That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out. — Sam26

It's not. Knowledge by skill is simply the means of testing, or justifying, your knowledge as a belief, by applying it.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions. — Sam26

I don't disagree because as Ildefonso shows, he had both beliefs and skills in being a gardener. He had no formal teaching. He taught himself by experience without any language. Organizing nature into neat little groups is what the mind does and language is a tool that helps us do that more efficiently - especially for communicating. Observing plants grow over time provides you with the same information as some professor and textbook does. Using what you have learned tests your knowledge. There are gardeners of varying skill - all based on the beliefs that they have about plants which were accumulated through learning by doing and/or taught. Even the best still learn new things. Your skill is a reflection of what you know.

When Ildefonso learned what words were for, he started asking what the shared name was for door, window, etc. He already knew what a door was, he just didn't know it's shared name. He already had beliefs about the door, but simply didn't know the symbol that we use to communicate the idea of them. When he learned what words were for, he wasn't shocked that there were suddenly doors and windows. He was shocked that there was a shared symbol for those things, and that people use those symbols to communicate the idea for those things. He could already use doors. He just couldn't use the word, "door". He had a belief in doors, but not in words.

There is knowledge as a belief, and there is knowledge as a skill. — Sam26

Knowledge as a skill is simply applied knowledge as a belief. You can't apply beliefs that you don't have.

OK. Another way to put it is that 'observe' and 'know' are achievement verbs (Gilbert Ryle's term). You can't observe what isn't there or know what isn't so. — Andrew M

But people use the term, "know", to refer things that aren't so. They don't know that they don't know. They think they do, which is why they use the word. We used to know that the Earth was flat until we learned that it wasn't. We can only know that we didn't know after the fact of saying that we did. So how people use the word isn't always about what is so. Knowing is only the belief that you have the proper information to form a conclusion, when you might not.

Justification (or warrant) comprises the rules that warrant someone making a knowledge claim. For example, your looking out the window warrants your claim that it is raining (or not raining). If the claim is true then knowledge has been acquired. (Gettier counterexamples aside which imply a further condition.) — Andrew M

But what if I mistook someone washing the roof and seeing water running down the window for rain? I would claim to know that it is raining, and it would take another observation (moving outside of the house) to prove that I was wrong. If the prior observation was wrong, then what makes us so confident in observations? We used to think the Earth was flat based on observations. It took a more objective observation to show that we were wrong (looking at the Earth from space). How do we know when we have reached the most objective observation to say that we then possess knowledge?

No. Note that I said "think we know". You can't know false things. So if a mistake is discovered then any claim to knowledge is retroactively retracted. For example, if I later find out that the clock was stopped then I also realize that I didn't know that it was 3:00 earlier despite my claim back then being warranted. — Andrew M

Which isn't any different from saying that you know you know. You can know false things. You might say that people in the 14th century didn't know the Earth wasn't flat, but the way they used the word, they did. Saying that you know doesn't cut the cake, which is why my claim that how people use the term isn't good evidence for what knowledge is still stands. Observations aren't good evidence of knowledge because we can show how observations can be skewed or biased. So how do you go about determining the truth condition of some statement?

Observations check our knowledge claims. A knowledge claim (or justified belief) can be false, knowledge can't. You can be warranted in making a knowledge claim (such as with the 3:00 example) but such warrant doesn't guarantee that the claim is true. — Andrew M

Knowledge claims are just sounds or scribbles that symbolize our knowledge that is made-up of visuals, sounds, feelings, etc. Observations check our knowledge - the beliefs that aren't composed of words, but are composed of visuals and actions in our minds that are merely communicated via claims.

Correct and that's important. But to say that a duck is all those things together that make a duck leaves us none the wiser about what a duck is. Neither does saying that a duck is whatever acts and looks like a duck. Both those definitions instead rely on a prior intuition (or definition) about what ducks are. For a definition to be useful, it needs a genus and differentia. — Andrew M

"Duck" is a word, not an animal. There were species before words. There are similarities and differences before words. These similarities are what we group under the symbol, "duck". The only reason we need the word, "duck" is to communicate all those things together. It's much easier to say "duck" rather than all those things that make a duck that we can observe. We don't need the word "duck" to observe that there are organisms that share more features and behaviors with others, and others that don't.

So differentiating and grouping (categorizing) just is the activity of defining noted above. Language is not fundamentally about arbitrary word symbols and sounds, but about the objects and activities they pick out. So we can ask about what people are doing when they use the word "know" or "observe". How are they using the term and what can we learn from an analysis of that use? — Andrew M

When you ask a 14th century person what they mean when they know that the Earth is flat, they will point to the Earth and show that they know by observation, and point to how others are saying the same thing.

