I'm basically saying that the internal logic of an argument is more important than adhering to some sort of arbitrary dictionary - but those words in question, while there is leeway in the way they can be used, must exist within some parameters determined by the larger body in which the argument exists. The way the word is used is more important than any sort of definition one might point to, but the thing has to make sense.

I think you are mostly right. But this:

One cannot learn one's first language from a dictionary. Therefore there is a way of understanding the meanings of words that is not found in their lexical definitions.

Hence there is a sense of "meaning" that is not found in a dictionary. — Banno

and the points you make based on this seem to be shaky. Just because a child learning a language picks it up without reading a dictionary (although some children do read dictionaries), doesn't mean that the meanings of the words the child learns are not roughly represented by what is found in a dictionary and that the definitions contained within aren't really useful. What you are saying about how setting out a philosophical argument with clear definitions is stifling is not the result of linguistics, but rather the simple point that there is some leeway with the way words are used when arguing within different paradigms.

it’s not intended to be about morals, which are prescriptive, but about meta-ethics, which is purely descriptive. — javra

Yes, dumb mistake. Just replace meta-ethics with morality and my post hopefully makes sense.

Any proposition regarding future states of affairs can either evidence itself “conformant to the reality of what will be” and thereby true/right/correct or, otherwise, “to lack conformity to the reality of what will be” and thereby be false/wrong/incorrect. For instance, the proposition that “the sun will rise again tomorrow” can either be true or false, as will be evidenced in the span of the subsequent 24 hours. — javra

Okay, so we have propositions about what will be that can be true or false. But that isn't the same thing as saying that future states of being or of the universe are false, and a relevant telos is a goal with what I would presume to be a state of being as its end - something that I now grant can be false when referenced against what is actually possible - even if fictitious, and not to make a proposition true. But I get what you are saying now.

a) that one as agent is compelled in an ontologically fixed manner to optimally minimize one’s own present and future suffering — javra

Disregarding that this might not apply to, say, Jihadists, this sounds pretty reasonable. But many people also feel compelled to reduce others' suffering, too. Or they might have any number of moral convictions.

Yet some such envisioned future states of being will be unrealizable and, thereby, false. — javra

I'm sorry, what? How can a state of being, even unrealizable and future, be false? Maybe it doesn't satisfy (a) given (b), but it is a state of affairs, not a proposition or something. You could say that a certain state of the universe, or being, could not possibly come to fruition, so therefore it would not be moral to pursue it, however, which you don't quite say here:

Pursuit of such a false state of future being will not minimize one’s own suffering but intensify it, thereby being a wrong notion of what is good. To pursue such false ultimate telos would then be to do what is wrong, or else bad, for oneself. — javra

But who is to say for sure that pursuing a false state of being is truly sub-optimal? Maybe one genuinely believes that climate change is a hoax and one will not be affected, and thereby believes that they are justified in being extravagant in their usage of fossil fuels. This harms other people, but not so much the individual in the short term.

Now that I look at what you are writing some more, you don't differentiate between "future states of being" of the individual with everybody's states of being, and I don't buy that what is good for everyone is always good for the individual.

Here tersely outlined, (a) given (b) is first off taken to be an objective fact. — javra

Presupposing (b), and thus (a), is true to support the argument that purports that there are true or false, or moral or unrealizable, future states of being that we should avoid or pursue, and thus that any realizable end that satisfies (a) given (b) is moral - even if to differing degrees - is circular. So yes, if (b) is true, (a) is too. But why is (b) true? And, once again, even if (b) is true, why is what is good for the individual good for everyone or vice versa?

Addressing just this part, one then gets into the riddle of how no matter what one does one can only be in pursuit of the good. — javra

What does this mean? People definitely don't always pursue the good. Are you talking about why under many ethics people are always obligated to pursue the good?

Next addressing that telos which, ideally, perfectly satisfies (a) given (b), one can again likely obtain more than one conception of what it might be. Given that these alternatives will be mutually exclusive, were any one alternative to in fact be fulfillable as a telos/goal in principle, it would then be the objectively true good, with all other alternatives then necessarily being objectively false, hence wrong, hence bad goals to pursue. — javra

Why would a satisfactory telos be an objectively true good? Your telos is based on a shaky presupposition - that what is good for the group is good for the individual, or that (b) is true in the way you claim. And who are the bad goals bad for? The group, or the individual? You didn't really differentiate between the two.

Furthermore, because of (b), that which is the objectively good end to pursue for yourself will then likewise be the objectively good ends to pursue for all others. — javra

I disagree. What about holding slaves? Even if (b) is true, slaveholders kept slaves for their own benefit, and that doesn't disagree with your argument as far as I can tell. They just did what benefitted themselves, and I'm sure the slaves tried to do what benefitted themselves too, or at least as much as they could, given the circumstances.

