A putative observer introduces a point of reference, with respect to which some predicates will differ, e.g. left/right. — SophistiCat

I'm not sure the observer is actually necessary, though. We could talk about what would be the case in such a universe, even if no one were around to observe it.

However, I don't see that just any observer necessarily breaks the symmetry. One could appeal to a perfectly symmetrical observer, for instance, perhaps one who is himself spherical, and situated equidistant from each sphere.

I think that anybody that expects to take their memories (and thus any sort of identity at all) into what they hope to be an afterlife cannot take a stance of memory supervening on physical states. Claims of OoB experiences rest on memory and sensory input operating independently of the physical apparatus of brain and sense organs. — noAxioms

Sure. I wasn't claiming that any and all people who reject that mental states are themselves physical or material can accept the supervenience thesis, I was just responding to this point of yours:

"You assume an exact physical copy would have all the memories, as do I, but somebody that argues for memory being part of immaterial state would disagree. So the thought experiment fails to resolve the issue for which it was posited."

My point is just that someone could hold that mental states are immaterial and still accept that a person's physical duplicate would hold identical mental states as that person. One doesn't preclude the other.

Furthermore, even if one accepts the existence of an afterlife or OOB (which I as yet see no evidence to accept), it doesn't necessarily follow that physical duplicates wouldn't also be mental duplicates. If one adheres to a type identity of mind, then yes, such a thesis is probably incompatible with believing that a given mental state (a particular memory, say) could be realized both by physical brains and by spiritual ectoplasm, or whatever souls are purported to be made of.

However, any theory of mind which allows for multiple realizability seems to be perfectly compatible with the notion that particular mental states tightly correlate with particular physical states (by supervenience, emergence, or whatever), and that said mental states could also be realized in another medium. Presumably, at least some proponents of strong AI are physicalists with regard to mental states, and yet don't maintain that mental states are inextricably bound to the 3 pounds of oatmeal in our heads: there are other types of stuff which can realize those mental states (including, perhaps, as I said, spiritual ectoplasm).

There is nothing wrong with using people as an end, but solely as an end. Whenever I hire somebody to perform some task, I am using them as an end. When I get a musician to perform at a party, we are treating each other as ends. The musician wants to get payed and get a chance to perform in public, while I want to have live music to enhance a party. We are both using the other to achieve ends we desire. There is nothing wrong here, so long as we do not treat each other as solely means. We still have to respect rhe wishes of others. I cannot force the musician to play, withhold pay, or anything of that sort. The same goes for the musician. — Chany

So refreshing to hear someone take this very sensible view.

Should harm be the deciding factor? — anonymous66

The deciding factor for what? Virtually everything is harmful to some degree (trees are nice, but people are killed by falling branches; ladders help us reach otherwise inaccessible heights, but are a source of domestic accidents, etc.).

One could take a dim view of pornography, and yet maintain that the societal costs of squelching free speech and free expression outweigh the benefits of governmental censors clamping down on porn, which is likely virtually impossible anyway, at least without imposing the sort of controls which are incompatible with liberal democracy. Stamping out drug use via the "war on drugs" has been a dismal failure, and yet narcotics are less accessible than porn, as they require the acquisition of a physical substance which must be ingested in some fashion. Porn (as with any other data) can be transmitted purely electronically; it's just information.

Arkady: You assume an exact physical copy would have all the memories, as do I, but somebody that argues for memory being part of immaterial state would disagree. So the thought experiment fails to resolve the issue for which it was posited. — noAxioms

Is this true, though? A person may possibly believe that mental states, while themselves immaterial, nevertheless supervene on physical states (or are otherwise emergent from them). In that case, the physical duplicate would still possess the same mental states.

Perhaps a sort of thoroughgoing substance dualist might deny that there is any connection between the mental and the physical, but I don't see how that view can be plausibly maintained once we accept some basic metaphysical assumptions (e.g. that there are material bodies) and scientific observations (e.g. that memories are neurologically encoded in the brain in some fashion, by long-term potentiation or whatever the exact mechanism is, and mental states at the very least correlate in some fashion with the physical state of one's brain).

