The standard use in philosophy is that a state of affairs is a truth-maker while a claim or a belief is a truth-bearer. So states of affairs obtain or fail to obtain (e.g., it is raining) while claims are true or false (e.g., Alice's claim that it is raining). — Andrew M

I don't like the wording here. It doesn't make any sense to say that some state-of-affairs is a truth-maker, as if some state-of-affairs makes some other state-of-affairs called the "truth". Which state-of-affairs are we talking about when using our knowledge - the state-of-affairs that made the truth, or the state-of-affairs that is the truth? Claims don't bear truth if they are wrong.

All you have done is state what makes truth and what bears the truth, but haven't explained what the truth is and how it is made by some state-of-affairs or carried in a claim.

With the rain example, if we went outside we presumably shouldn't be mistaken about whether it is raining or not. But that still falls short of a guarantee or proof. People sometimes have hallucinations, holograms are possible, and there will be other possibilities I haven't thought of. (And that's before getting to the more skeptical hypotheses of brains-in-vats, Descartes' evil demon and the like.) — Andrew M

Now it sounds like you've taken my argument. If we are brains-in-vats, do we know what rain is? All of these alternate possibilities, while I concede are far-fetched (brains in vats) or not the norm (hallucinations), are what make one a skeptic of one's own knowledge and skeptical of our understanding of what knowledge actually is. If we can't have proof that one's knowledge is actually true, then it is illogical to say "truth" is a property of knowledge.

However if only deduction provides a guarantee or proof, then the only mistake-proof claim we could make would be of our own existence, per Descartes. Which is a very different thing to ordinary knowledge of the time of day or whether it is raining (that doesn't require a guarantee or proof). — Andrew M

What is "proof"?

I did mention before about our minds being the only thing we can say that we know anything true about because to say anything true would require you to be the thing you're talking about.

Yes, that is my view. We can be mistaken about whether we know it is raining just as we can be mistaken about whether it is raining. — Andrew M

That sounds like the same thing.

It seems to me that we can only ever talk about our knowledge, not the actual state-of-affairs. If we say, "I don't know if it is raining", then we're still talking about the state of our knowledge. We can't talk about things we don't know - only things we know. In this case, you know that you don't know that it is raining, and it is true. You actually don't know if it is raining.

You can only speak truths about the state of your own mind. Thankfully, the world, like minds, establishes patterns and we can make predictions about what the other things, like other minds, can do, and the patterns work for us most of the time. It's just that each time is a unique time and we tend to confuse the pattern with the state-of-affairs that we are talking about.

Imagine a deterministic system A (a fair die with 6 sides). Once we have all the information on A we can make accurate predictions of how A will evolve. Deterministic systems will have specific outcomes right? There's nothing random in A and so however A evolves, everything in A will show a pattern and there won't be any variation in the pattern. — TheMadFool

Just to be clear, deterministic system A is one single die roll. The next die roll would be deterministic system B, and so on.

Just because you know the conditions of A, doesn't necessarily mean you know B. While their might be some causal influence, predicting B is not predicting the same system because you may use your other hand to roll, so the dice will roll in the opposite direction and maybe you roll it with a little less force, and so on. While you may have the formula for the system, you don't have the numbers to plug in for each die roll, unless you know the conditions of each die roll.

Please note that patterns are of two types which are:
1. Deterministic patterns. A good example would be gravity - there's a force and that force acts in a predictable manner.

2. Non-deterministic or probabilistic patterns. A die throw is effectively random but any sufficiently large experiment will demonstrate that the outcomes have a pattern viz. that three appears 1/6 of the time, an odd numbered face will appear 3/6 of the time.

Also bear in mind that a deterministic pattern will differ markedly from a non-deterministic/probabilistic pattern. The latter will exhibit multiplicity of outcomes will the former has only one determined outcome.

Imagine now that we lack information i.e. we're ignorant of factors that affect how A will evolve. We assumed A to be deterministic and given that our ignorance has no causal import as far as the system A is concerned, system A should have a deterministic pattern. However, what actually happens is system A now exhibits a non-deterministic/probabilistic pattern.

I will concede that there was a lack of information about system and that is ignorance but that has no causal import on A which should be exhibiting a deterministic pattern because system A is deterministic as we agreed. However, the actual reality when we do experiments we observe non-deterministic/probabilistic patterns. — TheMadFool

We may know the formula for gravity, which tells us how two massive bodies will interact via gravity, but we still need to know the mass and distance between the two objects in order to predict what will happen over time. We still need to have those conditions plugged into the formula.

So just because we have a formula for a type of system doesn't mean that we can always predict the outcome, because we still need more information because each system is unique, even though they share a common formula/pattern that we refer to as a "system". The "system" is actually a unique state-of-affairs in each moment. It's just that many states-of-affairs share similar qualities, like die rolls. Each state-of-affairs includes hands rolling the same die.

