I asked you what is the difference between "matter" and "mind", or "ideas". Stop getting distracted.

I said, "One difference is that idealsts are saying that not every existent has mass, but materialists are saying that they do."

Is that a difference or not? — Terrapin Station

I already said it isn't. Because you are begging the question. Mass is an amount of matter, so you are simply saying that materialist claim that matter exists while idealists say that it doesn't. I asked you what is the difference between "matter" and "mind", or "ideas".

No, I'm not going to be distracted. — Terrapin Station

Actually it's "No, I can say shit and not back it up."

Irrelevant. Saying that not every existent has mass is different than saying that they do, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

This doesn't answer my question, nor address the main point in my post (but that is what I should expect from you by now). I was simply asking what existents that idealists say have mass, Terrapin. Answer the question.

...and you skipped this part:

Again, the materialist just says that the mind is an arrangement of matter and therefore has mass. Are there minds with more "mass" than others? That is to say, do minds have different amounts of content (mass)? What is the difference between "matter" and "mind" and how would this difference still allow them to interact? — Harry Hindu

One difference is that idealsts are saying that not every existent has mass, but materialists are saying that they do. — Terrapin Station

Which existent do idealists say has mass (you said not every...so some might)?

Mass is the amount of matter in an object, so you are begging the question. You have to accept that there is "matter" to say that there is "mass". Again, the materialist just says that the mind is an arrangement of matter and therefore has mass. Are there minds with more "mass" than others? That is to say, do minds have different amounts of content (mass)? What is the difference between "matter" and "mind" and how would this difference still allow them to interact?

You have made Berkeley's point. Only ideas can resemble ideas. You cannot compare the idea of a tree with a tree or with anything else except another idea. All we know immediately are our ideas and we don't know enough about our own biology to say much more. — Jamesk

But you and Berkeley are saying that the tree (the external tree, not the idea of a tree) is an idea too. If everything is an idea, including the things external to your mind, then of course you can measure your idea of a tree in your mind to the tree external to your mind (which you and Berkeley say is in the mind of God which makes it just another idea)).

Do you agree that the true nature of social and natural phenomena is conflict and fight? Or is there anyone reading this who can propose an alternative view of reality, say more scientific and rational. — DiegoT

And cooperation is not all that we can see in nature; males do not cooperate to get to copulate with the females, and cats do not cooperate to preserve diversity of bird fauna — DiegoT

Excellent points.

I would say that nature of social and natural phenomena is propagating genes. Different species and different members (males and females for instance) of each species have different strategies for propagating their genes. Maybe we could say that the nature of social and natural phenomenon is environmental feedback (natural selection) - of adapting (trying new strategies in the face of environmental pressures (which can include other organisms, like predators trying to propagate their genes)) to propagate your genes. Sometimes cooperation is necessary, sometimes conflict is necessary. There is no doubt that both strategies work when used at the appropriate time.

I'm open to this. I think it's fair, however, to question whether it makes sense to talk about a primary substance. Maybe it does. The mind (or matter in a mind-like mode) seems to aim at unifying experience this way. Let's grant your point. Then all the apparently plurality (all the different kinds of things) would seem merely to be renamed as 'arrangements' or 'modes' of a primary substance. So there is 'really' just one kind of thing. But it's the nature of this primary thing to express itself not only in different modes that ask for useful and illuminating categorization but also this categorization itself.

The primary substance has to be the kind of thing that can mistake itself as a plurality. Moreover the primary substance has to be able to exist in the form of the question too. The primary substance unveils itself as primary substance, within time, by having a conversation with itself. So it also has a memory. It is (or one of its arrangements is) a speaking, thinking mode of primary substance (tempting us to call it a subject all over again.) It is also the world in which these subjects converse. Even if 'mind' and 'matter' are 'false' categorizations in some sense, they are inescapable at least as the ladder with which primary substance learns to grasp itself as one and homogeneous. [All this is just following out the implications of there being a primary substance and us becoming aware of it and how it happened.] — sign

Science explains the smallest unit of matter as protons, neutrons and electrons (or maybe quarks now). The arrangement and amount of protons, neutrons, and electrons dictate the the type of element that emerges on a larger size scale, and the amount and number of atoms dictate the emergent property of molecules on an even larger size scale, and so on, up to galaxies and universes.