The more I think about your argument the more I think you defined (a) too narrowly. There are good goals other than minimizing one's own suffering - but they are more nebulous than your (a), and you seem to have defined (a) in such a way that you could extrapolate such a goal to everyone, as (a) is pretty much true for everyone. But is it really the only relevant consideration?

By the way, what does all of this mean for the pre-existing, intensely religious people that care more about eternity than about minimizing pain on the Earth? According to you, and, given their beliefs are incorrect, they are being serious immoral pursuing such a state of being. It would be a moral obligation to convert them away from religion or to elsewise pacify them.

Indulge for the moment that the dictum of “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” serves as a steppingstone toward one conception of what this objectively good, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 1”

Also indulge for the moment that, as an alternative to this trajectory, the dictum of “It’s good to be the absolute ruler over everyone and everything other” serves as a steppingstone toward another conception of what the objectively true, ultimate telos which satisfies (a) given (b) might be. Call this “telos 2”.

The two will be mutually exclusive and thereby contradictory: one cannot gravitate toward both at the same time and in the same way. One will be objectively good and the other thereby objectively bad. If one were to figure out which of the two just mentioned teloi is the true objective good, one then would furthermore figure out an existentially fixed (though non-physicalist) “is” via which “oughts” can be established. — javra

Okay, I don't think your assertion that the "is" you have provided is justified. You just assumed (b) was true and then that what is good for everyone is good for the individual. It ends there as an assumption, and I don't think it is even existentially fixed, really.

Consider a population of people existing merely to serve a dictator. Is what is good for the dictator (staying in power) good for the people? This dictator could implement some grand, moral telos like “liberty, equality, and fraternity for all” that would benefit everyone, but why? He largely just wants to hold power, and preventing the people from, say, organizing, will serve his needs and be to the detriment of everyone else. Even if the people rise up and overthrow the dictator to implement some sort of new government, many people will likely be harmed in the process. This might be the right telos - liberty, equality, and fraternity for all - the people pursue by overthrowing the dictator, but it is most certainly not to each person's benefit when manifested; the suffering of each person is often not minimized even when implementing a good telos in practice.

Next, take the ought that “people should not be unduly harmed”.

Were telos 1 to be objectively true—hence, an existentially fixed telos that is actualizable in principle and that awaits to be fulfilled—then it would substantiate the just addressed dictum rationally, thereby making the proposition that “people should not be unduly harmed” an objectively good ideal/goal/telos to pursue, for it as such satisfies closer proximity to telos 1. However, were telos 2 to be objectively true, then “people should not be unduly harmed” would be unproductive to bringing oneself into closer proximity to telos 2—thereby signifying that this ought is an inappropriate and thereby bad ideal/goal/telos to pursue. — javra

All I'm reading is: if it sounds like it jives, it jives.

At core issue would be, not so much what most people deem to be good or bad (hence, current normality) but, instead, which ultimate telos specified is actualizable in principle and which is not. The former will be the right telos to pursue—what some in history have termed “the Good”—and the latter will be the wrong telos to pursue. — javra

So we should choose between the options available to us according to which ones can be actualized with guidance from a set of principles that are objectively good because they minimize each person's current and future suffering.

I think a case could be made that you could reduce the net suffering of a population this way, but I think my examples show that a good telos might still not be the best thing for each individual. It would probably be impossible to take into account enough variables to implement anything even remotely ideal outside of the current good stuff we have going in many areas.

Honestly, the morality you are outlining sounds more like the philosophy of a race of aggressive aliens trying to take over the universe and less like something any normal philosopher or person would take on, partly because it is a little too self-assured, and partly because there is only one good way to go about doing good: what the analysts tell us to do.

I mean, the pieces might fit, but will we like what we see?

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people.
— ToothyMaw

Asking why it’s wrong to harm people is like asking why electrons are negatively charged. There is no answer; some things are simply fundamental, brute facts. Explanations have to come to an end somewhere. — Michael

Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".
— ToothyMaw

One such brute fact might be “it is wrong to harm people.” — Michael

I agree. I also believe that to be a brute fact. But for the purposes of discussing the is-ought divide, I feel obligated to mention that we don't have the kind of philosophical or scientific certitude in the area of morality that we have elsewhere.

I think that you as well as I are certain people should not be harmed, and that also explanations do have to end somewhere. I just like to discuss meta ethics as it is really interesting to me.

If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it?
— ToothyMaw

If by "what reason do I have to follow it" you mean something like "why should I believe you" then maybe you shouldn't believe me if I can't prove it.

But whether or not I can prove it and whether or not you should believe me is a separate issue to whether or not it is true.

If realism is correct then something can be both true and unprovable. — Michael

Perhaps "you ought not harm another" is simply a brute fact about reality, much like "electrons are negatively charged particles" is. — Michael

Demonstrating why something like that might be true could constitute merely pointing to a relevant fact about why it is wrong to harm people. That isn't the same as proving it per se, but it certainly constitutes providing evidence. That is mostly all I would ask for to really ground an ought statement in reality.