What I think is happening here is that you are confusing the pattern with the state-of-affairs. The pattern is in your mind. The state-of-affairs is out there. Your formula/pattern is only a partial representation of the state-of-affairs. There are other factors that you aren't taking into consideration when determining the outcome of any particular state-of-affairs. If you know ALL the factors, then you can predict the outcome.

Since some of the factors change in the next die roll (but not all of them because we are still using hands to roll the same die), we'd need to know what changed, and by how much, in order to make the prediction for the next state-of-affairs.

This also makes you confuse the two patterns you have. You're conflating knowing one die roll with knowing all of them. How does knowing the formula/pattern for gravity allow you to predict every gravitational event in the universe? Don't you still need to know the mass and distance of the planets or stars in each event?

Rolling dice would be like rolling planets together. How will each interaction evolve? How many times will there be collisions vs. establishing orbits around each other? So you're confusing the pattern in your head as if it were the state-of-affairs itself.

But, what of differing or clashing values that don't correspond with any particular state of affairs in the world, necessarily? — Wallows

Values are subjective, not objective. Opposing objective facts would be a contradiction. Opposing values are not a contradiction because they arent about the same thing. Values exist only in our heads, so it is a category error to make them objective and therefore contradictory. We have goals that come into conflict, which is why it seems that our values are contradictory, but our values are based on our goals as individuals.

Saying that some thing is good while another says it is bad is not a contradiction because they are both talking about two different things - their own values, not the actual thing that they claim is good or bad.

How does my ignorance cause the die to become random?

Separately, I must ask you this:

Are all random and chance events caused by our ignorance? — TheMadFool

Your ignorance doesn't cause the dice to do anything. Your ignorance causes you to think of the world as probabilities and chances.

The outcome is determined. Your ignorance causes you to not know the outcome. You can only guess at the outcome. Your guess is educated in that you know the possible number of outcomes, but not the actual outcome, hence your educated guess is the probability that exists in your head, not in dice.

If it was all probability, then how is it not probable that you roll a 10 on a six-sided die? What constrains the possible outcomes?

No...

We use every term when asking what they mean, so if what you said were true, it would mean that we do not have a clear understanding of any term...

:yikes:

We do though, so... you're quite wrong. — creativesoul

I don't see anyone asking what "dog" or "house" means unless your an infant. I do see grown adults asking what "knowledge" and "god" is, so maybe there is something different with these terms. Maybe if you'd stop being so facetious we could have a respectful back and forth.

Consider a parallel example. Does discovering that it wasn't raining when you thought it was cause concern about your understanding of what "rain" is?

It shouldn't, unless there were some further reason to think there was a problem with your understanding (e.g., people consistently referring to what you call "rain" as "snow"). — Andrew M

It means that you can't tell the difference between rain and water hosed on the window until you go outside. So, you don't have proper justification to claim that it is raining by just looking out the window, just as you don't have proper justification to know the shape of the Earth or it's movement in space without the proper view to inform you of what actually is the case.

Another path is saying, "I know that it is raining" is talking about your knowledge, not the rain. You are talking about the state-of-affairs that is your knowledge, not the weather. So, while you may know what rain is, you don't know much about your knowledge because it isn't raining outside.

Because a mistaken belief doesn't feel mistaken when you have it.

To people several hundred years ago it looked as if the Sun went round the Earth. But what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the Earth turned on its axis?

As far as appearances go, both look the same. The difference is in the explanatory hypotheses. — Andrew M

Exactly, so our observations aren't proper justification for knowledge. I already said that since our justifications can be flawed, then we can never know whether or not we are using the term in the correct way, unless we obtain the proper perspective in order to have proper justification.

If they both look the same, how did you ever come to know what knowledge is to use the term?

It seems to me that you don't have proper justification to claim to know anything until you make the proper observation from the proper perspective. Since it is possible to confuse a hosed window with rain, you don't know that it is raining until you go outside. It is possible to mistake rain for something that isn't rain when you are outside? Is it possible to mistake the shape of the Earth when out in space? If not, then it can be safely said that that is when you possess knowledge, and not before.

So, it seems to me that you simply have to know when you're taking an objective view of what it is that you are talking about and you know you have the objective view because there isn't some other possible view to take, or this view doesn't allow mistakes in identifying what it is that we are talking about.

To people several hundred years ago it looked as if the Sun went round the Earth. But what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the Earth turned on its axis? — Andrew M

Yes, because from the perspective of being on the surface of the Earth, you can't tell the difference. Well, you can if you take other observations, like the movement of the Sun across the background stars and the movement of the planets, but this just proves my point - that you need other observations, not just one, to claim knowledge. Once you go out in space, you see the difference. So only in making the proper observation can we say that we possess knowledge and we obtain the proper observations when we are objective in our perspective. One observation isn't enough justification to make a knowledge claim.

You seem to be saying that probability = ignorance but that would imply that there is no such thing as randomness or even chance.

