Sure, it was. — unenlightened

Then the commons stole it, if we accept the premise that "property is theft."

So it was the property of the commons prior to being stolen? If not, then it's not theft (as no unlawful seizure of property has occurred). If so, then the commons stole it (because property is theft). (Recall that the post to which I initially responded said that "property is theft." You have tacked on the qualifier "private".)

Got it.

What is property? Property is theft. — charleton

"Theft" implies taking someone else's property. If property is theft, then who is being stolen from?

A conclusion is justified if there's evidence for it. There's evidence for it; therefore, it's justified. — Michael

A foundationalist would probably disagree with this...it would also rule out all forms of a priori knowledge, it seems to me, as I generally associate "evidence" with empirical modes of investigation.

Science could be omniscient. — Wayfarer

Sorry, but it's the religious people who claim to have all of the answers. Please stop projecting.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. — Wayfarer

Um, no. The "culture wars" (at least as generally defined in the U.S. - perhaps it's different in Australia) usually refers to the political struggle between the progressive and the regressive in shaping public policy and direction of society. The regressive side in the U.S. is the one generally aligned with evangelical or fundamentalist Protestants, as well as conservative Catholics. It has little, if anything, to do with debates over "the One" or the "ground of all being", or other metaphysical abstracta.

I suggest you look at it. — T Clark

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might address my questions, above, regarding how belief in "objective reality" (vs. the alternatives) would be useful in physics.

Example 1 - A belief in an objective morality can lead people to focus more on blame than on solving the problem. — T Clark

Hmm...the thesis of moral realism is more a matter for (meta-)ethics, rather than metaphysics, it seems to me.

Example 2 - Belief in objective reality is very useful, indispensable, for most of physics. On the other hand, it can lead to an overly reductionist approach that doesn't work well in other areas such as biology. Take a look at StreetLightX's discussion - "More Is Different."

I take it you are here using "objective" to mean something like "mind independent"? I have not seen StreetLightX's thread that you reference here. I am curious as to why biologists shouldn't assume that the phenomena which they study are mind-independent (that is, independent of their minds). I am also curious as to how, say, a solipsistic physicist would go about his work as compared to the physicist who held a realist position. (Again, this assumes that I have sufficiently understood the sense in which you mean "objective.")

So, anyway - Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness. — T Clark

What would be an example of a "useful" metaphysical answer or thesis?

That's what I mean by saying that all philosophical questions ultimately end up with a statement of belief, rather than an unequivocal answer. That assertion I do have scientific evidence for - My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. — Pseudonym

I admit that I've not read every page in this discussion, so forgive me if this point has been addressed. I've heard scientists such as Lawrence Krauss say things along the lines of "I don't believe that P, I know that P." However, if knowledge is justified true belief (or something in that neighborhood), to know that P entails that one believes that P. Thus, all knowledge statements are statements of belief. It is a different matter, of course, to claim "I don't merely believe that P, I know that P."

Additionally, it seems at least prima facie dubious to me that any affirmative claim at all is not a statement of belief on the part of the agent making the affirmation. No matter our level of justification or certitude in making an affirmative claim, our statement boils down to saying (even if only tacitly) "I believe such-and-such."

(I am using the somewhat clunky phrase "affirmative claim" to denote those utterances of ours which are (1) truth-apt, and (2) which express something we think is true. This would set such claims apart from non-truth-apt utterances and from truth-apt statements which we utter but do not believe, e.g. because we are lying, positing a hypothetical, etc.)

Not sure why it's funny. We may be talking at cross purposes here. I believe I've ably explained why "all men are mortal" is not tautologous. Anyone reading this can draw their own conclusions.

Off topic and overly pedantic. I see no value in pursuing this line of enquiry. — charleton

Suit yourself. However, I don't know that it's "pedantic" to point out that "definitional" and "definitive" are distinct, as "all men are mortal" is definitively true, but not defintionally so. Kind of an important distinction regarding our conversation...

Statements can also be tautological by virtue of their semantic structure, however, e.g. all cats are cats.

P1 from your argument (underlining mine): any human contrivance where the parts are so arranged that the completed whole is able to achieve or be used to achieve activities of a higher order than any part alone (e.g., a watch), are the result of intelligent design.