Things are only superficially identical even things that appear identical are in a different space and their atoms are unlikely to be identical. Identical twins can easily be told apart straight away by a dog using scent so there can be very easy routes to proving things that appear identical aren't. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think we really need dogs to tell apart identical twins: with one exception, I've never known a pair of identical twins which I've had much trouble telling apart.

For something to be truly identical they would have to be atom by atom identical and in the same space and time.

This is an interesting topic. In reading about Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles thesis, I recall coming across the thought experiment (be forewarned: it is rather implausible :D ) of spheres of identical dimensions (and every other feature) in a symmetrical universe. Let us assume the following account of logical identity: A and B are logically identical iff anything which can be predicated of A can be predicated of B and vice-versa.

Now, with the spheres in the symmetrical universe, there is nothing which can be predicated of one sphere (call it "A") which cannot be predicated of the other sphere (call it "B"), and vice-versa, and yet any putative observer would clearly (I think) see that there are 2 spheres. If there are 2 spheres, then A and B are not logically (i.e. numerically) identical, and yet that conclusion contradicts our starting premise which defines logical identity.

There is much literature on the identity of indiscernibiles, and I'm not suggesting that there is no possible way out of this thicket of confusion, but I use this example to point out that the notion of identity is far from straightforward. We should perhaps take care in speaking of what is "identical" (or not) to what.

For example say my boss at work calls me an idiot and that creates a nuanced mental state in me, then that mental state is inextricably linked to that event and can't be identically copied just by recreating a brain state. It is not the equivalent of making a square template and copying it to create an almost identical square, because experiences are not identical to each other or don't have this simplistic "copyability" structure. — Andrew4Handel

This strikes me as incorrect, though, of course, this is all just plausible speculation at this point. Perhaps some day we'll have super 3D printers which can print out identical copies of persons and can test some of these ideas in philosophy of mind, but til then, we are stuck in our armchairs.

I see no reason for supposing that, if you hold some particular memory or mental state, that an exact physical duplicate of yourself would not also have that memory (or a pseudomemory, if you like, the content of which exactly matches the content of your real memory) or realize the same mental state which you are realizing at the moment that your body is scanned for the copying process (such a scan would presumably have to be really, really fine-grained...).

Your argument seems to slip a bit when you move from saying that mental states cannot be identically realized in non-numerically identical minds because experiences are not identical to each other. But this seems to be a non-sequitur: even granting that experiences can't be identical to each other, it doesn't follow that mental states can't be identical to one another. I think you need something more for your argument to go through.

Some could argue that we aren't advancing at such a pace as we were in the 19th and 20th Centuries (as the years 2001 and 2010 weren't like the one's portrayed in the famous sci-fi books). — ssu

I have the impression that sci-fi predictions or depictions of the future have almost always overshot the mark in a lot of ways (flying cars, usually with no discernible means of flight or propulsion, are a staple of sci-fi depictions of "the future"). The TV show Lost in Space took place in 1997, for example.

Sometimes sci-fi has underestimated certain technological developments. For instance, the film Blade Runner had Atari signs in the background, and phone booths were still in use, with no sign of cell phones.

Trump continues to accuse the media of producing "fake news," but, as he never seems to actually refute anything that the Washington Post, New York Times, and the rest of his frequent targets say, I have come to understand that, for Trump, "fake news" = news he doesn't like.

(Though this is old news at this point, one is reminded of GW Bush accusing Gore of promulgating "fuzzy math" when Gore was poking holes in Bush's economic ideas. Bush, of course, never seemed to get around to explaining exactly what was fuzzy about it. The scary thing is that, as compared to Trump, Bush looks like Abraham Lincoln.)

There are millions of doctors around the world. One can find a doctor to say anything one wants if one looks hard enough. Just look at the ones that say immunisation is dangerous. — andrewk

The parade of physicians willing to whore themselves out to supplement manufacturers in television ads also speaks to this fact.

The term comes from David Kaplan – LD means 'logic of demonstratives.' His classical example was 'I'm here now,' but that one seems not quite to be a case, depending on how you construe 'here.' — The Great Whatever

Ah, got it. Thanks for the info.

For your examples, (1) and (3) would seem to depend on how you construe the tense, and (2) is liar-paradoxical where it's the first thing someone ever utters (and the tense is interpreted in the right way), no?

