If someone was to claim that they "don't see color" or "don't see race," would they be considered ethnocentric? — Cosette Brazeau

I'd consider them to be lying.

Hi Arkady, that's not proof. That's some collated samples that have been admitted into evidence. The burden of proof as required by science has not been met. Evolution and God, neither has been accepted by science at true, only by scientists. — MikeL

You may be using the word "proof" in an idiosyncratic way. Generally, one speaks only loosely of "proof" in empirical disciplines: true "proofs" only exist in mathematics and logic. Perhaps something can be said to have been "proven" if it is so well-attested to by empirical inquiry that it is a rock-solid finding, with little chance that it will be overturned, but this is all rather loose talk.

So, I'm not sure what "proof" of natural selection you have in mind. Evolution (with or without natural selection) most certainly has met the burden of proof to any reasonable inquirer. No one can reasonably doubt the common descent of all life on Earth, that species transition into new and different species over time, etc. These facts are simply too well-attested to by the fossil record and evidence from molecular genetics. And, as I said, the proliferation of advantageous traits in populations of organisms in response to environmental pressures has been well-documented (though, as I said above, there is some debate among experts, at least as far as this layman can tell, as to how big a role natural selection plays in evolution as compared to other processes).

If your standard of "proof" is pitched so high as to exclude evolution, I would wonder whether you are generally a skeptic about knowledge claims, or if you reserve undue skepticism for evolution because it does not comport with your pre-established ideological or religious views. That is a rather common view: people who happily accept results from other areas of science will all of a sudden fulminate that evolution is "just a theory" (as you have done above), "not proven," or even that there is evidence against it because they find it distasteful to their religious (or moral or whatever) sensibilities.

I have no idea what your last sentence is saying, as it is ungrammatical.

Hi Arkady, I agree, that God created Man and said bah to every other lifeform is nuts. Rather than God created the universe I propose that God is the universe. It is a sentient level of energy that science has no clue exists but permeates everything right down to the atom and beyond, right up to the galaxies and beyond. Do you really believe in a big, dumb universe? It's teaming with sentience at all levels in all manifestations in all quadrants. Natural Selection says B went to C went to D, and is only a theory as there is no proof - a requisite of science or so I'm told in this thread. So both views can be accommodated, no? — MikeL

Natural selection is a theory, you are right. It is a scientific theory, which (in a slight deviation from the term's meaning in normal parlance) is a set of propositions which have withstood empirical testing, and, somewhat more controversially, at least for those philosophers who are Popperians, has been confirmed to some degree. Saying there is no "proof" of natural selection is simply not true. The selection of particular traits in populations of organisms in response to particular environmental pressures is well-documented (though the degree to which natural selection, as opposed to other modalities such as neutralism, genetic drift, etc drives the evolutionary process is a matter of some contention among experts, of which I'm admittedly not one).

As for the universe "teaming [sic] with sentience" at all levels, I'm not sure what that means. Perhaps the universe is God, or perhaps it's just an electron orbiting an atom in some greater universe. But without any way in principle to test these claims, they must remain forever speculative.

I wouldn't say that concepts exist in minds, and I'm not necessarily suggesting that you're saying this, but only pointing this out as a point of clarification. — Sam26

I actually do believe that concepts inhere in minds (or at least their products), and all else that follows from that: I'm not sure where else they would inhere.

I wasn't joking when I said I was done with your nonsense. If you wish to continue to respond my posts "for the eyes of God," please feel free to do so, just know that I'm not reading them. I just don't want you waste your time (time which could be better spent actually learning about some of the things of which you speak).

Scientists are not in the business of proving the non-existence of supernatural entities. If a scientist attempts to do so, they've crossed over from science and into transcendental metaphysics. Even if they don't realize it. — darthbarracuda

If one posits the existence of a God who interacts with nature in some way (i.e. is not wholly "transcendental"), then it is perfectly legitimate to investigate God's existence by means of historical or scientific investigation. Some scientists and natural theologians who were in the business of proving the existence of God (including modern-day "scientific" creationists, intelligent design theorists, etc) have likewise employed such methods.

IMO, saying that the existence of God is not a subject for empirical investigation is simply a canard meant to shield certain claims from rational inquiry.

All biology/neurology is is pulling whatever science wants out of a hat. — Rich

I will give you the benefit of the doubt and just assume that you are breathtakingly ignorant and not just trolling. Either way, I'm done with your bullshit.

Yeah, to say that a God created man in his own image is a bit of a stretch. To ascribe the qualities of man to God is even more of a stretch. Nonetheless in this game called our lifetime you have to look up into the night sky and think "Holy Cow".

That a rock given enough time and pressure can change into another rock type is fine. That atoms given enough time self-assemble into living sentient beings is absolutely amazing. The inanimate has become animated. Just a fluke? All Darwin's theory tried to explain was how the lifeforms evolved after the process was started. — MikeL

I agree: Darwin described the origin of species, and not the origin of life (his speculations about a "warm little pond" notwithstanding, its safe to say that Darwin's primary area of interest was not abiogenesis, which is a good thing, given how he would have had no hope of solving the problem with the state of biochemistry and molecular genetics in the mid-late 19th century).