My critique was that this statement seems tautological, in that it essentially boils down to saying that "everything which is the result of intelligent design is the result of intelligent design," given that humans are intelligent agents, and given that "contrivance" can here be taken to be synonymous with "design."

Perhaps I'm missing something, but that's the way it looks to me. At the very least, everything in between the underlined phrases seems superfluous, in that every human contrivance whatsoever is the result of intelligent design.

EDIT: given that "human contrivance" entails "intelligent design", but not vice-versa (as, at least in principle, the contrivances of humans needn't exhaust the possibilities of intelligent design) perhaps (P1) is better read as saying something more akin to "all cats are mammals", rather than "all cats are cats." Under such a reading, I think it would escape my accusations of being tautologous. However, there may be another problem. One could re-write (P1) as follows:

(P1*): any human contrivance where the parts are not so arranged that the completed whole is able to achieve or be used to achieve activities of a higher order than any part alone are the result of intelligent design.

(P1*) is no less true than (P1), and yet does nothing to support (either deductively, inductively, or otherwise) the conclusion of your argument.

That's all I got for now. I'm tired, and I want my blankie.

"Definitive" is not the same as "definitional." I agree that it's pretty definitive that man is mortal (again, at least at present), but I disagree that that implies that man is thereby mortal by definition. There can be accidental features or properties which apply to every member of a class.

Man is mortal is tautological is man is mortal is definitive. And since none are claiming there are immortal men, then the point is mute. — charleton

Sorry, but that first sentence isn't even grammatical. I know that no one is claiming that there exist any immortal men: my point was simply to contest that "all men are mortal" is tautological. Again, even if contingent features of the universe made it true that no man can live forever, it doesn't follow that man is definitionally mortal.

Whatever your 'in any event' is, may I remind you of the thread title??? — charleton

I know. I was speaking of my discussion with Sam26 (re: whether tautologies can imply substantive - here defined as "non-tautological" - conclusions), which is what prompted your response. But this still has little to do with ID per se, so my comment is also applicable to the title topic.

Practical impossibilities aside, this says nothing about the logical impossibility of an immortal man, only that it would be inductively difficult to verify. It also makes unwarranted assumptions about "the end of time." Even assuming such a thing, it would be a contingent feature of the universe, and would be inapplicable to the supposed definitional mortality of men. There may well be possible worlds in which the universe goes on forever, and thus immortal men can persist forever. There are no possible worlds where cats are not cats or where ~(A V ~A).

EDIT: in any event, this is all rather beside the point, as what is at issue here is the derivation of non-tautological premises from tautologies, not the derivation of tautologies from tautologies.

But is this true by definition? The mortality of men could be an accidental regularity. Some men alive today may well be rendered immortal by means of technological progress. Would they thereby no longer be men?

If, by some freak occurrence, all men with hair on their head died off, it would then be true that "all men are bald." However, it wouldn't follow that men are definitionally bald.

We can surely have non-tautological premises in deductive arguments. For instance:

(P1) No man lives on Mars.
(P2) Smith is a man.
(C1) Smith does not live on Mars.

After all "All men are mortal" is a tautology too. — Sam26

It is? How? There are by definition no immortal men?

One might also quibble that deductive arguments tell us anything substantive about the world, vs. simply rearranging what we already know of it. Deductive reasoning is non-ampliative.

(I'm a bit rusty on this sort of thing, but I recall David Stove had a nice discussion on the invalidity of deriving non-tautological conclusions from tautological premises, a style of argument which he termed "the Gem." I believe that it arose in his critiques of idealism. There was even a lengthy thread about just this type of argument back in the old forum.)

But the ordered sequences are man-made and arbitrary, there is nothing different about them to any other sequence. — CuddlyHedgehog

But there is something different about them: they are much less likely to occur than non-ordered ones.

Any particular unordered sequence is no more likely to occur than any particular ordered one, but unordered sequences generally are more likely to occur than ordered ones generally, simply because, in the universe of possible outcomes, there are far more unordered ones than ordered ones.

This is true in just the same way that a specific sequence of coin flips like "HHHH" is just as likely as "HTHT", and yet it is more likely that one will get 2 heads and 2 tails than all heads.