What would be the smallest unit of the mind? Ideas? Sensory impressions? It seems to me that it would be the latter as all of our ideas, knowledge, imaginings, language itself is composed of sensory impressions - colors, shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, feelings, etc. These things come together to form the contents of our minds (emergent properties).

So, which is it? Is the world composed of sensory impressions or quarks?

Indirect realism implies that we would think of the world as dualistic - of being some way independent of how we perceive it. If the world isn't really how we see it, then it probably isn't composed of quarks or atoms, or brains. Brains would simply be a representation of the mind. In a sense, the world would be mind-like but that would be making a category mistake deriving from an anthropomorphic worldview. It would be like a tree claiming that the primary substance is wood-like because that is what the tree is and the world interacts with it so the rest of the world must be wood-like too.

It might make more sense to say that primary "substance" is processes, or relationships. Minds are just a process or relationship. Another term I like to use is, "information". I have referred to the world as being a relationship between causes and their effects. Effects carry information about their causes and information would actually be that relationship between causes and their effects.

As beings in and of the world, our minds are a process of a certain frequency relative to all of the other processes. This relativity between minds and the world are what creates this visual representation of objects. Causal relationships that are very slow in changing relative to how fast our minds process it appear as stable, solid objects. Causal relationships that have higher frequency of change appear as blurs, or aren't perceived at all (think of how reptiles are lethargic when they are cold, and how they perceive the world would be different than if they were warmed up. Their minds process information faster and faster change would appear to slow down.) Our own minds have subjective perceptions of time based on our own mental states. In other words, our minds stretch these causal relationships into what we call space-time, and these causal relationships are the fundamental units of reality.

Matter is physical and mind is not. — Jamesk

This is begging the question. What is it about "physical" and "non-physical" that are different?

Materialists are gambling that one day they will have advanced enough equipment to actually 'see' our thoughts. Idealists are gambling that science will never be able to so. — Jamesk

We used to think that it was fantasy that human beings would walk on the Moon. What science has done since it's formal inception (the Scientific Method) is beyond what religion and philosophy have done and science has only been around a fraction of the time.

Material is made up of atoms that we can empirically measure. Mental states produce thoughts and ideas which cannot be empirically measured. We do not know how the brain works, all we know is which parts of the brain are working when we are thinking. — Jamesk

Finally you made an attempt to answer my question.

This is wrong. I already went over this with Wayfarer and he didn't disagree.

Measurements are comparisons between similar things, like the length of a meter stick and the length of a rope, or the change in the hands around a clock's face and the change in you falling asleep and waking up again. You measure ideas by comparing them to other ideas. What is it about an idea that you want to measure - it's impact on society, it's coherence? Ideas can be measured empirically.

The idea of the physical is, among other things, the idea of radical, brute separation of all things from one another, whereas the idea of the mental is the idea of the deep inherent interconnection of all things.

So, if the substance is mental then all things are really one, and if the substance is physical then all things are separate and if interdependent are only so on account of quantifiable mechanical, energetic connections with one another. — Janus

It seems to be the other way around.

Science implies an interconnectedness between everything. You cannot exist without air, water or food. Atoms are just relationships between protons, neutrons and electrons. I have come to realize the interconnectedness of everything through my understanding of science.

When I was religious, there was a separateness that was implied. I was separate from nature - a spirit in a physical world. Dualism implies the same thing - seperateness.

Indirect realism allows for the world to not appear as it actually is. It appears as a representation and how it is represented makes many believe that that is how it actually is. Indirect realism implies that it may appear to be a world of separate objects when in essence everything is interconnected. Science shows this to be the case.

It seems logical that indirect realism would lead many to use some explanation of dualism to explain how they see the world and how they see their mind, but this ignores the fact that the mind and world interact and would be the same type of thing.

If you're saying that realists and idealists are saying the same thing, I don't agree with you. — Terrapin Station

Yet you haven't been able to explain the difference in what they are saying.

I'm open to this. I think it's fair, however, to question whether it makes sense to talk about a primary substance. Maybe it does. The mind (or matter in a mind-like mode) seems to aim at unifying experience this way. Let's grant your point. Then all the apparently plurality (all the different kinds of things) would seem merely to be renamed as 'arrangements' or 'modes' of a primary substance. So there is 'really' just one kind of thing. But it's the nature of this primary thing to express itself not only in different modes that ask for useful and illuminating categorization but also this categorization itself.

