We know how to measure this, and it's relatively easy to do so" isn't actually a criterion for something being physicall. — Terrapin Station

Could you please tell me what the criteria are then?

You know that empirical claims are not provable, right? (Assuming that you're using "proof" in a more strict sense of that term.) — Terrapin Station

Which is one of Berkeley's crux points. You have no more proof for materialism than for immaterialism.

So first, the criteria are going to have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with anything that WE do. It's not as if anything's ontological nature changes because of how we think about it, whether we can interact with it in particular ways that we have particualr understandings of, etc. It's important to remember that.

The criteria are the ontological nature of the "thing" in question. As a property cluster, whether it consists of material, whether it has mass, a charge, a location, spatial extension, etc.--those sorts of things. Whether we know how to measure those things in a particular case is irrelevant.

Which is one of Berkeley's crux points. You have no more proof for materialism than for immaterialism. — Jamesk

A fortiori because there's no proof of any empirical claim, hence "proof" is a red herring. We don't endorse or reject any empirical claims on proof. We endorse or reject empirical claims for other reasons.

Because it's not much different to saying something like, say, "The feeling of anger is an emotion". You do see the problem, right? — S

Why is this a problem? It's informative, and may serve as a premise for a deductive argument. It tells me that anger is classed as an emotion. If we agree on this, we can make statements about emotions in general, and draw conclusions about anger, because we've agreed that anger is an emotion. That's the process of simple deductive logic.

We already know that a feeling is an emotion. — S

Some people try to deny the obvious as irrelevant, that's my point. But this stymies deductive logic.

And, what's worse, it misses the point, namely that the aim of the game is to score a goal without cheating, so to speak. If you start by speaking about a notion, then that's cheating, because it's setting yourself up so that you can't possibly lose. But as a result of your cheating, your attempt can be rightly dismissed. — S

What are you talking about? We start a logical process by stating the obvious, as a premise, (preferably a self-evident truth) and when we have agreement on the premises, we can draw conclusions about the less obvious. There is no point to dismissing the proposition as irrelevant, or "cheating", without first understanding its position in the argument. It seems like you are saying "I don't like your premise because I'm afraid of the conclusions which it might produce, so I'm going to dismiss it as irrelevant, even though it's obviously true."

My reply to this will be much the same as my reply to Wayfarer. Masterful prose? Perhaps. A very clever piece of writing? May well be. But are the key arguments plausible? No. What's more important? Are you a truth seeker or something akin to an admirer of exotic artifacts? — S

I see your method. You dismiss premises from the argument which are obviously true as "cheating", then you claim it's "a very clever piece of writing". If you were really a "truth seeker" you would not be so anxious to dismiss premises which you recognize as true..

More mental gymnastics.

Again, you don't need proof to label something. We can call something anything we like. We only need to agree on what to label something when we want to communicate that something. What is it that you want to communicate, Jamesk? What is the difference between "mind" and "matter"?

I'm open to this. I think it's fair, however, to question whether it makes sense to talk about a primary substance. Maybe it does. The mind (or matter in a mind-like mode) seems to aim at unifying experience this way. Let's grant your point. Then all the apparently plurality (all the different kinds of things) would seem merely to be renamed as 'arrangements' or 'modes' of a primary substance. So there is 'really' just one kind of thing. But it's the nature of this primary thing to express itself not only in different modes that ask for useful and illuminating categorization but also this categorization itself.

The primary substance has to be the kind of thing that can mistake itself as a plurality. Moreover the primary substance has to be able to exist in the form of the question too. The primary substance unveils itself as primary substance, within time, by having a conversation with itself. So it also has a memory. It is (or one of its arrangements is) a speaking, thinking mode of primary substance (tempting us to call it a subject all over again.) It is also the world in which these subjects converse. Even if 'mind' and 'matter' are 'false' categorizations in some sense, they are inescapable at least as the ladder with which primary substance learns to grasp itself as one and homogeneous. [All this is just following out the implications of there being a primary substance and us becoming aware of it and how it happened.] — sign

Thank You!!

This is the best response I've received so far to the point I've been trying to make. Unfortunately, I have to go to class. I'll respond later.

<Turns down the poetry knob> — Terrapin Station

This just explains the initial responses you had to my questions. It's nice to see that you eventually came around to seeing and agreeing with what I've said all along.

This just explains the initial responses you had to my questions. It's nice to see that you eventually came around to seeing and agreeing with what I've said all along. — Harry Hindu

If you're saying that realists and idealists are saying the same thing, I don't agree with you.

Jamesk? What is the difference between "mind" and "matter"? — Harry Hindu

Matter is physical and mind is not.

Matter is not physical though, strictly speaking. And that's the demonstration which Berkeley makes. It's an assumption we make, an idea, which helps us to understand physical existence. But what Berkeley demonstrates is that this idea, "matter" really doesn't correspond with anything in the physical world. So we really can't say that matter is physical.