However, if a theistic evolutionist wishes to claim that God in some way intended or planned that humans (or something like humans, in terms of sentience, self-awareness, moral sense, etc) would arise as an outcome of the evolutionary process, that view is difficult to square with the apparently random and meandering path taken by evolution, with several mass extinctions in the 4 billion year history of life on Earth, including the most recent, the K-T extinction event, which removed dinosaurs as the dominant animals, setting the stage for the mammals to flourish in their absence.

So, in order for these apparent contingencies to have been built into the evolutionary process from the start, we now must posit God not only seeding life in that "warm little pond," but also have Him moving asteroids around the solar system in order to strike the Earth at just the right time, have him manipulating the Earth's orbital parameters and/or solar output in order to tweak the climate just so at certain stages in the history of life, have Him decide when animals would colonize land from the oceans (it's probably difficult, if not impossible to have sentience or civilization without fire, and it's hard to build fires in aquatic environments), etc. Very quickly, we come to see that there is nothing "natural" about natural selection, and we must ask again why it would be that God chose to create humans through one of the few pathways which makes him seem unnecessary to the process.

There is science's designer. Calling it natural is cute, but a keen observer will catch the sleight of hand. As a matter of observation, such a term had no meaning other than to replace the more commonly used word God. — Rich

I have no idea what you are talking about. You seem unacquainted with what "natural selection" even means. And reading your other comments on this thread about the topic only reinforce that impression.

When I proclaimed I was an atheist at about age 12, my Dad said something very powerful to me after I laid out my arguments for evolution. He said all that proves is that the bullet came from the gun, it doesn't say who pulled the trigger. — MikeL

The problem is that nothing about evolution seems that it was directed, designed, or orchestrated. If human beings were the desired endpoint, then God picked possibly the most circuitous route available to achieve that goal, and went out of His way to make it seem as if the process is undirected. Nothing about the driving force of evolution, i.e. genetic variation and natural selection, requires a designer.

Indeed, to invoke a designer in the process of natural selection seems a contradiction in terms, as it is no longer "natural" (except in the trivial sense that God can be said to stand "outside" of nature or some such thing), but is rather artificial selection, i.e. the cultivation or preservation of variants which embody desirable traits so that they may continue to propagate those traits.

To paraphrase Dawkins, it must give the evolutionary theist pause to consider that God chose a means of design which makes Him look superfluous.

Let me try again Arkady. For example, if I say, "Hobbits do not exist," for my statement to be meaningful, and in particular true, it would have to be about something. However, it can't be about hobbits, as I said above, since there are none; and if it were about hobbits, it would be about nothing. Thus, what the statement is about, is the concept of hobbits, not the subject of hobbits. The statement is saying that the concept of hobbits has no instances or individuals of which it is true. Therefore, existence is not something individuals possess; it is simply a way of expressing something about the concept.

Another important point, is that we must be able to explain the meaning of a proposition, including the subject, apart from knowing whether they're true or false. We also know that statements about hobbits are meaningful apart from knowing whether they are true or false. How is this possible? It possible because we understand the concept, and the only thing we know exists is the concept, not the subject. It can only make sense if the statement is about the concept, and not about the subject.

Moreover, we can coherently talk about the proposition that some X exists, or does not exist, because we are asking whether or not the concept X has an instance in reality. There is no inherent contradiction in the argument. Other philosophers who believed this were Kant and Russell, one being a theist, and the latter an atheist. — Sam26

I think I have a better idea of what you're driving at. A couple of questions/points: what does it then mean to say that a concept exists? That the concept of the concept is instantiated (presumably in one or more minds, or at least in one or more products of minds such as novels, etc., or wherever it is that concepts inhere)?

Secondly, in yoking existence to concepts, it would seem to imply that nothing exists which is unconceptualized. If the existence of X simply means that the concept of X is realized in at least one concrete instance, then the notion of existence is meaningless without reference to concepts. However, concepts require minds, do they not? Did that mean that nothing "existed" prior to the advent of minds which were capable of realizing concepts?

If someone says, "Hobbits exist," in order for the statement to be meaningful it would have to be about something, but what could the statement be about? It can't be about Hobbits since there are none. Thus it's about the concept of Hobbits. Thus, existence isn't something individuals possess - instead it's a way of talking about concepts of individuals. — Sam26

Something seems awry here. The concept of Hobbits exists. Hobbits don't exist (at least not outside of the fictional media depicting them).

Under your theory, how could we coherently express the proposition that some X does not exist? If we can talk sensibly about X and whether or not it exists, I think it's safe to say that the concept of X exists (and is at least partially understood by the interlocutors). However, it would then be a contradiction in terms to state that X does not exist. Therefore, anything and everything which can be subsumed under some sensible concept can be said to exist!

