We don't need to know what matter is made from, all we need to know is how it behaves, how it interacts, and why. — Inis

We explain how matter behaves as a result of what it is made of - tiny particles called atoms.

We also know, ideas aren't made of energy — Inis

We do? What are ideas made of? If you don't know, then how can you say that you know they're not made of energy? and how do they establish causal relationships with matter?

It seems that we are still in the same predicament. Matter is made of something that we don't know what it is. We could say the same thing about ideas. Are ideas made of energy?

What makes a decision "wrong"?

Yes, there is only matter and the laws of physics. Your "animals" and "design" are not real. — Inis

Then we don't agree. You keep using this term, "matter". I don't know what that is. I'd say that your distinction between "matter" and "ideas" is not real.

Okay, so we agree after all.

how did that string of words, "as a matter of fact" get in your post?

The word is indeed evoked by the idea in the author of a locution, but it must evoke the idea in the recipient if the locution is to communicate. If I look at the word "unicorn," and have no idea what a unicorn is, the string cannot signify unicorns to me. That is why unknown languages are meaningless to us -- because they are incapable of evoking the ideas their authors intended in us. — Dfpolis

Sure, but that isn't to say that the author never had any intent to write anything down. Those words still mean what the author intended even if no one ever reads what he wrote. The same goes with everything else ("material things" as you call them). Just because some effect isn't noticed, or part of some awareness, doesn't mean that the cause never happened. You are basically saying that meaning only arises in the relationship between matter and ideas. I'm saying there is no distinction that you have been able to coherently show between them and that they are both causal and can establish the same kind of relationships - meaningful/causal. Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect.

Ideas are not images. First, some ideas are to abstract to be imagined. What is the image of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence>? How could we have an image of indenumerable infinity using a finite number of neurons? — Dfpolis

If they can't be imagined, then how do you know what they mean? How do you know that you're thinking of <indenumerable infinity> or of <existence> if they don't have any imagery that the words refer to? How do you distinguish between <indenumerable infinity> and <existence> in your mind (other than seeing the words on a screen)?

Second, ideas are indeterminate, while images are determinate. Is the idea <human> black, Caucasian or Asian; male or female; old or young; tall or short? None, of course, but any image will have definite characteristics. — Dfpolis

Again, if words don't refer to some mental image, then what do they refer to? When the word "human" crops up in my mind, humans that look like me crop up in my mind (Caucasian, white middle-aged male, or maybe a fine-looking woman depending on my mood), and I'm sure it's similar for others. What a words evokes in some mind is what that mind has most of it's experiences with. Again, how could you know that you are thinking <human> instead of <unicorn> if there isn't some mental imagery happening that those scribbles refer to?

An imagined unicorn is not the mental image of a unicorn, which is an image, not a unicorn, but a mental image thought of as existing. — Dfpolis

This is so confusing. I think your problem is that you are over-complicating things. Yeah, a mental image of a unicorn is not a unicorn, but then what does the scribbles, "unicorn" refer to? You have used this string of scribbles, "unicorn" over and over while claiming that unicorns don't exist. Then what do you mean when you use those scribbles? You keep contradicting yourself saying that unicorns don't exist yet you keep using the word to refer to something. What is it? If "unicorn" refers to an image of a unicorn, then the image of a unicorn is a "unicorn".

As unicorns don't exist, all that there is to a unicorn is what we imagine it to be. — Dfpolis

Another contradiction! Unicorns don't exist, yet all there is to a unicorn is what we imagine! Then unicorns exist as what we imagine (mental imagery). What does your unicorn look like? How do you know you're thinking of a unicorn? Please answer that question and the previous one about how you distinguish between indenumerable infinity and existence in your mind. How do you know you're thinking of one as opposed to the other? How do you know what those strings of symbols mean?

The point is that categories are based on concepts and concepts are based on objective intelligibility being actualized by minds. So, appealing to categories does not avoid dependence on mental concepts. — Dfpolis

Actually, I'd go so far as to say that categories only exist in minds. Therefore the only kind of category is a mental category, (or a concept).