Perhaps some may suffer from liar-like problems. Let's take another look:

(1) I have uttered at least one statement, and
(2) I have uttered at least one falsehood,
(3) I have uttered at least one truth or at least one falsehood.

(1) would seem uncontroversially true, regardless of how the tense is construed. Assuming that I have never uttered a statement until uttering (1), it would seem to be no less true, despite the fact that in that case it would seem to be self-referential (unless one takes the position that self-referential statements are problematic tout court).

Re: (2), let us assume, as you say, that it's the first thing I have uttered. In that case, (2) is true just in case it is false (as it could be the only potential truthmaker of its own truth). And it is false just in case it is true.

So, you may be right that (2) could be infected by liar-like problems under certain circumstances. I will give this more thought when I have time...perhaps these are a case of a sort of contingent liar-like paradoxes? After all, the liar is paradoxical (or otherwise problematic, depending upon exactly how we diagnose what is the problem with it) under any and all circumstances, regardless of the context in which it's uttered, which is not the case for (2)-type statements.

It's not a tautology: it's LD-valid, which means it can't be uttered in a context by an agent without being true. But the proposition that it expresses, that the speaker exists, is contingent. — The Great Whatever

I am unfamiliar with the term "LD-valid," but the concept sounds interesting; I've previously given some thought to such statements, but never knew that they had a specific designation. Off the top of my head, perhaps a few other LD-valid statements (i.e. those statements which cannot be uttered without being true, and the truth of which is contingent) would be (1) I have uttered at least one statement, and (2) I have uttered at least one falsehood, (3) I have uttered at least one truth or at least one falsehood.

As far as I know no gay dating app accounts were ever discovered, but there is a boat load of eyewitness testimony suggesting he frequented the night club he attacked. How was all that debunked? Severe homophobia seems the primary motivator of the attack, regardless of whether or not self-hatred was a factor. — VagabondSpectre

In the immediate wake of the shooting, there were reports that Mateen had used gay dating apps such as Grinder (Grindr?). These reports, as you say, came to nought. There were other rumors swirling about him, as well. I thought I may have been missing something, as I've not followed the most recent developments into the Mateen investigation (to the extent that said investigation is still ongoing), so I checked his Wiki page. It looks like there are conflicting reports about him attending that nightclub which he eventually attacked, with some emphatically saying "yea," and others also emphatically saying "nae."

Given the fallibility of human memory, I am inclined to treat reports of people having seen him there skeptically, absent security camera footage or credit cards statements from the club, or something to that effect. I'm not ruling out the possibility that he was a closeted, self-hating homosexual, but I see nothing definitive to that end.

Now, of course, a person's Wiki page is not a comprehensive compendium of a person's life history, so there may yet be other sources of which I'm unaware; I remain open to that possibility. I am also aware that some animus towards homosexuals is rooted in repressed homosexuality, but it doesn't follow that all such hatred is so rooted.

An all powerful, all knowing, all present God just doesn't need this divine ménage à trois. Whatever happened, the omni-etc. unitary being (God, period) is perfectly capable of doing it. — Bitter Crank

I'm not an expert on the historical aspect of the Trinity, but I would imagine its development was motivated at least in part to reconcile the apparent tension for Christians in believing that God is unitary and yet also had son who was himself God.

Of course, some Christians also maintain that God is simple, which itself seems to be in some tension with Trinitarian ideas.

I've not begged the question, and, speaking of the article, you may note that it says "According to the most widely accepted versions of the Way of Negation: An object is abstract (if and) only if it is causally inefficacious." But, I suppose that point is moot now. Cheers.

Well I probably don't agree with your definition of "abstract object" then. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you have an idiosyncratic definition of the term, which is at odds with its actual usage in philosophy. That being the case, then I see no point in continuing to talk about it, as a conversation in which the participants don't even agree on the definitions of basic terminology is bound to be unfruitful.

You don't think that the concept of a circle, pi, the right angle, or the Pythagorean theorem have any causal efficacy? I beg to differ. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said that if concepts are taken to be abstract objects, then they lack causal efficacy, by definition of abstract object.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/#CausInefCrit

Remember, God is supposed to be immaterial, having the same type of existence as a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

If concepts are here taken to be abstract objects, then I would disagree with this contention, as abstract objects lack causal efficacy, and any God worth believing in does have such efficacy.

