These are great points and questions. An imperfect answer would be that when we are just gliding along pre-theoretically through life the notion of the external world never comes up. I am 'in' the world which is not an object for theory. I drive home for work, at one with the driving. I know that other drivers are in the same world with me. They can see the objects I see (if they are paying attention.) Sharing a world full of objects with others and a language with others is something like a foundation that obscures itself. A critic of this automatic view might talk of presupposing the external. I 'unconsciously' presuppose the reality of the everyday world. But talk of presuppositions arguably just projects a theoretical gaze that just isn't there, covering up the phenomenon of being-in-the-world.

The synchronization of our senses does seem to play a huge role in this. When we see an object, we expect that we can touch it too (though we learn that things like shadows break the general rule.) — sign

Yes. I've often put "external" and "internal" in quotes as I don't really see it as an inside vs. outside thing. I agree.

In this sense, a "view" is a unique (subjective) model of the world from a point in space/time. Our view is from somewhere as the world appears relative to our heads (remember what I mentioned before). We all know that the world is not located relative to our heads, but that is how it appears. Why?

I agree, but you didn't go into how you understand explanation. What is an explanation? — sign

I thought I did. I said an explanation is a use of language, and then I explained what language is.

I agree. I think being-in-a-world-with-others is something like a basic structure of experience. I see an lamp on my desk as see-able also by others and as something I can switch on for light. I expect others (within my community) to also grasp it immediately as something one can switch on for light and as something that I can see. I grasp the word 'lamp' as grasping such things in a vagueness that covers many individual lamps. So we start from somewhere like this, understanding 'too much.' And then an atomic reconstruction needs to forget this complex unity of self, others, and world through language in order to build it all back up. — sign

Yeah, but how did we get to the point of "understanding too much" in the first place if we didn't already start from a deconstructed state and then built it all up? The presence of culture and other human beings dominated our development and has a huge impact in developing our established norms - like there are human beings and I'm one of them.

That's true, and that's the difference between this hypothetical deterministic 'entailment' and purely logical entailment. We can't be wrong about logical entailment (if we are being logical at least, and if were not we would not be wrong but would be missing the point). — Janus

It seems to me that if something is logical, it is deterministic. If the same input is put into a logical system, you always get the same output. Same cause leads to the same effect.

I am learning coding as my occupation (tech writer) nowadays requires it. Whereas 10 years ago programmers coded and tech writers wrote, nowadays the lines have become blurred, mainly because of the great success of GUI’s pioneered by Jobs, which makes devices much easier to use. So you no longer have to write procedural instructions for a lot of software (how to do...), but you do have to know how to code interactive web pages and learning resources and how to convey high-level concepts along with procedural info. And that takes knowledge of HTML, CSS, JavaScript and so on - granted, not full-on programming languages but a lot of code to master. I agree, it does teach you how to think - in some senses. But if, for example, you were sociopath, you could be an effective programmer, and remain sociopathic. :wink: — Wayfarer

How do you think those GUI's are made? By higher level procedural coding, like Java (which isn't related to JavaScript), Visual Basic, Python, and C++. I have experience with some of these. C++ is very complex but it allows you to fine-tune the computer's behavior more than most other programming languages.

Sociopaths would just learn how to manipulate other people more efficiently. Jobs didn't say that programming would change your world-view - just how to think more consistently.

As it happens, I’ve address much of this in my last reply to Harry Hindu. Viruses are not living. Living things are autopoietic (roughly: self-sustaining). A bacterium, which is autopoietic, might be argued to hold some miniscule form of mind and intelligence, but not a virus (which is not autopoietic). Autopoiesis being a negentropic process. Otherwise, what would the distinction between life and non-life be? Or is there no distinction whatsoever?

