Then what is it that suffers?
— Harry Hindu

And the good question award goes to none other than Harry Hindu! — Agent Smith

You misjudge me. I'm not looking for an award. I'm looking for an answer.

However, this realization, speaking only for myself, doesn't diminish the suffering I have to bear. I don't feel better about someone belittling me in public just because I happen to know that I am in illusion, an accident of circumstances, having no real essence and so on. In short, there is no self, doesn't necessarily imply there is no suffering. — Agent Smith

Then what is it that suffers?

So, you think that suffering can exist without awareness of it? I don’t think so. I think that suffering is possible exclusively in proportion to awareness: if awareness is 100, suffering is 100, if 50, 50, if awareness is 0, suffering is 0. The medical practice of anaestesia is scientific evidence of it. So, there is absolutely no difference between “actual suffering” and “awareness of suffering”. Suffering without awareness can produce body reactions, but these body reactions are not suffering: when only the body is suffering, nobody is suffering: when doctors are operating your body and you are totally under anaestesia, nobody is suffering. We can see that animals have degree of awareness as well and it is possible to practice anaestesia on animals as well. This seems to me scientific evidence hard to deny. — Angelo Cannata

If I break my arm, I am aware of the pain. In being aware of the pain, I am aware of my injury. You seem to be saying that I suffer because I am aware of the pain, not because I am in pain. To say that when the body is suffering no one is suffering, are you saying that you are not your body? What is it that you are referring to when you say, "you"? Are you referring to your body, brain, mind, soul, or what?

How can you discuss the viewpoint of materialism without discussing it's validity? In discussing materialism you are inherently discussing its validity. :roll:

Absolute presuppositions can change with changing knowledge. — Clarky

This is not a discussion on the merits of materialism. — Clarky

You missed the point. In discussing materialism you inevitably get to the point of realizing it has no merit.

If Chalmer’s hard problem of consciousness does not exist, then there is no difference between a living human body suffering and a computer built to imitate all happenings and behaviours of suffering. — Angelo Cannata

It's not really about suffering, but our awareness of suffering. In what ways are we aware of suffering and how does that differ from actual suffering? What form does the awareness of suffering take as opposed to actual suffering? It seems that there can be one without the other. For instance, I can be aware of your suffering but not suffering myself. As a matter of fact, some people can take pleasure in others' suffering.

The observation of others' suffering takes a different form than my own suffering. From my perspective, others' suffering is a "physical" state (ie they cry, moan, pout, etc,). For myself, it's a mental state. I don't need to be aware of the "physical" state of my body to know that I am suffering. I can close my eyes and still be aware of my own suffering. This is not the case for others' suffering and this is essentially the hard problem - which is more about awareness of states-of-affairs and what form that awareness takes, and why it is different to be aware of others' suffering as opposed to our own suffering.

First focus - the discussion will take place from a materialist/physicalist/realist point of view. — Clarky

The purpose of this thread is not to discuss the validity of a materialist viewpoint. — Clarky

Then the point of this thread is to preach to the choir?

When I was a Christian, I didn't seriously think about the view of being a Christian. I just was, and accepted the idea that God exists without seriously thinking about what that meant. Once I began to seriously take on the view and asking deeper questions about this viewpoint in an attempt to better understand and defend this viewpoint did I come to understand that what I believed simply didn't fit with more objective observations. So it was only in delving deeper into the view that I began to reject the view.

Second focus - For the purposes of this discussion, we live before 1905, when the universe was still classical and quantum mechanics was unthinkable. I see the ideas we come up with in this discussion as a baseline we can use in a later discussion to figure out how things change when we consider quantum mechanics.

Third focus - We’ll stick as much as possible with issues related to a scientific understanding of reality. Physics in particular. — Clarky

Right. So for the purpose of this discussion, we accept the view that macro-sized "physical" objects are the interaction between smaller "physical" objects, and that those smaller "physical" objects are themselves composed of the interactions of even smaller "physical" objects. If "physical" objects are really the interactions of smaller objects, then it seems to me that it doesn't make any sense to say that it's "physical" all the way down. It appears that using a pre-relativity physicists viewpoint actually shows that the world is not "physical" but relational all the way down.

The sensation of depth perception would be the "map" your brain has given you so that you can be aware of your position in 3D space and make split-second decisions related to that. It is not the neurons in your optic nerve, but it is the neurons in the conscious part of your brain. The information from your optic nerves has been compounded into a more-useful form of information that is intended to be used for navigating by your attention. You are the attention. You are the navigating being performed. — Bird-Up

Then when you look at other people and see bodies and brains (via their MRI brain scan) then bodies and brains are part of the map, not the territory.