Knowing that it is raining outside is an example of propositional knowledge (the proposition being, "it is raining outside"). If you look out the window and see what looks like rain then you can justifiably claim it is raining. If it is raining (the truth condition), then you know that it is raining. Whereas if someone was hosing the window while watering the garden, then you don't know it is raining (even though you may think you do).

The principle is the same whether talking about rain or the Red Sox. People can be informed (knowledgeable) or mistaken about either. — Andrew M

Like I said, if people say that they know that it is raining, when it isn't, then how are they using the word that is meaningful? How is how people use the term evidence that they know how to use it?

That's probably the case. However, others become aware of these kinds of prelinguistic beliefs by observation, but only if they have the concept of belief. In other words, it's backward looking, it only happens, that I can say there are prelinguistic beliefs, from the perspective of language. It's only in language that we can talk about such beliefs. This causes confusion. — Sam26

It seems to me that people can display knowledge without saying so. I know that you know how to tie your shoes by me observing you tie your shoes. No words need to be spoken. From this observation I can see that you have a belief about shoes and their laces being tied. Only if I never observed you tying your shoes would it be relevant to say so. Observing you tying your shoes and you saying that you know how to tie your shoes would be redundant information.

Knowing how to tie your shoes is knowing that there are shoes to be tied and that if you don't tie them they will fall off. You telling me that you know how to tie your shoes isn't a truth about your tying your shoes. It is a truth that you know how to say, "I know how to tie my shoes", not a truth that you actually know how to tie your shoes. Tying your shoes displays to both you and I that you do know how to tie your shoes, not saying it, and doing entails knowing that there are shoes to be tied or else they will fall off.

Learning that your shoes fall off when they aren't tied can be learned without language use. It can be learned without someone telling you so. So your belief that your shoes will fall off when they aren't tied can be learned by the experience of someone telling you or by you experiencing your shoes falling off more easily when they aren't tied. The experience can lead one to inform others that are new to wearing shoes why it is important to tie them.

One of the fundamental beliefs that we have is communication. Organisms communicate. One might even say that a more fundamental belief would be "aboutness" - that there are things that are about other things. Symbolization and representation seem to be an integral part of any belief as beliefs are about things.

In order to be able to learn a language, one must be able to symbolize, or understand that things can be about other things, and those other things can be outside of our own immediate experience (object permanence) of having a belief about that thing. Language is only useful to communicate things that aren't known by the other party. It would be redundant, and a waste of energy, telling someone something they already know.

People can communicate their ideas and knowledge to others without language. Body language and sounds babies make communicate their needs to their parents. Think about how you'd communicate with someone who speaks a different language. Pre-linguistic societies had many ways to communicate their ideas. Language is just a more sophisticated tool for communicating those ideas and knowledge.

In these types of discussions I often bring up Ildefonso, who is a man that didn't learn what a language was until he was in his late 20s.



IIdefonso had beliefs and he communicated them to others. The problem was that he wasn't using a shared language where others used the same means to communicate. In learning a language, one isn't learning new beliefs other than what scribble and sound symbolizes some other belief or idea that isn't a use of language.

One of the things that Susan says in the video is how it was difficult to teach someone what a word is by using words. We do this all the time when we teach babies how to talk and write. So it seems to me that, at least humans, already have this built-in feature of their minds to interpret symbols, or to assume that things can mean other things - that things are about other things.

She also says that he could obviously think and that she wanted to meet him and the only way to meet him was to teach him a language he could use to express himself - what was already there before language.

Interesting, your question involves the phenomena of language. We might consider there is knowing without words. The whole animal kingdom has knowing without words (set of rules for interpreting). We also have knowing without words. Our words (set of rules for interpreting) separate us from our experience and interfere with our knowing. — Athena

No. I would say that the infinite regress of aboutness is a product of how we use the word, "knowledge". How we use the word is wrong because of this.

Using a set of rules for interpreting sensory impressions would just be another way of saying that you're going by experience. Experience is a synonym for knowledge. Also, knowing is often equated to observing. You know because that is how you always experienced it before. You know because you are looking right at it. And then we often refer to authority for our knowledge, or even computers now with all the information they store and accessible virtually anywhere with the right technology.

The problem is that philosophers find problems with all of these forms of knowledge. The problem of induction is the problem of knowledge by experience. The problem of illusions and hallucinations is the problem of using your senses to know. The logical fallacy of appealing to authority is the problem of using those in authority as the source of knowledge. So why do many philosophers then go and say things like, "Truth is a condition of knowledge"?

Yes, they are distinguishable. But we seem to have different ideas about what your duck definition can include. The common definition for a duck specifies the genus which serves to exclude other things that just happen to have a similar appearance or behavioral characteristics. — Andrew M

We don't have different ideas about what the definition of a duck can include. Acting like a duck entails all the acts of a duck, which includes laying eggs. Looking like a duck entails all the appearances of a duck. There is also the taste and sound of ducks. All of these things together make one a duck. Cherry-picking among them doesn't make one a duck.