If someone were to claim they can 'prove' the existence of God - what could that mean? That they could show me God? I don't think that 'God' is real in that sense, as an object of empirical proof. I think that the appropriate view, for believers, is that the Universe suggests the existence of God, but they ought to realise that we can't know, because of the limitations of knowledge itself. Knowledge (as the Einstein quote says) is limited - maybe it's radically limited. So my view is that philosophy points to the border of what can and can't be claimed. And God is over that horizon, 'over yonder' (or not!) — Wayfarer

You seem to be walking a rather fine line here. The state or nature of the universe "suggests" the existence of God, and yet the existence of God is not a matter to be adjudicated empirically. So, a dispassionate, purely rational assessment of the universe can reasonably lead one to a suggestion that God exists, but one cannot (even in principle) argue that God most likely exists or anything of the sort. This seems a bit arbitrary, wouldn't you say? Surely those (on both sides of the question) who suggest that the existence of God can be investigated empirically are not too far off-base, given your position here?

Whether they assume or, or observe it, those regularities must exist, in order for there to be science. But do they explain that order? I say, no they don't explain it, nor can they be expected to. That is what I mean by 'assuming' it.

But assuming the existence of X and being unable to explain the origin of X are not equivalent.

Hawkings mused idly in his Brief History of Time that if we hit upon the 'grand theory' then we would 'know the mind of God' - which I see as hubris, especially coming from a professed atheist. But then, maybe the reason why he and his ilk hate religion is professional jealousy ;-)

I think Dawkins once chastised Hawkings for such statements, saying something to the effect that it promotes misunderstanding among those hungry to misunderstand it. I agree with Dawkins. I also think it's dumb to refer to the Higgs boson as the "God particle," and so forth.

Where I take issue, is with the various attempts to present science as capable of a theory which accounts for everything - which is typical of science popularisers such as Lawrence Krauss and Jerry Coyne. A good deal of their writing on the matter is aimed at showing how the life and the universe could 'arise from nothing' (to quote Krauss' title.) — Wayfarer

Ok. So, the existence of God is fair game for science, just as long as it doesn't purport to explain "everything"?

But, as philosopher David Albert pointed out in his review of Krauss' book:

It happens that ever since the scientific revolution of the 17th century, what physics has given us in the way of candidates for the fundamental laws of nature have as a general rule simply taken it for granted that there is, at the bottom of everything, some basic, elementary, eternally persisting, concrete, physical stuff. Newton, for example, took that elementary stuff to consist of material particles. And physicists at the end of the 19th century took that elementary stuff to consist of both material particles and electro­magnetic fields. And so on. And what the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all there is for the fundamental laws of nature to be about, insofar as physics has ever been able to imagine, is how that elementary stuff is arranged. The fundamental laws of nature generally take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of that stuff are physically possible and which aren’t, or rules connecting the arrangements of that elementary stuff at later times to its arrangement at earlier times, or something like that. But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.

The fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about in “A Universe From Nothing” — the laws of relativistic quantum field theories — are no exception to this. The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

My underline. That is what I mean by 'assuming nature'. Physicalism assumes that what science is analysing is ontologically real - it is arguing that the entities that physics studies, or biology studies, are the building blocks or foundational layer of reality, that what we see can be explained in those terms. That is what naturalism means, after all.

What I'm saying is that science doesn't actually explain mathematics, as such, or why the universe has the laws it has, more broadly. Science always starts with some foundational assumptions, and besides, has to appeal to mathematical reasoning - given which, it is able to explain and predict phenomena. But it doesn't, and can't, explain all of its foundational assumptions (one of the implications of Godel's theorem, as I understand it.)

The ontology of the most basic physical constituents of the universe is a different matter from natural law, it seems to me. You have claimed that scientists have "assumed" that nature is lawlike, and I have retorted that they don't assume this, but rather observe it. You then quote Albert as saying that scientists assume that "at the bottom of everything" is some "real," "natural" stuff. But, again, this seems a different issue than what we were discussing before (why, in your world, philosophers are allowed to opine on science, but scientists are forbidden from opining on philosophy, is a mystery to me).

But I don't want to use this to argue 'see, it must be God'. We don't know - but I think that sense of not knowing is important, and also profound. Especially when it comes to passing judgement on whether the Universe is meaningful, as that is really rather an important question.

But you said that the findings of science incline you towards theism, not agnosticism, which would seem the more reasonable option if the findings of science don't speak to the existence of God.

But they do assume them. Every time that an experiment is run which involves velocity, they don't have to first check that this time, F really will equal MA. I mean 'assumes', in that naturalism assumes nature, as does realism, generally. It's not in the business of doubting the testimony of sense; and yet philosophers will do this. — Wayfarer

Assuming the reliability of the senses and assuming the existence of natural law are not the same thing. As I said, science is in the business of fallible reasoning. Scientists (knowingly or unknowingly) rely on induction or abduction. In the case of induction, this often takes the form of extrapolating from the observed to the as-yet-unobserved or to the future. Sometimes this works, sometimes one finds a black swan.