First, if I was to put forth the argument it would take the following inductive form:

(1) Any human contrivance where the parts are so arranged that the completed whole is able to achieve or be used to achieve activities of a higher order than any part alone (e.g., a watch), are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Objects of nature have a structure where the parts are so arranged that the whole can achieve or be used to achieve activities of a higher order than any part alone (e.g., a cat).

(3) Hence, objects of nature are the result of intelligent design.

This is an inductive argument, not a deductive argument. The conclusion is not necessarily the case, but follows from the premises with a high degree of probability, based on the number of examples in nature, and comparing them with what we know about intelligently designed human productions.

By higher order, I mean that when parts are put together they achieve a higher order than any part alone.

To answer the question about whether a tree would fit the description of intelligent design, the answer is yes. Any living organism would fit the description of intelligent design.

Does intelligent design negate evolution, absolutely not. — Sam26

I know I'm very late to this party, but...

Premise (1) seems rather tautological, wouldn't you say? Given that humans are intelligent, all of their contrivances are the result of "intelligent design." Thus, it is just a circuitous means of saying that "objects designed by intelligent agents are intelligently designed."

Thus, you are here attempting to infer substantive conclusions about the world from a tautology, which seems logically suspect to me. Not that arguments from analogy can never work, of course, just that this particular one seems problematic.

ON that note, there's a quote about a well-known economist, E F Schumacher (author of Small is Beautiful) who became a philosopher and ultimately converted to Catholicism. He gave a radio lecture to the BBC, in which he said:

The first great leap was made when man moved from Stage One of primitive religiosity to Stage Two of scientific realism. This is the stage modern man tends to be at. Then some people become dissatisfied with scientific realism, perceiving its deficiencies, and realize that there is something beyond fact and science. Such people progress to a higher plane of development which he called Stage Three. The problem was that Stage One and Stage Three looked exactly the same to those in Stage Two. Consequently, those in Stage Three are seen as having had some sort of relapse into childish nonsense. Only those in Stage Three, who have been through Stage Two, can understand the difference between Stage One and Stage Three — Wayfarer

So nice for Schumacher that he has "progressed" to a higher plane of development, which the poor, recalcitrant scientific materialists are powerless to understand. Just more of that humility inherent in the religious, eh? So much better than the "arrogance" espoused by the "New Atheists."

Sexual assault, we are told, is not about sex. It is about power, we are told. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

This seems more a trope of sexual assault theology than anything grounded in evidence. Many rapes (e.g. those which occur during wartime) seem nothing more than opportunistic coerced copulation. It is highly dubious that a crime whose defining component is sexual has nothing to do with sexual gratification on the part of the attacker. (I am not denying that some attackers are excited, motivated, or even aroused by the thought of imposing their will on a less-powerful victim, only that this is the primary motivator in most or all male-on-female sexual assaults.)

I do think that male-on-male rape has a significant component of lording power over its victim, however, reducing them to a subservient role. I read a rather disturbing article some time ago which states that male-on-male rape can be used as a weapon in cultures with a high degree of "machismo" (during civil conflicts in Latin America or Africa, say, or inside of prisons), as being the male victim of a sexual assault in a patriarchal culture would be that much more devestating and painful. This is analogous to the way in which rape was used as a weapon of war against female Muslim populations in the former Yugoslavia.

Then again, this recent tidal wave of sexual harassment accusations has mostly been against men in some of the supposedly most progressive/liberal places in society, such as Hollywood, the news media, and the Democratic Party. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Not necessarily: I don't know that Matt Lauer, for instance, was especially liberal, despite being in the supposedly liberal news media. Fox News (not an overly liberal place) has also been struck by a number of such claims. And Roy Moore may be just a tad right of center :D.

But, yes, Al Franken was definitely a liberal politician, and Harvey Weinstein had historically aligned himself with Democratic candidates.

The old forum has died. In any case in this thread I have provided detailed responses to your questions here, here, and especially here, and here. There must be about - what - 2,500 words written in response to your criticisms (although some of them you didn't respond to and anything that strays too far from your customary positivist scientific realism seems to go by you.) — Wayfarer

None of these contain arguments. Do you not understand the difference? All you have done is quoted other sources, stated your view, and so forth. But, you have provided no reasons for supposing that materialism (or physicalism, naturalism, and allied positions) is false. It has nothing to do with my "positivist scientific realism;" it has to do with you never defending your views, only stating what those views are and complaining about those views you don't like.

ow is it an empirical question? Could a 'non-designed universe' ever be compared to 'a designed universe'? — Wayfarer

I think it couldn't be any other way. Again, if an undesigned universe is empirically indistinguishable from a designed one (that is, each hypothesis makes the exact same predictions, and both are equally well-supported by the same set of observations), then just what is the designer supposed to have designed?