So why place them in the category, "ideas"? — Harry Hindu

Because they have something (not everything) in common: their whole being, all they can do, is refer. — Dfpolis

And so can matter. I already went over this. Effects refer to their causes and effects can be "material" or "intentional". The tree rings refer to the age of the tree because of how the tree grows, and the tree rings will mean the age of the tree even if no one comes along to see them. The tree stump and its rings still exists. It still reflects light, even if their are no eyes to capture that reflected light. That reflected light could make other things happen - material things - without ever encountering a mind to branch off the causal path into new directions.

So you have yet to explain the difference between "matter" and "ideas". Everything you say that an idea can do, I can say that matter does as well. They both establish causal relationships. They both refer to their causes. Is there anything else that you can think of that would distinguish between "matter" and "ideas"? I'm willing to be that you can't because it is a false dichotomy.

And I already went over this with you where you talked about how you change your intent and I pointed out how this is no different than how an apple changes color, but you didn't respond to it. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I know. I did not respond, because I did not understand how it helped you. Say an apple changes color from green to red. The principle of continuity, what remains the same, is the apple, not the color. One color ceases to be, and the other comes to be. In the same way, if I change my intent, I, the intending subject remains, but my old intent ceases to be and my new intent comes to be. The principle of excluded middle allows no continuity between willing to go and not willing to go, or between no being red and being red. — Dfpolis

You obviously didn't understand my point if you didn't understand how it helped me. You actually just proved my point here. Your intent is the same as the color. You are the same as the apple. In other words you are no different than an apple (you are both constants that change), and intent is no different than the color (what changes). So again, how are intents different than matter if in both cases there is a constant and something that changes?

You have failed in making any coherent distinction between what is "matter" and "ideas".

Being actually predetermined is not the same as actually existing. — Dfpolis

Sure it is. It is your perception of time that makes you see the future as something that doesn't exist yet.

I have no idea what "Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe," means. I have a very good idea of what "Time is the measure of change according to before and after means." We have no power to stretch causal relations. We do have the power to measure change. — Dfpolis

I explained this already when I spoke about how our minds operate at a certain frequency of change relative to the other processes of the universe. Your mind stretches those causal relationships. The speed at which you experience the world is dependent upon your conscious state. Lethargic lizards experience the world as a blur, where the causal relationships are blurred together. When they warm up, those causal relationships stretch into something more discernible (causes and their effects).

I already asked you this question. You're asking me how they work, when I asked you the same question. How did the words, "animals" and "design" get on this screen in your post? If you are the one claiming that they are separate, then what are the rules for how abstractions behave and how are those any different from how matter behaves? If I claim that abstractions and matter are the same thing, then I'm not claiming that they obey different laws than "matter". You are and so it is up to you to explain their differences.

I think that Popper and Eccles really mean the sort of material determinism that takes the universe from one state to the next. If you admit the causal power of "animals" and "design" you are already stepping outside material determinism, into a situation where abstractions are causal. I think the two conceptions are distinct, and this could be the cause of some confusion. — Inis

No. The confusion arises out of making them distinct. Abstractions are causal. They cause us to behave in certain ways when they are in or mind. How did those words, "animals" and "design" get on the screen in your post if the abstractions, "animals" and "design" aren't causal?

It makes no sense distinguish between, "material" or "abstractions" when they both are causal. That is why I didn't use those terms in my explanation. They are unnecessary and cause more problems than they solve. Dualism is a false dichotomy. Monism is the truth.

I think the problem lies in the premise that if one responds instinctively, one is responding irrationally. Animals are not irrational. Determinism implies that they respond to stimuli just as they were designed and learned to do.

To express an idea is to instantiate a sign capable of evoking it. So, "unicorn" is an expression because can evoke <unicorn>. Still, it is not a symbol for the idea, because it is not the idea <unicorn>, but imagined/potential unicorns (animals) that both the word and the idea refer to. — Dfpolis

This is very confusing.
First, the word, "unicorn" does not just evoke <unicorn>, the word itself is evoked by <unicorn>. As I have been saying, words and ideas are both causes and effects of each other, and each carries information about each other.
Second, I have no idea what you mean by "imagined/potential unicorns". There is the word, "unicorn", pictures of unicorns, and the idea <unicorn> (a mental image of a unicorn), and the causal relationship between them. That's it. An imagined unicorn is just another name for the mental image of a unicorn.