But the point is that the regularity of nature is not an a priori assumption: where nature has been observed, it has been found to be remarkably constant and uniform. It could have been otherwise (at least conceivably), and scientists have looked for such deviations, but none have presented themselves (at least as far as I'm aware: I'm not a physicist). If you want to speak to the fallibility of induction, that is fine, but that's a different topic.

That is the story of the last several centuries of Western history, right? Used to believe in divine causes, now knows better because of science? But I think the wheel is turning again. — Wayfarer

My point is that you are claiming that science does in fact provide reasons for believing in God (feel free to substitute "higher intelligence" here if you'd like), and so are claiming that scientific investigation can be brought to bear on the existence of the divine. At the very least, this seems a departure from your earlier positions. So, given that science can be so brought to bear, you surely don't begrudge those who attempt to use science to argue against the existence of God?

I have often said that you can't scientifically prove the existence or non-existence of God, and I stand by that. So I wouldn't like to defend the kind of vulgar attempt to 'prove that God exists' undertaken by ID theorists. But then, neither would David Bentley Hart, or Ed Feser, both of whom a theistic philosophers, and neither of whom will have any truck with intelligent design. — Wayfarer

I agree that science isn't in the business of "proving" the existence of God. But that's because I don't believe that science is in the business of "proving" anything. That seems more the domain of mathematicians and logicians, wouldn't you say? In that sense, science can't "prove" the existence of electrons.

Science deals in defeasible, fallible reasoning, more inductive or abductive in nature than deductive. But the point is that you believe that certain scientific observations speak to the existence of God (you find it "persuasive" that they point to God, or at least a "higher intelligence"). Even if we are only here dealing in probabilities and not in proof per se, you are of the mind that scientific investigation can provide reasons for believing in the existence of God. But, my point is that that road surely runs two ways: if science can be brought to bear in providing reasons to believe in God, surely it can also be brought to bear (at least in principle) in service of providing reasons not to believe in God? But I suspect that you'd deem the latter to be an instance of "scientism." So, I'm not sure how to reconcile this apparent tension in your views.

My argument is more along the lines that science assumes natural laws, or the 'regularities of the heavens', or whatever; and also assumes the efficacy of mathematics. Given those two foundation - namely, natural laws, and mathematics - science can discover a great deal indeed. But why nature is so ordered, and why the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences' (to quote Eugene WIgner), is another kind of question altogether. I don't think science answers that kind of 'why'; I wouldn't expect it to, but that is no criticism of science, either.

But, as I've pointed out before, science doesn't "assume" these things: science (and the lay public, to a lesser extent) observes these things. Observing X and assuming X aren't the same thing. There is no a priori reason to believe in invariant physical laws or values of physical constants, and scientists have in fact searched for such variance, and not found any within the limits of physical detection.

However, I personally find the 'fine-tuning' arguments, and the 'biological information' arguments, quite persuasive in favour of theism. — Wayfarer

Why would that be in favor of theism, rather than, say, deism, pantheism, etc?

If scientific findings can be brought to bear in service of demonstrating God's existence (as you say here), I presume you believe that it is also fair game to use scientific findings to argue against the existence of God? Because it seems that in the past, such things would invite cries of "scientism" from you.

But then you have the 'observer problem' which has thrown the entire 'mind-independence' of observation into question. One implication of that being, what you see depends on what you decide to measure. 'We have to remember that what we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning' ~ Heisenberg. — Wayfarer

Ok. Not sure what that has to do with the "telos" of the positron, though.

Firstly, let me thank you for that interesting quote; it provided a rather succinct definition of "telos."

With the advent of scientific materialism, explanations were sought which could understood solely in terms of physical, material and efficient causation. That is how the notion of 'purpose' came to be rejected entirely from the scientific account. And that is what being 'shorn of teleological baggage' means, isn't it? — Wayfarer

Yes, although in some small corner of the larger scientific enterprise (namely psychology and the social sciences), purpose and intention are still legitimate areas of inquiry. I would say that, in the overall sweep of science, it has simply become unnecessary to impute a purpose or telos in explaining most phenomena. Explaining, say, why a positron behaves as it does in the presence of a magnetic field can be done without reference to the inclinations or purpose of the positron or its behavior.

I think that science can answer "why" questions, provided that the "why" is shorn of any teleological baggage ("why is the sky blue?" is a common question, one that admits of a purely physical explanation. I suppose one could throw in "and because God wanted it that way" or something similar, but it wouldn't add much).

I would think that, when pelted with a series of "why" questions, scientists would just answer until their explanations bottomed out at whatever level of analysis at which they were working. For instance, a biochemist might be able to give an exquisitely detailed explanation of some biochemical reaction, but keep asking "why" long enough, and he will just say "that's a matter for physics to answer."