If that's the case then consider:

1. A theoretical probability assumes randomness in its calculations. The theoretical probability for a three is 1/6

2. The die thrown 1 million times will show a three 1/6 of the 1 million throws


2 is exactly as predicted by 1 and 1 assumes randomness.

According to your claim then our ignorance led to the random behavior of the coin? How is this possible? How can my ignorance lead to randomness? — TheMadFool

You didn't answer those questions I had in my post.

There is such a thing as randomness and chance. They are ideas that stem from our ignorance. Like every other idea, they have causal power. It's just that you are projecting your ignorance/randomness/chance out onto the world where their only existence is in you head as ideas.

The outcome of die throw can be calculated probabilistically e.g. probability of getting a 3 is 1/6 — TheMadFool

Isn't it probable that you roll the dice six times and never get a 3?

The outcomes of a set of 1000 die-throws can be predicted probabilistically e.g. 3 will appear approx. 166 times — TheMadFool

What does approximately mean? Doesn't it mean that it is possible that you are wrong? Isn't it just as likely that 3 will appear approx 150 times or 200 times?

Some (@Harry Hindu) have said that probability = ignorance but that would mean that there is no such thing as actual chance and what we perceive as chance is a manifestation of our ignorance.

However, if that's the case 2, and 4 should be false but they are true and indicate the die is behaving as if determinism is false. — TheMadFool

They are. Roll the dice and find out that it is possible to not roll a 3 in six rolls, or roll a 3 166 times out of 1000 die rolls. Your use of "approximately" doesn't supply some truth, only an approximation, so I don't see how you could say that it is true. Approximations can't be truths. They are guesses and we guess because we are ignorant.

Maybe we should rethink what we mean by "justifications"?

A justification for one may not qualify as justification for others.

What if looking out the window wasn't proper justification for knowing that it is raining. You'd have to go outside and then you'd have the proper justification.

What if looking at the Earth from the perspective of standing on it wasn't proper justification for knowing its shape. You'd have to change your perspective to being out in space to have proper justification for knowing its shape.

But this still begs the question of knowing when we ever have the proper justification. Is it when we obtain an objective perspective of what it is that we are talking about?

Well, you seem to have set the cart before the horse here. — Wallows

And that could very well be the case in a solipsist's world. Who are you to judge what happens in my world being that you are just part of my world? The solipsist would be the prime mover, and why would it not know this? The sole source of causation in a solipsist world would be its own intent. If not, then what is "intent"?

Yes; but, the solipsist can never doubt that things happen otherwise. It's a self-determining future at all points of the experience. — Wallows

What is "doubt" in a solipsist world? "Doubt" and "skepticism" would be meaningless in a solipsist world. What it thinks about at any given moment is what exists at any given moment.

Contradictions aren't problems to solve. A contradiction is a solution to a question that is gives the answer, "This is not true".

Contradictions inform of what isn't the case.

I don't find it to be.

It's certainly a commonly asked philosophical question. We look to how the term "truth" is used. We find out what is being said in those different uses(what is meant).

No problem. — creativesoul

Contradiction.

If people use the term in asking what it is, then doesn't that mean that there isn't a clear understanding of what it is?

What is the relationship between use and meaning? What does it mean to use words? What entails "use"?

I was hoping you'd answer this:

Here's the definition of use from Lexico: "Take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ." In the context of our discussion what are being deployed are words and sentences.
— Andrew M

What is it that we are trying to accomplish or achieve in deploying words and sentences? What caused words and sentences to appear on this screen for me to read? — Harry Hindu

What is it that we are trying to accomplish when we say, "I know <something you "know">"?

Yes, and no-one disagrees with this. There is a language distinction between what we claim we know (which can be false) and what we know (which can't be false). When someone claims to know that it is raining when it is not, they have made a mistake - and they don't have knowledge. — Andrew M

Then why does it feel like you possess knowledge when you don't? When you've already had the experience of claiming you have knowledge and then find out that you didn't, then that should cause some concern for any other knowledge you claim to possess AND cause concern about your very understanding of what "knowledge" is. When having knowledge and not having knowledge are indistinguishable at any given moment you make a claim, then how can you really know what you are talking about? How can you ever say that you are claiming some truth at any given moment?

Why would the characters in the dream world seem to have an intent if their own? Why wouldnt the solipsist's intent be the source of all the action within their own world if the world was really just its self?

Everything that exists at any moment exists within the solipsist mind, so it would be a contradiction for a solipsist to posit a cause that isn't part of its experience, like the unconscious being the cause of something that is experienced. For a solipsist, all causation happens within the experience. There can be no external causes to its experience. There is no unconscious - only consciousness - which would be the world in its entirety.

So again, I ask, how would a solipsist even come to posit others that have an intent of their own?

I am my world. (The microcosm.) — Wittgenstein, Tractatus

He's confusing world with mind.

How and why would a solipsist conceive of others?