We don't even have to use words to define what it is to be a duck. We just observe, over time, the similarities and differences between different organisms and group them in our minds without the use of language. Language is merely a tool for referring to those categories when talking about ducks when we're not around ducks (talking about the trip to the pond and feeding the ducks after the fact), or when teaching the behaviors and appearances of ducks (like in Biology class), or when teaching which scribble or sound refers to ducks (in English class).

No it isn't. Per the example above, we know that the Red Sox won the 2004 World Series. But no-one can know that they lost it, since they didn't lose it. That's what it means for truth to be a condition of knowledge (and not falsity). — Andrew M

The difference in the types of knowledge seems to depend more on what we are talking about. Referring to artificial social constructions as states-of-affairs that you have knowledge about (like who is President of the United States and who won the 2004 World Series) seems much easier than referring to natural states-of-affairs (like knowing when it will rain). In the former case, we have created our own truths, or pre-defined them. In the latter, we haven't. We are defining them based on experience and observations.

If we can only know what something is (like knowledge) by empiricism, then knowledge doesn't fall into your category of propositional knowledge. It isn't something pre-defined like who won the World Series in 2004.

You can only observe that it is raining if it is raining (if that's what you're referring to). — Andrew M

Right, so truth is a condition of observations.

If I know that it's raining because I observed rain, then I can also know that I observed rain (by reflection). In that case, I would also know that I know (that it is raining). — Andrew M

Right. And you can then know that you reflected by reflecting upon the reflection, ad infinitum.

Is knowledge an infinite regress of aboutness? Or is knowledge some kind of set of rules for interpreting sensory impressions? To know that you reflected upon what you reflected seems to just be applying the same set of rules to some sensory impression or thought process. Sometimes the rules we have don't work and we have to come up with new ones.

The connection with language use is just that this is how we ordinarily use terms like "observe" and "know". But, of course, we can be sometimes be mistaken about what we think we know (such as when reading the time of a stopped clock). — Andrew M

Right, so mistaken, or false, is a condition of knowledge.

It is true that the clock says 3:00. You assume from experience (knowledge, or your rules that you have learned about what clocks do) that it is 3:00, until you observe another clock that says something different. Observations check our knowledge.

but I gave examples of how knowing how entails a sequence of knowing thats.

I asked how do you know some statement is true when we seemed to agree that observations determine truth, not language use. So truth is a condition of observations, not of language-use.

I also asked how knowledge can be turned on itself to say things like, "I know that I know". Isn't that similar to saying that "I observe that I know"?

Describing the shadows on the wall of a cave will never give you a satisfactory understanding of your surroundings no matter how sophisticated you are able to formulate your description of them. — ovdtogt

I don't see shadows. What I see is much more detailed than shadows. Not only that but I have other senses that give me even an even greater resolution on reality by way of providing more information that can confirm what one other sense is telling me. Notice how the location of objects in your visual field match up with the location you can feel and hear those objects in your tactile and auditory fields of consciousness. If we only had shadows to go by in how we understand the world, we wouldn't be as adaptable as we are, and survive as long as we do.

"Brains in a vat" is an external world scenario, thereby language would still have it's uses in such a world.

Our language is made up of many kinds of beliefs that can be called foundational or even bedrock, but not all foundational beliefs have the same structural significance...
What is the structure? — Sam26

In other words: since beliefs are propositional attitudes, I consider them to be a component of mind, not language. — Galuchat

I thought the same thing when I read that. Language is made up of many kinds of letters and words, not beliefs. Minds are made of beliefs, but beliefs aren't the foundation of minds. There are the brute sensory experiences that are the structure of our beliefs and the root cause of changing (restructuring) our beliefs.

Our beliefs are composed of shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, etc. The words and letters of any language are themselves composed of these things. You need to see and hear (or feel in the case of using braille) to learn and then use a language. So the structure of language and the beliefs it symbolizes are composed of sensory impressions.

It seems to me that a more fundamental belief in the kind that Sam26 is trying to get at would be the belief that there is an external world. You need that as the foundation before you can build a structural understanding of what language even is. The idea of language is built on the idea that there is an external world with other minds, and that my mind is a representation of that world including how human being communicate. Language would have no foundation to stand on if there wasn't the foundational idea of an external world, for what purpose would language serve to a solipsist? How would the idea even come about in a solipsist mind?

You might say that our senses, with all of their brute sensory impressions informing the mind of how the world is, are using the language of sensory impressions to communicate the state of the world to our bodies. The mind's interpreter tries to make sense of those impressions, which the shapes and sounds of language are a part of. Learning a language entails interpreting the correlation between the shape, color and sound and what it represents, just as learning that the redness of an apple means it is ripe.