While there are categories, <category> is not a fundamental concept. An instance is in a category because its objective nature, its intelligibility, is able to evoke the concept defining the category. If beagles were not able to evoke the concept <dog> they would not be categorized as dogs. So concepts are logically prior to categories -- and concepts refer to all of their potential instances, not just those that we have experienced or those that actually exist at any given time. — Dfpolis

This is just more confusing. This is just a bunch of unnecessary use of terms in a long-winded explanation.

There is just the causal relationship between some visual or auditory experience of the written or spoken word "unicorn", and a mental image of a unicorn. That relationship is your evocation - causal. And it happens in the opposite direction where mental images (ideas of unicorns) of unicorns cause/evoke the written word, or spoken sound, "unicorn. Concepts are mental categories, so it doesn't make sense to say that concepts are prior to categories.

Ideas are not things, but subjects thinking of things. Further, ideas are abstractions. The do not exhaust what we are thinking of. Since ideas are abstractions, they can leave individuating characteristics behind, and so the same idea can be evoked by many individuals. That is why many concepts are universal. — Dfpolis

All I am saying is that ideas have causal power. Does an idea of a unicorn exhaust a unicorn like the idea of a horse exhausts a horse? An idea of an imaginary thing does exhaust what that thing is because an imaginary thing only exists as imaginary, not also as real. There is nothing more to an imaginary object than what is imagined. But the idea of a unicorn (an imagined unicorn) has just as much causal power as an idea of a horse (an imagined horse). The difference is that there are no real unicorns to evoke the idea of unicorns. There are only pictures and words.

There is no distinction between what is ideas and what is matter if everything is different from each other. — Harry Hindu

This is a complete non sequitur, and I can't think of how you came to this conclusion. The fact that we have 100 different plastic toy cars does not mean that there is no difference between the idea of plastic and the idea of a toy car. — Dfpolis

No, that isn't an example of my restatement of your claim.
It would be more like we have 100 different things with no relationship at all. Everything would be made of a completely different element and with a different function. Using your explanation of "essences" and "existence" there is no possibility for the existence of categories.

Again, you said that animals and ideas have different essences because they can do different things. A goat can eat grass, but the idea of a goat can't. You also said that an essence is a specification of possible acts. This would mean that the idea of a horse and the idea of a unicorn have different essences because they both do different things. If they did the same thing, how would you know which one you were thinking of? So, not only do animals and ideas have different essences, different ideas have different essences too. So why place them in the category, "ideas"? Everything can't do everything different or else there could be no categories. There must be actions that things do that are similar for us to form categories.

We can imagine many things, but that does not make them exist. Grass that ate grass would have a different essence than actual grass. — Dfpolis

Can you please try to stay focused. That isn't what I asked. I don't think you're actually taking the time to read what I'm writing. You seem to only want to push your view.

Go back and read what I wrote. I was comparing two imaginary things, not imaginary grass and real grass. Go back to your definition of "essence". If two things do the same thing then they would have the same essence. Does the idea of grass eating grass have the same essence as the idea of a goat eating grass?

I explained it to deal with your misunderstanding my use of "essence," not to explain the difference between the concepts of materiality and intentionality, which I already explained in the OP. — Dfpolis

And I already went over this with you where you talked about how you change your intent and I pointed out how this is no different than how an apple changes color, but you didn't respond to it. Your intent, along with the apple's color changes as a result of prior causes. I am showing that their isn't a difference that you can explain coherently because there is no actual difference between what we call ideas and matter. It's all information.

Determinism alone does not eliminate the distinction between actual and potential. Even if the time-development of the universe were fully determined by its initial state at one time the present state was not the universe's actual state, but only a fully determined potential state. — Dfpolis

No, the present state is one of the universe's actual predetermined states.

I think you have this backward. Time is a measure of change, and change occurs because what was merely potential becomes actual. Determinism is irrelevant to the reality of change. — Dfpolis

Time is the stretching out of the causal relationships that make up the universe. A causal relationship is a change (cause and effect).