In a Scientific American cover story on the Multiverse, we read the following:

Fundamental constants are finely tuned for life. A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere. This reasoning has been applied, in particular, to explaining the density of the dark energy that is speeding up the expansion of the universe today.

DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? (cover story). By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug 2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. 6p.

So, notice the reasoning here: Weinberg and Susskind find the actual 'fine-tuning argument' is embarrassing, because, by golly, it really does seem to show that we're not simply accidental tourists, that the universe, in Freeman Dyson's words, 'really did seem to know we were coming'. But not to worry! Why not just posit gazillions of other universes! And then we save the 'accidental tourist' theory! It's so easy! And nobody can ever resolve it! That sure kicks the ball into the long grass, doesn't it.

Now, as it happens, in the years since this article was written, a controversy has erupted in which that author, George Ellis, is a player. This controversy is about whether string theory, and the related mutiverse cosmology, are scientific theories at all (for which, see Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics, Nature.) Ellis and Silk recommend circumspection with respect to some of the wilder theories in circulation. In the other corner, we have Max Tegmark, Sean Carroll, and others, for whom no speculative metaphysics is too far-out provided the mathematics makes some kind of sense.

So when you work out a way, in this climate, to resolve the question of the 'grand design', then do let us know.

I admit I have not read this in detail, as you have provided yet another quotation in lieu of actually discussing something yourself. I will only say that I have never defended the veracity of the multiverse, many-worlds hypothesis, string theory, or anything of the sort (and I agree that, to the extent that they don't make testable predictions, then they're not science). It is simply a subject outside of my knowledge (or even interest, really).

All the things you've 'pointed out to me' over the years, amount to your explaining your point of view. We agree on some things, and disagree on many more, as I have always been opposed to scientific materialism, and so it would be mistaken to assume that I have been persuaded by your arguments. — Wayfarer

What I "pointed out" is a logical consequence of your own view. If you are unpersuaded by what I am saying, then that is simply a failure of rationality on your part, not a failure to be swayed by my general worldview.

However competing philosophical theories are adjudicated, it is not by reference to empirical observations about nature. If they were, then we'd no longer be doing metaphysics, but rather would be doing physics. Debates over, say, platonism vs. nominalism are not fought with competing sets of data: they're fought with a priori argumentation.

Science (under which I here broadly lump other empirical, evidence-based disciplines such as history) relies on observation and the collecting of evidence to bolster its theories, i.e. an empiricist methodology. Disputes which can be adjudicated empirically fall (at least in principle) within the ambit of the sciences. Ergo, to claim that a particular dispute - "design" vs. "no design" in this case - is not a matter for the sciences is to claim that it cannot be adjudicated empirically, i.e. that a designed universe is observationally indistinguishable from an undesigned one. That seems, at least prima facie to be an absurd claim (for one thing, in the case of the "design" hypothesis, it makes one wonder just what the designer has designed). Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that such disputes are not a scientific matter. If you see a flaw in my reasoning, please point it out, and please be specific.

As for 'stamping my feet', I have been on these forums for a good while, at various times I have entered elaborate arguments in favour of the views I hold which I'm not going to repeat in detail on every occasion. What I provided is my general attitude towards the matter, and I stand by it.

Could you do me the favor of providing a link to a discussion (with me, or with anyone else) in which you in fact did offer arguments in favor of your views? Not to be uncharitable, but the closest thing to an argument I've yet seen you muster is a sort of appeal to adverse consequences (i.e. "it would be terrible for society if materialism is true, ergo materialism must be false"), which is most definitely fallacious reasoning. The rest comes from name-dropping your circle of preferred authors and linking to things other people have written, rather than putting their points into your own words, and distilling them into cogent arguments which can be analyzed on a premise-by-premise basis, or anything of the sort.