As to life being “machinery”, be it simple or complex, one can think of it this way: There are two forms of machines: living and non-living, which brings us back to square one: differentiating the properties of life (such as that of degree of intelligence) from those of non-life. — javra

I made the point that the solar system or the sun is a perfect self-sustaining balance between the outward push of the nuclear reactions and the inward pull of gravity, and has been like that for billions of years. You have now adjusted your claim (moved the goal posts) to say that living things are autopoietic and that is what makes them intelligent.

The term autopoiesis refers to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself. — Wikipedia

The sun maintains itself but doesn't reproduce itself. Is that what makes life intelligent and non-life not intelligent - our ability to have sex and have babies? Those are instinctive behaviors, not intelligent ones.

Then there is a kind of knowing (distinct from knowledge, which must be recalled as memory) which spans across lifetimes. Intelligence = instinct in a preconscious way (do all individuals have equal amount of instinct, why or why not?). — Anthony

The "lower" animals are driven more by instinct (genetic knowledge) than learned knowledge. Humans, chimps, dolphins, elephants, have larger brains and instinct drives our behavior to a much lesser degree. Learned behaviors begin to take over as we develop because we have larger brains to store more information (memories).

Memories are only memories if they can be recalled consciously. It's a stretch applying evolutionary psychology to AI. Our primal intelligence is quite different from AI are we not admitting here? Generally, human intelligence is far more complex and cryptic than AI, which always has implied programming as knowledge issuing from the head of the learned programmer. There's no knowing involved in carrying out instructions. When soldiers lose communication with their orders, they run amok, unintelligent. — Anthony

No. You obviously didn't check out evolutionary psychology so you're just not knowing what you're talking about here.

"Evolutionary psychology adopts an understanding of the mind that is based on the computational theory of mind." — Wikipedia

May I suggest Steven Pinker's book: How the Mind Works

God is understood to be changeless, and therefore timeless, but God is also understood to be the creator of time.

If God creates the physical world along with time, then God experiences a change - from existing alone to existing along with time.

Can anyone explain how God is the creator of time and remains changeless? — Walter Pound

It's not just when it creates, but when it thinks. If god thinks (has a mind), its thoughts change.

Dimensionality.

God exists as an independent dimension above all others. S/he/It encompasses all other dimensions, such as space and time. — Wallows

There is more than one dimension, so back to polytheism?

If "god" were a dimension, then why call it "god" and not just "dimension"?

If learning requires memory, and there's no other kind of learning which doesn't require memory, then how would an infant begin to learn in the first place? — Anthony

Instincts, which is built-in (unconscious) knowledge thanks to natural selection.

Check out the field of evolutionary psychology.

You guys have read my full post.

Is there disagreement, for example, in that you uphold life itself to be entropic rather than negentropic? — javra

No, the problem is that your definition of entropy and negentropy isn't clear. Where do you draw the boundary of life and non-life? Are dragonflies entropic or negentropic? What about starfish, jellyfish, an oak tree, mushrooms, bacteria or viruses? Life is just more complex non-life. The solar system is a closed system of order (negentropic) that has existed for billions of years and will continue to exist more billions of more, well beyond your own negentropic state. In order for our bodies to exist for any extended period of time, there must be some established negentropic state-of-affairs prior for us to evolve. Our existence is part of the increasing complexity that already exists in this corner of the universe.

You guys want to say that we'll be making negentropic computers soon. OK. I can't argue with this issue of faith (other than by questioning what the benefits would be of so doing). But my point was that until its negentropic its not thinking, or understandings, or intelligent, etc. — javra

I never said that today's computers are as complex as we are, but they are complex. Do you know how one works, or how to program one? Do you know how to manipulate another person, especially one that you know well? I already explained the differences between robots and human beings, yet there are similarities as well. When it comes to thinking, I think we are more similar in that thinking is simply processing information for a purpose. It's just that the computer doesn't have it's own purpose (not that it doesn't think) because human beings would find that scary.