There's no way in Hell I'd ever try to discuss anything more complex with you by the way, given the absurd difficulty we're having with something so simple and stupid. — Terrapin Station

You're right. It is stupid. All because you couldn't answer a simple question several posts ago:

What is brain phenomena? Objective or subjective? — Harry Hindu

You beat around the bush, performing all these mental gymnastics before you finally, just now, answered the question:

"Objective," however, in my usage, does NOT refer to "brain phenomena. — Terrapin Station

Finally!

Yes, they all have the property of being brain phenomena. Brain phenomena with the property of being mental is a subset, and "brain phenomena" is a superset that includes the subset of brain phenomena that has the property of being mental. — Terrapin Station

Objective refers to things that do not have the property of being mental. So subjective stuff, in my usage, isn't a subset of objective stuff. I'm stipulating this. So it's not something I can get wrong. I'm telling you something about the way I use words. You can use the words differently. It's fine if you do. — Terrapin Station

So basically you're logically inconsistent, but that isn't considered "wrong" in your dictionary. You have a problem.

Not all brain phenomena have identical properties. — Terrapin Station

They have at least one identical property. They are brain phenomena. Why can't you either admit that you are wrong in saying that mental phenomenon is subset of brain phenomena or that you were wrong is saying subjective is not a subset of the objective? When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.

Set M is a subset of a set B, or equivalently B is a superset of M, if M is "contained" inside B, that is, all elements of M are also elements of B. If that isn't what you are saying then its not just objective and subjective that you have idiosyncratic definitions for, you also have an idiosyncratic definition of "subset".

So see what I said right after that above: — Terrapin Station

But what you said after that - the part I quoted - you said that mental phenomena are a subset of brain phenomena. A subset is part of a larger group of similar things, not opposite things. Your subjective is subset of the objective. Either that, or mental phenomena are not subsets of brain phenomena.

the way I use the terms, the subset of brain phenomena that have the property of mentality is NOT objective. — Terrapin Station

That isnt what I implied that you said.

You stated that mental phenomena is subjective. What is brain phenomena? Objective or subjective?

Ugh, another fragile snowflake complaining about complaining. — StreetlightX

If you didn't know, that's called hypocrisy. — MindForged

Yeah, I know this wasn't a reply to SX, but it works as a reply and I agree. :smile:

I just became curious because you were using the terms in a way that I wouldn't use them. I'd never say that subjectivity is a subset of objectivity for example. — Terrapin Station

Didn't I just say that your usage isn't much different than my, or the common usage of these terms? Doesn't that mean that you do use those terms in that way?

Just look at what you said:

Regarding how I use subjective and objective, which isn't that unusual, I simply use them so that "subjective" refers to mental phenomena (that is, that subset of brain phenomena that is mental phenomena), and "objective" refers to everything extant that's not mental phenomena. (I've given those definitions on the board quite a few times, so apologies to folks to whom I'm repeating myself yet agin.) — Terrapin Station

You said that mental phenomena is subjective and is a subset of brain phenomena. Brain phenomena qualifies as being part of everything that's not mental phenomena (objective). Mental phenomena is a subset of brain phenomena, so subjectivity is a subset of objectivity.

However, even if I were unclear, that is not equivocation, which requires the same term to to be used with different meanings in different instances — Dfpolis

Exactly. Using the same term with with different meanings in different instances would be unclear in your use of the term.

The string, "unicorn" expresses, but does not refer to, the idea <unicorn>. Except when we're considering ideas, universals do not refer to ideas, but to potential instances -- to potential realities that could evoke the idea when and if we experience them. Because of ideas' potential and contingent nature, the existence of an idea has no implications for extramental reality. — Dfpolis

Okay, the string, "unicorn" represents, or symbolizes (both are synonyms of "express") the idea <unicorn>. You seemed to contradict yourself by saying that universals refer to potential instances.

Instead of "potential instances" - which seems like a loaded term, I'd use the term "category". Unicorns, cats, dogs and planets are categories. We put things (Uni) in mental boxes, or categories (unicorns) - Uni the unicorn.