Well, it seems to me that you've no way of talking about what sorts of things can be true - such as knowledge claims - and what makes them so. — creativesoul

Isn't that a fundamental philosophical problem - What is truth? If philosophy is questioning what truth and knowledge is, then it seems to me that there is a problem in what truth and knowledge is, and we are having a difficult time in doing it. So you've basically explained the philosophical problem we have. You may think that you know what you're talking about when you say, "truth" and "knowledge", but others obviously disagree or else this wouldn't be a major philosophical problem.

If you have no way of talking about what can be true, then what is a justification? It seems to me that justifications can get us close to the truth without actually getting all the way (indirect realism). Some statements are more justified than others and are closer to the truth than others, but truth would be like "perfection". Our justifications are never perfect, which is why they can be fallible.

To get the truth, you'd have to be what it is you're talking about. You do have direct access to your consciousness, so you have access to some truth of reality. You can speak truths about what is on your mind, or how you are feeling. When we talk about things other than our minds, we are referring to justifications. We know other people have minds because our observation of their behavior justifies it. We don't know if it is true or not, hence the philosophical problem of other minds. We have philosophy because we are skeptical. We are skeptical because we have all experienced moments where we found that what we claimed we knew was wrong, but was justified at the time we knew it.

What makes a knowledge claim true if its premises are just other JTBs? You're using circular reasoning if truth is a property of knowledge claims. You seem to be saying that what makes a knowledge claim true is that it is a knowledge claim.

That people are fallible means that they sometimes misuse the term "knowledge" or "know". They sometimes claim to know things that they don't. — Andrew M

This is why we shouldn't be looking at how people use the terms to understand what "knowledge" is because how they use them can be ambiguous or not meaningful (because it gets misused). This is why we have philosophy of epistemology - to try and ask what knowledge is. If people already knew what knowledge is then why this thread? Why would we ever ask, "What is knowledge"? if we already knew what it is we are talking about? "Knowledge" is the same as "God" in this sense. We just regurgitate what we see and hear without really delving into what it really means.

I no longer believe in "God" as most people use the term because no one could ever give a consistent explanation as to what "God" is, so I've adopted "God" as a synonym for "Universe". I've done the same with "knowledge". Since no one can give a consistent explanation of what "knowledge" and "truth" entail, then using "knowledge" as a synonym for "justified belief" rather than JTB, works perfectly.

If it is a common understanding that what we claim we know can be faulty (which doesn't mean that it necessarily is all the time), then it should be obvious that when we claim we know something, doesn't mean that truth is necessarily involved. Truth has to be something separate.

It means that 'information theory' as per attempted computer modelling of 'cognition' is not applicable. The organism structurally adapts to perturbations in its environment. It makes no 'choice' in the information theoretic sense of 'deciding between alternatives'
Indeed the failure of such models has led to the rise of alternative models such as 'emboded cognition' in which 'languaging' is merely a complex behaviour which requires no concept of 'a world independent of the organic system/s which defines it.' 'Closure' implies 'a world limited by the organism'.
These developments follow the evolution of ideas from Kant, via phenomenology, to linguistic nonrepresentationalism in which there are no independent 'things-in-themselves'.
Socialization implies that individuals 'structurally couple' to form a more complex system which defines its 'joint world'.
'Predation' in which 'a predator' is separate from 'its prey' is seen by Maturana as an anthropomorphism. Predation is merely an automatic structural coupling involving a a temporary 'joint system'. — fresco

This is all nonsense. The only alternatives are solipsism or realism. You seem to be arguing for the former. If you are conflating "world" with "mind", then you are a solipsist.

If "languaging" (a silly term to use when I'm sure that there are other, more applicable terms to use) is a complex behavior which requires no concept of a world independent of the organic system that defines it, where does this complex behavior take place in relation to you and I? What does it mean for some system to be "organic"? What is an organism?

Saying that "languaging" is a complex behavior implies a world in which this behavior takes place. If not, then what is a behavior? It seems to me that the use of words does imply a world that our words are about. If not, then words are meaningless.

If "languaging" doesn't require the concept of a world independent of the organic system, then there is no aboutness to its complex behavior. What does the organic system accomplish by "languaging" and how does an organic system become a 'languager'?

Doesn't the organism have other complex behaviors that isn't "languaging" and that its "languaging" can be about? Your behavior isn't the world. You can only behave within a world, and "languaging" is an organism's way of relaying information about certain states of this world to others. This is why seeing that it is raining and hearing another say, "It is raining." is redundant information you're receiving on two different channels - eyes and ears. One is a state of the weather, while the other is a state of using complex behaviors to inform others about the state of the weather.

What do you mean? = What are you talking about?

When you say,
"Indeed the failure of such models has led to the rise of alternative models such as 'emboded cognition' in which 'languaging' is merely a complex behaviour which requires no concept of 'a world independent of the organic system/s which defines it.'",
what are you talking about if not some state-of-affairs where there are failures of models?