The primary substance has to be the kind of thing that can mistake itself as a plurality. Moreover the primary substance has to be able to exist in the form of the question too. The primary substance unveils itself as primary substance, within time, by having a conversation with itself. So it also has a memory. It is (or one of its arrangements is) a speaking, thinking mode of primary substance (tempting us to call it a subject all over again.) It is also the world in which these subjects converse. Even if 'mind' and 'matter' are 'false' categorizations in some sense, they are inescapable at least as the ladder with which primary substance learns to grasp itself as one and homogeneous. [All this is just following out the implications of there being a primary substance and us becoming aware of it and how it happened.] — sign

Thank You!!

This is the best response I've received so far to the point I've been trying to make. Unfortunately, I have to go to class. I'll respond later.

<Turns down the poetry knob> — Terrapin Station

This just explains the initial responses you had to my questions. It's nice to see that you eventually came around to seeing and agreeing with what I've said all along.

More mental gymnastics.

Again, you don't need proof to label something. We can call something anything we like. We only need to agree on what to label something when we want to communicate that something. What is it that you want to communicate, Jamesk? What is the difference between "mind" and "matter"?

subject-likeness and substance-likeness — sign

I don't understand what this means if you're not simply talking about different arrangements of the primary substance.

See, Harry, you get people saying things like this. — Terrapin Station

I'm not getting him to say that. He's performing all these mental gymnastics to avoid the questions I'm asking.

Consciousness does not appear to be material. No one can be sure what the mind is about. We will find out with AI if we can create a consciousness in which case a lot of philosophy will be debunked. — Jamesk

For the umpteenth time, What does it mean to be "material" as opposed to "mental"?

I'd say the distinction is imperfect but useful. I agree that their interaction shows the limitations of the distinction. At some point these issues lead back toward meaning and language. While I understand your point, that interaction implies identity of type leads to abolishing just about all distinctions. The world is full of different kinds of things that interact. We perhaps categorize them according the specifics of these interactions. I don't interact with a human as I do with a can-opener. Both are things from a point of view of maximum abstraction, but this doesn't say much. It just grasps them as separate and otherwise indeterminate unities. — sign

Different things are just different arrangements of the primary substance (whatever we decide to call it). If you define "substance" as something that allows things to interact, then everything is made of the same "substance" and making a distinction between "substances" would be incoherent.

What we're saying is simply that mental stuff isn't something different than material/physical stuff, contra claims otherwise — Terrapin Station

That's what I've been asking all along. If there is no difference (You've finally come around to seeing that they're the same thing), then it doesn't matter what we call it.

Idealists could keep on referring to it as "mental" and materialists refer to it as "matter" and they would both be talking about the same thing and therefore there are no disagreements.

So, (I asked this question earlier in the thread) why the debate for the past 1000 years?

I'm not for or against mind as a process of matter versus matter as a process of mind, but something occurs to me. If matter includes the process of mind, then the 'immediate access' we seemed to gain is lost. I only have immediate access to matter if I have immediate access to its mindlikeness. I would surely, I might think as this materialist, have immediate access to myself as a process of matter. And yet I keep questioning and overhearing myself, as matter exploring matter.

It seems to me that trying to collapse either concept into the other just sweeps the complexity of the situation (which inspired the imperfect but serviceable distinction in the fist place ) under the rug. And for the materialist, this is very conversation about matter is a process of matter. Which is fine, but matter is more or less the same protagonist as mind at that point. Matter does philosophy. And the idealist crashes into 'mind' that also known as a telephone poll. — sign

It makes no sense to call the substance outside of you one thing and the substance inside of you another. They are both the same substance because they interact.

Now, what do we call the substance? Does it make a difference?

I don't think so. Hume says that our ideas come from impressions of the senses or from associations of ideas, so I need to have seen an apple to have an idea of one but once I have the idea I can play around with it in my imagination. — Jamesk

This is a ridiculous response. To say that our ideas come from something is to say that they are caused by that something. You are also saying that mind isn't necessary for the existence of ideas - that ideas can exist without a mind. Nonsense.

In other words, you and Hume cannot escape the notion of causation because it would be incoherent to do so.

Which is a claim with no immediate proof. Many scientists, especially in neurosciences are having a hard time with materialism and cannot rule out some form of dualism. We understand less about our own minds than we do about matter, note I said minds not brains.