I find the main argument against this view, that mentality is multiply-realizable, rather plausible. It seems like life forms with very different structures than the human brain could conceivably have a mind, but Mind-Brain Identity Theory doesn't allow for that. Functionalism is probably the better theory. — Brian

I think that token identity could accommodate multiple realizability, but type identity less so. Based on the description of Smart's position summarized here I'm not entirely sure which one he subscribes to.

Sun big. Parker-probe small. — Michael Ossipoff

Fire bad.

This picture depicts the scale of the size difference between the Sun and Earth (as well as some other planets). Even assuming that our solar probe was garbage (even muff garbage), I daresay we could toss an Earth-sized mound of garbage into the Sun and it would make little difference.

"Since the dawn of time Man has yearned to destroy the Sun."
-Mr. Burns of The Simpsons

I recall Dawkins or someone describing a paleontologist who was actually a young Earth creationist, but whose PhD dissertation was on the distribution of Mesozoic aquatic reptiles (which, of course, would have to be predicated on an old Earth model). The dissertation was apparently pretty good, despite the guy's not believing what he was propounding.

Fun. I can think of one "move" that would not be the same, if we use the term generally to mean things like events and outcome: I raise my right hand and say "I am raising my right hand". The difference between me and my duplicate is that I am telling the truth, where as my duplicate is lying. — Samuel Lacrampe

Interesting point. Would it change anything if the duplicates each said, for instance, "I am raising my western-most hand" as opposed to right/left? How would one define directional coordinates in such a universe?

But by definition, whatever cause science is concerned with, is not of a different order to the natural order, i.e. is not transcendent to the natural order. In the case of meteors or other types of causal agents which have all but vanished, the cause is still understood to be the kind of cause that, were circumstances different, would have been physically detectable. — Wayfarer

Not necessarily. Yes, natural science generally adheres to methodological naturalism in its day-to-day work: phenomena under study are presumed to have a naturalistic explanation, and this explanation is sought by interrogating nature by means of contrived experiments or natural observations as a means of testing hypotheses (indeed, even the 40% or so of scientists who believe in God usually adhere to MN in their work). This general strategy has been extremely successful since the advent of modern science.

However, adherence to MN doesn't entail ontological naturalism, i.e. the belief that the naturalistic universe of objects exhausts all possible entities in this reality. And notice that when discussing "science," I've been careful to propound a broad definition of that term as including those fields which examine evidence or data combined with rational analysis of said evidence or data, in service of learning about the world. This empirical methodology, broadly construed, could apply to history, archeology, anthropology, sociology, investigative journalism, and many other fields which normally wouldn't fall under the ambit of the natural sciences (there are some borderline cases, of course).

Notice that below you reference the Catholic Church's evidence-based investigations into the veracity of supposed miracles. You have also spoken approvingly of Ian Stevenson's scientific research into reincarnation. You and I have spoken about the scientists who investigated supernatural phenomena as part of the Society for Psychical Research (when I recommended The Ghost Hunters to you). And so on and so forth. All of these investigations employ empirical methodology to collect data of various types and interrogate that data to see if a particular hypothesis concerning particular supernatural phenomena passes muster (in other words they all at least aspire to a scientific methodology; whether some have fallen short is a different matter). Nothing in my definition of empiricism would rule out such fields of study (indeed, I encourage them, as when I spoke approvingly of OBE studies which I thought were well-designed).

The view that theological arguments are empirical is based on a misrepresentation of what is being claimed. Granted, theology and metaphysics might (as all positivism insists) be empty of meaning, but not on the grounds you have stated.

I never said that all theological arguments are empirical: some, such as the ontological argument and first cause argument, don't seem to rely on empiricism at all. I also never said they were "empty of meaning;" this is just more of you poking the corpse of logical positivism.

'Arguments from design', for example, might state that science can't account for the order which is necessary for life to have arisen in the first place.

This sounds rather more like the fine tuning argument, wouldn't you say? Or would you consider that argument to be one type of the argument from design?

And that question, again, is not a scientific one, as science presumes that there is an order - otherwise it can't really even get started - but doesn't, and may not be expected to, explain how this order.

I'd say that it is more the case that science observes that the universe is orderly. And only in highly circumscribed instances is it orderly enough to predict its behavior for any length of time (which is why we still don't have long-term weather forecasting, despite decades of effort; though things are improving).

That is true, and if I or a loved one were admitted to hospital for a serious illness, I would certainly not wish to rely on prayer for the cure.

However, there is quite a lot of documentation describing various cases of alleged miraculous intervention in the case of serious or life-threatening illnesses, when these cases are considered grounds for canonisation proceedings by the Catholic Church. As the Church has been gathering such cases for centuries, there is quite a lot of documentary evidence, apparently.

