Perhaps the root of trust lies in the ability to trust yourself? Maybe before you can ever really trust another, you first must trust, at least to a certain extent, your own judgment, intuition, perspective, etc. Doing this, however, requires introspection and the will to be honest with yourself, and brave enough to recognize your own faults, biases, etc. Perhaps the extent to which we trust others is simply a projection of how much we trust ourselves?

That does not entail that we must be alive so morality can come into play. — schopenhauer1

I’m not making the claim that morality must endure no matter what, as if it is some purpose or meaning of life. I’m just not seeing how Antinatalism can justify its claim by appealing to morality when that very claim seems to refute morality, albeit indirectly, due to the end of human life being a direct consequence of its claim.

1) Antinatalism’s claim that one should not procreate is a moral claim.

2) As such, it’s justification is entirely dependent on the existence of morality itself.

3) The purpose of making moral claims is to increase moral behavior.

4) Antinatalism’s logical conclusion results in the ending of human life.

5) This results in the end of morality.

6) Therefore, Antinatalism’s goal of increasing moral behavior becomes impossible, as neither people nor morality will continue to exist if Antinatalism is adhered to.

It’s similar to coaching a team to do its best, but then not keeping score of the game. Doing your best becomes pointless, because the purpose of doing your best is to win the game.

Imagine that there are only two types of fruit; apples and oranges. Someone holds up one of them and declares that it is an apple. I can deny that statement without making any affirmation in any way. I don’t have to then declare that it is actually an orange. This is Atheism. Agnosticism would deny that the object is neither an apple nor an orange. Theism affirms that it is an apple. Now, that being said, if I investigate the matter and then come to the conclusion that it is an orange, so be it, but doing so isn’t a necessary condition for denying that it is an apple. Following this analogy, my question is does Antitheism simply deny that the apple is not a specific type of apple? So that the Antitheist could still believe that the person is holding an apple, just a specific type (red delicious let’s say).

Again, I see no problem. No humans = no need for morality. — schopenhauer1

If Antinatalism entails “no humans” then it also entails no need for morality. Agree? If that is the case, then why make moral statements and judgements? Your argument for me to refrain from procreating is based on the belief that doing so is good. However, your argument also entails that morality is pointless or unnecessary. Therefore, what you consider to be good is irrelevant because morality is pointless or unnecessary. Put simply, you can’t tell me to behave morally and then go on to say that morality is unnecessary. I have no reason to behave morally if morality doesn’t matter.

No that is not entailed in morality. Morality can be a set of many things that are regarded to how humans should act and treat each other. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but behavior is only a means to the end, which is life being good or tolerable. Life is what gives meaning to behavior.

This argument states that it is wrong to create suffering on behalf of another person who will suffer throughout their whole life in unknown but often predictable ways. — schopenhauer1

Why is this wrong? If the justification for this includes the goal of making life better in some way, then ending life refutes the justification. Having no life at all doesn’t make life better.

No, it does not deny morality. Unlike nihilism (which does not believe in any values), pessimism/antinatalism puts a premium on prevention of unnecessary suffering which is actually a compassionate stance. In the case of procreation, the least suffering you can cause for a future person is to not have that possible future person. — schopenhauer1

It’s nihilistic in the sense that it’s consequence results in morality ceasing to exist. I understand that Antinatalists have values. But their values are irrelevant because they result in morality becoming extinct.

Yes, the second one. ONCE BORN, then things change. The whole logic changes actually. The decision prior to someone's birth is an asymmetry in respect to preventing suffering for a future person (which is always a good thing), and preventing good experiences for a future person (which is neither good nor bad because there is no actual person to be deprived of the good experiences). The asymmetry here always is skewed towards the prevention of suffering, meaning non-birth of the future person. — schopenhauer1

:up:

Correct me if I am mistaken, but these do not seem to be equivalent. Not believing in god is not the same as believing that god does not exist. The latter entails the former, but not vice-versa. — darthbarracuda

@Frank Apisa

Precisely. This is why Atheism is not a belief that no no Gods exist. It isn’t a belief at all.

Yes, it is like veganism. It is a choice, and one can convince others of its merits. — schopenhauer1

Yes one can, but only by convincing them that it is “good.” But “good” only makes sense in the paradigm of morality. The issue is that the statement “Antinatalism is good” destroys the only context in which “good” makes sense. Antinatalism only exists within the context of morality, but Antinatalism entails the ending of human life if carried out across the board, which then entails the end of morality, which is the very scaffolding holding up Antinatalism in the first place. It’s a snake swallowing it’s own tail.