And if there is evidence, ought I not believe you? I mean, if realism were true, maybe some facts would exist that couldn't be proven, but these facts could be used to form reasonable explanations for other moral considerations. Shouldn't we also pay attention to those explanations that are most logical, reasonable, etc.? Sure, one might make mistakes in analyzing such explanations, but the moral person would search for those most true given a set of "brute facts".

... it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).
— ToothyMaw

The realist will claim that that one ought not murder is a fact about reality, much like that an electron is a negatively charged particle is a fact about reality. — Michael

I know. Are you saying you are a realist and thus that your claim that one ought not murder is a moral fact? It sounds more like you are just adopting a pragmatic way of going about it that appeals to concepts like innocence and obligation and not actual fact hood.

Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling?
— ToothyMaw

That's a different question. It might be true that one ought not murder even if knowing this doesn't compel me to obey. Perhaps I just don't care about what I ought or ought not do. Perhaps I enjoy doing things I shouldn't.

Meta ethics isn't concerned with what we actually choose to do. — Michael

Yes, meta ethics doesn't concern what we actually decide to do, but one's meta ethical view either does or does not make valid whatever normative efforts one puts forward. If you cannot demonstrate why your particular morality is fundamentally more justified than another's, what reason do I have to follow it? You need to define the space in which you are working in when applying morality, and that means at least a lightweight meta ethical exposition.

To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome.


I think you have what I was intending flipped around backwards. It's not the observed outcomes that can be correct/incorrect, it's the models that ground our "is statements." That is, "if my 'is statement' is correct, x ought to happen." If x does not occur, it casts doubt on the "is statement," not the outcome that occured. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, so there is an outcome within the parameters of the model that validates an ought if it occurs. But this ought is totally contingent on the veracity of the "is statements" that make up the model. Thus, they must be grounded in reality if they wish to reflect reality - and in the case of morality must likely also be universalizable. Saying merely that "flourishing is good for the individual", for instance, could contain myriad interpretations as to what constitutes flourishing depending upon which "facts" you start with, and how broad your scope is.

So now let's consider obligations:

c)
Premise: One ought not murder
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not murder John

d)
Premise: If John is innocent then one ought not kill him
Premise: John is innocent
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not kill John — Michael

I don't think either e) or f) can ever be valid. But so what? Why isn't c) or d) sufficient?

There seems to be this implicit claim that if "one ought not murder" cannot be derived from "murder is Y" premises alone then it cannot be true. What justifies this claim? — Michael

I think the issue is not that it cannot be true, but rather that such an "ought" is up for debate if it isn't supported by a relevant fact. I mean, if we cannot say that killing that might constitute murder is wrong in a way related to a reality outside of us, then how can we say that one is definitely behaving morally by not killing John? Why is the "ought" in "one ought not murder" morally compelling? I could just as easily claim that we ought to kick dogs and it would be equally as supported as your assertion one ought not kill John, but people wouldn't consider that morally acceptable. You might couch the "ought" in a concept of innocence in (d), but that concept of innocence is, naturally, theoretical and somewhat subjective.

You could, of course, shore up your statements with plenty of compelling reasoning and by appealing to some basic shared principles concerning innocence, but it will never be related as strongly as if it corresponded to a fact about reality (or something like that).

So, I think you are right. I also think your position is inherently weaker but far more reasonable when it is expounded upon than hoping for some more mystical, direct is-ought connection - as much as that pains me to write.

edit: I mean that the moral status of the ought is up for debate, not its trueness

Take: "The glass is fragile, if you drop it, it will break."

We can expand this to "based on all my knowledge of the glass, observations of past glasses, etc. and my knowledge of how the world works more generally, glasses ought to be fragile. If you drop this glass, it ought to break." — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is, fact statements can be seen as statements about what "ought" to happen (what would be the "correct" outcome) if our model of the world is correct. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That the glass will break might be an extrapolation deriving from observing something that occurs so often that you can predict a likely outcome - but there is nothing "correct" about the outcome; the glass breaking is just a state of affairs that will likely obtain that is, technically, totally disconnected from our knowledge. The "ought", then, is not really supported by our understanding of glasses.

In other words: our model of the world is rooted in states of affairs, one of which is the glass potentially breaking. To say that the glass ought to break is contingent upon our abstract, perhaps even mathematical, knowledge of glasses. So, to call the likely outcome "correct" if confirmed makes no sense even in the context of a model because such a state of affairs is just that: a likely outcome. You could, however, say that our prediction was accurate and validated our model of the world if the glass breaks. But there is no real, tangible correctness there.