I don't think even the nature of 'purpose, intention or design', or arguments about what these amount to, are in scope for the physical sciences (although they may be for natural philosophy proper).[...]

AFAIK, "natural philosophy" is simply an antiquated term for "science;" thus, there is little relevant distinction between the two in modern times.

Design, purpose or intention doesn't incidentally mean an endorsement of 'intelligent design', which I am generally averse to, on account of my dislike of American evangelical protestantism.

This would seem a genetic fallacy. I myself am likewise no fan of intelligent design creationism or of evangelical Protestantism, but to regard ID as false "on account of" one's dislike for its main proponents is fallacious. Good arguments can be propounded by bad people.

However, the nature of life and mind remain elusive. Certainly there is no 'vital spirit' as an objective substance, but the allegory I prefer to think in terms of, is the relationship between letters and meaning, or between microelectronics and drama - you won't find TV shows or the characters that play them, inside a television set, you won't find the meaning of a text inside the ink and paper in which it is reproduced.

I grant that the nature of mind (at least in terms of the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, etc) is poorly understood: however, it is as poorly-understood by philosophy as it is by science! And science (unlike philosophy) can have important and relevant things to say about the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness, the workings of the brain, its ontogeny and phylogeny, and a host of other problems which a priori philosophy is mostly impotent to tackle.

However, I deny that the nature of life itself remains elusive. What, exactly, is elusive about it? Again, we have dissected life to its component atoms, and have acquired exquisitely detailed understanding of its workings, down to the level of molecules in many cases. Certainly, much remains to be discovered, but there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about life anymore: science has demystified it.

More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'.

Sure. And as I said above, the good money is on a physicalistic/naturalistic science to solve these problems, given its extraordinarily successful track record, and given the extraordinary paucity of successes of its alternatives. So, you'd do well to extend those promissory notes to materialism than to its alternatives: it has much better credit.

But it’s just not true., The nature or existence of purpose, design, intention - none of these are scientific questions at al. Certainly naturalism puts those matters aside for its purposes, but then declaring that ‘science has shown’ that the Universe/world is devoid of purpose is a metaphysical; conclusion based on a naturalist assumption. — Wayfarer

This would seem an argument by assertion. As we've gone over many times at this point, some disciplines (e.g. natural theology - for which you yourself have expressed some sympathy - and intelligent design creationism) have purported to detect the workings of God, gods, or a "Designer" based on an examination of nature. To simply state that these questions are out of bounds of science doesn't cut it: the onus is on you to demonstrate or argue for this point.

As I've pointed out to you long ago, to say that design, purpose, and intentionality in nature is not a matter for science is to posit that a designed universe is empirically indistinguishable from an undesigned one. To say the least, this proposition is counter-intuitive, so you need to flesh out your position somewhat instead of just stamping your feet and declaring what must be the case.

Second - the gaps are getting bigger, not smaller. We are told that science can detect only 4% of the totality of the cosmos. Galaxies are held together by some unknown force - let’s call that ‘dark matter’ as matter is all we’ll consider. The Universe is expanded by some unknown energy - let’s call that ‘dark energy’ as energy is all we’ll consider. And so on. Then there’s ‘the multiverse’ - respected scientists are on the record saying they favour the idea, because it presents a solution to the annoying problem of why the universe seems fine-tuned for life. And other respected scientists question whether the multiverse and ‘string theory’ are even scientific theories at all.

I largely agree with this. Writer Matt Ridley once had a nice line about scientific progress sometimes clearing a space in the forest of questions which gives scientists a clearer view of multitude of trees still before them.

However, my point is that since the advent of modern science, every question posed about organisms and their workings has yielded to a physicalistic, naturalistic, and mechanistic analysis. Living things have been dissected down to their component atoms, and it has become increasingly clear that there is no mysterious "life force", "elan vital," or any other supernatural or teleological process. Some frontiers remain: consciousness, for instance, is still very poorly understood.

But given the successful track record of modern science to date, there is no reason whatsoever for thinking that the answer to such questions will not be solved in the same manner. The same applies to cosmological mysteries such as dark matter and dark energy. Yes, they are as-yet poorly understood: but there is no inkling that it is anything other than yet another scientific problem.

No, he doesn't say the opposite at all. In The God Delusion, he presents an elaborate argument along the lines that 'life only had to start once' and that there are billions of planets on which this might have occurred. He admits that science really has no account of how DNA came into existence, but also claims that this is not really important.