The common definition for a duck specifies the genus which serves to exclude other things that just happen to have a similar appearance or behavioral characteristics. — Andrew M

Ducks are a particular type of species - ones that produce fertile offspring. Ducks are part of the genus we call "birds", because they have wings and feathers. Human actors and robots are of a different category altogether with one of the attributes that defines them is their adaptive abilities and ability to mimic other organisms to a wide degree.

I'm of the view that truth is a condition of (propositional) knowledge which I regard as a thesis about how people ordinarily use those terms. — Andrew M

Bandwagon fallacy. When you can use the term in such a way as, "I know that I know nothing", then something is wrong with our understanding of the term. If we can use terms like, "God" without any clear understanding of what "God" is, then the way most people use words is not good evidence that most people know what they are talking about.

What is it that they are talking about? What is knowledge? What is propositional knowledge vs other kinds of knowledge? Saying that truth is a condition of propositional knowledge is also saying that false is property of propositional knowledge. Doesn't that mean that true beliefs are not a necessary condition of (propositional) knowledge?

What makes one bit of propositional knowledge true and the other false? Some people talk about using truth tables, others talk about justification. How do you know that some knowledge is true or false? What does it mean to know this? How is it that we can turn knowledge on itself - of knowing that I know?

Er, no. Now 'that' is inconsistent. I'm not inconsistent, you are. If knowledge is an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs, then people have knowledge when they have a 'true belief' that Reason is adopting that attitude towards. Not when 'they' have the attitude, but when 'Reason' does. Owned.
O.W.N.E.D
It isn't dumb, but it will appear that way to the dumb. If it was dumb, why am I finding it so easy to own you?
I so own you. — Bartricks

What, are you 12 years old?

I was just reiterating what you said, so if I was inconsistent it was really you that is being inconsistent. What is Reason, and what is the thing that has a true belief? What is a true belief? How do you know the belief is true?

Oh yes, thinking of life as process instead of opposites is beautiful — Athena

I wasn't aware that the goal was to come up with beautiful ideas (which is subjective). I was trying to come up with useful ideas. IMO, useful ideas are beautiful ideas. The theory of evolution by natural selection is a beautiful idea because it solves the dualistic dichotomy of man vs nature by making man part of nature.

Time is a measurement of change. The measurement uses change to measure change, like the change of the second hand across the face of the clock relative to the change in the location of your body across the track during a race. So, in talking about past, present, and future, we are talking about relative change. This change occurred prior to this change, while this change occurred after that change. Simultaneous change would qualify as the "present", while prior and subsequent changes would qualify as "past" and "future".

How the guy seems to conflate "existence" with the "present" is interesting. He says that what is in the past existed but no longer does and the future will exist but doesn't yet - as if what exists qualifies as the present. Something must exist, and that is the present.
Did exist = the past. Will exist = the future. Exists = the present.

Jack is a newlywed.

Oh really? Was Jack a newlywed in the past, present or future? — 3017amen

"Is" refers to the present tense. Can Jack claim to be a newlywed a year from now? That depends on what a newlywed is. This is like asking, when do we stop saying, "Happy New Year"? When is the year no longer "new"? It seems to me that all we need to solve these problems are more specific definitions.

Sentences cant assert to be true or false on their own. A sentence isnt true or false because it says so. It is true or false if it fits or doesn't fit observations, or some state-of-affairs that exists that isnt the use of the statement itself.

As far as i'm concerned, I'm a married-bachelor until the ink of the registrars signature is dry. — sime

It seems to me that you are a bachelor until the ink dries, if the state of the ink is what determines whether you are a bachelor or married.

Great questions!

My first thought it reminds me of 'Vagueness' in LEM logic or bivalent qualities:

This apple is red.

Upon observation, the apple is an undetermined color between yellow and red, or it is mottled both colors. Thus the color falls into neither category " red " nor " yellow ", but these are the only categories available to us as we sort the apples. We might say it is "50% red". This could be rephrased: it is 50% true that the apple is red. Therefore, P is 50% true, and 50% false. Now consider:

This apple is red and it is not-red. — 3017amen

Sound like you just claimed the apple has no color at all.

The apple has a color. It is red. If it were a different color, I'd say so.

If words are vague then that most likely means that you havent established some context for your use of words.

Just to break it down slowly, that would not be correct. Because, a person is in-fact awake, while being asleep. — 3017amen

Then what do you mean by being asleep and being awake? Why use two different terms if they actually mean the same thing? What is the purpose of having two terms to refer to the same event?

Let's press on the "determinant" thing there. One way to look at the conditions under which a statement is true or false is to submit it to a T-sentence and see what happens. At face value, you can T-sentence the Liar:

"This sentence is false" is true if and only if this sentence is false.