How do you understand explanation? For me it's the postulation of necessary relationships. It's a grid thrown over experience. If you see this, then expect that (or project 'that' back on the past.) To get this, do that. Entities in relationship. I like this project/understanding of explanation. Clarifying/installing the causal nexus is what it looks like to me. — sign

I see explanation as just a use of language, and language is just composed of visual and/or auditory impressions. When we explain things to others, we use our cultural language (those specific visual and auditory symbols) to communicate an explanation.

If we are just explaining it to ourselves, we may do it in our cultural language, but those scribbles and sounds still need to refer to something to mean something other than just being visual scribbles and sounds. We don't necessarily think in our cultural language, rather we think in our sensory impressions. Most of the information we receive about the world comes visually. We are visual creatures and is why most of the terms in our language refer to visual experiences, or visual models. They are the "words" (or symbols) that make up a majority our explanation of the world (world-view). We then communicate that amalgam of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory representation of the world by converting them to specific visual and auditory symbols that we know others understand the meaning to (they refer to their other sensory units). I hope that makes sense.

A little more on my understanding of Heidegger that might add this issue. Our pre-theoretical experience of the world is largely in terms of objects that we can just grab and use. We as the subject aren't present to ourselves much of the time. Instead we just 'are' grabbing and using. From this perspective, pure mind as opposed to pure object is a theoretical postulation. When we switch to the theoretical mode we gaze on the objects dispassionately (or of value only in the construction of generalizations.) And we are also highly conscious of the subject as we scan our own ideas for coherence. So the theoretical mode only reinforces its founding assumptions, in some sense --maybe trapping us in problems or at least trapping us in a reduced set of approaches to these problems. — sign

Going back to being skeptical of this state-of-affairs being a "view", I have to ask, "why does it appear like a "view""? What I mean is, why is there depth, not just in vision, but in our auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory symbols? That may be the one thing that they all share in common because if not for that, we could have good reason to be skeptical of our sensations being about a external world. Each sense supplies very different symbols. The fact that I can see coffee and feel coffee at the same time, isn't as good as being able to see them and feel them in the same location as well.

And it's not just depth, but the location of everything seems to be relative to a specific location - the head, or dare I say, the brain. All of our sensory impressions carry with them a location in space relative to the head. Try this experiment. Close your eyes and touch your thumb and index finger together. Move your arm slowly around and you can sense the location of that sensation moving relative to a specific location - your head.

It just seems odd that this state-of-affairs isn't a view when it certainly seems like one. And it's not just using language to call it a "view". This state-of-affairs is what a "view" would be, no?

“Everybody in this country should learn how to program a computer (learn a computer language), because it teaches you how to think.”
-Steve Jobs

Living things, including brains, restructure their “hardware”. For brains, this is called neural plasticity. As the “hardware” is restructured, so too do the capacities of the “software” change in turn (which can further restructure the hardware). This, generally, either maintains or increases complexity over time; roughly, till death occurs.

The computers we have today, regardless of how complex, do not restructure their hardware via the processes of their software so as to either maintain or increase complexity as a total system—no matter how much electricity is placed into them. — javra

Living things, including brains, don't just "restructure their hardware" randomly, or for no reason. Input is required to influence those changes (learning). Learning requires memory. Your input (experiences of the world) over your lifetime has influenced changes in your hardware and software. A robot with a computer brain could be programmed to update its own programming with new input. Actually, computers do this already to a degree. Input from the user changes the contents of the software (the variables) and how the hardware behaves.

Natural selection is the environmental pressure that filters out mutations that inhibit an organism's ability to survive long enough to procreate (copy its genes). We'd have to design robots to replicate themselves with the possibility of "mistakes" so that new attributes arise in their design that can then be affected by natural selection. As it stands right now, computers evolve by human selection, not natural selection. That is if you don't see human beings as natural outcomes. If you do, then you can say that computers have evolved by natural selection, just like everything that exists does.