What Dawkins objects to, is the assertion that evolution progresses 'by chance alone', i.e. random and unguided chance gives rise to new species. He says that there are many factors involved, meaning that 'chance' is only one facet of the whole process.

I accept that, but I still consider the above criticism to stand. — Wayfarer

Yes, there is a gap in scientific knowledge concerning the origin of DNA (you may be aware that some models - referred to as the "RNA world" - posit RNA as the first molecule of heredity, rather than DNA).

But why wedge God or Purpose or Design or anything into that gap? A creationist offering a "God of the gaps" strategy has set himself upon an ever-shrinking landscape, with fewer and fewer places to provide refuge every year against the advance of science (yes - materialistic science). I know you've previously derided such thinking as the "promissory notes of materialism" (channeling Popper, was it?), but given the history of the last 400 years or so, where would the safe money be? On supernatural or teleological explanations, or on mechanistic, physicalistic science? I think that any objective reading of the historical record can give succor only to the latter.

What I have said, is that the belief that 'life began for no reason', as argued by, for example, Jacques Monod, in his book, Chance and Necessity, does not amount to an hypothesis. Ask the proverbial man-in-the-street why they came to exist, and they will generally say that life's a cosmic crap-shoot, it's a fluke.

I suppose it would depend on what street. The majority of Americans, for instance, profess belief in God (or a "spirit" of some sort...), so it's questionable as to whether they would indeed say that "life's a cosmic crap-shoot." Indeed, popular discourse is rife with narcissistic statements (masquerading as pious humility) along the lines that "God sent me here to [X]..."

Speaking for myself, I would indeed say that life is most likely a purely chemical and physical phenomenon, with no purpose, design, or teleology in either its origin or functional workings.

Overall, 'popular Darwinism' has had a degenerative effect on modern culture IMO.

Perhaps you'd like a return to the European Middle Ages: the "Age of Faith"? Ah, those were the days.

If my posts about it bother you, you have the option of ignoring them.

The reason I started this thread, if you read the OP, was to acknowledge a negative review of one of the authors I have frequently referred to about this matter.

Sure...but that has nothing to do with his views on The New Atheists, his criticism of whom you've repeatedly said you still agree with. That's what at issue in the little sidebar you and I have going here.

But - you're right. This is the very last post, ever, I will write about Dawkins and Dennett.

Somehow I doubt that. >:O

I stand by all of them. Again, my criticism of Dawkins, Dennett, and their ilk is purely on the grounds of their scientific materialism for which they are known public advocates. — Wayfarer

Ok. Once again: you said that Dawkins et al claim that life is an "accident," when in fact he has said exactly the opposite. You have said the evolutionary biology is unique among the sciences in allowing for "chance" to enter into explanations, which is grossly false. You have admittedly never even read The God Delusion, and yet carp about it endlessly. So, again I submit that you are as ignorant about the target your criticisms as you purport Dawkins to be about religion.

I would again offer you to submit some arguments against materialism, which you never seem to get around to doing: you offer only complaints, and then quote additional complaints by like minded individuals. You have accused me of not doing philosophy, but you never seem to do any yourself.

"what does the sentence mean, beyond the everyday notion that 'I would not be surprised if this acorn became a tree', and if it does mean something more, can that thing be explained in a non-circular manner, ie without using synonyms for 'potential' like 'can', 'possible', 'may', 'might'. — andrewk

Not to be pedantic, but the vast majority of acorns probably never become oak trees, so in a sense it would be surprising if any given acorn became an oak tree, just on probablistic grounds. Of course, any given oak must come from some acorn, so it would be not at all surprising to learn that a given oak tree came from an acorn.

That’s all I’ve ever done, as far as I am concerned. Dawkins makes many sweeping philosophical claims on the basis of the biological sciences, which is generally what I think deserves criticism. If I wanted to discuss Dawkin’s contributions to evolutionary biology, then I would read his books on that, and discuss it on a biology-related forum. — Wayfarer

That's all well and good, but don't you think said criticism should be based upon an accurate understanding and presentation of his position? Because you've said things here about Dawkins, evolutionary biology, and science generally which are grossly inaccurate. Ergo, I don't see how your critiques can have much merit. I daresay that you appear to be as unacquainted with the subject of your critique as you purport Dawkins to be with regard to religion.