Why do these realisations lead to melancholy or escapism? Why don’t people change their expectations instead of being mad about human nature? Why isn’t there a discipline that aims to build concepts that are closer to reality? — Skalidris

I think that people are genuinely confused, and when they aren't they are as likely to be devastated by clarity as they are to be enriched by it. People want things to adhere to their naive preconceptions that are usually somewhat inculcated in them, and, as you suggest, what we would need is not a revolution in terms of a series of cyclical epiphanies, but rather a method by which we can dispel the bullshit and prop up truths - especially those truths that have utility or are impactful.

Why do we keep these intuitive concepts that we can’t even define and that are a poor reflection of reality? — Skalidris

They might not represent reality properly, but they do enable the representations of reality that we hold in our heads. None of us are just seeing the world for what it truly is like a machine reads code, but rather we navigate a very complex space that is full of abstractions, contradictions, ambiguity, and emotional influence. In fact, those things are required for a human to navigate the world socially and otherwise, I would argue.

We have so many insights about human nature but yet we keep on using concepts that give us a completely unrealistic view of humans, and cause Weltschmerz whenever we try to learn more. — Skalidris

People are perfectly content not to avail themselves of all of the insights we have into human nature because there are other things to do and it can be unpleasant. I mean, sometimes one gets slapped in the face with an "insight", and it is often times unpleasant, but that sounds like what you are saying one might want to avoid? Are you not kind of suggesting we catalogue human nature and teach it so as to avoid Weltschmertz?

I have a large problem with your analogy in the sense that human decision making is in fact predictable somewhat — LuckyR

Thanks for the reply. I actually agree with that, thus:

While with a true slot machine it is random in the short term which symbols the reels stop on, there is a general pattern to those combinations that determine a “winning” combination. This could be similar to how there are changes in peoples’ experience that they react to predictably, but not deterministically. — ToothyMaw

Maybe I wasn't clear enough, but I do indeed think human behavior is largely predictable, and, thus, the internal computer of the hypothetical slot machine would exist as a gradient of probabilities and would not just be random.

The Bushido code of accepting death is an interesting counterpoint to that. The state of mind is not the cessation of ego but access to a capability outside of its operation. — Paine

I am not familiar with Bushido, but that sounds mostly ideal. Honestly, I don't think anyone just doesn't have an ego, although it may appear that way.

Bushido is pretty cool as a philosophy, heard the word before but never actually read about it until now.

Fear resides in the ego. Every psychological fear rests on the image of myself and every feeling of fear is directly connected with the threat to this image.
A fearless person cannot have a shred of fear from public speech, not because he/she is used to it through exposure but because for him/her there is no sense of threat to the ego/self-image.
So this ego-lessness does not make the person brave because there is nothing to be brave about in the first place. — TheMadMan

It seems to me that the state you describe is at best conditional, as everybody has fears - and if they don't, they just don't know about them yet. Someone mentioned a sociopath: sociopaths might oftentimes have less fear due to some irrational confidence, and many are also narcissistic - in which case it is not a lack of ego that gives rise to the fearlessness, but it is actually the inflated ego itself causing the fearlessness. You should take that into account, I think.

If we are talking about a person who has totally just negated their own ego, then that act itself would probably have required effort and bravery. No one would achieve such a thing easily or in some mundane way, I think. So, we are discussing an incredibly rare person if indeed the two words are categorically exclusive when applied to people, as you claim, which is a different claim than that just the two terms are exclusive.

Otherwise, I mostly agree with you. It is, however, strange that you present it like it is a dilemma ("fearless people can never be brave"), when really it seems like more of a tradeoff than anything to me.

So yes, still screw Hamas - if that's what you want to hear.

This seems like a trick question to me. You ask if the pilot and the men from group A are equivalent, not the person in group B who ordered the pilot to do the bombing, which is who I would expect to focus on. The pilot's intent is not to murder, as measures are taken to minimize casualties, whereas the armed men in group A intend to murder. In that regard they are not equivalent. So, unless the pilot mows down a few extra people, I would say she is okay morally.

However, if group B knows that a hundred civilians could die because of the bombing and they just don't care, then their intent to minimize casualties is not enough to absolve them, as they are intentionally killing some civilians. So, in terms of consequences, there is very little difference and the actions of both groups A and B pretty much equate to terrorism. B is just in a better position for arguing for their terror, as the brutality of group A will evoke horror from just about anybody.

Not morally equal at all. One group (B) tries & intends to strike only or mainly military sites. It minimizes civilian deaths & injuries, as best it can.

The other group of thugs murders & slaughters civilians with abandon. — Nicholas

How is that worse than intentionally killing an equal amount of civilians merely because you do not care if they die? Is this armament plant worth those deaths? Maybe it was a bad - perhaps even evil - decision if the intelligence was so wrong that a hundred civilians were killed?

Well, I tried to contribute something. Thanks for the response, Frank.

