Right. I agree, I'm probably just not in touch with how science is related to culture. Probably because I'm no scientist or philosopher of science. But I get what you are saying. Thanks for the correction.

It’s not a question of paying attention but of comprehending what one is paying attention to. We have philosophers , scientists and mathematicians today who represent widely differing levels of cultural understanding. The more traditional among them are living in the midst of ‘aliens’ they cannot comprehend. — Joshs

I don't see how culture would get in the way of good science. Scientists, if they are good scientists, largely shouldn't pay attention to culture. That's not to say we shouldn't have ethicists directing how we use our science, but culture doesn't matter that much, I think. The same goes for mathematics.

As for philosophy, yes, philosophers have a tendency to make more mistakes because the only corrective methods are when it intersects with science, or someone formulates an indisputable counterargument. There is no hard and fast means of showing a philosopher to be wrong if they cloak their arguments in layers of ambiguity.

You mean like the robot hand in Terminator 2?
I think our most talented philosophers, mathematicians and scientists will become Quines when presented with the ideas of an advanced civilization, just as the ideas of Freud, Darwin and Einstein would have been gibberish to the scientists of ancient Babylonia or Azteca. Science doesnt emerge in a vacuum, it is a product of larger cultural worldviews. — Joshs

That's part of why the surprise box would read our inputs to determine where we are technologically/philosophically/scientifically (and maybe even culturally) and then guide us instead of just giving us a bunch of information outside of some absolutely necessary proofs and explicit philosophical arguments.

You are right to think that the aliens' information would be doubted, but if the surprise box works the way I say it would, then your trepidations wouldn't apply so much.

I also suppose we have something of a paradox: the more surprising the alien information, the more and more efficiently the information would be communicated, but also the less likely that we would accept it.

Thus, the surprise box.

We already live amongst intelllectually advanced aliens, interacting with them in myriad ways. — Joshs

What? Where are these aliens? Do you mean smart people?

this direct and unrestricted access does not make possible the transfer of one mode of thinking from one individual or group to another. Why not? Because we can only assimilate complex ideas that are consistent with our own worldview. — Joshs

I think people often change their worldviews in light of discovering new, complex ideas, although people often don't, too. I change my views quite often, even if I have a semi-consistent worldview.

As a result, we share a world in which ancient, traditional, modern and postmodern ways of thinking co-exist. If the immediacy of social media cannot bridge these gaps in outlook, our exposure to other-worldly cultures will fare no better. — Joshs

That's pretty pessimistic. I think that philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians, at least, would pay attention to what we might be able to learn from such advanced aliens. Maybe many people wouldn't adopt, say, moral facts given to us by aliens, but much of the important stuff would get through.

Not to mention, the advances we might make would be largely self-discovered if the surprise box exists. I think people would probably be more likely to invest themselves in such discoveries because of that.

However, we would have no idea of where the surprise box is guiding us, which could be creepy. So, there's that.

yes, seems good to me, but i would say it is not clear what some of these terms mean..."nature' being a big one... — jancanc

I just used the term because it was expedient. I could have said "the totality of all of the things that make depression, depression", but that is cumbersome.

I'm not sure what Kant would think of my usage of the word, honestly. Haven't seen him use the word at all, or any online resources when they discuss his work.

I thought about it some more: philosophy of physics definitely matters, but most of our science is done through the same old methods outside of that highly specialized field. Or so it seems.

Not necessarily. What if their civilization imploded because of rampant moral relativism?

Thanks for the extended version of the argument and link to the article. Makes a lot of sense, and I certainly have no immediate objections.

In my experience, you can't cure a sadist or a psychopath, but you can get them to play by the rules.

edit: for whatever that's worth

Can one overcome a born predisposition to harm others? — jgill

Yes, one can overcome such a predisposition. I have a predisposition for doing self-destructive things, but with time that has diminished. Sometimes you also have to shift the goalposts to something more reasonable than some ideal you have in your head. But largely, yes.

In the end we are largely responsible for our actions. — jgill

I agree.