The T-sentence (in a deflationary manner) sets out the truth conditions for the statement. Whether it provides a full account of what it means for a sentence to be true doesn't seem too relevant to me here, it's about whether arbitrary sentence interpretation requires the universal applicability of the T-sentence. — fdrake

What determines if the sentence is false? It seems to me that what you find irrelevant is the relevant statement that makes that statement false. The word, "if" implies that another statement is needed to determine if the statement is false.

"IF <this statement> or observation is true, then <this sentence> is false." makes more sense and is meaningful.

You can't determine whether the statement is false on it's own. You need another statement, or an observation to make sense of it.

The sentence, "this sentence is false" isnt a sentence designed for determing whether it is true or not with a T-sentence. It is a claim about some truth in itself. It doesnt make sense to use T-sentence on a statement defing what is already false or true. Using a T-sentence with a statement that already asserts it is false based on some other qualification other than the T-sentence, is nonsensical. You are applying a method for determining the truth of statement that doesnt apply, and claiming that the method the sentence is using to determine its truth value is irrelevant. You can't determine the sentence is false or true because there isnt enough information to go by, and applying the T-sentence is irrelevant.

Jack is a married bachelor
Jack is sleep-walking — 3017amen

Married and bachelor are two seperate and opposing qualities.

Sleep-walking are two separate non-opposing qualities. We know from experience that one can both walk, and even talk, while being asleep. One cannot be awake while being asleep. Being asleep doesn't prevent one from walking and talking. It does prevent one from being awake. You cant have both properties of being asleep and being awake at the same time in the same entity. Only at seperate times can these opposing statements about the same entity be meaningful.

Contradictions are not meaningless. Rather, contradiction requires a plurality of meaningful statements. — creativesoul

They would only be meaningful if they were seperate statements on their own, not asserting two opposing qualities of the same thing.

"Jack is a married man" and "Jack is a bachelor" are two meaningful statements on their own, but the statement, "Jack is a married bachelor" is meaningless because it doesn't refer to anything real. When you assert two opposing qualities about same entity you arent saying anything meaningful about that entity.

There is nothing that can make it true/false. That's the reason that it is neither. It doesn't have what it takes in order to be either. — creativesoul

Which is the same as saying it is meaningless.

I dont think people need permission from others to make an argument for or against something. If people want to make an argument for the existence of something, then define it in such a way that EVERYONE can see.

If you can't define it in a way that EVERYONE can see, and part of your argument is that everyone comes to realize its existence in their own way, then that would be the best reason for them to NOT argue for the existence of that thing - to not make positive assertions that it exists in some objective sense. It would be subjective and not objective. There is no good reason to assert the existence of the subjective as if it were objective.

We don't use language to make subjective assertions. We make objective assertions with language-use - assertions that others can see and verify when they look. If others can't see and verify when they look, then what is the point in saying anything about it?

This sentence is short.
This sentence is false.

Why is the first truth apt but not the second? — fdrake

You need references to say that one is true or not.

This sentence is short. Compared to which other sentences?

This sentence is false. Which sentence and what makes it false?

When held up in isolation of all else, "This sentence is false" is incapable of being false. It is also incapable of being true. It is neither coherent nor sensible. Meaningful... Sure. That's what makes it seem so puzzling. It's tempting to say "if it's false, it's true", or "if it's true, it's false"... that's what makes it puzzling... basing subsequent thought on the presupposition that it is even capable of being true or false.

It's not.

It has no empirically verifiable/falsifiable content. It has no truth conditions. There's nothing that can make it true/false.


"This sentence is false" is something often uttered when the speaker is pointing to a specific sentence that they believe contradicts what's happened and/or is happening. Excising "This sentence is false" from the only sensible context to say it in leaves something very important behind. Crucial. The referent of "this sentence".

Sentences that can be false have truth conditions. The Liar does not. Sentences that have referents and truth conditions are meaningful. Sentences that have neither referent nor truth conditions are utterly meaningless.

When properly accounted for - while it's in total isolation from it's normal use - "This sentence is false" is utterly meaningless. — creativesoul

So contradictions and sentences without any clear reference, are meaningless. Contradictions don't have any clear reference either. A contradiction is saying two opposing things about the same thing. One cannot be both a bachelor and a married man. Which one are they? They can't be both and claiming that they are both leaves no room to know which one they actually are until you observe the man wearing a wedding ring or not. Observations resolve contradictions by supplying the truth, and using our definitions, we find the other simply can't be the case when the other is the case.

"This sentence is false", is no different than saying "This sentence is cruel". The sentence is meaningless because it doesn't establish any connection with reality. Which sentence is it pointing to? Which part of it is cruel? Which part of it is false? This is like using words without any context, which makes it meaningless. It doesn't trigger anything meaningful in my mind when I read it. It doesn't give me anything to act on.