Yes. And even if the alleged miracles are not on quite as firm a footing as the Church may suppose (it doesn't help that the Church picks its own supposedly skeptical peer-reviewers in the form of a "Devil's Advocate;" I don't know if that practice has fallen by the wayside), you will note that the Church here at least aspires to employ scientific rigor in its investigations of purportedly supernatural or sacred phenomena, contra those (including perhaps yourself) who might insist that such matters are not for science.

That's because of the nature of philosophy itself. The fact that there is still discussion to this day about Ancient Greek philosophical concepts does not mean that those claims cannot be proven. It's not the same as with empirical sciences. Evolution of philosophy is in improving arguments. And metaphysical claims are to be argued for/against only by philosophers as those are by nature philosophical question. — Coldlight

Perhaps you could do me the courtesy of giving a sample of metaphysical theses or postulates which have been proven?

I haven't merely asserted that. It is truth in principle. Example question:

''What is human? What is the nature of human being?'' To elaborate a bit more on this question: ''What is the definition of a human being that defines it in its most broad and principal sense?''

I'm not going to suggest any answers to this question as this serves only as an example. So, who is the most competent to answer this question? A scientist? No, because a scientist does not define human nature and does not in fact ask any questions about human nature. That is all down to philosophy. Even if scientists came up with a claim about human nature, they would have to use philosophy. In the end, philosophers are the ones to argue for or against the validity of the argument presented.

Back to the question of God. Only philosophy is capable to look at God as a concept and define it in its broadest sense. Physicians cannot ''discover'' God without knowing before hand what the God is and even after ''discovery'' they would need a validation from philosophers in order to see whether it really is God or not.

Philosophy is therefore competent of answering metaphysical questions completely without empirical sciences as those cannot grasp metaphysical concepts in its broadest and most abstract sense.

I'm not talking about defining God (or defining anything, really). I'm talking about empirical detection of the effects God is purported to have wrought. Particular religions make particular claims about what their God (or gods) has done (or continues to do), claims which can be empirically investigated.

As I said (and which you continue to ignore), fields such as natural theology, and its modern counterparts in the intelligent design creationism movement (and creationism generally, albeit with varying degrees of scientific and historical sophistication) attempt to demonstrate the existence of a creator by means of appealing to the natural world, or by appealing to findings from archeology and related historical fields.

For instance, some believers appeal to God to intercede on their behalf and on behalf of others, including with regard to health. It is perfectly valid to investigate whether those who receive prayers for God's intercession in their disease have better health outcomes than those who receive no such prayers. This experiment has been performed, and found no statistically relevant difference.

Now, I would agree that such empirical studies may be insufficient to reach a detailed, complex, and thorough understanding of God and its nature; theology and philosophy may yet have some work to do. After all, few people can reasonably deny that there is evil in the world, and yet reach radically different conclusions about the meaning or interpretation of this data. So, even if it were demonstrated empirically that there exists some form of creator God, whether said God is good, evil, or something in between (i.e. a value judgment) would likely be outside the purview of science. But, demonstrating the mere existence of a creator god (of some sort) needn't be.

I'm implying, on a personal level, that to say that we don't know answer to such questions is more laziness than a real thing. Whether I am a theist or an atheist does not matter.

So, agnostics (qua agnostics) are lazy?

As you don't believe that the existence of God is a matter to be adjudicated empirically, and you believe agnostics are lazy people who perhaps just haven't done their philosophical due diligence, what do you believe is the a priori argument (or family of arguments) which demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt (or even with certainty) that God does or does not exist?

I take issue with that. They are more like abductive arguments, i.e. arguments to the most likely cause. But an empirical argument would require that you were able to detect 'the first cause' (or whatever) by scientific apparatus or observation; that it would be a phenomenon whose existence could be demonstrated by some actual observation or experimental outcome. 'Empiricism' means 'experienceable' in that sense - that it shows up some way that can be see either by the naked eye, or detected by instruments.

But take, for example, an argument like this: 'that evolution naturally tends towards creating higher levels of intelligence'. I think that would generally not be accepted by evolutionary biologists; although it has happened on Earth, the general belief is that 'were the tape of evolution replayed', that the outcome might be blue-green algae, or cockroaches, or sharks (as indeed it was for long periods of time). So I don't think that evolutionary theory would agree with the apparent teleological nature of such an argument.

So how would such an argument be settled empirically? I would think it could only be if a large number of other life-bearing planets were discovered - which I'm sure you will agree, seems highly unlikely. But then, if all of them showed the emergence of language- and tool-using beings, no matter what form, then you might have an empirical case that evolution tended towards that outcome.

But absent that, many of the 'arguments from design' or teleological arguments of various kinds, could never be settled empirically, even in principle. They're simply based on what seems a likely kind of explanation. — Wayfarer

Science (here broadly defined to include avenues of empirical investigation which rely upon examining data and generating explanations for phenomena by employing a reasoned analysis of said data) does employ abductive arguments (inferences to the best explanation).