As for animals and ideas, they have different essences because they can do different things. A goat can eat grass, but the idea of a goat can't. — Dfpolis

Then the grass would be a different essence than the goat. All you have done is redefine "thing" as "essence", and that throws a wrench into your explanation of "matter" and "ideas". — Harry Hindu

I am unsure what line of thought led you to this conclusion. — Dfpolis

What led me to that conclusion was your own explanation of "essence". You said they have different essences because they can do different things. Every thing does something different, which means that each idea is a different essence, and each material thing is a different essence. There is no distinction between what is ideas and what is matter if everything is different from each other. Goats eat grass, but grass doesn't eat grass, so they would be different essences. The idea of grass doesn't eat the idea of grass either and would be a different essence than the idea of a goat eating grass.

But wait a second, can you imagine grass eating grass (the idea of grass eating grass)? Would that then make it the same essence as the idea of the goat eating grass?

Things, beings, are characterized by an unspecified capacity to act. They are operational -- have "causal power" in your turn of phrase. That unspecified capacity is what is intended by the concept of <existence>.

We know from experience, however, that things can not only act, but act in specific ways. They can do these acts, but not those. Goats can eat grass. The idea of a goat can't. So, a thing being able to act in unspecified ways does not exhaust its reality. The specification of each thing's possible acts, which is its essence, resolves this indeterminacy.

In sum, essence is a specification, but an abstract specification does not entail that any operational thing has that specification. Existence reflects operational capability of what essence specifies.

So, I haven't redefined "thing" as essence. Every real thing has both essence (specification) and existence (operational capability). — Dfpolis

Then I don't see how you've said anything different or made anything clearer. Every thing has a different essence and existence. Each idea would have a different existence and essence. So what? What does that have to do with the difference between what an idea is and what matter is? You've simply explained the difference between things, not the difference between the category "idea" and "matter".

It seems to me that one's essence defines one's existence. It seems to me that they are inseparable, as one's essence/existence is a relationship with everything else, so in a sense you did redefine "thing" as "essence/existence". In a deterministic world, that relationship would be deterministic, with no potentialities. "Potentialities" are the result of our perception of time, as if the future is yet to happen and still isn't determined.

I never said that the ideas <unicorn> and <horse> do the same things. <Unicorn> refers to actual and potential unicorns while <horse> refers to actual and potential horses. Contingently, there are no actual unicorns, but there are actual horses. — Dfpolis

I didn't say you did say they were the same. My point was to restate your claim that they don't do the same things and therefore would be different essences and different existences. You still haven't addressed the differences between "idea" and "matter".

When we become aware of present situations we modify our intentions to address the situation. We also plan ahead, and when that goal is in the mind we use the present situation to choose a course of action that will get us to our goal. It's basically like an IF-THEN statement in goal-oriented decision-making.

Here's an interesting article:
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2015.00395/full

..which is part of a series of articles submitted specifically for this topic:
https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/2705/from-intentions-to-actions-psychological-and-neural-processes#articles

Regarding how I use subjective and objective, which isn't that unusual, I simply use them so that "subjective" refers to mental phenomena (that is, that subset of brain phenomena that is mental phenomena), and "objective" refers to everything extant that's not mental phenomena. (I've given those definitions on the board quite a few times, so apologies to folks to whom I'm repeating myself yet agin.) — Terrapin Station

That really isn't much different than my usage, or the common usages of those terms. I emphasized the parts that are similar, if not the same, as how we are using them, so I really don't see what the big deal is.

SUBJECTIVE
1 : of, relating to, or constituting a subject: such as

a obsolete : of, relating to, or characteristic of one that is a subject especially in lack of freedom of action or in submissiveness

b : being or relating to a grammatical subject especially : nominative

2 : of or relating to the essential being of that which has substance, qualities, attributes, or relations

3a : characteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived rather than as independent of mind : phenomenal — compare objective sense 1b

b : relating to or being experience or knowledge as conditioned by personal mental characteristics or states

4a(1) : peculiar to a particular individual : personal subjective judgments

(2) : modified or affected by personal views, experience, or background

b : arising from conditions within the brain or sense organs and not directly caused by external stimuli

c : arising out of or identified by means of one's perception of one's own states and processes — compare objective sense 1c

5 : lacking in reality or substance : illusory


OBJECTIVE
1a : relating to or existing as an object of thought without consideration of independent existence —used chiefly in medieval philosophy

b : of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind objective reality — compare subjective sense 3a

c of a symptom of disease : perceptible to persons other than the affected individual objective arthritis — compare subjective sense 4c

d : involving or deriving from sense perception or experience with actual objects, conditions, or phenomena

2 : relating to, characteristic of, or constituting the case of words that follow prepositions or transitive verbs

3a : expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations

b of a test : limited to choices of fixed alternatives and reducing subjective factors to a minimum — Merriam-Webster

Yes, by implying that my definition was idiosyncratic. If you weren't implying this, then you were speaking out of context, for none of the definitions I have used are idiosyncratic, so I don't know why you'd even bring it up.