So, we are caused to will, but we are still willing one thing over another. Seems like a safe thing to say. How does that relate to the (probably misrepresented) argument in the OP? The argument seems to dispute that we can will one thing over another in any meaningful sense.

I think Strawson would argue that the way we are is caused itself. That seems implicit in (3).

edit: thus, our will would be caused because we will what we will because of the way we are

You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon

Okay, this doesn't make sense. You also behave the way you do based on external constraints. You might will one thing over another because of some event or conclusion reached through deduction, for instance. You might choose a vanilla ice cream cone semi-arbitrarily even if you prefer chocolate because chocolate isn't available.

Or you might act in such a way as is contrary to the way you are, insofar as you could want to stop smoking crack even if you are addicted to smoking crack because someone persuaded you to quit. You are acting in a way that is antithetical to the way you are; you are a reluctant crack smoker.

Furthermore, if you have libertarian free-will you are not necessarily choosing based on the way you are, but rather your choices originate with some magical mechanism that allows you to choose unimpeded. So, (1) presupposes that we don't have free-will. Unless you can demonstrate how choice is only determined by the way one is?

It seems to me Strawson must have had some other premises in there.

Indeed. We can leave that task to Sam Harris. :razz: — Tom Storm

I have mixed feelings about that man.

edit: he is right about free-will and on religion, that is true, so I think he has been a force for good. But I know he has made some mistakes here and there on philosophy.

Definitely.

As for identifying them, I don't know. Maybe science will eventually give us some answers on that one, as philosophy doesn't seem up to the task.

edit: what I am saying here is that I don't think we can come to an understanding of moral facts merely through thinking about them, and that rather science, which often seems to be the first mover of our understanding of truth, might stand a chance of revealing some sort of fact about morality. Not claiming we can get an "ought" from an "is".

I'm not a philosopher but this seems reasonable. — Tom Storm

lmao, neither am I

Really? Perhaps it's no different to having a view on the merits of a novel. There is no 'correct' assessment of any book, but some assessments are better argued, are more illuminating and make more sense. — Tom Storm

Given a basic text to interpret, yes. But the only objective common ground we seem to have is some putative universalized claims and human nature to work with.

If we take a goal we can all or mostly agree upon - say the flourishing of conscious creatures - we can make assessments about morality - what we ought or ought not to do. I would argue this is superior to consulting gods, say. — Tom Storm

Agreed. That would be a good goal to converge on, but, again, there is so much seemingly intractable disagreement. Look at my discussion with 180.

I'm interested to understand (in theory) how would a moral fact ever be identified? Would it need to have a transcendent source? — Tom Storm

Maybe. Moral realists are split on this. Moore's Open Question argument seemed to indicate moral facts would be transcendent, but some advances have shown that it might not have to be that way.

edit: going to resolve this elsewhere than the actual thread

Maybe a promise creates an obligation, but that also doesn't propel it into facthood.

No, I'm saying that saying that if you promise to do something, and then say that there ought be a phenomenal manifestation of that promise being followed through on, isn't so much a moral fact in itself but rather a claim about whether or not there should be a manifestation of what a promise entails if a promise is made. You are only making a descriptive claim about the consequences of a promise followed through on; furthermore, it doesn't report a moral fact in the sense of a normative statement or more abstract moral claim like "torture is wrong" - the latter of which doesn't offend Hume's Guillotine. What other form could moral facts take?

And you jerk yourself off every time you write a post, you sad little man.

Insofar as we humans are a eusocial species, it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another constitute our eusociality in practice and that these implicit promises entail that we ought to behave in ways which fulfill them — 180 Proof

You are claiming that the implicit promises somehow entail that we ought behave in ways that fulfill them. In what way do these implicit promises entail within themselves that we ought follow them, exactly? Because it is natural, given we are eusocial? That is both circular and fallacious - to assume that we ought, in a moral sense, follow through on these promises merely because our eusociality is predicated on such implicit promises is to claim that what is natural is right. That is a mistake.

thus, they are moral facts because, unlike institutional facts (e.g. money, citizenship, marriage) which are explicit constructs (e.g. contracts), these promises are implicit to – habits for – adaptively cohabitating with others in a shared/conflicted commons. — 180 Proof

These implicit promises might result in a reasonably structured society, but it doesn't follow that these are moral facts merely because they are not explicit like institutional facts. There is nothing that says that moral facts need be implicit. You also conflate moral facts with useful norms of behavior here.