We start with noting that there is a number so large, you've never dealt with it before, but in our challenge, we'll just pick 57. You've never dealt with anything over that. You and I are sitting with a skeptic. — frank

I think that this challenge is even less straightforward than we think it is and that the quoted portion must be evaluated first.

When one says that they've never dealt with a number over 57, does that mean that we do not know if addition will work when trying to add things to sums greater than 57? Or does it just mean that we haven't bothered to add that high but have the knowledge that addition will definitely continue to work?

This dilemma could allow for one or the other. I think that this challenge is interesting but the meaning of "you've never dealt with anything over that" seems to not indicate any clear constraints.

If it means the former, then the simple answer that mentions at the bottom of the first page does not apply. It does not matter if the rules of addition when handling sums over 57 must be consistent to preserve our knowledge of arithmetic if what appeared to be addition just stops working the way we think it would because really, we have been quadding - and this doesn't even mean the rules have changed as we have potentially been quadding this whole time. Or maybe addition sticks if we have knowledge that addition extends to (potential) sums that are greater than the greatest number we've ever encountered.

But I don't see that anywhere. So long as this uncertainty exists it seems to me we must side with the skeptic: you cannot prove that we can add 57 and 68 to 125, or that we haven't been quadding, because quaddition is one of an infinite number of equally valid rules that might dictate what happens when handling sums over 57 that could be consistent with the behavior observed when adding with sums less than 57.

Sorry Frank if you are over this thread already and have moved on.

It is usually just so-and-so is evil, too extreme, too centrist, too censorious - and no one provides practical solutions, even if those solutions are just favorable tradeoffs.
— ToothyMaw

Yes, I can see this as well. I suppose the difficulty is that if we are to go beyond "duty for duty's sake" then we are effectively required to proffer a moral argument, and this is difficult in the midst of such strong skepticism. — Leontiskos

Yeah. Obviously this forum has a leftist bent, which is understandable, but we need good leaders, not just ethical ones. Not to mention there is no viable alternative to the two parties in power in the US. The divergence in policy from what people want because they must vote democrat or republican can be greater than that which would be the case voting for a third party candidate that they don't agree with totally. And you also have to ask yourself what is really important and necessary, and what can be addressed at a later, more convenient time.

For instance: should we do our best to mitigate the chances of nuclear Armageddon arising from the war in Ukraine? Should we continue pumping billions into what looks a lot like a proxy war and encourage Ukraine to fight to the last man? Should we concern ourselves with the culture war? Is it even useful to rail against wokeness?

Certainly there is room for comedy when it comes to anything, really. I'll just try not to feel like I'm being made fun of by people who lived more than a century ago.

It seems to me that a sense of duty is powerful given the nature of duty, but at the same time a sense of duty is becoming harder and harder to find. Duty is powerful in a practical sense because it concerns precisely what ought to be done, but I find that a lot of people no longer experience a sense of duty, and this is especially true as familial ties continue to weaken. — Leontiskos

Yes, I agree that people don't feel nearly as much of a sense of duty as could be expected or desired, but I don't think that it is all that difficult to instill something resembling it in people. In the OP I said people crave it, and I definitely still believe that - even if they do not know it.

I think contemporary philosophy is generally averse to duty and normative morality, and I wonder if this explains some of the motivation behind your "open letter." — Leontiskos

It occurred to me that I rarely, if ever on this forum, hear about the kind of duty I define in the OP or see people prescribe strong, traditional moral obligations towards leadership in a plain way. It is usually just so-and-so is evil, too extreme, too centrist, too censorious - and no one provides practical solutions, even if those solutions are just favorable tradeoffs. The principled leaders I have in mind are not perfect, but they are our best chance.

I don't really pay attention to what contemporary philosophers have to say unless I have to engage with what they have written directly. So, even though I would like to say my open letter was also intended to excoriate those philosophers who challenge the necessity of normative morality and duty and encourage the discussion of such concepts in good faith among them, it wasn't.

I did know, however, that the OP would be equivalent to throwing the gauntlet down against people like Banno, who seem to be staunchly opposed to any sort of strong, traditional moral convictions, specifically those convictions rooted in something other than the typical self-righteous, leftist dogma people dunk on all the time.

Heh. I suppose I'd say that it's only us chickens that have to step up, and that's the real problem. We're the leaders we have been waiting for -- we're just not as good as we want our leaders to be, so we feel inadequate to the task. — Moliere

No one would follow me, I'm afraid. But people will always step up when they think they need to. I just hope it is enough.

Yeah, I wouldn't mind hearing from some more soldiers either. There seems to be a paucity of them, oddly enough.

These all sound good to me. I'd even be able to point to some examples of people that fit. — Moliere

Me too.