If he had stuck to his biological knitting I would have had no reason to discuss his books on a philosophy forum. It's the inferences he draws from biology to philosophy that are at issue. — Wayfarer

You are of course free to critique his philosophy, but when you misrepresent basic tenets of Dawkins's thinking, it does you no service, and it makes one think that perhaps you are engaging with a caricature of what you think Dawkins is, and how he's been represented in the sources you prefer, rather than engaging with the man and his works.

I was referring to your characterization of Dawkins's position that life (or its adaptive features) is an "accident," which, again, you pretty much admitted above was not accurate. As I've said many times, he not only does not believe that, it is almost exactly contrary to his actual views on evolution by natural selection.

I don’t believe I do. — Wayfarer

You don't believe you consistently misrepresent his position, or that you don't misrepresent it simpliciter? If the former, then we can debate that, if the latter, then that belief should be negated by our discussion in this thread alone.

Well, back to the Wieseltier review that started this thread:

It will be plain that Dennett's approach to religion is contrived to evade religion's substance. He thinks that an inquiry into belief is made superfluous by an inquiry into the belief in belief. This is a very revealing mistake. You cannot disprove a belief unless you disprove its content. If you believe that you can disprove it any other way, by describing its origins or by describing its consequences, then you do not believe in reason. In this profound sense, Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it. — Wayfarer

Evolutionary arguments against naturalism are an interesting (IMO) and challenging area of inquiry to naturalistic theories of the evolution of intelligence. However, I'm not sure that appeals to supernaturalism, Aristolelian telos, or anything else really solves the problem, as ultimately we employ reason to analyze our reasoning faculties, whatever the origin or providence of said faculties is presumed to be. There may well be an inescapable circularity to such inquiries (albeit a very large circle, perhaps).

To what does one refer in relation to the nature of God, if not that? It is the background of this entire debate. — Wayfarer

Someone needn't be Jewish or Christian to believe in God. One could be a non-denominational theist, a deist, a pantheist, etc.

I've read Dawkins' characterisation of chance in evolution, and I accept it. He says, iit is chance constrained by many other factors, so that in the context of evolutionary adaption, it's not simply random. I get that.

Ok. Is there any reason that you consistently mischaracterize Dawkins's position, then?

But why living things exist in the first place, and why intelligent, self-aware beings evolve, is a different kind of question altogether. It's much more a question about telos, about whether there is a reason for living things, in a general sense, that is assumed by, for example, Aristotelian philosophy.

But, in smuggling a "why" question into such matters you are presupposing what you set out to prove. Why not ask "how"? I see no reason at all that abiogenesis or the evolution of intelligence are not scientific matters. The evolution of, say, feathers, is a matter for science, is it not? Why should intelligence not be? Because we exult sentience (H. sapiens's defining feature, conveniently enough) over all else? So, too, might a sparrow exult feathers over all else, and proclaim that no "scientistic" philosophy could ever begin to pierce the eternal mystery of "why" birds have feathers.

Now, this is not to say that a natural history of intelligence is understood in much detail, only that there's no reason for ruling it out of bounds for a scientific discussion.

Only after I came to an understanding that God exists, I started to look into atheistic arguments more closely.

And my conclusion is that atheists, both in general and those most prominent ones, are:

1) quite unreasonable in interpreting what nature provides as clues for or against God
2) quite unreasonable in their reasoning about God

The amount of blank ammunition atheists generally use against God makes me think that atheism itself is a miracle. Meaning, it's not something natural, but interruption of nature forced from something outside of our observable world.

And as a miracle, it's basically one more clue for existence of God. — Henri

I can't believe that a just and loving God could allow one of His followers to make such an atrocious argument, so I'm forced to conclude that God doesn't exist. QED.

I suppose it's a case of abductive inference - arguing from effect to cause. I prefer the traditional belief that 'the heavens bespeak the divine word' to the opposite. But I can't make the leap from there to 'therefore the Bible is the Revealed Word of God', as I am by no means exclusively attached to the JC tradition. — Wayfarer

I didn't say anything about the Bible or the Judeo-Christian tradition; I was asking about the existence of God. Is it that nature provides "suggestions" to the effect that God exists, or is it merely that you prefer that belief to its contrary? If the former, then I'd ask again what "suggestion" means in this context, because it seems a lot like "basis for rational belief," "justification," "evidence," and the usual accoutrements of abductive reasoning (the sort of reasoning employed by scientists, you will recall).