Information would then have to be explained for how it can "generate a feeling" of subjectivity. — schopenhauer1

Information doesn't generate anything but more information via some process of causation. So the feeling is just information, as feelings inform you of something. The feeling is subjective because it's a relation between you and what the feeling is about. The feeling would be objective if it didn't include information about yourself in some way. Every feeling or sensation includes information about you and about what you are observing, which makes it subjective. This fits with how we define objective views as being a view from nowhere, or a view independent of some observer, or information independent or absent of information about the observer.

The kinds of things I have listed as knowledge cannot be seriously doubted, let alone discovered to have been wrong. — Janus

Like...?

So you're saying that you've never held an idea that you though could not be seriously doubted, yet only to discover later that you were wrong?

Sounds like you're saying that you've never been wrong in your life.

I'd say the human experience is 0% objective and 100% subjective. We are completely dependent on the information being supplied to us by our brain. That's why I consider objective reality to be an abstract idea. The best we can do, is to gain consensus about what is real by comparing our experience with others. But we can never truly prove that objective things actually exist. We strongly-suspect objectivity. — Bird-Up

Youi just explained how the world is for "we", as in more than just you. You just explained a state of the world in objective terms. How could you ever know what it is like for others if you are stuck in your subjectivity?

Also, is your mind part of the world? Do you have direct access to your mind and can communicate to others the states of your mind? And is your description factual despite what others might believe? In describing the state of your conscious mind, you are describing an objective state-of-affairs of the world - no different than describing any other state-of-affairs. We are able to get at actual states-of-affairs in the world (objectivity) via our subjective information. We just have to separate the information about ourselves from the equation.

The sensation of depth perception would be the "map" your brain has given you so that you can be aware of your position in 3D space and make split-second decisions related to that. It is not the neurons in your optic nerve, but it is the neurons in the conscious part of your brain. The information from your optic nerves has been compounded into a more-useful form of information that is intended to be used for navigating by your attention. You are the attention. You are the navigating being performed. — Bird-Up

There you go again describing the world in an objective manner - as in the state-of-affairs that is the case not only for yourself, but for me and everyone else too. How did you come to acquire this objective information if not subjectively?

How do neurons create sensations in the first place? You keep talking about neurons and optic nerves, but you only experience those things in observing other people's mental states, not your own. Do you need to look at an MRI scan of your own brain to know your mental state? Why or why not?

e, if you just redefine it as "information", then somehow this confers powers of subjectivity. Information would then have to be explained for how it can "generate a feeling" of subjectivity. — schopenhauer1

What is subjectivity if not information about location relative to some other location - like your head?

I'm just saying that two languages can describe the same thing; even if they use a different vocabulary. Subjectivity is the first language. Objectivity is another language. — Bird-Up

But we can speak objectively about subjective experiences. Is it not objectively true that you have subjective experiences, or that you feel a certain way, or that you perceive things a particular way? The problem with subjectivity is trying to determine what part of the experience is about the object perceived vs the object doing the perceiving.

The physical brain has developed an awareness-center so that it can obtain decision-making functionality. The shapes, color, sounds, etc would be the "summary" or "map" that our subconscious brain presents us with for the purpose of deciding. — Bird-Up

You still don't seem to be getting at what the point I'm trying to make. How does a "physical" brain create the feeling of visual depth perception? How do neurons generate the feeling of empty space between me and the other objects in my vicinity? The empty space is not made up of neurons. It is made up of information about location relative to my eyes.

You can view your own view. — Bird-Up

What about how I described it using the visual feedback created by a camera-monitor system? In effect, you are not viewing a view. You are simply turning your attention back on itself.

I know that is the way things seem to me; there is no belief involved. — Janus

In that case you'll agree with me that it is better not to speak of believing things about which there can be no serious doubt, but of knowing them, and you'll also agree with me that when it comes to things we don't know, there is a distinction between adopting and holding one of the alternatives and declaring it to be the truth, and remaining undecided or provisionally adopting what seems most plausible, and seeing how it pans out. — Janus

As I pointed out in my previous post, there are instances in our actual lives where we have discovered that what we thought we knew was wrong. So it seems to me that there is no knowledge involved, only beliefs.