I suppose I'd just point out that we have quite a few leaders. But I don't recognize your list in many of them. And so this is the cause of doubt: it seems that we already have leaders who believe themselves to be all of these good qualities, but we're lamenting that they don't possess them. — Moliere

We have lots of people attempting to lead and influence, it's just not the right people? Is all that's stopping them is that they don't realize what their duty is? — Moliere

When one is actually given a measure of power and is exposed to the kind of game politics is, I think it is easy to become afraid of misusing that power and to play it safe. Furthermore, it is less a problem of vision than many people think, as many people have favorable ideas of what they want for the country, but rather an issue of not being spineless when you finally get to the point at which you could make a difference. People would throw their lot in with the pre-election Obama of 2008 nine times out of ten over a more principled leader merely because he expressed a fantastic vision in addition to magnetic charisma.

Is all that's stopping them is that they don't realize what their duty is? — Moliere

I'm not totally sure what it is, but I gave you my best guess. I'm just trying to appeal to their pre-existing feelings of duty because that seems to the most direct route to getting them to step up.

"We need good outcomes. X is a strong motivator, therefore X should be manipulated for the sake of good outcomes," in fact has nothing to do with the nature of X. X can be anything you like so long as it is a strong motivator. The idea is more truly about the manipulation of strong motivations for the sake of good outcomes, and is only about X in an incidental way. — Leontiskos

It is not quite as incidental as it seems, because I am making an appeal to the duty of certain people to lead because they would do a lot of good in doing so - and appealing to their pre-existing ideas of duty is the best way. That has less to do with how effective duty is as a motivator and more to do with perceived ethical obligations. It is somewhat incidental, as you note, that a sense of duty would be what the leader tries to foster in those they lead, however.

using duty as a means to an end is rather ironic given that duty is supposed to be intrinsically contrary to such use. If a leader believes that someone has a duty to do something, and he tries to convince them of this, then he is being honest. If a leader believes that someone has no duty to do something, but he tries to convince them that they do, then he is being dishonest. He is being dishonest even if he is lying to them for a good end (good outcome). The dishonesty arises because he uses the word or concept 'duty' in a false sense, and he wishes them to falsely believe that they have a duty so that he can achieve his end, which he considers to be good. — Leontiskos

if duty is being recommended independently of what ought to be done (in a rather intrinsic sense), we are on shaky ground. — Leontiskos

Read my reply to :

If you follow a command- even an ethical one, you have to do it for a reason. Well, how do you know if that reason is "good" or not? Generally that more meta-ethical question has to do with issues dealing with universal principles. These universal principles, in turn, have to do with something more though. Simply being universal doesn't confer
— schopenhauer1

the meta-ethical root of ethical action and sensibility is the emotional component of compassion. Compassion applied to ethics, is not violating the content (dignity) of others. Violating this dignity would be things like not respecting autonomy of others, not respecting the suffering of others, etc. So that is how I think deontology is rooted. It can't simply be duty for duty's sake.
— schopenhauer1

Probably the best reply yet.

I agree with you. Duty is at best a vehicle for (likely deontological) moral convictions and an outlet for action, as duty for duty's sake is not sufficient to provide a meta-ethical base. Duty, I would still say, is the keystone of putting together a moral world, however, but must be guided by compassion and respect for the dignity of others. — ToothyMaw

In light of this, I would argue for authenticity and candor on the part of a leader, and, even if people are being cleverly controlled, there must be good reasons for doing so and, if the leader can supply these good reasons for one to throw their lot in with them, there will be no myth-making or noble lies.

The thing that is interesting about duty is how powerful it is, not that it is intrinsically moral as an end. One might argue that it is also a useful adaptation, but that kind of thing is far beyond my understanding.

In fact, sometimes we agree to give words new meanings without negating the other meanings those words have in order to discuss philosophy better.
— ToothyMaw
Of course you do. It's an insidious habit, leading to all sorts of problems - see Wittgenstein. Here, you think that you have explained how important duty is, when all you have done, as I and others have pointed out, is to say that leaders are manipulative.

You think you have done something profound, when you have only done something silly. — Banno

Look, Banno, it is easy to send these little snippets of sarcasm and ill will at people trying to argue their point of view in good will. If you want to engage in cynical drive-bys, be my guest. But if you actually want to engage, even if you believe it is below you, you would stand to benefit too, I think.

I actually don't think I have done a very good job of arguing for what I'm arguing for, and do not believe I have said anything particularly profound. But I'm trying.

That's more than you can say, isn't it?

all you have done, as I and others have pointed out, is to say that leaders are manipulative. — Banno

No, I said the right leaders should use everything available to them to rally people to their cause and instill a sense of duty in them. I might have used the term "manipulate", but that doesn't always mean unscrupulousness - it can just mean controlling something cleverly.