How can there ever be a failure of our models if our model is the world as we define it? If an organism uses a particular set of complex behaviors, how can those behaviors entail a "failure"? What would that mean? It seems to me that you can't escape talking about the world when using words. You are always attempting to explain some state-of-affairs in the world that you and I share, and are trying to impart knowledge about this world to me.

That people are fallible means that they sometimes misuse the term "knowledge" or "know". They sometimes claim to know things that they don't. — Andrew M

Why do they claim to know things that they don't? If they claim to understand what knowledge and knowing is, then how can they misuse the terms?

Here's the definition of use from Lexico: "Take, hold, or deploy (something) as a means of accomplishing or achieving something; employ." In the context of our discussion what are being deployed are words and sentences. — Andrew M

What is it that we are trying to accomplish or achieve in deploying words and sentences? What caused words and sentences to appear on this screen for me to read?

Not only does your version of "knowledge" not fit how people use it, it relegates truth into meaninglessness as well. If there is no infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, what does it mean to be "true"?
— Harry Hindu

It means that a claim describes a state of affairs as it has been defined. For example, we understand what the phrase "it is raining" means. So if Alice claims it is raining when it is raining then her claim is true. That is a correct use. Whereas if she claims it is raining when it is not raining, then her claim is false. That is an incorrect use (or misuse). — Andrew M

This means that a claim is accurate or inaccurate.

Accurate: Free from error, or conforming exactly to truth.
Truth is the actual state-of-affairs.

It can be true that you make a claim, but the claim itself might not be accurate. Claims can have a range of accuracy. Some of it can conform to the truth while some of it might not. Truth is what is the case regardless of whether claims are made about it or not.

I reject this notion of truth... — creativesoul

That's nice. I reject your rejection. Now what?

This is false. It all depends upon the claim under consideration. — creativesoul

Sure. Like I said before: we can make our own truths like who is the current President of the United States, or what the capital of France is, but when it comes to the things we didnt design ourselves, like nature, we can't be sure that our knowledge is infallible because the truth is some state-of-affairs that we had no role in making.

That's it? No explanation as to why?

I take issue with the very first sentence in your link:
"If there is no other, there will be no I. If there is no I, there will be none to make distinctions.
Chuang-tsu, 4th Cent., B.C. (*)"

What qualifies as "other" and "I"?

According to Maturana, the cognizing organism is informationally closed. Given that it can, nevertheless, produce descriptions; i.e., concepts, conceptual structures, theories, and eventually a picture of its world, it is clear that it can do this only by using building blocks which it has gleaned through some process of abstraction from the domain of its own experience. This insight, which Maturana expresses by saying that all cognitive domains arise exclusively as the result of operations of distinction which are made by the organism itself, was one of the points that attracted me to his work the very first time I came across it. — Ernst von Glasersfeld

What does it mean for a cognizing organism to be "informationally closed", when an organism has senses, and the organism produces behaviors that is part of the environment and has an effect (even a selective effect like predators vs prey) on the processes of other organisms? How does an entity that is "informationally closed" become social?

This also seems to contradict the first sentence in the link. The bold part seems to imply that a "informationally closed" entity can produce operations of distinction which are made by the entity itself. So an "I" (if it means the same thing as an "informationally closed" entity) isn't necessary to make distinctions.

wittgenstein is really making a profound point here. He even has Turing struggling to give a good counterpoint.

I think the central issue is that "rule following" or usage in mathematics is mathematics and not what what meaning we get out of it. If we assume that, it is easy to see why a contradiction isn't a problem if we either assign something to the result obtained after contradiction or leave it there. Read it again perhaps, it will get clearer. — Wittgenstein

What are the rules, and to what end? Who made the rules and how? It seems to me that if the rules were arbitrary, then they'd be much more malleable. Reality has this tendency of working how it wants to and we are just along for the ride - subjected to the forces that be, and active participants in what the calculus formulas represent, or mean. We all made the the rules as we all live in the same reality that help us determine what the rules should be. It is our common experiences of the same world that make the same rules applicable for others. If we didn't live in the same world, then how is it that the rules work for others and how are they shared?

It seems to me that the end is to ultimately predict future events - like landing a spacecraft on Mars in 6 months after it has just left Earth. Since meaning is the relationship between cause and effect mathematics has meaning as the relationship between what caused the formulas, and variables in some formula, to exist (our shared experience of the world) and how they are applied to create some effect (like landing on Mars).

There is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true — Andrew M

Bingo! You finally got it! So if this is common knowledge - that there is no getting around the fact that no-one has an infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, then that means people use the term, "knowledge" in the way I have described it, not you. People understand that their knowledge is fallible and so don't use the term in a way that implies truth - only justification.

Not only does your version of "knowledge" not fit how people use it, it relegates truth into meaninglessness as well. If there is no infallible guarantee that any specific claim is true, what does it mean to be "true"?