I would say that both objective and subjective experiences are an authentic version of reality. One is an accurate assessment of what it looks like from outside the head, and one is an accurate assessment of what it looks like from inside the head. — Bird-Up

I don't know what a view from outside of a head would look like. It's an impossibility. Third-person views are simulated first-person views.

Using your analogy, I would say that your conscious experience does show up on the MRI that the technician is looking at. Current medical technology is crude, low-resolution stuff. But imagine a snapshot of the brain that did capture everything. Every electrical signal jumping across each neuron. — Bird-Up

But that is what I'm getting at - why does someone else's conscious experience appear as a brain, but my own conscious experience does not include a brain, or neurons, or electrical signals. My conscious experience is composed of shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, visual, auditory and tactile depth, etc. of which my view of other people's brains and their neurons are composed of. I don't experience my own consciousness as a brain with electrical signals. That is only how I experience other people's conscious experience, and only via my own conscious experience, hence defining my own conscious experience as an illusion just relegates my view of other people's conscious experiences as brains to an illusion as well.

It is like the relationship between a program and its code. Nothing will happen until you start running the code. And the entirety of the program is expressed somewhere in the code (physical brain). At the same time, the experience of interacting with the program (conscious experience) is not described directly anywhere in the code. The code never mentions "yellow", but it does say: red intensity is 255, green intensity is 255, and blue intensity is 0. Could you imagine such instructions leading anywhere else but "yellow"? "Yellow" is clearly nowhere to be found, and "yellow" is also undoubtedly the only possible result. — Bird-Up

This just expands on the problem I mentioned above. Naive realism suggests that we see the world as it truly is - as if we are merely looking through the windows of our eyes. Science has suggested otherwise - that we don't see the world as it truly is. So what does that say about how we see brains and computers? If we posit the world being composed of information rather than static objects, then we resolve the problem of dualism and the static objects become mental models of what the world is really like, not the way the world actually is. The world is more like our minds, but that is not to say that mind is fundamental. Mind is just a particular type of arrangement of information.

Our minds operate at a certain frequency relative to the frequency of change of other processes we might observe. Our mental state can have an effect on the speed at which our minds process information about other processes and the relative change, or frequency, between the mind and other processes can skew the appearance of the other processes making slow processes appear as static objects while faster processes appear as actual processes or as a blur of change. Think of the difference between how see view water in all of its states - solid, liquid and gas with each being composed of slow vs fast moving molecules relative to the speed at which our minds process the information.

I think it is an error in logic to attempt to unify subjective experience with the objective world. Yes, all the underpinnings of conscious experience can be found there, but the objective account itself will not directly show you subjective experience. Two different views of the same object can both be 100% correct. — Bird-Up

I'm not sure if this makes sense. I can have a view of your body and it's behavior and deduce that you have experiences that are the causes of your behavior. But can I view my own view? Does that make sense? It might if we think of our view like the camera-monitor system where the camera represent the focus of attention in the mind while the monitor represents the information the camera (attention) is focused on. When the camera is looking outwards, focusing the mind's attention on the world, what appears on the monitor is a representation of the world relative to the camera's eye. When the camera turns itself to look at the monitor, it creates a visual feedback loop - like the kind that occurs when you "observe" your own mind. With our attention, we can create an informational feedback loop of thinking about thinking, knowing that we know, being aware of awareness, etc.

But nowadays artificial neural networks do the same. Can a feeling also develop on the layers of an artificial neural network? — SolarWind

I don't see why not. Feelings are just information, and information takes the form of the relationship between cause and effect. As such feelings are the effect of prior causes and the cause of subsequent effects, like your behavior that results from your feelings. One might define feelings as any information that is processed within a neural network. "Artificial" and "natural" are useless terms here.

There are two kinds of doubt: ordinary doubt and radical doubt. When it comes to taking the perspective of radical doubt, pretty much anything can be doubted, which means we don't know anything, or at least we don't know that we know anything. But that kind of artificial doubt is abstract and has nothing to do with our actual lives. — Janus

Too vague. What do you mean, "actual lives"? There are many that seem to spend much of their "actual lives" on these forums expressing doubt in "radical" ways. We have experienced what it's like in holding a particular view only to find it was wrong, and this happens during our "actual lives". These types of "actual life" experiences are what cause us to question everything we know. So, I don't see a distinction you're making between radical and ordinary doubt. Doubt is doubt. It's just that we can doubt different things with different degrees. Questioning our purpose and whether we know anything is just like any other doubt. It's just that questioning foundational knowledge brings everything that was built on that foundation into doubt as well.