Obviously, if they think that the case is relevant enough to follow-through with it, they believe they are indeed causing someone else's lifetime of possible instances of suffering if they procreated. Clearly, they agree and follow the antinatalist argument, they think it is more important to prevent suffering than to cause conditions of suffering for another (even if it seems against their own initial wants). — schopenhauer1

But to prevent suffering by preventing life defeats the purpose of Antinatalism. If Antinatalism is a type of morality, then it necessarily includes the premise that life is worth living. If not, then how can it purport to answer the question “What is the good life?”? If it is stating that one cannot live a good life, because there’s no such thing as a good life due to the inevitable experience of suffering, then it is essentially Nihilistic. It denies morality. Therefore, it cannot validly make moral claims about what is good, or how we should live.

A very extreme example of this is a sociopath who gets joy from causing others pain. Should he be accommodated because his pain is so great by suppressing his true passions? Of course not. Let's make it less stark. Should a religious nut who thinks causing suffering and death for others is the righteous thing to do be allowed to act on those impulses because not doing so causes them the suffering of not being able to do those acts? Of course not. — schopenhauer1

I can agree with this, but if Antinatalism’s premise is that causing suffering for someone else is always bad, then that entails much more than preventing birth. It would also entail being against many different medical procedures; vaccines/shots, foul tasting medicine, exams that cause discomfort, etc. Or does it hold the position that it is ok to directly cause suffering if by doing so more intense suffering is prevented or lessened?

If no one is around to suffer, then morality doesn't matter. Morality only matters for those already existing. I don't see anything contradictory there. Humans don't exist to keep morality going, morality exists only when multiple humans and sentient life comes in the picture. — schopenhauer1

Holding a moral view that results in ending morality seems contradictory. The justification for the view directly appeals to morality, but also indirectly destroys the preconditions for morality.

No, but that's not my argument, which suffering will be greater. My argument is that the parents' suffering is irrelevant as it is causing suffering for someone else. This is no longer about one's own pain, but causing someone else pain. — schopenhauer1

Well, I'm not. I'm advocating that people don't cause the conditions for other people to suffer. I am not forcing them to do so. And again, the "needless suffering" of unrequited parenting is irrelevant when it is tied to causing the conditions for someone else's suffering. — schopenhauer1

I get that my suffering is irrelevant if I, as someone contemplating parenthood, choose to not have children on the basis of Antinatalism. However, if I adopt Antinatalism as an ideology, it seems to entail that I believe that people should not have children. Meaning other people. This is where I get stuck on how you can actually hold Antinatalism as an ideology without implying to the rest of the world that they shouldn’t have children. I know people who have chosen to not have children, and their reasons are whatever they are. It is a personal choice, and as such, remains private. But by making your personal choice public and espousing it as an ideology, it is implied that you judge other’s choices to have or not have children as either “good” or “bad.” In this way, suppose you are successful in convincing me that I shouldn’t have children even though I want to. Wouldn’t you at least be partly responsible for whatever suffering I endure as a result of this decision?

Rather, antinatalism values prevention of needless suffering for other people, especially in the case of birth, as there is no downside of an actual person losing out on the goods of life (as no one existed prior to birth to be deprived of this). — schopenhauer1

I agree with this.

It is true that procreation is the necessary condition for people to suffer. — schopenhauer1

I also agree with this, but it’s also true that procreation is necessary for morality itself to continue. Therefore, to be against procreation entails being against morality, at least as a side effect. IOW’s if the moral statement “Thou shalt not procreate” is applied universally via Kant’s Categorical Imperative, then the elimination of morality will logically follow in time.

@darthbarracuda Perhaps this helps...

https://www.learnreligions.com/atheist-vs-agnostic-whats-the-difference-248040

1) I've definitely heard this argument before and my general response is that if it causes other people's suffering, one that will continually appear throughout possibly 80+ years of another person's life, then this consideration overrides one's own suffering for not being able to do an action that causes someone else's suffering. — schopenhauer1

Ok, but I’m just not convinced that the intermittent suffering of the child for 80+ years would be greater than the intermittent suffering of two people (both parents) for, let’s say 50-60 years. And to me I think it is at least conceivable that two people who desperately want to have children but can’t would intermittently suffer for the remainder of their lives as a consequence.