Janus gave a great reply to your post earlier:

What's the point of discussion in a context of differing usages unless you were to discuss the virtues of the one usage over the other? — Janus

Care to define your idiosyncratic terms for others so that we can compare our definitions?

For the same reason you point out where people are wrong. To teach you. You're welcome.

When we use highly idiosyncratic definitions we can simply define them for others. — Terrapin Station

:roll: Again, if it's in the dictionary, it can't be idiosyncratic.

If we allow that the physicalist defines what counts as "physical" then everything is physical, because that's the assumption of physicalism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. And the idealist can do the same thing - claim that everything is ideas.

What are they actually saying? They are both saying the same thing, just with different terms. They are saying that everything is the same "essence" or "substance", but are using different terms to refer to that. This is no different than two people using a different language to say the same thing.

The materialists and idealists can't even explain the differences between matter and ideas. How would the world be different if the world was made of ideas as opposed to matter, and vice versa?

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages (Italics added). — Claude Shannon -- A Mathematical Theory of Communication

Sort of like how one has to select from a set of possible options. But there is only one meaning to the message - the source's intent. What did the sender intend when they wrote the message? How you interpret the message depends upon your experiences. Try to understand a message in a different language. How could you ever hope to come up with even a set of possible messages when looking at a different language? You'd have to learn the language, just as you have to learn the language of your sensory impressions. What does the color red on an apple mean? What does that sound downstairs at night mean?

I like this idea. Thanks.

If this were the case, then we could raise elephants in a human society and they would become human. This obviously isn't what will happen, because an elephant's nature is such that it can't behave like a human. It is designed differently. Its nature is such that it prevents it from being affected the same way humans are by our social environment. In other words we would have equal outcomes for everyone, despite their genetic differences if they were simply raised in the same environment. This isn't the case. Nature is just as important as nurturing in the how an individual develops.

I wasn't saying anything about popularity or idiosyncrasy, and I especially wasn't implying anything normative about that or implying a value judgment in general. I was just saying something purely factual/descriptive--we're using different definitions. — Terrapin Station

But it wasn't factual. You were wrong to say:

I wouldn't say it can't work to divvy up the terms that way, but it's very different than the definitions I use. (And it's very different than some conventional usages, although of course you don't have to care about that.) — Terrapin Station

It isn't very different from some conventional usages. It's in the dictionary.

Yours would be the one that is very different from conventional usage.

And I do have to care about that if I ever hope to have coherent communication with others.

This seems to introduce a paradox. When is an intent realized or conceived and when it is not? Does this reduce the issue to what is an intent? Hence, we're perpetually stuck in never knowing what we really want? — Wallows

I mentioned earlier that our intent to get better is a result of the experience of pain. We don't experience the intent to get better when we feel good - only when we feel bad. Intent could simply be a mental/neurological response to some stimuli.

I don't think that "attachment and ownership" are what real love consists in at all. Feeling love is not a "symbol" of anything, it is simply a feeling of profound care for what is loved. The idea of love may be a "symbol" of the feeling, but I think it would be more accurate, less confusing, to say that it is the conception of the feeling: conceptions consist in networks of symbols, just as language does. — Janus

Love is a feeling that you feel - in your body. Why would the feeling be in your body, if it wasn't something about your body?

We can place ourselves firmly in our imaginations to the point where our heart beats faster, we sweat, get an erection, etc., It is when these things occur that the chemical ratios change within our bodies, and that is what we are feeling - those chemical changes. We associate those feelings with our thoughts or the things we experience, as if they are about those thoughts, or things in the world. But they are really about those chemical reactions that occur when you have those thoughts or experience those things.