Contrary to the typical conception of "moral realism" which ToothyMaw is incorrigibly fixated on, isn't it more reasonable to conceive of moral facts as performances, or practices, (i.e. norms / grammars) instead of the objects of propositions (i.e. "claims")? — 180 Proof

If you make the claim that no moral propositions exist, you are committed to the claim that no moral claims can be true. This, for the third time, leads to no grounds for resolving moral disagreements. If that is okay with you, then more power to you, 180.

But don't think you have any moral grounds for objecting to being slapped with a fish.

By the way, I think promises are incredibly important and provide traction for a reasonable morality.

Okay, I understand what you are saying now. And I don't like it. Give me a moment.

it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another constitute our eusociality in practice — 180 Proof

This seems severely reductive. We also have billionaires exploiting their wealth and that contributes to the structure and arrangement of our society, but I wouldn't say that even implicit promises and wealth distribution account for everything.

No. :roll: — 180 Proof

Then what are the promises implicit in if not our moral statements? As stated, they are quite explicit.

Contrary to the typical conception of "moral realism" — 180 Proof

It is an actual thing. You don't need to put it in quotes.

edit: Thanks, btw, for posting something substantive that lays out your position

Insofar as we humans are a eusocial species, it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another — 180 Proof

Are you saying that promises are implicit in the claims that we ought not harm one another and those other things? Because those things you listed are not themselves implicit promises.

What about the person who is forced to change, to become stronger and braver or end up dead in a ditch, or so heavily traumatized they are hollowed out from within? That seems to cut against this self-exploratory, somewhat saccharine, and speciously value-laden discussion.

Millions of people are forced to change, and it has nothing to do with ethical questions. Get tough, or perhaps even monstrous, or die. For many people it is that simple. No child forced to flee a genocide and live as a refugee in a slum asks: "should I try to become more ruthless and cleverer to survive?"

So you might be able to decipher that I am a poster on a philosophy forum, and yet not know what I had for breakfast this morning.

Smart dude, Kant, I can find no fault with his position. — unenlightened

I honestly don't know what to think of Kant. I think he would say that both your status as a poster on the forums and what you had to eat for breakfast are directly knowable as phenomena to the senses, so you aren't addressing the novelty of things-in-themselves or the noumenon.

If one were instead employing logic to deduce from some premise derived from observation that you must have had eggs for breakfast, then one would be using some sort of transcendental means of deciphering something that is distinct from direct experience and observation - the noumenon.

Yes.

(i.) If some object/thing A manifests as some object/thing B, then B is the nature of A, — KantDane21

It seems deductively valid, but unsound because of (i.). e.g. i can say the “if depression manifests as body-trembling, then a body-trembling is the nature of depression”. But this seems to be false since body-trembling is not the "nature" of depression, but maybe just one symptom... — KantDane21

Good point.

But even if we knew in totality what the nature of depression was through our senses - even if it is arrived at through some piece-meal process - our understanding of depression would converge on what it is in itself independent of its phenomenal attributes. It seems to me that if you take into account the fact that noumenon is necessary as a limiting factor, at least according to Kant, we can't say that something's nature can be identified with the way it manifests to our senses - or we could know everything about depression, or anything, really. So, your conclusion that (i) is unsound seems right.

What is the standard or criterion you're using in order to say that something counts as a "moral fact?" — creativesoul

I didn't mention moral facts, but rather that moral claims are propositions, and that the way you used "ought" wasn't the way it is typically used in moral claims. In a moral claim, the object of the "ought" or "ought not" is typically not an inanimate thing, but rather a behavior or action.

If you are saying one has a moral obligation to follow through on a promise, then it could be a moral claim. But you didn't mention that. As it turns out, moral realists actually value promises quite a bit, so you are definitely right to frame promises such that we ought follow through on them.