It seems to me that if you are saying "This sentence is false" isn't either true or false, then the reason it isn't true or false is because it doesn't actually refer to anything. If something doesn't refer to anything real, does it make that statement automatically false - a lie?

For a statement to be a lie it has to refer to things that aren't the case, or where the statement refers to an idea in the liar's head and not to an actual state-of-affairs that exists outside of their head. Being a victim of a lie means that you confused the idea in the liar's head with a real state-of-affairs outside the liar's head.

If I said that Santa Claus will come visit you in Munchkin Land, is that a true or false statement? Both Santa Claus and Munchkin Land do not exist. There are no references to real things in the sentence. Is it false or true, or neither? Is this a lie, a paradox, a falsehood, a truth, or what?

So are you claiming that all knowing-how reduces to knowing-that? — Banno

All I have done so far is offer some examples of knowing-how reducing to knowing-that. I don't know if I'd say all of them do.

I was hoping you might provide some examples to the contrary?

What we need here is quantum physics and getting past dualistic thinking — Athena

What we need is a theory that joins the theory of the micro with the theory of the macro. The dualism is a result of our ignorance and skewed perspective

Dualistic thinking is the solution to most problems. Most (everyday/philosophical) problems are dualistic by nature. — ovdtogt

The most obvious one that comes to mind would be nurture vs nature argument. But I can think of many: Freedom vs responsibility, private vs public... too many to mention all. Yin and Yang, Day and night, winter and summer, high tide and low tide. cold and warm, light and dark is a common thread in all philosophical pursuits. The pendulum of time sways to and fro. Even DNA is are 2 interconnected sinuses. Up and down like a spiral staircase they wind their way to the top. — ovdtogt

You said that dualistic thinking is the solution and that the problem is dualistic by nature.

I'm saying that thinking in dualistic terms creates the problem in the first place. Thinking of it as nature VS nurture is the problem. To imply that they work against each other is the problem. The fact is that you can't have one without the other. They both work in unison to define your being.

Day/night, winter/summer, high/low tide, etc. are cycles - a process. Because one aspect cannot exist without the other, one aspect is meaningless on it's own. Thinking of them working together, instead of in opposition, you get at the true meaning of the process.



.

Dualistic thinking is the solution to most problems. Most (everyday/philosophical) problems are dualistic by nature. — ovdtogt

Like what?

I would have accepted: 'reason is the effort to justify our beliefs' and that would not have precluded 'reason is the effort to express 'reality' in words and numbers'. — ovdtogt

Reason is the effort to justify our beliefs and language-use is the effort to express reality in words and numbers. Language-use isnt necessarily a use of reason. We can say unreasonable things about reality using words and numbers.

Well, not really. He describes developing that theory as no more than farting.

It was rejected from the start.

I'll add to the dualities described here, by pointing out that one can know that such-and-such is the case; and that one can also now how to perform some action. The distinction between knowing how and knowing that is well worth considering.

Isn't it odd that we talk of knowing in both these cases? Why should we have the very same word for such disparate activities? — Banno

Dualistic thinking is the cause of many of the problems of philosophy.

You know how to play soccer by knowing that you can't touch the ball with your hands, that your teammates wear the same color jersey as you, that you have to kick the ball into the goal more than the other team to win, etc.

You know how to tie your shows by knowing that you cross the strings and then fold one of them under the other, then knowing that you make a loop with one string and fold it under the other string and pull, etc.

You know how to get to work by knowing that you have to put the keys in the ignition and turn on your car and drive your car to the main road just down the street from your home, etc.

I can recall how to do something without doing it, just like I can recall that the Battle of Hastings was in 1066 without someone asking a question about when the Battle of Hastings was. I possess information/knowledge that I can access arbitrarily, not just within the social contexts it is used.

Reason is the effort to express 'reality' in words and numbers — ovdtogt

No, reason is the effort of linking justifications to beliefs.

No, because now we can recognise that there are two distinct questions here - "what is knowledge?" and "when do we have knowledge?"

The answer to the first question is "an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs". The answer to the second question, well, varies and we can only say rough-and-ready things about it. Such as that, for the most part, we have knowledge when we have a justified true belief, but not always - sometimes we can have knowledge without a justification, sometimes we can have a justified true belief and not have knowledge, and so on.

Hitherto most have thought that they were answering the first question - the "what is knowledge?" question - by answering the second. That's a big mistake. And in a way one is continuing to make it if one faults my view for not being able to answer the second, for that is to fail to recognise that the second is a quite distinct question. — Bartricks

This is so inconsistent, it can't be philosophy.

If knowledge is "an attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs", then people have knowledge when they have an "attitude Reason adopts towards some true beliefs". But what are true beliefs?