What this all comes down to is that when you are doing something to someone else that leads to inevitable and unnecessary suffering, then any other consideration for one's own reasons for doing this are secondary or should not even be in the equation. — schopenhauer1

A couple things regarding this.

1. This checks out fine if you are only practicing this in your personal life, but if you are advocating for, or in any way trying to prevent other people who want to have children from doing so, then you are causing them to needlessly suffer. I’m not saying you are or aren’t trying to do this, I don’t know.

2. This seems like a moral argument since it pertains to how people should conduct their life. However, morality itself is aimed at determining what type of life is good, among other things. Antinatalism seems to entail the denial of morality since it denies that life itself is good. Therefore it appears contradictory for a moral nihilist(?) to proceed to make moral arguments. IOW, if you do not value life, or think that life has any value, then how can you logically make an argument that appeals to values at all? If you do not value life, then how can you say you care how people are treated?

I say rebel. We can rebel communally. We all know we are in this situation, and we all agree to stop it for future generations. — schopenhauer1

If you consider Antinatalism to be rebellion, then aren’t you throwing the baby out with the bath water? Your solution to living a life of suffering is to end life?

Well, I’m not asking you to, but ok. Could you explain why a Pantheist or a Polytheist couldn’t also be an Antitheist? I don’t see why either one couldn’t believe their respective conceptions of God and come to the conclusion that God, as they define him/it, is bad and should be opposed.

I get that, but so what? Whats the relevance of whether I agree with the first sentence in someone else's post? I actually think there are a lot off errors in that quote from Fool, but I would bring that up with him not you, right? I was disagreeing with the statement you made — DingoJones

Because I’m making the same argument as him, only more specific. His post was in reference to Theism in general, whereas mine was referring to particular types of Theism (Polytheism and Pantheism).

If you’re claiming that polytheists and pantheists are incapable of being antitheists because they are types of Theism, then you’re disagreeing with the first sentence in Fool’s quote above.

I have some ideas I’d like you to consider:

Regarding antinatalism, couldn’t it be argued that attempting to prohibit people from having children creates additional suffering on those of us who would prefer or enjoy having a child? It see to me that the suffering that two people that want to be parents would experience potentially could be greater than the suffering one person could potentially experience as a result of being born, because the total amount of suffering would have to include the sum of the two people that want children (and perhaps the suffering of people who want grandchildren, nieces/nephews, etc.). I know that people that learn they are infertile, as well as expectant parents that have had miscarriages, can go to some pretty grim places emotionally and mentally as a result of not being able to have children or losing them. Also, it seems that antinatalism disregards the pleasure that one person can provide to several other people.

Regarding pessimism, it seems that the entire philosophy is predicated on the fact that life is absurd due to the repetition of chasing goals to temporarily alleviate our suffering, such as you have described. I don’t dispute this, but have you considered whether or not life would be better or worse if our needs for survival, maintenance, and entertainment were completely and permanently satiated? I think this scenario would be even less tolerable, because then we wouldn’t even possess the absurd repetition that we claim is so bad. Also, doesn’t the pleasure of chasing things count for something? Therefore isn’t it better to accept fate, a la Nietzsche, and will both the pleasures and sufferings that life necessarily consists of?

So you disagree with this?

It seems it's possible to be a theist and yet an antitheist for the latter is defined as an active opposition to god. An atheist being an antitheist is natural evolution doing its thing but a theist who is an antitheist is someone who must hold that god does more harm than good, something not too outlandish if one looks at all the atrocious acts being committed in his name. — TheMadFool

Neither polytheism nor pantheism, as I understand them, are anti-theistic — 180 Proof

But, a Polytheist or Pantheist could be an Antitheist if they disagreed with the Theistic conception of God and had some animosity towards Theism in general, right?

You're mistaken. E.g. (JCI) monotheists are atheists with respect to "other gods" (e.g. Olympian Pantheon, Nordic Sagas, Hindu Vedas, Indigenous tribal totems, etc). — 180 Proof

Yeah, I realize this. I should have said can apply across the board.