Philosophy of mind is one of the most active departments where ll the modern 'rock stars' of philosophy are making names. — Jamesk

You don't need proof to label something. Labeling things is arbitrary. It doesn't matter if we call the mind "matter" or "mental", or "humpfalump". That's the point.

What is important is the nature of "mind" and "matter". What is the difference in the nature of "mind" and "matter"?

You are all missing the point (well most of you anyway). Destroying the thesis of materialism is easy. Berkeley just applies a sophisticated form of Cartesian doubt and 'poof' materialism crumbles away. Hume does the same thing afterwards aimed at all forms of knowledge.

The theory that Berkeley replaces materialism with does seem to be 'better' than Descartes at least in instrumental terms. It also competes with Locke's theory and if you accept God then it is also 'better' instrumentally.

The weakness I am trying to expose is Berkeley's reliance on the same 'insufficient empiricism' he accuses Locke of using, Berkeley admits this but says that his 'notions' of minds and God are immediate to us in a way that matter is not.

Is he right? — Jamesk

No, it is you that is missing the point. The materialist just says that the mind is matter and there you go, now mind is just a process of matter and we have immediate access to matter. To say that what exists out there is different than what exists in here is the mistake dualism makes. Causation occurs across the boundary of mind and matter, in other words they are both the same substance. The problem comes when you want to call that substance, "mind" because that would be like a tree calling the primary substance, "wood" because that is what the tree would have immediate access too.

Also, if God were immediate, then why are their atheists? Atheists don't deny the existence of their minds, but do deny the existence of God.

In actual fact, it was a slightly tongue-in-cheek response to Terrapin's contention that 'ideas are physical'. — Wayfarer

In other words, your response wasn't an argument against what Terrapin said. It was useless.

Of course, but that is not the point at issue. — Wayfarer

The point was that you didn't say anything useful.

How much does the Theory of Relativity weigh...? — Wayfarer

This is the type of mistake in thinking that dualism causes.

This is like asking what duration is water? You're asking for an improper measurement of a thing.

Measurements are comparisons between like things. Time is a comparison between the movement of a clock's hands, the rotation of the Earth, or the revolution of the Earth around the Sun and some other change. Length is a comparison between a meter stick and some other length.

So how would we measure an idea? By comparing it to other ideas. The Theory of Relativity has held up quite well for a century and has brought about an astounding array of new technology since it's inception. It's impact is enormous compared to other ideas.

Those are the three things we observe in what we conceive to be some necessary connection between events or some 'hidden power' in the objects that causes events to happen. We don't actually observe anything else so when we attribute cause we do so by means of inference alone. — Jamesk

What about when a criminal confesses to a crime? The evidence is the effect and the criminal's actions is the cause. Is the criminal desribing an inference or an actual experience when he recounts the crime in detail which explains the evidence perfectly?

What about your own intent being the cause of changes external to you. In essence you are a power of cause and directly experience your will moving your hands to type a post. Or are you inferring that your will, or intent, is causing your hands to move?

Wouldn't Hume say that the mind is the cause of ideas? Can ideas exist without a mind? Think of a cause as the prerequisite conditions for some emergent property.

Another way of thinking about it is energy transfer/flow.

Hume claimed causation is Temporal priority, spatial contiguity and constant conjunction. All “immediately temporal” means is that the cause comes before the effect. — Jamesk

I have no ideas what you or Hume are talking about.

Time is change. Causation is change and thetefore the essence of time. Causation is also meaning as effects mean, or represent, or carry information about, their causes.

Does A always cause B? — Jamesk

In a deterministic world, yes.

In my view, there isn't even a difference in what people think. Idealists and materialists think that they have different notions of what the primary substance would be, but they haven't been able to make any coherent distinction between the two. The only reason you declare yourself a physicalist is because you've simply decided to label the primary substance, "physical".

Both materialists and idealists claim that "matter" and "ideas" are substances, but can't explain the nature of the substance, much less any distinction between them, so there really isn't any difference between what they are claiming or thinking.

Newborns are born ignorant of more or less everything, including knowledge of God. — Pattern-chaser

..and unicorns and elves and leprechauns, etc...

Hume says it is constant conjunction. The mental relationship that happens when you see something always happening in the same way. — Jamesk

That is called "recognition".

I love it when philosophers try to make up these complex-sounding words and phrases for something that we already have a simple term for what they are talking about.