Not all investigation involves detecting the putative cause of a phenomenon directly: sometimes just its historical traces are examined. For instance, sometimes impactors strike the Earth, and are vaporized completely, meaning their characteristics have to be inferred from the marks they've left behind.

Also, not all directional processes are teleological in nature. Science accepts directional processes or phenomena (e.g. the 2nd law of thermodynamics).

All those arguments have to start with philosophy as philosophy, unlike empirical sciences, can define God and look at the most basic nature of existence in a most abstract and general way. Empirical sciences focus on different topics. This is off topic, but I challenge anyone to prove that a scientist can answer a metaphysical question using only empirical data and science. Impossible. — Coldlight

I challenge anyone to prove a metaphysical claim using any means whatsoever: what metaphysical claim has even been "proven"? Philosophers still wrangle over Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, with nary a resolution in sight.

You have simply asserted that empirical investigation cannot, in principle, provide evidence for the existence of God because they are "different topics." But from the fact that philosophy and empirical investigation are distinct areas of inquiry it does not follow that there is no overlap between them.

I gave examples of multiple philosophical argument families or fields of empirical inquiry which purported to demonstrate the existence of God. If you believe that such investigations are ill-fated in principle, then you must provide arguments to that effect, rather than bare assertions.

To be honest, it seems to me that agnostics try to dodge the bullet and don't want to admit that they're claiming that they've found an absolute truth.

I'd welcome the correct definition if anyone has it :)

Presumptions aside:

1) God is unknown. - I'm yet to hear why God is unknown and why that is not just lack of trying on our side. (God is used just as an example here, same could go for the soul or some other immaterial, empirically improvable existence) And if anyone finds it highly unlikely to be able to answer the questions of such sort, isn't it just a cultural influence? Isn't it just ''okay'' to think that we cannot know such things?

2) God's existence is unknowable. - Somehow it is knowable that it is unknowable, I wonder how that is the case. This is not a claim based on empirical evidence.

I don't even know whether you're an atheist or a theist, but you seem to think that an answer to question of whether God exists is already in hand, and that no reasonable person could believe that God (does/does not) exist. No doubt (atheists/theists) would argue just as vociferously for their position, and would say they have "yet to hear" why the negation of their belief is correct. That's the problem with such a priori metaphysical wrangling: it just goes on and on.

Using God's existence as an example, it cannot be widely known because it's not something you can prove by using empirical evidence. It's not like scientists are going to discover God, they're not looking for him anyway. That's outside of their expertise. — Coldlight

I disagree: there have been many empirical arguments which purported to demonstrate the existence of God. The entire body of literature on the arguments from design, arguments from fine-tuning, natural theology, intelligent design creationism, and biblical archeology all, in some form or another, seek to provide evidence for the existence of God and (in cases) the veracity of the Bible. But, this is rather off-topic.

But then again, why do we not question why agnosticism isn't agnostic about itself?

The question is whether agnosticism says the existence of God is unknown or unknowable: your OP posited somewhat different definitions along those lines. That was the point my reply addressed.

Agnosticism is the view that the existence of God or the supernatural is unknown or unknowable.

According to the philosopher William L. Rowe, "agnosticism is the view that human reason is incapable of providing sufficient rational grounds to justify either the belief that God exists or the belief that God does not exist" — Coldlight

Yours and Rowe's definitions seem to be slightly at odds: you say that agnosticism can mean the belief that whether or not God exists is unknown or unknowable, while Rowe's definitions seems to limit it to the latter, phrasing it as a matter of the capabilities of human reasoning faculties.

If Rowe's definition is to be accepted, that prompts the question as to what to call those who believe that whether or not God exists is in principle knowable, but is in practice currently unknown (to quote Jodie Foster's character from Contact: "there's no data either way").

When the search is negative we may conclude nonexistence. — MadFool

No we may not. There have been many intense searches that failed to find the sought object, only for somebody to find it in another search years later. — andrewk

I think it depends on the situation. If, for instance, particle physicists perform a series of experiments designed to detect a particle which their theory predicts will possess a mass within a certain range, and the experiment comes up empty-handed, that is at least preliminary evidence of the non-existence that particle. At the very least, the theory will need to be re-worked, and its ontological commitments re-examined.

When astronomers consistently failed to detect the putative planet which was causing aberrations in the orbit of Mercury ("Vulcan", I believe they called it?), then they were justified in at least tentatively rejecting the existence of that body when repeated observations in its hypothetical orbit were negative.

Sorry if my post didn't meet your standards of clarity. — TheMadFool

I accept your apology.

Please pick up a book on logic and read up fallacy of composition and how it's confused with fallacy of hasty generalization (both of which I haven't made, fyi)

And nor have I accused you of a hasty generalization: a hasty generalization fallacy in this context would be something like examining a small sample of a population of universes, observing that they're ordered, and thereby concluding that all universes must be ordered. Nothing like that has transpired here: we currently have observational access to one, and only one, universe, namely ours.