You don't seem to understand that you have to assume "naive" realism if you expect to teach others how to use words - as if the words appear the same to others as they do to you so that you can come to some shared meaning about how they are used. This means that you know how the scribbles appear to others, and what they mean to others. We have the same beetles in our boxes and if any of what we say is accurate (meaning our statements correspond to some state-of-affairs) and meaningful to others, then how can you not say that you don't have direct access to reality as it is? How can you say that you don't have direct access to your mind and your mind is part of reality - a causal part - which means that your mind is about your body and its relationship with the world.
Try this:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281656260_Aboutness

I have a model for what knowledge is. For example, my model says that knowledge is always true. So if Alice says that she knows it is raining, but it's not raining, then Alice's claim doesn't satisfy that model. So she didn't use the term correctly (in the veridical sense - her claim may still have been justifiable).

Whereas her claim may be satisfied on your model (that doesn't include a truth condition for knowledge). — Andrew M

This isn't anything different than what you've already said. Your model is useless if you can never know when it's appropriate to use. Knowledge would be this state-of-affairs that we'd never know about because we can never know that knowledge is true because we only have justifications and justifications are not truths. They might be, but we'd never know.

I dont get it. Is Witt using logic to render logic meaningless?

I dont see how you can't use logic and expect to make any sense and communicate. Communication requires logic. Maybe that is why it is so difficult to understand Witt's scribbles, and why there are different interpretations of his scribbles.

Sorry, but I have no idea what you mean by the phrase 'true nature of reality' ! — fresco

Most other people understand what I'm talking about when I said that. If meaning is use, then I used words and they have meaning. Saying that you don't understand what I mean is inconsistent with the idea that meaning is simply use. If someone uses words, everyone should understand the meaning, right? How can someone not understand what someone else means if meaning is simply use and use entails drawing scribbles and making sounds with your mouth? There must be something more to "use" if others can't understand what it meant by word use.

Since you say that you don't understand, I'll rephrase. Take this bit from your previous post:

From developments in phenomenology, the idea of 'an actual thing' is countered by the views that 'things are thinged by thingers'..i.e. 'things' are those social acquired words we (humans) give to repetitive interaction events of observers and focal aspects of 'our world'. 'Physicality' (of chairs etc) is merely one possible aspect of that interaction. 'Things' such as 'love', 'understanding', 'God', etc...may lack such an aspect, but may still have consistent social usage. — fresco

Does every statement you scribbled here refer to some real state-of-affairs which is the case for everyone regardless whether they believe it or not? If not, then how would it be useful to anyone else and why did you type it in the first place? Why are you communicating with me if it's not to transmit your ideas to me as if your ideas would be useful to me and others? And is it your word-use that is useful, or what your words mean that is useful?

Is
"From developments in phenomenology, the idea of 'an actual thing' is countered by the views that 'things are thinged by thingers'..i.e. 'things' are those social acquired words we (humans) give to repetitive interaction events of observers and focal aspects of 'our world'. "
accurate?

Do these scribbles represent some real state-of-affairs that everyone would realize if they just had the same observations as you? How is it that you came to realize that "From developments in phenomenology, the idea of 'an actual thing' is countered by the views that 'things are thinged by thingers'..i.e. 'things' are those social acquired words we (humans) give to repetitive interaction events of observers and focal aspects of 'our world'. ", if not by observations?

IMO, all we can attempt to explain is what 'communication' is functionally about. Maturana for example might describe it as ' structural coupling between biological,systems directed at a mutual goal'. And, If you think 'cause and effect' are essential aspects of the term 'explanation' we are not on the same wavelength. — fresco

How can you explain anything without having what the explanation is about prior to the explanation? Aboutness is another term for causation. Effects are about their causes. Effects carry information about their causes. Information/meaning is the relationship between causes and their effects.

The justified claim only needs to be true in order to use the term "knowledge" correctly or successfully. It is the same in this respect to the use of the word "raining" above. — Andrew M

Right. So how do you know that you or someone else is using the term, "knowledge" correctly, so say things like, "I/You are using the term, "knowledge" correctly."?

I suggest you think about your somewhat vacuous phrase 'naming things for the purpose of communicating the named things'. Compare it with ''things are merely repetitive observation events' (Rovelli) and ' all observation involves verbalization' (Maturana). — fresco

I thought about it before I typed it. That's why I typed it. Cause and effect. The words on the screen refer to the idea in my head that wasn't the words typed on the screen, but were visual and auditory images of humans using words to refer to things in the world. Humans are not made of words. They are made of flesh and mouths and make noises with their mouths and point with their hands. The words on the screen are black scribbles that are about those images that I thought about, so I don't know what you mean by "vacuous".

Things are not merely repetitive observation events. Everything changes. Cause and effect are the only constants.

Observation does not necessarily have to involve verbalization. I can experience things without applying words to the experience. Think about what it's like listening to instrumental music.