Mine is a simple question: is retro-time travel possible? — Happenstance

Travel, no. Looking, yes. By looking at the Andromeda galaxy you are seeing it as it was 2.5 million years ago. By traveling closer to the Andromeda galaxy it's change would accelerate "forward" in time until you get to it and see it in its near-present state.

I am clarifying for myself that I don't object to the atomistic project. Analysis is good. I would just balance it out with a further clarification of what is already there. If we are going to explain reality (including what is called mind or reason) in terms of building blocks, then we also have to really look into the nature of reason. Otherwise we have something like an un-opened box at the heart of our explanation. We We explain 'mind' (which includes our own ability to do) without having clarified its nature. Our attempts to explain reality add to reality and in that sense oppose themselves. — sign

That's not really how I see it. I see explanations (both right and wrong ones) as part of that causal substratum I talked about. They are just new arrangements resulting from interactions of input (sensory data) and our built-in software (genetic and life history). Explanations would be the output, no different than any output a computer produces (processed information). Explanations are causes themselves and produce effects. Everything is a process of causation (information/meaning). In essence, what is real is what has causal power.

Not if you define "thinking" as processing information.

Computers have an input (raw information (data)) and an output (processed information), just like you and I.

Computers make decisions, and can only make decisions with the input and/or stored information and time they have, just like you and I.

Computers can apply both bottom-up (rely heavily on input to produce output (creating a document or editing a picture)) and top-down (rely more heavily on the installed software to produce output (a game or operating system)) processing, just like you and I.

Indirect realism implies that "empty space" containing "solid material" may not be the way things actually are and that reality is this item of process - where a computer's processing is part of the same substratum as your own processing. The world is not as you see it - as solid objects containing minds. It is as you experience it - a process.

The lifeworld can be deconstructed, examined by reason, and put back together (if possible) to test our understanding of the pieces and the way they fit together. — sign

And put together into completely new configurations (imagination). This is another reason to think of sensory impressions as fundamental units.

He can learn to see the lectern as brown surfaces. — sign

Yes, and eventually realize that it may even be presumptuous to call this state-of-affairs a "view" where one is "seeing" brown surfaces. What the f*** is this state-of-affairs that is going on?!

For me this bottom-up approach is not the way to go. We can't atomize the mind and reconstruct it. Of course you mention emergent properties, so you see the problem. But I'd say that our atomizing theories themselves emerge from this same 'emergent property.'

Another way we might approach this is to 'confess' that meaning (in all its embarrassing and suspicious mysteriousness) is fundamental. The world or what exists is clearly not only 'meaning' (whatever this meaning is), of course. But existence is always already meaningfully structured. Of course we can theorize about the origin of meaning as an act of meaning. — sign

"Emergent" might be the wrong word. It's a result from our size relative to the size of other things. We seem to be right in the middle with everything extending away in both space, size and time. Our minds compartmentalize space - into atoms, molecules, on up to things on our size-scale and past it to planets, solar systems, galaxies and universes. These larger things seem to "emerge" from the interactions of smaller processes if you think from "bottom to top". In order to try to get a more objective understanding of it, we'd need to think of ourselves as not having a size relative to other things. That seems difficult - maybe something we just can't grasp because having a size relative to other things fixes our subjective size-relation perception of the world and we can't escape that view of the world

I agree with your explanation of meaning. I consider meaning and information the same thing and the relationship between causes and their effects. Effects carry information about their causes. Effects mean their causes. I like to use Steven Pinker's tree rings example. Tree rings (the effect) are the result of how the tree grows throughout the year (the cause). The tree rings mean, or carry information about, the cause, which is why you can get the age of the tree by the number of rings it has.

For me we still have the problem here that 'sensory impressions' and 'quarks' are signs that point to meanings that themselves point beyond themselves. The world, in my view, is composed of (among other things) acts of meaning. The world is composed of (among other things) attempts to say what the world is composed of. I know this may sound strange. But what does it mean when a metaphysics excludes itself from the real it tries to grasp? If acts of meaning are 'unreal,' then any theory of the real is itself unreal. It's odd that a theory of the real would be satisfied with building up itself from quarks or sensory impressions that themselves function within this theory. — sign

This seems like how I keep saying that the mind, including it's misperceptions, illusions and delusions, are real because they are part of reality as much as everything else. Galaxies and illusions should be part of the same substratum.