That's the way I see things, and it seems to be consistent and to work for me. I don't require or expect anyone to agree with my view. — Janus

I don't see how this is any different than the way I explained the differences between belief and knowledge. When others disagree with your view does that not instill doubt in your views? I know that it makes me want to understand the reason for their disagreement and whether or not it is a valid disagreement.

Belief is like holding a view without either some observation or logic to support it. Belief in God is an example. Also what some theory of physics seems to show without having been verified by observation would also qualify as a belief. Only when the belief has been shown to stand up against observational AND logical inquiry can it be categorized as knowledge.

I know that is the way things seem to me; there is no belief involved. — Janus

What is the difference between you knowing something and the way something seems to you?

What is the difference between the way things seem to you and you having a delusion or hallucination?

What terms can we use to refer to the way things seem to you and the way things are? Belief and Reality.

What is the difference between belief and knowledge? Belief is when you only have an observation OR reason to support a particular view. Knowledge is when you have both observation AND reason to support a particular view.

Instead of trying to imagine why the human brain is using consciousness, it might be easier to imagine how difficult it would be without conscious experience. — Bird-Up

I can imagine. We can also observe blind-sight patients and understand that while they may be able to navigate around objects they cannot see, then cannot describe the object in any detail. So if consciousness provides more detailed information about the world.

I would argue that the experience of consciousness does solve a practical problem. But it's mostly about making the brain more efficient, not about giving the brain an entirely new ability. I think that is why people find it confusing; it seems like a whole lot of work just to make the brain faster. Using conscious experience is like chalking the end of a pool stick; you could still hit the ball without it. — Bird-Up

This still doesn't explain how a brain can create an experience of not being a brain. It doesn't get at the problem of explaining why I experience my mental processes differently than how I experience everyone else's.

If your conscious brain making decisions is like walking the paths of a park, then conscious experience would be like looking at a map of the park. You could discover all the paths eventually if you walk around long enough, but the process goes a whole lot faster when you are using the map to make decisions. Some would also be quick to point out the deceitful nature of your strategy: "You fool, that is just a piece of paper with lines drawn on it; it is not actually the park!" — Bird-Up

Right, so how do we know that the brains that we associate with other people's mental processes aren't just part of the map and not actually reality? How is it that the mind that I experience as my own is the illusion but the brains that appear in my mind (like when I look at your brain scan while you are inside an MRI) when looking at your mental processes isn't an illusion? Neurologists seem to think that they have direct access to the park when observing the brains of others - as if they don't have a map at all - but see the world as it truly is with brains in skulls.

This does not explain why information-processing organic matter has feelings and information-processing inorganic matter does not. — SolarWind

Information-processing is taking certain inputs, manipulating them in some way based on the instructions of some program to produce certain outputs. What follows is that the types of inputs and the type of program can produce different outputs. Think of organic matter and inorganic matter as different systems, or instructions in a program, that take in different inputs and produce different outputs. So it stands to reason that one will produce outputs that the other does not.

Rocks do not have the same inputs and the same instructions as an organisms does, so how it reacts to temperature changes will be different than an organism.

Think of the conscious mind as one layer of fault-tolerance where the information that appears in consciousness (like feeling hot or cold) is then used to fine-tune behaviors, especially fine-tuning instinctive behaviors in social environments. Sensory information passes through different layers of processing in the brain and the conscious part is just on of those layers.

Janus you just said: "Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons; no believing needed."

That statement is fundamental and sums up and modifies this entire conversation. — Ken Edwards

"Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons;" is what it means to believe anything. All you've done is show that you can't escape believing anything.

And you're avoiding the question I posed to you earlier about it means to "believe in" things.

All you're doing is moving goal posts. :sad:

You say, To "believe in" something as in believing in love is the same as saying you believe "love exists" to be true."

It does not Say that love exists. It might or might not imply it depending entirely on the interpretation by the listener which is something else entirely.. — Ken Edwards

The goal of the listener is typically to understand what was said by the speaker, not to make up its own meaning to the words spoken by someone else.

So what is it you mean or are implying when you use the phrase, "i believe in love.", if it's not that you believe that it exists.

I carefully avoid believing anything at all.
— Ken Edwards

Is this not an expression of what you believe about believing, that is is better to avoid believing? — Fooloso4

Exactly. This whole time Mr. Edward's has been telling us what he believes to be the case. He could be wrong. So if he is wrong that means he cant be describing what actually is the case, but what he believes to be the case. Is Mr. Edward's never wrong?