If concepts are taken to be mental states of some sort, then this analogy may be closer to the mark, provided we do not adhere to an identity theory of mind, wherein mental states are identical to the physical states which realize them (as that would imply that God is physical, contradicting the premise that he's immaterial). If the ontology of mental states is understood as a substance dualist might understand them, i.e. as non-material entities possessing causal efficacy, then God might fit that bill.

Some of us pretty much heretic protestants and catholics find the concept of the trinity kind of incoherent and nonsensical too. Press a priest and you get "It is a mystery." I'll say it's a mystery, all right. — Bitter Crank

The classical depiction of the Trinity:

You will notice:
F = G
S = G
H = G

But:
F =/= S
F =/= H
S =/= H

Are we to understand that identity is not a transitive relation, or does Christianity claim for itself a special brand of "theological" logic, to which the normal rules of inference do not apply?

ABSTRACT: Religiously inspired terrorism can be understood as a response to a fundamental problem of secular modernity: the ‘‘God-shaped hole’’ that motivates it. The key issue is identity, and the anxiety that lack of secure identity arouses. Secular values undermine the ontological identity that religion traditionally provided. By devaluing such religious solutions to the ungroundedness of our constructed sense of self, the modern/ postmodern world aggravates the sense of lack that it cannot understand and with which it is unable to cope. This may seem too abstract, but the problems created are all too real. This essay discusses these problems and adumbrates a Buddhist solution. — Wayfarer

I am curious: what would be a Buddhist solution to the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar currently being carried out by Buddhists, while that great beacon of democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, basically does nothing? Physician, heal thyself!

In the case of the Orlando massacre, that is indeed a task for pathologists. The causes and consequences of religious fanaticism is another matter. — Wayfarer

I don't think you know what pathologists do.

No one who knows the motivations behind the Orlando shooter's acts could possibly dismiss the religious factor unless they were ideologically motivated to do so. Yes, Omar Mateen was a deranged individual, but his religion is part of what deranged him. He didn't just pick a target at random and attack it: he picked a very specific target (i.e. a nightclub frequented by homosexuals, a frequent target of Islamist violence) and drove hours to attack it. He had previously expressed sympathy for Islamist terrorist organizations, and learned Islamic-driven hatred at the knee of his father.

In this case, "radical ideology did it" seems to tell less than half the story. His religious and cultural hatred of homosexuals in particular (not hatred of the west as a whole) was central in his crime, and in light of the fact that he was himself gay or bi-sexual, it stands to reason that the resulting self-hate played a substantial role in creating the instability/psychopathy evident in his actions. — VagabondSpectre

I think the supposition that the Orlando shooter himself was gay or bisexual and frequented gay dating sites was later debunked, IIRC.

No, I was simply making the point that the secularism of the renaissance was still informed by a generally spiritual philosophy.

Consider it a footnote. — Wayfarer

I don't know how many full-blown atheists there really were in Renaissance Europe. No doubt some of the "spiritual" people you refer to were actually closet atheists. In some places one risked life and livelihood in criticizing religion. Thomas Aikenhead was hung for blasphemy shortly before 1700 (well into the early modern era). Even Hume appeared to show some trepidation in criticizing religion too openly, couching some of his critiques in the form of his dialogues (which allows for plausible deniability).

Two of the leading renaissance humanists - Ficino and Erasmus - were priests. Della Mirandolla was not. But they were all to a greater or lesser extent platonist or neo-platonist (Ficino translated the Complete Works of Plato into Latin). To be sure they had run-ins with the Church, but in their view, atheism would completely undercut what they understood as 'humanism'. — Wayfarer

Does being a freethinker somehow preclude someone from being a (neo)-Platonist?