Fascinating theory. I must confess that I'm still somewhat opposed to the project being framed in terms of finding fundamental units. IMV, any description of what is has to acknowledge what makes such a description possible and intelligible. I'm not saying yours doesn't, but it doesn't go into much detail about its own presence. Let's say we have a theory about what is fundamental that does not include language. Maybe it theorizes the origin of language. Yet language is also the origin of this theory of the origin. This doesn't make the theory worthless. But perhaps it calls for an enriched account. — sign

As for the basic building blocks of the mind, it seems to me that it would be sensory impressions. All of our ideas, imaginings, beliefs and knowledge are composed of sensory impressions. The smallest unit I can think about is a sensory impression. For instance, I can think of just the color red, or a tactile sensation, or a sound with no meaning. Anything else I can think of, would be composed of these things. Coffee is composed of visual (black vs. w/ cream), tactile (warm liquid or iced), auditory (the sound of the coffee dripping), olfactory and gustatory units.

Even language is composed of these sensory impressions. Language is just visual scribbles or sounds. Words refer to other sensory impressions. When you think of "democracy" what fills your mind? What form does "democracy" take in your mind other than just the scribbles on the screen? How do you know that you're thinking of "democracy"? It requires an awareness of some visualization of maybe politicians vying for your vote, or citizens voting. Our minds cross-reference these visual or auditory impressions with other sensory impressions. "Warmth" refers to some tactile sensation. "Green eggs and ham" refer to a visual of eggs and ham that are colored green with maybe even an imagined smell or taste.

Can you think of anything more basic than your sensory impressions? Is that evidence of a fundamental unit of thought, or mind?

Berkeley says that we don't have ideas of other spirits or of God, because an idea can only resemble an idea. We do have 'notions' of other minds and of God because of our intuitive knowledge that we have ourselves minds. The notion theory is a bit more complex than I make it out and it is one of the weakest parts of his theory. — Jamesk

This is the most incoherent reply you've had yet. If an idea can only resemble an idea, then an idea is a resemblance of itself? Or, it would be that resemblances are the fundamental aspect of reality - not ideas!

"Notions" is a synonym for "ideas", so you've contradicted yourself.

Are idealism and determinism compatible? Can you logically predict ideas that haven't been realized yet? — Harry Hindu

100% Everything is caused by God. — Jamesk

If everything is ideas and if the ideas external to my mind are the ideas of God, then why is it easier to predict the mind of God than it is to predict the mind of another human being? There are many theories of science that make accurate predictions and are why the theories persist. In essence, science is predicting the mind of God.

So, why do idealists complain that science can't explain the mind - the human mind - like it can explain gravity or chemical reactions when gravity and chemical reactions are ideas of God? Why is our knowledge of the human mind less than our knowledge of the mind of God? How is it we can make so many predictions of the mind of God, but can't do so when trying to predict the minds of others?

Some ideas logically presuppose other ideas; that is all I was saying.

As to determinism, if all events since the big bang have been precisely what they had to be; in other words if it is true that if you 're-ran' the Universe every event would have been precisely the same down to the smallest particle, then it could be said that objects physically presuppose ('entail' is probably a better, clearer, word) one another.

It could even be said that, in a sense they logically entail one another: ' if this one exists that one had to' and so on. But this is not a purely logical entailment insofar as you could never know precisely which future objects are entailed by present ones, you could only know in general that future objects are logically (and physically) entailed by present ones.