The second question is not distinct because you can tell when someone has knowledge because you have defined it. So people have it when they fit the definition that you have proposed, which is a dumb way of explaining it, IMO.

Reason is the process of providing justifications for what you believe. The justifications have to be logically sound - which means that the conclusion follows from the justifications. Truth is a property that we shouldn't be attributing to knowledge. Truth and knowledge are distinct, not what knowledge is and how to know whether someone has it or not.

I don't see how you can define knowledge in such a way and then say that a person fits that definition yet doesn't possess knowledge. It's like saying, "It walks, talks and acts like a duck, but isn't a duck".
— Harry Hindu

The issue is that we're trying to empirically find out what knowledge is (or, linguistically, how people use the term), not legislate it.

A human actor or a mechanical robot that walks, talks and acts like a duck satisfies the above definition, but isn't a duck. — Andrew M

How else do you find out what something is, except empirically? How people use terms can be inconsistent with their understanding of what it is they are talking about - like in this case of "knowledge".

How do you know that you know anything? How do you know what knowing is? Can you know? It is a contradiction to say that you know that you know nothing, and any understanding of knowledge that can lead one to say such things must be wrong.

Can a human actor or a mechanical robot lay an egg like a duck? No. Of course not. So you can distinguish between human actors or mechanical robots and ducks because human actors or mechanical robots can't behave (and look) exactly like a duck, or else how would you be able to distinguish between the them to be able to use different terms to refer to them?

Why doesn't the person have knowledge if they fit all the requirements? Find what is missing and make it part of the definition.
— Harry Hindu

Right. So JTB is like Newton's theory of gravity. Newton's theory predicts the planet's orbits really well. Except for Mercury. So the question just is to find what is missing (or to posit a different theory altogether). — Andrew M

Yes, so either something else is interfering with Mercury's orbit, or we need to posit a different theory, in which case our knowledge would change. Is knowledge something that can change, or is it a black and white case of either you have it or you don't, and if whether you have it or not is dependent upon whether it is true or not?

No, that's quite wrong. It's not a 'definition'. It is a thesis. It was Plato's thesis. And it seems true for the most part. — Bartricks

Definition, explanation, etc. whatever you want to call it. You need an explanation of "knowledge" - of determining the common features, or qualities, that entail "knowledge" and "knowing" - before you can say that others have it or not.

But then counterexamples were devised - cases where although a person possesses what the thesis says they need to possess, it seems manifest to reason that they nevertheless lack knowledge. — Bartricks

How were the counterexamples devised? If a person exhibits the common features and qualities that are commonly understood as "knowledge", or "knowing", then the counterexamples must be assuming something else about "knowledge" than what is commonly understood. What are they assuming?

A philosopher tries to figure out what knowledge is by a combination of looking at clear cases of knowledge possession and seeing if there is anything they all have in common apart from being cases of knowledge and conceptual analysis. — Bartricks

What is a clear case of knowledge possession? How would you know unless you already have an idea of what knowledge is? In explaining a clear case of knowledge possession, you'd be defining the common features and qualities of knowledge possession. How does one possess knowledge, and how is that different from "knowing"?

Now it seems to me that there is nothing all clear cases of knowledge have in common apart, that is, from involving a true belief.

That doesn't mean that having a true belief is sufficient for knowledge - it is clearly not, for we can easily imagine cases in which someone has a true belief but does not have knowledge. Nevertheless, there seems nothing - apart from being cases of knowledge - that all cases of knowledge have in common apart from involving a true belief. Knowledge cannot be reduced to 'true belief', but there seems nothing else all cases of knowledge have in common.

And that's why I propose that knowledge itself is an attitude Reason is adopting towards true beliefs. Hence why there is nothing else they all have in common apart from being cases where an agent has a true belief. — Bartricks

It seems to me that you're not saying anything different than I am, except that you seem to be trying to using phancy words to say it, like with your Reason with a capital "R".

If you had read the rest of my post, you would see that I mentioned that knowledge was justified beliefs, where "justified" means tested.

Beliefs are like hypotheses. Knowledge is like a theory. The fact is that the universe exists. Some hold a belief that God created the universe. Others believe that the Big Bang created the universe. We can't test the belief/hypothesis that God created the universe, therefore it remains a belief. We have tested the hypothesis of the Big Bang. We have the expansion and background radiation as evidence. This doesn't mean that the Big Bang theory is true. It just means that it has been tested. It can be falsified, therefore it counts as knowledge, not just a belief.

Truth shouldn't be conflated with knowledge. Any explanation of "knowledge" needs to explain how our "knowledge" is wrong even though we claimed we possessed "knowledge" at the time.