I think that some philosopher-scientists try too hard to sound witty (because they think language is a game) and they end up being incoherent, or just making word salad.

Whether or not you understand these points, they certainly indicate attempts to transcend your 'naive realism' by emphasizing the inextricability of 'observer' and 'observed'. — fresco

If you and those that you've quoted have made true statements about the nature of reality, then it seems that it is you and they, who are the naive realists. How can you make any truth statement about the nature of reality, implying that is how it is for everyone, and not be a naive realist? How is it that you know the nature of reality to say that ''things are merely repetitive observation events"? How do you know this if not by observing reality?

Words are names of things, not the things themselves. So there aren't thingers thinging things. There are namers naming things for the purpose if communucating the named things.

It is my understanding that Wittgenstein's 'meaning is use' was a later rejection of Frege's support for 'a picture theory of language'.
From developments in phenomenology, the idea of 'an actual thing' is countered by the views that 'things are thinged by thingers'..i.e. 'things' are those social acquired words we (humans) give to repetitive interaction events of observers and focal aspects of 'our world'. 'Physicality' (of chairs etc) is merely one possible aspect of that interaction. 'Things' such as 'love', 'understanding', 'God', etc...may lack such an aspect, but may still have consistent social usage. — fresco

No. IMO, definitions merely suggest potential usage contexts, and 'materiality' tends to imply 'of focal concern', not an allusion to 'physicality' as such (although 'to be of concern' is not without its biological connotations which are also 'physical events') As suggested on another thread, what 'matters' in social agreement is 'what happens hext', not some abstract state we call 'agreed meaning'. Reification, is the process of reinforcing the functional social value for a concept which lacks immediate 'physicality' by associating it with a physical 'object'. Thus, for example, 'recycling' is reified by designated disposal bins, or 'nationhood' is reified by a flag.
Now we could perhaps stretch the reification argument to a claim that the physicality of 'words' is itself responsible for reification of any concept, but that could be a step too far. — fresco

Seems to me that recycling is an act, or a cause, in the world that leads to a change in the world. I don't see any reason to throw around terms like "materiality", "physicality" "reification", etc. as it complicates things for no good reason. Talking in terms of causality, or the processing of information - from input to output - cause and effect - is more applicable to how language is used and why it is useful in the first place.

If things are thinged by thingers then what are those thingers, if not things themselves? It seems to me that one would be elevating, or separating, the thingers above, or from, the thinged when you'd have no good reason to do so. What is it that is being thinged? By things are thinged, means that things were already things prior to being thinged.

Why would thingers be thinging things in the first place?

What did Witt mean when he said "meaning is use"? What did he mean by "use"? Meaning is "use" seems like what a p-zombie would say. I need to be able to see and hear to use words. I need to be able to experience things other than words in order to use words.

No. Just above you were talking about our usage of knowledge terms ("know", "knowledge", etc.), but now you're talking about our knowledge itself (what we do know), which is always true, never false. — Andrew M

The key point is the distinction between Alice's knowledge claims (which can be false) and Alice's knowledge (which can't be false) — Andrew M

Well yeah, because in using knowledge terms you are referring to your knowledge. What else could you be doing with those terms? What do you mean by "use" when you say people use words? What are you doing mentally when you say that you "know" something? What are you doing mentally when you tie your shoes? I just want to make sure you're not a p-zombie.

That difference between the usage and the reality is what the observing aliens notice. But Alice also notices it as well if she subsequently discovers her mistake. She becomes aware that her prior claim was an instance of using a knowledge term when, in fact, she did not know it was raining. — Andrew M

But you're not taking this to it's ultimate conclusion and that is how do we know that the aliens know the truth? How do you know that you have acquired the truth when you only have justifications to go on? Again, as you are defining it, you'd need to know that your knowledge is true, not only justified, in order to use the term "knowledge" correctly. If you're not referring to your knowledge when using knowledge terms, then what do you mean when you use the terms? When I say "use" I mean making a particular sound or scribble to refer to the information one possesses about a particular state-of-affairs, like the steps one takes to tie their shoes, and the reasons why one should tie their shoes. What do you mean by the word "use"?

People use the term "know" correctly if their belief is justifiable. It need not be true. They only misuse the term if their belief is not justifiable.

Whereas knowledge is acquired - that is, the conditions of knowledge are met - if, in addition to being justifiable, their belief is true.

There is no guarantee or proof that any particular claim to knowledge is knowledge, no matter how justifiable. — Andrew M

We agree on the first part. We seem to disagree on what "know" and "knowledge" mean. Maybe it's because we are using different definitions.

I see "know" as the act of recalling information and using it.

I see "knowledge" as that information that is recalled.

So to say that I know something is to say that I have information in relation to some state-of-affairs that I can recall and use if necessary. It says nothing about whether that information is true or not. I gain more trust in the knowledge when the use of the knowledge accomplishes the goals I apply it to.