If you follow a command- even an ethical one, you have to do it for a reason. Well, how do you know if that reason is "good" or not? Generally that more meta-ethical question has to do with issues dealing with universal principles. These universal principles, in turn, have to do with something more though. Simply being universal doesn't confer — schopenhauer1

the meta-ethical root of ethical action and sensibility is the emotional component of compassion. Compassion applied to ethics, is not violating the content (dignity) of others. Violating this dignity would be things like not respecting autonomy of others, not respecting the suffering of others, etc. So that is how I think deontology is rooted. It can't simply be duty for duty's sake. — schopenhauer1

Probably the best reply yet.

I agree with you. Duty is at best a vehicle for (likely deontological) moral convictions and an outlet for action, as duty for duty's sake is not sufficient to provide a meta-ethical base. Duty, I would still say, is the keystone of putting together a moral world, however, but must be guided by compassion and respect for the dignity of others.

Perhaps one's notion of duty might be a simplistic mythical ideal that doesn't correspond very well with the way things happen in human societies? — wonderer1

...

Perhaps it says something about how comfortable humans find it, to feel like we have a role in our social primate band?

Perhaps duty is a reification humanity came up with for discussing the strong impulse to take care of the family? — wonderer1

Those are undoubtedly good questions. I'm more concerned about how to go about getting the right people to step up and give the people who want change direction, as I think a dutiful, loyal leader can make the difference.

No, I'm saying that said it was slavery to give a fetus rights in another post. I don't think it's slavery either, and thus tried to call him out on that ridiculous comparison. I'm pro-choice too, I just think we shouldn't go overboard and say dumb stuff like that.

180 said women should have abortion on demand even in the third trimester, and that it is basically slavery to give the fetus any consideration other than that it can be terminated at will. He said it in a post on another thread. Unless I'm misinterpreting what he said. And thanks for the correction, I thought there were legal consequences for giving your child fetal alcohol syndrome for some reason.

for example, it might have been the case that the people who joined the movement were just extremely bored at the time, with nothing better to do, or even that some other incentives for joining were offered, that are undisclosed to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you say that we should take into account boredom when discussing why a nazi became a nazi? Or would you attribute the joining to a mental weakness that is exploitable by charismatic leaders heading up (not so) righteous causes? Maybe we should consider whether or not they joined because their favorite uncle said he would buy them a case of beer if they did?

Well, I think there is two basic problems with the conclusions you draw from the experiment. First, is that you cannot necessarily say that it was a sense of duty which lead those people into that movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe so, but once they joined the movement, they had some idea of the duty they had to the movement and its leader; the expectation was that they would do their part, whatever that might have been, to serve the cause, and they clearly relished it. If that isn't duty, I don't know what is.

even if all those people were moved by a sense of duty, this does not validate your claim that duty is the "single strongest motivator for action", because there is no other motivators offered for comparison. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do I really have to go through all the different motivators humans have? My contention, if you have been paying attention, is that duty can override just about anything - not that it is the most prolific motivator.

Do you think the Spartans could have existed without their incredible elevation of duty above all else? It takes something powerful to get a mother, or wife, to tell her husband or son that they should die if they find defeat, and it takes a lot to get a man to fight until he dies merely for the benefit of the state or the tribe.

Love, you might say, is as powerful. It is certainly more pervasive, but I think it is too capricious. Ambition? No one who is motivated by ambition solely would make significant sacrifices for the less fortunate, or give their life, as it doesn't serve to further their own power or rank. So, what does that leave us? Self-righteousness like Hanover mentioned? There is a risk there, that you become so blind to certain other considerations that you lose yourself and your good intentions over time. Duty is always in context, always able to be revoked and applied elsewhere - and it never loses its edge so long as one avoids becoming cynical.

There is no indication of what percentage of the people exposed to the movement joined the movement, and there is no indication as to what other type of motivators those people were exposed to at the same time for comparison, to show that they chose the experimental movement out of a sense of duty, over something else. So for example, it might have been the case that the people who joined the movement were just extremely bored at the time, with nothing better to do, or even that some other incentives for joining were offered, that are undisclosed to us. (The followers were students, and the conditions were of course set up by the teacher who was carrying out the experiment, so he might have set up conditions of extreme boredom in the classroom, then offered the students 'something to do'.) — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, I think the people joined for myriad reasons, including just feelings of obligation rooted in that the people in the movement expected other people to join, but quickly adapted to the movement and felt intense feelings of duty and a desire to serve once they joined. I mean, they delegated a bunch of different jobs that were carried out with fervor, including assigning the guy who started the experiment bodyguards.

And, once again, the important thing isn't the percentage of people who joined that were exposed to it, it was that anyone at all was able to be converted, let alone hundreds, and that those who joined were so zealous. As for the classroom being boring: any teacher who would do an experiment like this is probably an entertaining teacher.

Ah, OK, so you are not actually talking about duty on your thread of that name, but instead about manipulative leadership, and pretending that we call this "duty".