No. Holding 'simultaneously' that both theism and anti-theism are 'true' is contradictory. As Wolfman & Wayfarer point out (above), the 'apparent inconsistency' (of (e.g.) Daoist pandeism (or pantheism?) combined with worship of local deities + ancester veneration) is only apparent and quite pragmatic, or non-binary - different 'objects of hope' for addressing different 'modes of fear' - in terms of cultural (traditional) context. — 180 Proof

I took their posts to just refer to behavior, which doesn’t necessarily correlate to belief. What concept(s) of God they worship, pray to, revere, etc. can be different than the one that they actually believe in. This is similar to Atheists celebrating Christmas. Either way, holding both beliefs “simultaneously” is what I meant.

Yeah, I saw that in the link @Baden provided. Very interesting. Does this mean that Antitheist’s can believe anything they like regarding the existence of any Gods, as long as they are against the spread of Theism?

If a religion is not theistic, then atheism isnt a position one is able to have about that religion because atheism is a position on theism (namely, the absence of theism). If one is an anti-theist, then one is only anti-theistic religions — DingoJones

I take Atheism to apply across the board, since it is the denial of any God’s existence. This would apply to Theistic conceptions of God or otherwise, but the word is misleading. I would agree with your last sentence, but I wasn’t sure, which is why I asked.

Those “isms” you listed are types of theisms, and I do not see how a specific definition of god (the 1,2 and 3 traits) implies any of those “isms” are not theism. — DingoJones

Because, wouldn’t a Theist be someone that agrees with the Theistic conception of God? If so, then anyone who disagrees with Theism’s conception of God could not be a Theist, they would be an Antitheist(?).

Speaking for myself as an anti-theist, I'm agnostic (and even ignostic) with respect to 'non-theistic concepts of divinity' because they're either insufficiently evident (ágnôsis) or intrinsically undecidable (epoché). — 180 Proof

That’s basically what I meant by “plausible;” Agnostic.

I don't think so. Many Japanese Buddhists, for instance, also revere? (worship?) traditional Shinto 'deities'. — 180 Proof

Ok, but which conception of God would they believe to be true? Theistic, or non-theistic? Holding both beliefs would be contradictory, so holding one excludes you from being capable of holding the other, right (at least logically)?

Thanks, but this doesn’t seem to address the issue. Essentially if Theism refers to only certain types of religions, then it would make sense that Antitheism only refers to the same religions as Theism. The question then is what about the other religions that are excluded from Anti/Theism? I assume Atheism would include all religions, Theistic or otherwise. But there doesn’t seem to be a word that describes someone that disbelieves religions that are not Theistic, but who has a different stance towards Theistic religions, which seems odd to me.

This is from a conversation from different thread with me and @180 Proof

Theism (as I understand it's sine qua non attributions) defines g/G with claims (1) there is at least one Mystery (2) that Created Existence & (3) Intervenes - causes changes - In the Universe (as per e.g. scriptures, prophesies, testimonials, theodicies, metaphysics, etc) — 180 Proof

My response to him:

but when is God ever defined as something different than claims 1,2, and 3? — Pinprick

His response to me:

See wiki re: (e.g.) deism, pandeism, animism, acosmism, etc. :fire: — 180 Proof

I take his response to imply that the “isms” he listed are not Theistic. Hence this thread :grin:

We all have preferences we can't change — Craiya

Are you sure? I know that some of my preferences have changed since childhood.

It only means that majority of people agrees with your opinion on his appearance. — Craiya

This is what attractiveness is; the majority of people agreeing on certain physical characteristics being more desirable than others.

Now, you walk up to this person and give them a compliment. They thank you. But for what exactly? Are they thanking you for having a preference? You only say how you view their looks. Why should they be thanking you for that? — Craiya

They’re thankful that you complemented their beauty. Being beautiful is a positive characteristic to have, therefore being complemented for having it a positive thing. Hence the thankfulness. You essentially gave them a boost to their ego/self-esteem. Furthermore, you went out of your way to do so since it wasn’t required or expected.

They didn't work hard to look this way. — Craiya

You don’t know this. Vanity seems to be pretty popular, as is evidenced by the lengths that people are willing to go in order to improve their looks, not to mention the amount of money they’re willing to spend.