When making such a claim the speaker is voluntarily entering into a commitment to make the world match their words. — creativesoul

Once again, you have to stipulate that following through on promises is the moral thing to do. If you consider this putative fact to be true, then you could be making a moral claim.

However, I am definitely a moral realist. Humans will not long survive without attending to the moral world. You might think of morals as analogous to laws of physics. they do not exist as facts about the world, but describe the way the facts work - ethics as social physics. — unenlightened

Okay, so you must have done some reading. I don't think that that is the kind of claim a moral realist would make, but intriguing, nonetheless. They say that moral claims do indeed report facts about the world, which is not merely a claim about how moral facts would work.

If you think this conversation is a waste of time, then why bother? I'm sure your insights would be appreciated elsewhere.

I guess it is easy to act in ethical outrage sometimes, and to suppress such things could be expedient and also more difficult. Compassion might be a hindrance in some cases, and a will would be required to overcome such an overriding imperative - or at least that is how it would be for me.

I think this last observation is great. The will is both a means and an end; we must utilize our will in order to strengthen it. :up: — Pantagruel

Thanks.

Is ethics always about what you think is right? Or is it about not doing what is easy? I just don't know. — Pantagruel

Yes, I think that ethics is partially about doing the difficult things we know we ought to.

Some people might claim that ethics is largely a will to control, an attempt to impose one's - or their culture's - norms on others or those within their culture. But I think that this is inconsistent with actual formulations of morality, as nested within many of those formulations is the idea that people ought be free to live as they choose, so long as they do not step too far out of line. The preponderance of this seems too significant to adopt such a simplistic view.

But people want easy answers like that - ethics is about norms enforced by a will to control - and will is both the means and the end.

Insofar as ethics is concerned, the role of will would be relatively controversial, I think. However, I can say my own desire to seek some sort of higher moral truth is an act of will, as it certainly involves obstacles to my biased, although admittedly developed, primate brain. Thus, according to it as so defined, it is different from the mere intention of intending to do what is right or wrong. There is an impetus to discover, even if it takes me to some unpleasant or weird places.

edit: this is probably true for most people who study ethics

Sorry, I said something I didn't mean to say in one of my previous comments and then corrected it after you already responded to it. My newest comment represents what I think.

Hmm. And I tend to think the opposite. Two people can have the exact same physical abilities, but one person is able to push further - past the pain barrier, per your second point. — Pantagruel

I'm not saying that, quantitatively, willpower is constant across people, but rather that what willpower is is the same in each person so defined as in your OP; qualitatively it doesn't differ from person to person, even if it does in quantity. Thus, what one can accomplish is functionally relative to both their amount of willpower and their attributes and the extraneous factors imposed on them. Sorry if this seems pedantic; I'm just trying to come to a common understanding of the term in question.

Excellent OP, Pantagruel.

I'm not sure that it follows that will is subjective, but rather that people have different attributes, capabilities, potencies of addictions, etc. It is much harder for an alcoholic to refuse a drink than for someone who just has a beer every now and then - even if the alcoholic might have significant willpower. I would say that the extent to which someone can accomplish something they will to or will not to do is instead relative based on their attributes and extraneous factors. But, if I'm being honest, a deficit of willpower is often the greatest obstacle to achieving the things one wants to achieve, imo.

I think something you don't address in the OP that is important, is the inevitable pain derived from the failure to accomplish what one wills. This is reciprocating insofar as the more one fails the more one's will to will decreases. What this means is that one should divorce the pain of failure from their actual failures and invite such things, thus "good".

While Nietzsche predated Jocko by over a hundred years, Jocko sums up a similar philosophy: compartmentalize the pain of failure and don't let it affect your will to will, or you will be consumed. This is why people become jaded and apathetic: fear of the pain of failure.

edit: deleted the thing on free will, it isn't relevant

Thanks for the link. Looks interesting. I'll check it out. Their article on moral realism is particularly well-written, btw, so I'd advise people to check it out if they haven't already.

No, we are, I'm just saying the thing you quoted doesn't apply to you, because you didn't claim that moral realism and error-theory are incoherent. Please continue to speak your mind!