By the way, if the laws or constants did change in the past, there would have been evidence of it that we would have readily noticed. The structures of our theories are highly integrated and there's a lot of consilience in the observations, so that changing one or two things in the structure is almost impossible without conflict with already available evidence. But that's only if we change one or two things. There are still infinitely many ways in which the world could conspire to be very different while still maintaining the appearances. — SophistiCat

Some YEC's (and I'm not saying that aletheist is one) claim that the speed of light in a vacuum was faster in the past in order to account for the "starlight problem." However, one rejoinder to this line of argument is that, as c factors into the energetics of nuclear reactions via E = mc^2, nuclear processes would have been greatly more energetic with higher values of c, and would have reduced the Earth to a cinder, or something to that effect.

I am too lazy to chase down detailed expositions of this debate at the moment, but all those interested can Google "starlight problem" for some interesting discussion on this topic. As silly and intellectually repugnant as views such as YEC can be, they at least have the benefit of prompting us to re-evaluate how we know what we purport to know, which any good science should constantly do.

Thanks for this, BC. As others have pointed out, you always seem to have a ready supply of relevant information to bring to bear in these threads. The historical name "Comstock" was vaguely familiar to me, but I may have associated it more with the "Comstock lode," which the other Comstock likely would have found phonetically disagreeable, given his views on "vice." I am reminded of that great H.L. Mencken quote, which defines Puritanism as "the haunting fear that someone, somewhere may be happy."

I would point out, however, that my remarks about freethinkers should not be taken to be limited to the Western hemisphere, as there were European Renaissance humanists, for instance, who were integral in pushing back against the superannuated superstitions of the past in forming the modern world. Indeed, if Christianity's death grip on Western culture were never loosened, we may well still be hunting "witches" and massacring Jews for poisoning the local well every time there is an outbreak of illness.

But, yes, some of the giants of the U.S.'s founding were freethinkers or religious skeptics. Thomas Paine comes to mind here. Even the esteemed George Washington declined to accept communion at church service. You are probably familiar with the "Jefferson Bible," in which ol' Tom snipped out some of the more ridiculous passages of the NT, instead compiling a sort of "greatest hits" compilation of JC's moral teachings.

Now no new religions are taking root — Ashwin Poonawala

This doesn't seem quite right. Off the top of my head, Mormonism, Scientology, and Christian Science are relatively recent inventions (though it's perhaps debatable to what extent the latter two are "taking root").

The principle of individual rights is attributable to the Christian West, where 'freedom of conscience', 'freedom of association', and so on. Of course it is true that many such reforms were fought tooth and nail by religious conservatives, but the reformers themselves were also Christian. — Wayfarer

Many were also deists, freethinkers, and various other sorts of non-Christian.

Precisely. I think that if a person has an inner struggle with that kind of racism, rational examination of the question can become impossible. Anytime the issue comes up, a reflexive "I'M NOT RACIST!" will appear. Maybe clothed in more sophisticated language. — Mongrel

I see. Then it is a good thing that you have such an illuminating beacon into the heart of men. Perhaps you prowl the streets of your hometown with a lantern in the manner of Diogenes, looking for a truly non-racist man, only to search in vain. How sad.

Gad...that has to be the worst standup comedy routine of all time.

I would sacrifice my life for your right to ignore my claims. And yet.. you can sort of tell if a person thinks of Arabs or Mexicans or whatever as a different race (as fundamentally different). — Mongrel

And yet it is those who protest so-called "Islamophobia" who break out Muslims into a separate race (at least when it suits their agenda of demonizing any and all critics of Islam). So, perhaps they are the ones who view Muslims as "fundamentally different"?

Race is not biological. It's a social construct. So it can be configured as desired. — Mongrel

Then it can also be ignored as desired, and thus yours (and others') tendentious claims about "racism" against Muslims can be disregarded for the conversation-inhibiting rhetoric that it is.

Hmm. You can always tell the ones who harbor hidden racism. They're the ones who get the most sanctimonious. — Mongrel

I will ask this question again: which "race" is Islam?

science assumes that there are regularites which it describes as 'natural laws'[...] — Wayfarer

This seems to me to be an observation as much as an assumption, wouldn't you say?

the bombing of abortion clinics is again hardly representative of Christianity. — Wayfarer

It is also hardly representative of religiously-motivated terrorism, except by those who are deliberately obfuscating, or who are ignorant of statistics (and I'm not saying that you're one of them, mind you). This simply draws a false equivalency between the frequency and deadliness of Christian and Islamic terrorism.