So to rewrite the first sentnece:

Some ideas logically entail, or are logically entailed by, other ideas. — Janus

But if determinism is the case, and we could re-run the Universe, every event would have been precisely the same down to the smallest particle, then it could be said that objects physically presuppose ('entail' is probably a better, clearer, word) one another, then it seems that all future objects are entailed by the ultimate cause. You are simply talking about knowing what the future holds as opposed to what it actually holds independent of our knowledge. Our knowledge can be wrong. Ideas can be wrong. If Idealism is the case, can ideas be wrong, and if so, what does that actually mean? It is incoherent to say that "matter" can be wrong, unless we redefine "matter" as what the mind is made of as well as everything else, in which case arrangements of matter can inaccurately represent other arrangements of matter.

I don't know what you mean by "physically" entails... What is the difference between things that physically entail one another and those that logically entail one another? It seems to me that determinism would be that logical entailment - the "rules" for which everything follows. If we were to know the "rules" we could predict every event. Nothing would be random.

Are idealism and determinism compatible? Can you logically predict ideas that haven't been realized yet? If you can't then how can you say that there is a purely logical entailment? You would have the same problem you described earlier with not knowing what present ideas entail future ones.



Thanks, I'll reply when I get a change to absorb your posts.

Ideas can interact with other ideas purely logically I suppose whereas material objects, although they do interact with one another logically (or at least, not illogically), do not do so purely logically (although Hegel, the man who said "The rational is the real", might disagree)

In other words material objects do not logically (that is,necessarily) presuppose one another (well, not unless hard determinism is the case, anyway, and even then the necessity would be more than purely logical, it would be physical). — Janus

What do you mean by "purely logically"?

If matter interacts in deterministic fashion then it there are rules we can establish and make predictions with. Can you predict the behavior of ideas?

I didn't bypass it. I replied and I said that it is only coherent if they mean something, or else it's just scribbles. That isn't subjective.

You're the one bypassing. Janus is actually making an attempt to answer the question thatt I'm asking. He seems to understand the question just fine. So I'll continue with him. Thanks for nothing.

The more I think about it I still don't understand how it all works. How do we actually receive sense data if sense data is basically Gods ideas? If it is a Brain in a vat situation I can understand, however if it isn't then where exactly do our minds exists? How do our own bodies interact with other bodies?

I also understand the frustration people are having with this discussion of ideas and matter. I still haven't understood how the immaterial universe actually functions other than God makes it so. — Jamesk

To make it coherent it must be realized that according to this view we are also ideas in the mind of God. Sense data, our sensory apparatuses, our brains, our minds, our souls are all ideas in the mind of God. So there is no problem concerning our bodies interacting with other bodies. — Janus

And there would be no problem with our bodies interacting if God was material and we all were material.

What is the actual difference between "material" and "ideas"? How do ideas interact with other ideas differently than how matter interacts with other matter? How are the interactions between ideas different than the interaction between matter?

You have made Berkeley's point. Only ideas can resemble ideas. You cannot compare the idea of a tree with a tree or with anything else except another idea. All we know immediately are our ideas and we don't know enough about our own biology to say much more. — Jamesk

But you and Berkeley are saying that the tree (the external tree, not the idea of a tree) is an idea too. If everything is an idea, including the things external to your mind, then of course you can measure your idea of a tree in your mind to the tree external to your mind (which you and Berkeley say is in the mind of God which makes it just another idea)).

Yes. We went through that. So, given that you can't grasp the differences in what each side is saying in that regard, we need to look at what your beliefs/expectations are re meaning and coherency, so we can diagnose just what's going on for you not understanding the difference. — Terrapin Station

There was nothing to grasp. You keep referring to what scribble or sounds an idealist and materialist makes when I'm talking about what those scribbles and sounds mean. You have only shown that they make different scribbles and sounds. You have yet to explain the difference that those scribbles and sounds mean.

I already told you that for a word to be coherent, it must mean something. If you don't mean something when you make scribbles and sounds, then you aren't saying anything, you're just making noise and scribbles (what you have been doing). When someone says, "Color my love brittle" then it is only coherent if it actually means something other than just being noise. What do they mean? That is what I ask them, and they would tell me. You can't seem to do that with words you seem so sure that you know what they mean, "matter" and "mind".