We can only ever use language to refer to our beliefs/knowledge of what is the case. Whether or not our beliefs/knowledge of what the case is accurate is another story.

I am correct. — Jackson

Saying so doesn't make it so. Do better.

Choose:

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some aspects of its environment and not others.

or

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism sees some kinds of picture in its Cartesian theatre and not others. — bongo fury

What do you mean by "sees"? Can an organism see it's own mind?

I think that "information" is more useful here. Just as every computer that comes off the production line and is purchased by a variety of users - over time the information in these computers will diverge in that each computer will possess different information depending on the inputs of different users.

Organisms possess information as well. The information they possess will be unique because each organism occupies a different location in space-time and possess different wants, needs and values. They're accumulation of unique input over their lives is part of the subjectivity in the information we possess.

So your options should look more like:
the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism possesses a perspective of some aspects of its environment and not others.

or

the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that the organism possesses a perspective of some kinds of picture in its Cartesian theatre and not others.

Each organism possesses a perspective and a perspective is a structure of information about the relationship between the organism and it's environment. The environment appears located relative to the eyes but the environment is not located relative to the eyes. The experience is subjective because the information is about the environment relative to our self, and not any one else.

As information, we turn the information back on itself, forming a loop - like that seen when you point a camera at the monitor it is connected to. This creates a feedback loop where the information on the screen is about itself being about its self, being about its self, etc. In this sense we are not really "seeing" our minds. We are simply looping the information of our mind the same way the camera-monitor system does.

The idea of the "hard problem" just makes a fetish out of consciousness. — Jackson

Wrong. The hard problem exposes the fetish of physicalists with their naive realism and dualists with their inability to explain how two opposing substances can interact.

The hard problem is resolved by a monistic view that information or process is fundamental - not matter and/or mind.

I meant we could be deceived that our conscious experience is more than just electrical signals bouncing around in our heads: "Whatever this sensation of consciousness is that I'm experiencing, it is something more!" — Bird-Up

But that is the question the hard problem shines a light on - how does electrical signals bounding around in our heads deceive our heads? In essence the brain is fooling itself into believing that it is not a brain. Why would it do that? What evolutionary problem would that solve (ie why would such a thing evolve in the first place)?

A hard cutoff point for "thought" assumes that the definition shouldn't take place on a gradual scale. Instead of "thought" and "not a thought", couldn't it be defined as "more conscious" and "less conscious"? Why does a paramedic wave a flashlight in your eyes and ask you pointless questions? They are trying to measure how much consciousness you are currently experiencing. — Bird-Up

It doesn't necessarily assume that there isn't a gradual scale, but if there is no cut-off then you're implying that everything has some degree of consciousness.

There are degrees of pain, but there is also no pain, so implying a cut-off doesn't necessarily imply that there isn't a gradual scale where describing your level of pain on a scale of 0-10 where you feel pain and a 0 would be that you feel no pain.

Maybe your subjective experience is not really a valid experience of the objective world. Maybe it's more like we are each hallucinating our own existence. — Bird-Up

In conversing with you on this forum, would I be hallucinating your existence? The point was that we both experience our own and each other's existence very differently. If consciousness is an illusion, then everything I experience, which includes your posts on this forum and your body and behaviors, would be an illusion. This also means that neurologists' experiences of other people's brains and all their scientific descriptions of such would be an illusion too.

Sorry, I just don't know what you're talking about anymore. — Jackson

Are you a p-zombie?
— Harry Hindu

Yes. — Jackson

Well, there's proof that p-zombies would have no idea what a human is talking about when it comes to the mind and consciousness.

Funny. I was going to say the same thing to you.

It can all too easily grab hold of the adverb "in" which changes the meaning completely. Instead of "I believe" something to be true, it says I believe IN Love or in Democracy or some such which has a totally different meaning. — Ken Edwards

Also its noun form: "Belief" has a completely changed meaning. The noun, "Belief", might be said to be one of the results or one of the outcomes of believing something to be true. — Ken Edwards

It does not change the meaning. To "believe in" something as in believing in love is the same as saying you believe "love exists" to be true. To believe in something is to believe that it exists, or to have the belief that it exists. Just as hammering requires a hammer, believing requires a belief.

Banno? Is that you?

How do you experience another person's mental activity? — Jackson

By looking at their live brain scan - just as any neurologist would. But do you need to look at your brain scan to experience your own mental activity? Do you even need to know you have a brain to know you have thoughts and experiences?