To all those who believe that all religions are equally-violent, I invite them to participate in a little experiment. I will go to Salt Lake City, Utah and put on a performance of the musical The Book of Mormon. You go to Riyadh or Islamabad or Jakarta (your choice) and put on a performance of a new musical called The Muhammad Monologues. Then let's compare notes as to our respective experiences doing so (assuming that we're both alive to do so; there's a distinct chance that one of us won't be).

They are basically in the limelight to enforce the islamophobia and outright racism of people. — ssu

Please remind me when "Islam" became a "race." I must have missed that.

The fact that something occurred by "chance" doesn't entail that it lacked a cause or explanation: it may simply mean that there was no intentional plan or design underlying its occurrence. — Arkady

That's precisely what it means in this context. — Wayfarer

I confess to some confusion on this point: you claimed that science rejects "chance" explanations in every domain except the origin of life. I pointed out that "chance" simply means "without intentional plan or design," and you agree to that definition.

But substituting our agreed-upon definition into your original statement means that you believe that science ordinarily rejects those explanations which don't involve intentional plan or design, which, of course, is glaringly false. So, our wires seem to have gotten crossed somewhere. Also, you have segued from talking about the origin of life to the origin of the universe, which are quite different phenomena, at least as far as science is concerned.

So what does getting stabbed with scissors represent in your analogy? Intense emotional pain, death, or what? — Noble Dust

It represents nothing in particular: only a form of evil so severe that it would warrant the parent's (or "parent's") intervention.

All analogies break down eventually. In the second half of my paragraph which you didn't comment on, I explained more of my thoughts on the topic of God intervening in our pain. You seem to have critiqued my analogy without noticing that I addressed your point directly afterwards?

There was nothing in the remainder of your paragraph which bolstered your point. You simply made unfounded assertions and ad homs against those who might disagree with you, calling them "weak-minded." You are free to believe that "pain is a gift," but that doesn't advance the discussion one bit, or speak to the problem of evil.

"those"? Is this passive-aggressively aimed at me or something? >:O

Not only against you: the anthropomorphization of God complaint arises with some regularity in these parts. X-)

Anthropomorphization and analogy/metaphor are different. Analogies are self-conscious; when we use them, we know full well that they're ONLY analogies. An analogy is a way of imagining a theoretical idea, it just happens to not be a very popular mode of thinking in academic philosophy. Anthropomorphization, on the other hand, is unconscious; the Biblical analogy of God as Judge, for instance, is an anthropomorphization because it's so ingrained in Western and even Eastern Christendom's conception of God that it isn't even questioned, by and large. Anthropomorphization of God is corrosive because it shapes the very framework of how Christians imagine God; it closes off countless possibilities of wisdom.

Christians literally anthropomorphized their God (in the form of Jesus Christ), and even the God of the OT is routinely spoken of as having a will, desires, emotions (e.g. anger), etc. It's not merely a "Biblical analogy": it's what the Bible says, and what Jews and Christians believe. Christian eschatology involves God standing in judgment of mankind at the end of days, for instance.

Yep. The blame for an act of violence is on the perpetrator.

But when we take a break from judgement and try to understand, it's meaningful to ask how what gives rise to terrorism. How would you answer that? — Mongrel

Terrorists (Islamist and otherwise) act for any number of reasons: political, ideological, religious, military, etc. In some cases an extreme, violent interpretation of Islam gives rise to terrorism, which is a running theme in this thread.

I always think of it like this: does a good parent shield their child from all possible negative experiences in the world? No, the parent trains the child to have autonomy, and through that autonomy, the child comes to experience the negative things in life through his/her own eyes. The parent can't prevent this, only train the child for it. — Noble Dust

That a good parent doesn't shield their child from all possible negative experiences doesn't entail that they don't shield their child from any possible negative experiences. Parents may allow their kids some leeway in getting into scrapes with each other and learning conflict resolution skills, but if one tries to stab the other with a pair of scissors, no "good parent" would fail to intervene, I should think.

(As a side note, those who are bothered by what they perceive to be the over-anthropomorphization of God probably shouldn't lean on parent/child analogies when explaining the nature of Man and God's relationship.)