It's not a good analogy, unless you assume that God was the programmer, because programming of computers is intentional. If nature is without any overarching intentional direction, then it would be confusingly anthropomorphistic to equate what purportedly happens due to what is thought to be purely random mutation and purely fortuituous natural selection with intentional programming. Also instinct can be distinguished from, but cannot be coherently, ontogenetically or ontologically, separated from, either animal or human volition and judgement. — Janus

But computers had to be perfected before they propagated across the planet. It was human mistakes and learning that led to the current version of computer you have on your desk. The computer evolved and continues to evolve based on human selection rather than natural selection. But humans are part of nature and part of that natural selection. We cause the extinction of other animals and promote the existence of others. We are a force of nature ourselves. In sense, computers evolved by natural selection. The more useful they are, the more of them we make. Computers are using us to procreate. Eventually they will take over the world. :gasp:

It's not just my usage when that usage is in the dictionary. Is yours? And is yours consistent with the rest of what you know?

This claim would require quite a fair bit of justification (with data) to support. You would first need to come up with a metric to measure the relative contributions to even begin to utter the words which you have here spoken. If you were to be able to defend this statement in a peer-reviewed manner, you would probably win a Nobel Prize. — MarcRousseau

My point in the quote above that, was that nature and nurture are the same. If they are the same thing, then it makes no sense to say that there must be some distinction between them that we can measure.

What if the intent is undirected? I am depressed and I want to get better but don't know how to. Then what? — Wallows

This is a good question.

Your ultimate intent/goal would be to get better. How you go about achieving would be several sub-goals. I can't think of a case where you wouldn't know, or at least have an idea of what to try, to get better. And if you didn't try to get better, then could you really say that you intended to get better? What do intents do? What makes an intent, an intent?

I think the source of depression is either mental/neurological, or genetic. Sometimes you can work yourself into a bout of depression just by thinking certain thoughts. Controlling the contents of your mind and finding other things to grab your attention can help in certain cases.

Intent to do harm is the goal to do harm.

Sometimes what you intended isnt what happens. You didn't intend to cause harm. It wasn't your goal to cause harm. Intent and goals are predictions. You didnt predict that your action would cause harm. We can use these words interchangeably without any meaning anything different.

I made you a formal argument with propositions and a conclusion. You made an emotional response. Show where the propositions are false or the conclusion does not follow — Rank Amateur

No. You made a formal argument based on faulty prepositions. I already told you this. I questioned your first premise.

The argument from evil is dependent upon a theist's claim that a god is good - about the nature of god. No claim about the nature of god - no argument from evil is necessary. — Harry Hindu

You are just too dense to get it.

I never said it was. I said objective claims are about objective views. What is a claim other than a truth statement? How can you make any claim without a view?

You can move the conversation forward when you stop putting words in my mouth and answer those questions I posed to you.

Do you have an objective view of views? Is your claim something I should believe? Why?

An objective view is not possible when the viewer is a subjectve experiencer, while the objective standard (or “measure” if you prefer) is something the experiencer has set up to be referenced as a tool in precisely the way you described. — DingoJones

You just made an objective claim about the nature of views, as if you had an objective view of views. Do you have an objective view of views? If so, then you contradicted yourself. If not, then is your claim accurate or biased (subjective)? Why should I, or why should I not, believe your claim?

Re my usage, it's not possible for someone to have an "objective view"--that's an oxymoron on my usage. — Terrapin Station

You just made an objective statement - one about how things are - that "objective views are not possible". So your statement defeats itself. Is this statement true independent of whether I believe it or not? Are you telling me how things are, or how things are for you? Isn't that the same thing? Are you part of how things are?

Subjective views are a view from somewhere and are inherently subjective. The only way to obtain an objective view is to put all of our views together into something consistent. Objectivity would then be a consistent explanation of all subjective views together, and would even include why we have subjective views in the first place.

Let me make one try putting this in form

P1. There is such a thing as the argument from evil — Rank Amateur

I'm going to stop you right there.

The argument from evil is dependent upon a theist's claim that a god is good - about the nature of god. No claim about the nature of god - no argument from evil is necessary.

Conclusion: Atheists base arguments on the nature of god — Rank Amateur

For the last time, atheists base arguments on the claims of theists.

no, behavior needs biology. Can you have behavior without biology? Being a social animal is part of your biology.