(My undestanding is that "evil" today usually refers to malevolent or cruel human behavior, however in other contexts, it refers to "adversity" or "hardship" in general, such as disease, famine, poverty, natural disasters, not necessarily evil acts or intentions by people). — IvoryBlackBishop

You could also add to that that “evil” is sometimes viewed as a force, as in the “forces of good and evil.” If I’m not mistaken, this is what Nietzsche was getting at in “Beyond Good and Evil.”

Also, somewhat related, is Mary Midgley’s book “Wickedness,” where she comes to the conclusion that wickedness should be defined in a negative way, as an inability or unwillingness to “do the right thing.”

Let me be brief and simply state what seems apparent about philosophical pessimism. Namely the slippery confirmation bias that a person might hold towards the world and it's structural features in regards to a sad existence. — Shawn

Any attitude or emotion you have towards life will result in this same issue. However, I tend to disagree that sadness is necessary to be a philosophical pessimist, as your title suggests. I would argue that all that is needed is to recognize prevalence of suffering in life, and that due to our mortality, it is unavoidable. This is similar to the roots of Buddhism. Philosophical pessimism is the result of acknowledging this truth about life, and attempting to find a solution to the problem, but ultimately failing to do so. Therefore, all that can be done is to resign yourself to the position that life has put you in.

Language isn't that logical, though, when used in the wild. If you insist on thorough grammatical logic within philosophy, you either have to be very careful how you phrase things, or you create a insulated bubble, where your conclusions have little to do with the world we live in. — Dawnstorm

Not sure if I agree or not. Rules of grammar dictate the relationship between different types of words (i.e. verbs and adverbs), as well as things like punctuation; and as far as I can tell these rules are applied logically with very few, if any, exceptions. If you’re meaning that the rules of grammar aren’t adhered to very well, then I would agree, but otherwise I’m not certain.

Under the assumption that "All Gods are fictional," and "Gods don't exist," are synonymous (which is not a given in every context), you could lead someone to commit to the positive phrasing and thus have them have a belief. — Dawnstorm

True.

Intuitively, I'd consider that move a rhetorical trick rather than anything philosophically meaningful. — Dawnstorm

Yes, but then the issue becomes which statement is correct or accurate, and which one is a trick of rhetoric. How would you propose we distinguish between the two?

That may work. The question, then, is if "All Gods are fictional," are semantically tied together with "Gods don't exist," phrased once with a positive and once with a negative structure. If so, can you say that there is a "believe in nothing"? — Dawnstorm

I’m going to say no. A lot of this question comes down to sentence structure and which words are used. “All Gods are fictional” and “Gods don’t exist” are synonymous, but add “I believe” to the front of each and (perhaps?) one negates itself, while the other does not. Hence why I say it comes down to sentence structure and essentially the logic behind grammar. Verbs make sense when their objects are phrased positively, but when they’re phrased negatively, the verb itself is what becomes negated. It may even be the same logic that’s applied to mathematics that’s being applied here, although I’m not sure. Consider that a positive times a negative results in a negative.

See wiki re: (e.g.) deism, pandeism, animism, acosmism, etc. :fire: — 180 Proof

Ok, there are other ways God is defined, but it just seems like God is so commonly used in the context of Theism that that would be your default assumption. When someone says that “God exists,” I assume they believe in the existence of God as defined by Theism. Maybe that’s wrong of me to do, but if I assume wrong it usually becomes apparent that I did as the conversation progresses, at which time I can ask for clarification. But whatever, I wasn’t trying to bust your balls about this, I was just curious.

Only if g/G is undefined at I point out in previous posts. Theism (as I understand it's sine qua non attributions) defines g/G with claims (1) there is at least one Mystery (2) that Created Existence & (3) Intervenes - causes changes - In the Universe (as per e.g. scriptures, prophesies, testimonials, theodicies, metaphysics, etc) which can be examined; if any or all of these claims are falsified or demonstrated to be not true, then theism is not true, and therefore every theistic g/G is merely fictional, no? — 180 Proof

Makes sense to me, but when is God ever defined as something different than claims 1,2, and 3? I’m just not understanding why it is necessary to ask for a specific/formal definition of God every time someone uses the term. Isn’t it safe to assume the definition Theism provides is the one meant by whomever is using the term?

You’re saying God is a meaningless concept unless it is defined, but I think it is always defined, at least implicitly.