What I'm focused on is you understanding the difference of what idealists and materialists are saying. — Terrapin Station

And I already told you I'm not interested in the difference of scribbles or sounds. I'm interested in the difference of what those scribbles and sounds mean. In order for a word to be coherent it must mean something. What do materialists mean when they say, "matter" or "mind". What do idealists mean when they use those words?

Synonyms are different words that mean the same thing. It seems to me that "matter" and "ideas" are synonyms because while they are different words, saying one would be different than saying the other, but they mean the same thing.

That would be a whole big tangent about how communication works that wouldn't help you figure out what the difference is between what idealists and materialists are saying, which is all I'd want to accomplish. — Terrapin Station

It is very difficult for you to stay focused. I wasn't asking about how the difference in that post. I was asking how you can expect others to understand you if coherence is subjective.

You obviously have issues that won't allow you to engage in any real, meaningful discussions. I'm done.

So, we don't at all agree on this, and we don't at all agree about logic, either, including that I think that logic is subjective, and obviously, even for those who do not, there are many different species of logics, some incompatible with others. — Terrapin Station

So then why are you trying to be coherent to others when you speak? How is it that you expect them to understand anything that you say? Do words mean things? Are they coherent?

The only way we're going to get anywhere is by doing this "game." — Terrapin Station

No. It would be by answering the question that you keep avoiding.

Are you asking if something is coherent to someone else? Or to your self? — Terrapin Station

I wasn't asking anything. I was simply reiterating what you said - that your concept of "matter" and "mind" are only coherent to you, and that isn't enough. Coherence isn't subjective. It follows rules of logic that are the same for everyone.

I'm done with the game of yours. When you can actually answer the question, we can continue.

Coherence is always to someone, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

Okay, so then your idea of "matter" and "mind" is only coherent to you, then.

It is when something is coherent to many, not just one, that we make strides in objective knowledge.

You're asking something about your own understanding, right? — Terrapin Station

No, I'm asking about "matter" and "ideas" and how you understand the difference. You've only supplied a difference in scribbles.

So what you're really asking for is not what they're saying that's different, and not whether they think about it differently, or whether they think that the nature or the world is different. You want to know what one side or the other is saying differently that you find to be coherent, that makes sense to you. — Terrapin Station

If the concepts of "matter" vs. "ideas" are coherent to you then why is it so difficult to answer the question? I'm trying to get at the state-of-affairs that is independent of what we say or believe. What is "matter" and what is "mind"?

You wrote, "Yet you haven't been able to explain the difference in what they are saying"

Meaning is subjective and can't be shared. Do you want different definitions? — Terrapin Station

Because in order to say anything, it must be coherent, or else you haven't really said anything. You've simply created a bunch of scribbles or sounds.


"Xyrchitz" is different than saying "Xyrchits". But what am I saying? What do I mean?

Again, I'm not asking on the difference of what they say, I'm asking the difference of what they mean. Both statements are incoherent, therefore they both mean nothing.

Which is irrelevant. All that's relevant is if they're saying something different. — Terrapin Station

I already went over this with you. Saying two different things that are both incoherent isn't really saying anything different, other than simply using different sounds, or scribbles that don't refer to any actual state of affairs, like differences between what matter is and what ideas are.

All I care about at the moment is addressing "Yet you haven't been able to explain the difference in what they are saying" because you keep saying that even though I've explained differences in what they're saying many times. — Terrapin Station

And I keep reiterating that what they say is incoherent.

We can talk about that after we finish the other thing first. — Terrapin Station

I asked you what is the difference between "matter" and "mind", or "ideas". Stop getting distracted. — Harry Hindu

I asked this question a million times before your question about begging the question. Maybe if you try to answer it, you will see why I said you're creating a circular argument.