If the latter, then I'd ask what your preferences have to do with what is true or false?

But one thing I will say is that the belief that it is not God, or the requirement to exclude any such idea from consideration, has consequences. For example, there's the role attributed to chance - that living organisms are essentially the outcome of chance and physical necessity, that life is a cosmic accident. Scientists, generally, are concerned with disclosing causal relationships - yet curiously, when it comes to why evolution has produced intelligent self-aware beings capable of asking such questions, they are silent; we're simply the outcome of an algorithmic process rather like a chemical reaction, which in this case, has happened to result in h.sapiens . But in what other field of science would that be accepted as amounting to an hypothesis?

Ok, we've been over this before. I don't say this to be condescending, but you honestly do sometimes seem incapable of imbibing information which goes against your set viewpoints. For the umpteenth time, evolutionary biologists do not regard life or the adaptive features thereof as an "accident." Dawkins goes positively apeshit when anyone characterizes his position thus; he does not believe that.

Furthermore (another thing we've covered, albeit fewer times, probably), evolutionary biology is not divested of causal relationships (how could it be, if there is to be any meaningful link between environment and phenotype?). It simply posits that life and the adaptive features thereof are a product of random variation and non-random selection. As I've said before, science does not eschew chance: on the contrary, it is the default position (i.e. null hypothesis) in the context of hypothesis testing! So, to answer the final question in your above paragraph: every other field of science!

Nevertheless, the question is beyond the scope of empiricism, by definition. Maybe if we found a bunch of other life-bearing planets, and found they were inhabited by beings somewhat like us, and not like the denizens of a Star Wars bar, then perhaps we'd be obliged to re-consider. But I don't see it happening in my lifetime.

Um, what would such a thing prove about the existence of God?

Indeed. For example, a talented chef like Rick Bayless is castigated for specializing in (and profiting from) Mexican cuisine...because he's white. Never mind that he has traveled in Mexico, spent years studying regional cuisines and adapting them...ideas are to be hermetically locked up inside of one culture.

(This is not to say that there can't be legitimate concerns along these lines...just that the latest shrill cries of "cultural appropriation" are largely spurious. Black people can wear Dockers, can't they? White people can wear dreadlocks...not that they should wear dreadlocks, mind you. Besides looking unappealing, they also seem impossible to wash. So, get back to your Phish concert, you damn, dirty hippy!)

For instance, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer: — Wayfarer

Nothing in that quote really answers my question, sorry. I don't even see what it has to do with supernaturalism, specifically.

Not demonstrate - only suggest. — Wayfarer

What does "suggest" mean? In my experience, a "suggestion" of something (as it is used in this context) is akin to a hint, or a weak form of evidence. Does empirical investigation provide evidence for or against the existence of God? Does it justify claims to the effect of "God [does/doesn't] exist"? If not, then what is the "suggestion" which you speak of here? If so, why do you have a bee in your bonnet about Dawkins and likeminded folks who also believe that empirical investigation can shed light on the existence of God (albeit coming at it from another angle)?

So I am inclined to favour the arguments of natural theology over their opponents. But, that said, I know that I don’t know, and that the argument can’t be settled one way or the other. — Wayfarer

No offense, but you have screamed bloody murder of the position of some scientists (e.g. Dawkins) who have claimed that the existence of God can be investigated on scientific grounds. And now you profess sympathy for natural theology...which purports to demonstrate God's existence on scientific grounds. So, is your position that such investigation is acceptable only if one believes in an affirmative answer to the question? I know you say that no definitive resolution can be reached, but this is nevertheless something of a double standard, wouldn't you say?

But one reason I am not committed to naturalism is that I accept the theistic argument that ‘nature doesn’t contain its ground or explanation’. — Wayfarer

Does supernature "contain its ground or explanation"? If so, what might that be? At some point, we may well just bump up against brute facts, right? Is supernaturalism allowed brute facts, but naturalism is not? If so, what would be the justification for this claim?