I think this because 'theism' is defined - definite - insofar as it's a 'conception of divinity' that consists of distinct truth-claims about g/G, and therefore, to my mind, are not "meaningless" ontologically, epistemically or ethically. g/G, I agree, is meaningless, but what we say about g/G - if it's proposition - is not. — 180 Proof

I don’t understand this. If God is meaningless, then doesn’t that render Theism meaningless as well, since it is defined by one’s belief in this meaningless concept? BTW, when I use the term God, I mean any Theistic conception of the term.

Can anyone here think of a way to phrase "God doesn't exist," as a positive, to which "God exists," would be a negative? I can't. — Dawnstorm

Perhaps?

All Gods are fictional.
No Gods are fictional.

People who use the word "atheist" as a descriptor do not use it simply because they "lack of belief (in) God"...but because they either "believe" there are no gods or "believe" it is MUCH more likely that there are no gods than that there is at least one.

If you disagree with that...let's discuss it because I consider it to be extremely important. — Frank Apisa

I really don’t have a way to argue for or against this. It’s possible Atheists use that term to mean what you describe, but that doesn’t mean they’re using it correctly.

If it would make the notion any more acceptable to you, it could be rephrased to: "There are some people who have money, I am not one of them."

On the god variation, "There are people who 'believe' at least one god exists. I am not one of them." — Frank Apisa

Of course I accept this; it doesn’t imply belief in the nonexistence of God.

“I have no money” is making the claim that something is in my possession. However, if taken literally, it is a contradiction because really I don’t have anything. There’s nothing that I am actually in possession of. That’s why it is incorrect to negate the object of a verb, whether the object is money or existence. Claiming that the statement “I believe no Gods exist” means that I have a belief is like claiming that the statement “I have no money” means that I have something.

I personally tend to fear negative things :/ — JacobPhilosophy

Sure, but it doesn’t mean you have to. That’s all I’m saying

One of these premeses has to be false, either life is not worth living (and therefore there is no reason not to end it) or death is inherently bad (and therefore should be feared). — JacobPhilosophy

I don’t think that fearing death necessarily follows logically from the conclusion that it is bad. Your attitude towards it could be more stoic, or indifferent, or any number of things.

As an agnostic, I can truthfully say: "I do not 'believe' that God exists." But that does not mean that "I believe that God does not exist. In fact, I do not. — Frank Apisa

Right, I agree, because that type of belief is impossible to hold. It is empty. Let me give you an example. The statements “I don’t have any money” and “I have no money” mean the same thing, the absence of the possession of money. Unless you would argue that I actually do have/possess something if I say the latter. Maybe you would, because that’s what it seems you’re doing when the statements are about beliefs. I don’t see or understand what makes the term “belief” special to exclude it from following the same logic that’s used in the example.

How do you know that?

So, even if such moral oughts are only desires/wishes, they aren't simply approving hurrahs and disapproving boos in the sense of being reflexive emotions sans thinking. — TheMadFool

Unless we have evolved to respond with positive emotions to what we now call “moral oughts.” In which case all thinking done on the subject is after the fact, simply post hoc justification of our emotional responses. IOW, moral oughts are simply our attempts at justifying our emotional responses in regards to behavior.

But making a statement like that means that you can change the position of the “positive” and “negative” aspects and retain the same meaning.

“I believe that this doesn’t exist” becomes “I don’t believe that this exists.” Which means, to me at least, that by negating the object (exist) you actually negate the verb (believe).

Sorry if I misrepresented your claim. I found your previous post to be confusing. I’ll try to explain.

I would not say "I believe there is no God" is a claim about the nonexistence of a concept. — Cabbage Farmer

This seems to disagree with this:

Well, God is certainly only a concept, but I think that “I believe there is no God” refers more towards the non/existence of the concept, rather than the concept itself. If I say “I believe the shirt is not red,” I’m making a statement about a property (the color) of the object (the shirt), not about the object itself. — Pinprick

However, this seems to agree with my quote above.

I might agree that this statement is also about something like "the color red", or "the property of being red" or "the predicate 'is red'"... and about the relation of some such thing to the thing called a shirt. Accordingly I might characterize the speaker's belief as a belief that there is a thing called "this shirt" and that the concept or predicate "being red" does not apply, or is not correctly applied, to that thing. — Cabbage Farmer

Hence my confusion. I can’t tell whether you agree or disagree with me. And I think an example, provided by you, of a belief that is about existence would help me understand better what you mean.

Insane according to the definition I provided?