Truth is the actual state-of-affairs. Accuracy would be more like an external relationship between the information/knowledge in one's brain and the actual state-of-affairs the knowledge is (supposed to be) about. Knowledge is more or less accurate in relation to the state-of-affairs (the truth) it is about.

So, to know something is to recall and apply the knowledge one has. If one talks about "knowing" then they are talking about recalling and using their "knowledge", so there is no difference.

For you, there seems to be a difference. You seem to be saying that we could use the term "know" correctly since it is based only on justification, which I have said and agree, but never use the term "knowledge" because we can never actually know our knowledge is true. For you, it seems, one could never say "I possess knowledge", but can only say "I know something". I don't see any difference in what those statements mean.

Your question assumes that she needs an infallible guarantee or proof. She does not. She knows her belief is true (if it is) by reflection on what made her belief justifiable (e.g., her observation). If her belief is not true, then she won't know that (unless she later discovers her mistake). That's the logic of the usage. — Andrew M

Right, so if aliens observed our usage if the term, then they'd see us using it in instances of when we do know and when we don't. We use it when our knowledge is true, and when it is false. Truth conditions would not be a qualification for it's usage. Only justification.

So, as you see it, knowledge is simply justified belief? — Andrew M

Yes, it is the justified beliefs that you recall and apply when you say that you "know".

I wonder,

Who is an expert in God to know what they are talking about?

Who is an expert on consciousness to know what it is they are talking about?

Who is an expert on knowledge and truth to know what it is they are talking about?

Who is an expert on morality to know what is good and bad for everyone?

If these fundamental questions can't be answered by experts, then is it safe to say that anyone is an expert on anything?

One person’s truth might well be another person’s untruth. What is true today might not be true tomorrow. So, how can we know what is true? — ovdtogt

Were the first two sentences truths? Doesn't it seem strange to use truths to show that we can't know what is true?

I believe in everything until it’s disproved. So I believe in fairies, the myths, dragons. It all exists, even if it’s in your mind. Who’s to say that dreams and nightmares aren’t as real as the here and now?
John Lennon — ovdtogt

No one is denying that dreams and nightmares exist. They have causal power. They exist. The question is what is the nature of their existence?

If God created the universe, then there is a casual relationship between God and the universe. God and the universe would exist in the same causal (material?) reality. There can be only one reality. Dualism makes no sense.

We're just repeating ourselves, so either we're talking past each other, or one is simply failing to see what the other saying, or how they are using their words.

You keep referring to how people use the term and I keep pointing out that people don't use the term correctly if their belief didnt have a truth condition. We agreed on this so I dont see how it makes sense for you to keep referring to how people use the term when it is impossible to know when they used the term correctly (ie. problem of induction) when truth doesnt follow from justifications. It follows from the relationship between some belief and some state-of-affairs. It would be possible to have a true belief without any justification.

My argument is that they think they know what it means, but don't know what it means. If they really knew, then they'd know that knowledge, as they (and you) are using it, is an illusion.

In order to justifiably believe that it is raining, Alice needs to look out the window. If her belief that it is raining is true then she knows that it is raining. — Andrew M

This doesnt follow. If her belief is true then it qualifies as knowledge. Her belief can be justified, but not true. So she can't have knowledge unless she knows her belief is true. How will she know if her belief is true when she only has justifications from which truths don't necessarily follow?

My argument is that a truth condition is not a qualification for knowledge. Justifications are the only qualifications for knowledge.

Truth is some state-of-affairs. Knowledge can be true or false, which fits how we use the term in an objective sense - outside of our awareness of whether our knowledge is true or not.

If Alice looks out the window before claiming that she knows that it is raining, then her use of the term "know" is justifiable. If her claim is false, then she will not actually know what she thinks she knows. That is, she has used an achievement verb, but has not actually acquired knowledge. Nonetheless, it is a perfectly ordinary and acceptable use, and does not indicate that she doesn't know what it means. — Andrew M

If Alice knowing wasn't true, then she misused the word. You misuse a word when it is irrelevant to use. You misuse words when you don't know what they mean.

Compare with "It used to be true that the Earth was flat" (which is an unconventional use). Since knowledge entails truth, people used to think the Earth was flat (as you say below), but they could not have known it was flat. — Andrew M

So they confused knowing with thinking? If knowing and thinking are indistinguishable so that you don't know whether you're doing one or the other, then how do you know that everything that you know is what you know and not what you think, including what knowledge is? If you can't ever attain knowledge as you've defined it, then what's the point in using the term?

As you have defined it, you'd have to know that you know it is raining in order to say that you really know that it is raining. How do you know that you know if knowing and thinking are indistinguishable? You've engineered a nice infinite regress of homunculi of knowing that you know that you know that you know, etc.

You probably need to resolve the disagreement in order to move on. You can't move on when you have a disagreement. Well, you can, but it would be by yourself, or only with those that agree with you, but that would just be preaching to the choir.