I accused you of a compositional fallacy, because you are drawing unwarranted conclusions about the whole of a system based on observation of certain of its parts.

I haven't assumed anything. I have first made an observation and it reveals undeniable order. I then entertained two possible origins of order viz.

1. God
2. Chance

I find possibility 2 to be unrealistic because it's, mathematically, next to impossible. Option 1 then becomes viable.

Your mathematical hand-waving aside, the point you have failed to realize, which Harry Hindu pointed out to you way back on page 2 or so, is that there is nothing special, magical, or supernatural about order: it simply must be purchased by an input of energy, a purchase which tends to lead to increased disorder in the universe as a whole. That's it.

The fallacy of composition occurs when:

The property in question (in my case ''order'') is distributed collectively rather than distributively

I haven't done that. My argument is statistical, a basic version of which is:

All observed things in this universe are ordered. Therefore ALL things in this universe are ordered. The property (order) is trasnferred distributively and not collectively. So, no, I'm not committing the fallacy of composition.

As for crystals, you won't disagree, their formation is determined by their molecular structure, pressure, temperature, etc. - all of which follow the laws of nature. So, this order, as I mentioned in one of my posts, is of a higher form. And just as we seek a person when we see man-made order, it's logical to seek a God-creator when we see order in the universe as evidenced by the existence of the laws of nature. — TheMadFool

Honestly, I have no idea what you are getting on about here. This just seems like a confused jumble of words to me. You have already assumed that "order = God", so why do you even need an argument?

You're mistaken, sorry. The point is order is naturally associated with a conscious agency. This isn't a fallacy in everyday experience - we do it everytime we see organization/order - whether it's a stack of books or a library. However, the same chain of reasoning is rejected when it comes to the universe. Do you deny that the universe is ordered? Of course you can't. Then, we should, rationally (as in the above situation), infer an orderer. — TheMadFool

Besides proceeding from a false premise (it is not true that "every time we see organization/order" we infer conscious agency at work: crystals, for instance are highly ordered structures found in nature which have no apparent designer), this is an instance of a fallacy of composition, i.e. inferring that some characteristic of the parts of a system or object necessarily attaches to the whole. Even if the presence of order in parts of the universe implied a designer (which it doesn't), it would be a non-sequitur to claim that the ordering of the universe as a whole therefore implies that it has a designer.

EDIT: I admit I have not read all 14 pages of this thread; if this point was made earlier, apologies to the poster whose efforts I am duplicating.

I truly believe that Sam Harris is the smartest philosopher alive, the clarity and precision of his insights is impressive. Although this is certainly not the case, he appears to be almost infallible. I dont want to sound like a fan boy but, can you thnk of anyone whose books I could read, or videos I could watch who is more brilliant and insightful than him? He is just so logical and mathematical with his arguments, I always try to come with counterarguments to what he says but what he says simply makes a lot of sense! What other people like him could I follow? — rickyk95

Christopher Hitchens had a nearly-unmatched erudition, combined with an acerbic and pointed style of argumentation. I would recommend not only his writings, but the copious amount of videos of his debates, lectures, and interviews, available on YouTube. This is not to say that the man was perfect, either in his arguments or his interpersonal style, but his was a unique mind, greatly missed and not easily replicated. Alas, weathering The Age of Trump is just a bit tougher without his biting social commentary.

'imagining a universe with a single thing' seems literally impossible to me. Even the concept of 'in' requires a distinction or a duality - the area or space in which 'the thing' resides, and the space it resides 'in'. And then you already have 'more than one', namely, the entity, and the space it occupies. You have edges, boundaries, and sides. For this reason it is simply an empirical and logical impossibility that there could be a universe comprising a single entity. — Wayfarer

Would it be easier to imagine a universe with only one thing if that one thing were a simple, point-like object, with no spatial extension or internal structure? That would negate any problem with whether edges, boundaries, etc constitute "things" in their own right.

But in a 'universe of one thing', how can there be any relations? — Wayfarer

Things stand in certain (reflexive) relations to themselves. For instance, everything is identical to itself; identity is a relation.

The further point, though, is that under the assumption of determinism, all human decisions, feelings, experiences, thoughts, desires, volitions and even actions are not really causally efficacious (the real causation happens at the 'bottom', at the invisible microphysical level that really determines everything), but are really just illusory epiphenomena. — John

I don't believe it is coherent to say that feelings are illusory. When it comes to feelings, there is no difference between perception and object. There is nothing for feelings to be illusory about.

Sure there would be practical outcomes that result from praising and blaming behavior, just as there are from any behavior. In a deterministic world things are not done for reasons but accompanied and rationalized by reasons and everything that happens is what it is and never could have been otherwise.

In any case my point was not about behavior at all but about attitudes and feelings of praise and blame. — John

I take it you are an incompatibilist, then?