How do we get to the point of saying that matter is an idea?

You know, so phenomenally, there's a tree say (not as a tree--that is, the concept, etc.--but "that thing"--I have to call it something to type this), and then how do we go from that to saying that the phenomenal tree is an idea?

Superb explanation, thank you.

How do we get to the point of saying that matter is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I discussed this with you earlier in the thread. There is nothing in the physical world that we sense as matter.

You know, so phenomenally, there's a tree say (not as a tree--that is, the concept, etc.--but "that thing"--I have to call it something to type this), and then how do we go from that to saying that the phenomenal tree is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that the tree is an idea, I'm saying that matter is an idea. You sense the tree as a tree, you do not sense it as matter.

I'm not saying that the tree is an idea, I'm saying that matter is an idea. You sense the tree as a tree, you do not sense it as matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

A couple different questions here, but I'll start with this one: what's the difference between the tree and matter?

The thing called "the tree" is something I can see, and reach out and touch. If that thing were called "the matter", then I could see and touch the matter. It's not though, it's called "the tree", and I haven't yet come across anything which I could see or reach out and touch which is called "matter".

So the distinction you're making is about what we call things?

Not exactly. We call things by names so that we can talk about them. I am talking about the things which are named, not the names. So the thing which we are calling a tree is something which I can sense, and these are the things which we call physical things. The thing we call "matter' is not such a thing, because of all the things which I sense, or can be sensed, the thing called "matter" is not one of them.

Unless you're saying something about the calling per se, that just restates that you think there's a difference between trees and matter. It doesn't specify what the difference is.

(And even if you were saying something about calling, would there be no difference if I did call a tree "matter"?)

Unless you're saying something about the calling per se, that just restates that you think there's a difference between trees and matter. It doesn't specify what the difference is. — Terrapin Station

I specified the difference with great clarity. A tree is a thing which I can sense. Matter is not. What's your problem?

A tree is something you can sense while matter is not only if it's the case that there's a difference between the tree and matter. I'm asking what that difference is. If you answer that the difference is that you can sense one and not the other it's circular.

The difference is that I can sense the existence of one but not the other. I can go out in the world and see trees all over the place, I can't see matter anywhere, nor can I sense its existence in any way. If this does not qualify as a difference to you, then I think you have serious problem.

If trees are matter, then you sense matter all the time, right? (Well, assuming you often encounter trees.)

"You can sense trees but not matter. Trees and matter are different. What's the difference? You can sense (the existence of) one but not the other."

The problems with that argument should be pretty obvious to you.

If trees are matter, then you sense matter all the time, right? (Well, assuming you often encounter trees.) — Terrapin Station

Trees are not matter though, they are trees. You violate the law of identity if you say trees are matter.

The problems with that argument should be pretty obvious to you. — Terrapin Station

I don't see the problem. You asked me for the difference and I told you. You're obviously trying to create a problem where there is none to be found.

By denying the reality that there is nothing physical, sensible, which the word "matter" refers to, you are creating a problem for yourself. All you need to do is accept this simple fact, and your problems of understanding will disappear.

Trees are not matter though, they are trees. You violate the law of identity if you say trees are matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music?

"You can sense a song, you can't sense music" "What's the difference?" "You can sense the existence of a song, you can't sense the existence of music. That's the difference."

Do we violate the law of identity when we say that the song "Kashmir" is music? — Terrapin Station

Of course not, this is classification. But music is not the thing you are sensing, you are sensing the particular playing of a particular song, just like "matter" is not what you are seeing, when you see a tree.

Do you understand the difference between a word which is being used to refer to a general idea like "music", or "matter", and a word being used to refer to a particular thing? You don't sense music.

Trees are not matter though, they are trees. You violate the law of identity if you say trees are matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is like saying “t-shirts are not clothes though, they are t-shirts. You violate the law of identity if you say t-shirts are clothes” and in the context of this discussion you then use that statement to conclude that there are no clothes, or people cannot experience clothes but somehow still experience t-shirts.
Im afraid your a bit confused here.
And matter isnt decribing an idea, it is describing, in general as you said, something physical. When you experience the t-shirt, you are also experiencing clothes.

T-shirts are as categorically abstract as clothes, as trees are to matter when talking about abstracting properties from sense experience. We experience none as they truly are a part from mind, so their existence depends upon mind (any mind, including a mind that might transcend conventional mind, like a network of minds as mind). They aren't really anything besides what we perceive them to be, which includes the fundamentally or functionally pragmatic imposed categories of experience.

The in-itself outside of minds is not even an in-itself. There is not even nothing qua nothing.

Only our perception of them needs a mind. They can exist without our minds.