And why do philosophers feel the need to reference long-dead philosophers as if these long-dead philosophers had access to something we don't. It's actually the other way around. We have access to modern scientific knowledge that they didn't.

You philosophers always ignore the hard questions that are asked (It's because philosophy never answers questions. It asks therm. Science answers them). There was more to my post than what you replied to.

There are people who think that some things are nonphysical. Hence the utility of the distinction. — Terrapin Station

So the distinction is in what certain people think, and not a distinction between the nature of "physical" or "non-physical" things.

I'm asking about the nature of "physical" and "non-physical", not about what other people think.

I pity someone who has put so much time and effort into philosophy yet can't answer as straight up question that you should have probably asked yourself decades ago.

Newborns are inherently atheistic.

So the first ball hitting it is only a part of a chain of causation that ultimately traces back to the big bang. In which case the first ball hitting it is not the cause but the explanation of why the second ball moved. — Jamesk

How is it an explanation if you witnessed one ball hitting another. You'd only find an explanation useful if you didn't witness it.

Is your idea just an explanation for the existence of your post?

Every effect is also the cause of something else and causes are effects of other causes. It becomes incoherent to use terms like cause and effect. There is just causation, or maybe a better term is "relationships".

Ideas are mental states caused by something outside of us. — Jamesk

And materialists say that ideas are material states caused by something outside of us.

Why wouldn't material objects have causal power where ideas do?

Whatever it is outside of you you can't say, so why say that it's ideas outside of us and not matter?

If matter and ideas are substances, then why not just say that the tree is composed of substance instead of ideas or matter?

All we are doing is disagreeing on the term we use to refer to the substance, not on the nature of the substance. Both ideas and matter have causal powers because they are the same substance.

According to Berkeley matter is an incoherent idea that we arrive at by an abuse of language. Ideas are by definition non material unless you follow Descartes dualist approach that there are two types of substance — Jamesk

So, the difference between matter and ideas is that matter is incoherent and ideas are not, unless you follow Descartes dualist approach where the difference between the two is that they are different "substances".

What are ideas and how are they coherent where matter is not? What is a "substance"?

Locke denies Descartes spiritual substance and Berkeley denies Descartes material substance. — Jamesk

I deny them both.

Idealism states that there is no matter at all, only ideas and minds. — Jamesk

How is that more coherent than saying there's no ideas at all, only matter and processes of matter?

That isn't a useful distinction. Define the words.

"Similarly, in Philosophical Investigations he rejects the theory that we might have developed a language for reporting our sensations without the help of the language in which we describe the external world, on the ground that such a language would fail to meet a requirement that must be met by any language."

Where I am lost is, I can't tell apart the language used for reporting our sensations and language in which we describe the external world. — yonlee

It seems to me that what he means is that language is composed of sensory impressions. Language is just sounds and visual scribbles - sensory impressions.

The mind evolved to symbolize - to represent the external world with sensory impressions. The mind naturally knows that the impressions mean things. This knowledge is the requirement for learning a language - that impressions mean things. The sounds and scribbles refer to, or represent, other sensory impressions. Language is just a cross-matching of sensory impressions (this sensory symbol, "mom" refers to all the sensory symbols that represent my Mom. This is how we can talk about our moms.

The private language seems to ignore the fact that we are members of the same species and have similar sensory systems which would allow us to have a shared internal language as well (the way we see the world is similar).

No. That is what you have said. I continually reiterate that I have said that both concepts are incoherent and therefore there are no differences or similarities, except in maybe location. We already have terms to refer to different locations. "Space" and "time" are two of those terms. Why use "physical" and "non-physical"?

You keep side-stepping the issue. Define "physical" and "non-physical".

How is it any less coherent than the idea of matter? What is matter? Atoms? Quarks? Higgs-Bosun's? Dark matter? Is light a particle or a wave? What the hell is Quantum theory all about? Hawkins last theory points to a multiverse, is any of that any more coherent than God? — Jamesk

Exactly. What is "matter"? What are "ideas"? How do they differ if not just by location (Ideas are in a mind. Matter is everywhere else)?

Well, personally I think that the idea of nonphysicals is incoherent, so I can't explain that end. — Terrapin Station

Which is why you gave up when I asked you to define "awareness" as a idealist would define it. The problem is that "awareness" has no meaning in an idealist "universe" - the same for "experience".

Remember that I also pointed out that idealists are really just direct realists.