Knowledge is like a tested model of reality, or some specific aspect of it. We test our knowledge every time we use it. When our knowledge leads to predicted results, or goals, then we call that an act of knowing. When our knowledge doesn't lead to predicted results or goals, then we call that an act of not knowing. But then how can we say that we possessed knowledge if we were caught in the act of not knowing? Was it that we never possessed knowledge in the first place, or is it that our knowledge/model changed? Is a common quality of knowledge that it can change, or is an either-or case of either you have it or you don't? If it is the latter, then how do you ever know that you have it, and what would it mean to know that you know or don't know?

The topic here is "what is knowledge?" There is already broad agreement that whatever else knowledge involves, it involves having a true belief and a justification for it. But there are cases where these elements are present yet the person does not possess knowledge. — Bartricks

I don't see how you can define knowledge in such a way and then say that a person fits that definition yet doesn't possess knowledge. It's like saying, "It walks, talks and acts like a duck, but isn't a duck".

Why doesn't the person have knowledge if they fit all the requirements? Find what is missing and make it part of the definition.

Maybe truth and knowledge shouldn't be conflated. Knowledge is like a theory - a justified a hypothesis. One might say that knowledge is an effect of testing one's beliefs in the same way theories are the effect of testing one's hypotheses.

Knowledge is a thing one possesses and knowing is the act of using that thing one possesses. In this sense, knowledge is the same as information. We possess information. Knowledge and information have this quality about them - particularly "aboutness". They are about states-of-affairs in reality. This means that I don't have the states-of-affairs in my mind, I have knowledge about those states-of-affairs in my mind. Knowledge, in this sense, is a mental representation of those states-of-affairs, based on testing my beliefs/hypotheses.

I would rather dispense with the use of external vs. internal, physical vs. mental dichotomies and just say that all correlations are causal.

Freedom entails choices. The more choices you have, the more freedom you have.

Most animals don't make choices. Their actions are instinctive. They respond to the environment in programmed ways. The program is a general response to a variety of circumstances. Bees evolved to instinctively use the Moon as a means of navigation, and a porch light can be mistaken for the Moon and cause the bee to fly around and around until it dies of exhaustion. The bee has no choice. It simply does what it was programmed to do and can't distinguish the Moon from a porch light.

Humans have more freedom because we can make choices. We can make distinctions between the Moon and porch lights. Being able to make more distinctions enables us to make more choices. Our ability to plan ahead and store a significant amount of information in our brains also provides us with the ability to make choices. Sometimes, though, having too many choices is a detriment. It can freeze us in place as we try to make a decision about what to do when it might become to late to act. Instinctive behaviors are good in the way that they limit response times to changes in the environment, while decision-making can fine-tune our responses to the variety of environmental changes that occur. Both have their pros and cons. Nature is simply trying different tactics to see what works best. If humans end up destroying themselves, then one might make the case that freedom and choices are more of a detriment to organisms over the long term. But then, humans have been able to use their intelligence to learn of the threats to our existence that other animals are oblivious to, and enables us to take actions to prevent it. The jury is still out one whether or not one is better than the other.

If we weren't ignorant we wouldn't ask questions because we'd already have all the facts.
— Harry Hindu
Where do you have them, and how do you know? You're claiming no questioning. What summons them, then? — tim wood

How is this any different than saying that the universe is filled with information/facts that is the answer to some question?
— Harry Hindu
The Universe is not filled with facts. Facts are constructs of the mind. And they can only be considered 'Facts" if they contain 'truths. And 'truths' solve problems or answer questions. — ovdtogt

I don't have facts in my mind. I have knowledge in my mind - knowledge of the facts.

I recall the facts I know. I ask questions to get at facts that I don't know.

A fact is a state-of-affairs. Truth is accurate knowledge of the facts - like knowing the fact, or state-of-affairs, that Donald Trump is president of the United States.

When I mentioned the probability of life I was speaking from a normal, probabilistic sense. I wasnt using this “probability after the fact” version, though I can see now I could have been more precise. I should have said “for life to have formed” or “for life to come to exist” instead of “for life to exist”. My mistake, but my points still stand. — DingoJones

But you already live after the fact. I asked you how do you know the probability of life arising in any universe? Doesn't it depend on pre-existing conditions? And if those pre-existing conditions exist, then life is certain to exist, and without them then life is certain to not exist. Probabilities are ideas that stem from our ignorance of what is, was, or will be.

I can see you making that statement before the fact, say 13 billion years ago when galaxies were just beginning to form and before any life existed. You would say that it is improbable for life to form, but that would be based on your ignorance of the future.

A statement that does not answer a question or solve a problem is not a fact. It is just a string of words that has no meaning or value. It does not contain a scintilla of 'truth'. — ovdtogt

You didn't answer my question.

Statements are about facts. You making a statement is another fact for a different context.