. — Banno

It was minutia from the get-go considering the assumptions built into the OP.

If not an algorithmic account, then what reasons would you have for interpreting some sound our scribble in some way? It seems like you can only go by experience, which is information. Processing information is an algorithmic process. You use past experiences (information) to interpret (process) present information - the meaning of some scribble or sound seen or heard at that moment.

An algorithm is a method for solving a problem. When each of us hears the use of a specific malapropism, do we not use the same method to solve the problem of interpreting what was meant?

You may have something here. We regularly produce speech errors (I haven't found a solid source on the frequency). Why? Why isn't our speech production better at its job?

I would guess the answer is it's too slow and too expensive. Perfect is the enemy of good. — Srap Tasmaner

About 1 in every 1,000 words for adults - according to Garnham A, Shillcock R, Brown GDA, Mill AID, Cutler A. Slips of the tongue in the London–Lund corpus of spontaneous speech. Linguistics. 1981. — Isaac

I'm not sure about this stat or how it interprets "speech errors", and what impact speech impairments have here, but it if this is correct it seems to indicate that our speech production is 99.999% accurate, so I think that qualifies as good, but not perfect. It seems like it might actually be better than the accuracy of computers communicating with each other and they follow strict protocols.

Why do we process in parallel and not series? Possibly efficiency, as you say, but the high necessity of working memory involvement rather negates that theory, it's possibly even less efficient. Possibly it points to the fact that word selection and grammar are secondary to general communication and have been 'tacked on' in evolutionary terms. — Isaac

The high necessity of working memory indicates that learning how people use words is very useful for survival, so extra energy that is used to extrapolate what is communicated from sounds and scribbles is necessary for survival. Even though if what is actually said isn't important, how certain scribbles and sounds were used to communicate is. Every use is knowledge acquired about how to use scribbles and sounds to communicate.

The comparison of sounds, and their similarities and differences, happens within consciousness.
— Harry Hindu

According to whom? — Isaac

According to conscious beings, like myself. It is not only observable in my mind that sounds are compared, but logical in that you can only compare what appears in consciousness.

Scientists say that there are no colors out in the world. Colors only exist in the mind. That means that the only place that colors can be compared is in the mind. The same goes with shape and sound. Seems obvious to me, unless you're a p-zombie.

Not only do colors, shapes and sounds exist only in the mind, but the process of comparing is a mental process and therefore only happens in the mind.

While I agree that that is the usual meaning of the term, the substituted words need not rhyme or sound similar. The etymology of malapropism renders it close to 'misappropriate'. And in relation to this discussion concerning how we are able to understand what is meant when a misappropriate word is substituted for an appropriate one, rhyming or not seems pretty much irrelevant. — Janus

Trivial nonsense. Trying to solve the problem of interpreting what is meant by an unintended word that sounds like the word that was intended is done differently that interpreting what is meant by an unintended word that doesn't sound like what was intended. You're talking about two different processes for solving the problem of interpreting what was meant because of the relationship, or association between the word that wasn't intended and the one that was (the unintended word sounds like the intended word vs not sounding like the intended word).

This is why I asked earlier: If I told you to dance the Flamenco and you danced the Macarena, then is that an error in language-use or dance-use? If I told you to dance the Flamenco and you stood on one leg like a flamingo, is that an error in language-use or dance-use? What is being misunderstood - language, or dances?

So, I was right. We are talking past each other. I'm talking about one problem and you're talking about another as if it can be solved by the same process that solves the other. One process involves comparing sounds, the other involves comparing what the words point to.

In fact there's plenty of evidence, near as I can tell, that top-down constraints play a huge role here -- the phrasal, sentence, and conversational context. We take a speaker to have uttered a word that would make sense in the context as we understand it, rather than whatever mispronunciation they actually produced. All of that "correction" happens below the level of our awareness. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that you are muddying the waters bringing awareness into this. If it happened "below our level of awareness" (whatever that means) then how are you able report it? And what does "our" entail, as in "below the level of our awareness"?

The comparison of sounds, and their similarities and differences, happens within consciousness. Sounds only appear in consciousness and so how they are compared can only be done in consciousness. Consciousness is working memory and computers have both working and long-term memory, just like we do.