P-zombies are specifically stipulated as appearing to be normal people. — Tate

P-Zombies are make-believe concepts that have no basis in reality. P-zombies are stipulated as having no experiences of color, shapes, sounds, feelings, etc. and being identical to humans in behavior. All one has to do is point to blind-sight patients as evidence that p-zombies could not behave like humans. In this sense, the concept of p-zombies are like the concept of god. They are proposed to be possible realities when one simply needs to look at reality to see that such things are not possible as stipulated.

Before responding, what is it like reading my post?
— Harry Hindu

I do not see how that is a meaningful concept. — Jackson

I put it several ways but you're cherry-picking.

Before you responded you had to read my post. It took conscious effort and time to do so. How would you describe this state-of-affairs - of you reading my post? If you wanted to describe to someone this state-of-affairs how would you do it? How would the description from someone else observing you reading my posts differ from your account of the same state-of-affairs?

The hard problem is certainly trying to come from the position of neutrality. — Bird-Up

Ancient Greeks, like Aristotle, never discussed consciousness. He talks about thought, but makes nothing of self-consciousness.
Kierkegaard said Christianity invented inwardness, or subjectivity. It strikes me that trying to explain consciousness is based on this error. — Jackson

Self-consciousness would simply be thoughts of the self.

The question is what are thoughts composed of, or what forms do they take? What makes a thing a thought as opposed to not a thought?

The hard problem is asking why do the thoughts of others take the form of the visual of their brain/neural activity, while our own thoughts take the form of sounds, feelings, colors, shapes depth, etc. All descriptions of mental activity from a third-person scientific perspective are actually first-person visual subjective descriptions of other's mental activity. You never experience your own mental activity the way you experience others' mental activity.

I don't think a p-zombie would claim to be one. She doesn't understand what her deficiency is. — Tate

A blind-sight person seems to understand what their deficiency is. They seem to be unsure about what it is that they are experiencing visually. They seem to respond to things that do not appear in their visual field without knowing what it is they are responding to. People with blind-sight don't behave like normal humans. Neither would a p-zombie.

What is it that you can point to to say, "I am reading a post in the English language on my computer screen."?
— Harry Hindu

I read and responded. Proof. — Jackson

Your response is not you reading the post. That comes after reading the post. How do you know that you responded to my post?

Before responding, what is it like reading my post? What form does the information, "I am reading Harry Hindu's post" take for you? How do you know who's post is whose after you've written and posted your posts? What form does the information in your memory of you having written a post take? What is it like for you to remember something? What are you comparing to say that you remember writing your post if not a visual of your post and the visual memory of writing it?

That is not true. A rock absorbs sunlight, heats up on this side and processes this information through heat conduction. How do you know it doesn't feel that? — SolarWind

What reason would there be for a rock to feel that? Rocks don't possess goals of seeking out a nominal temperature, therefore there would be no reason for it to feel hot or cold.

Humans do have goals of survival and achieving homeostasis, therefore it would need to be able to use information about it's body's temperature (feel hot or cold) to then be able to engage in behaviors that achieve such goals of homeostasis or nominal body temperatures.

You don't need to necessarily feel hot for your body to sweat. Sweating is an involuntary reaction to high temperatures, but sweating will only go so far in solving the problem. Being able to react by moving into the shade, or getting out of the kitchen, could be more useful but would require one to feel the heat to then produce behaviors to remove one from the hot spot.

It's most likely that the superman will be a computer. — Bird-Up

Then it wouldn't be a superman. It would be a supercomputer as opposed to just computers, which is what you are using right now.

Maybe superman would be more of a merging of biology and technology. In effect, cyborgs would be superhuman.

If only some relations have a qualitative aspect, then it is that which still has to be explained. You cannot get around this. Whether "process", "event" or "object" or combination thereof.. the problem remains as none of that entails qualitative aspects. — schopenhauer1

To answer your question, you should answer 180's.

My answer to 180's question would be a type of relation composed of sensory information. Sensory information is a relation between perceiver and perceived. Not all relations are composed of a perceiver and perceived. Rocks do not have eyes, ears and a working memory, therefore it is not possible for a rock to be a component (the perceiver) of a qualitative relation. It can only participate in a qualitative relation as what is perceived by a perceiver.

I do not know what it is like to be me. I am not sure that is a meaningful concept. — Jackson

Sounds like something a p-zombie would say. Are you a p-zombie? What form does your information about the world take? For instance, how do you know that you're reading this post right now? What is it that you can point to to say, "I am reading a post in the English language on my computer screen."?