I'll leave you to it. You have enough problems here already. — Banno

Maybe you don't know this, but when we do philosophy sometimes words are used differently. In fact, sometimes we agree to give words new meanings without negating the other meanings those words have in order to discuss philosophy better. Fascinating, isn't it?

OK, so now it's your turn to demonstrate why you believe that this particular flower, the one you call "duty", is more prolific than all the rest. I don't see how the Third Wave experiment demonstrates this.

The article says "As the movement grew outside his class and began to number in the hundreds, the experiment had spiraled out of control. " There are millions, billions of people in the world, "outside his class", "hundreds" does not represent a majority. This is more like Trumpian logic, 'I have thousands of people at my rallies, therefore the majority supports me'. You might say 'I see hundreds of people motivated by duty, therefore duty is the single strongest motivator'. You have not provided the premises required to produce your conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point of the experiment was that he quickly formed a fascistic super movement. That it was localized at a school means nothing. It didn't have to grow into the millions for the point to be made: it is easy to manipulate people into acting like Nazis, who largely had an incredible sense of duty to their country, even if they were the epitome of evil.

If we can easily recreate the conditions that gave rise to the militaristic, hyper-nationalist Nazis, doesn't that say something about the power of duty to country and leader?

Also: I wasn't saying that the majority of people need to have a sense of duty for duty to be the most potent motivator. The flower comment was not meant to be taken so literally.

I still don't see how that is a lie. They aren't brainwashed; they are convinced that there is a good cause and that they should take it up. I would say manipulation is not always via unsavory means, although it has that connotation.
— ToothyMaw

That's at least pretty close to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_lie ? Or not?

It's not brainwashing. It's myth making. — Moliere

It isn't, because at no point is there a requirement that a falsehood or myth be propagated. To say it plainly: the leader shows through duty to a cause that the cause is worthy and the people pick it up if they agree that this is a good cause led by a suitable leader. The causes one might propose could actually compromise social harmony in the short-term, but, if this leader is at all moral, it is unlikely they would spread a myth to gain power, as that could have all kinds of bad effects.

Maybe "manipulate" was the wrong word.

One should lead by example, demonstrating that a cause is worthy even without such an appeal.
— ToothyMaw

Seems like it would apply to Donald Trump and to Joe Biden, for instance. At least we can see that there are people who follow either leader, and so believe those leaders to be demonstrating their cause to be worthy. But you're blaming the leaders -- so it's not them.

In fact I think it's no one, if I'm reading you correctly.

So how am I to know this duty when I see it? — Moliere

Consistency, authenticity, candor, good intentions, competence, dedication to achieving clear goals that align with your own. The ability to listen. I think it is easy to recognize when someone is showing you the way to what you want, or what you think your nation needs.

the easiest leadership role one can be put in is one where one's followers all operate out of a sense of duty. One whose motivation is that of righteousness isn't someone in need of leadership. He's going to do as he's going to do and he's going to tell you to fuck off if you violate his sense of righteousness.. — Hanover

Righteousness is intertwined with duty; some of the most driven people feel duty to a righteous ideal. If you can get a man to airdrop into a jungle deep behind enemy lines with nothing but some basic navigational instruments and a rifle out of a sense of patriotic duty, you are playing with something powerful.

I don't know how aware of it you are, but you're rattling off many alarmingly convenient oversimplifications. — Judaka

I'm aware I'm simplifying things, but I wouldn't say that they are oversimplifications.

The immoral billionaires and their evil corporations are manipulating and abusing the innocent, who need a bold, righteous leader to rise. A hero who can lead us, the many, to a new, great future". Yeah, that's not what you said, it's my interpretation as a cynic, but how off is it really? — Judaka

The public is quite complicit in supporting the system that creates the conditions you're (probably) referring to. — Judaka

I have said in this thread that the people need to be redeemed because we very much are complicit in the current situation we find ourselves in, that we support the systems that keep us down, and that a leader needs to come along and help us start helping ourselves.

Philosophers often seem to overly rely on interpreting problems through a moral lens. — Judaka

If we didn't view it through a moral lens there would be no impetus for change - or any recognition that such a paucity would even matter. You might claim that it is not beneficial to be so intensely judgmental of corporations and billionaires...but I don't know why you would.

It’s probably just a fantasy, but I enjoy picturing a world where social conditions are not twisted to the extreme like taffy, and citizens are not stuck like flies in the sticky morass. — 0 thru 9

That's a good way of putting it. Maybe some day, right?

I probably have a different sort of ‘patriot’ in mind: Bernie Sanders lol.
Yeah, he lost, he’s too old, he’s not a reeeeal genuwine patriot, etc. (Some may say). — 0 thru 9

Yeah, Bernie is great. I would call him a patriot and would vote for him if he ran again.

Interesting, but I don’t see why a person’s sense of duty needs to be controlled, redeemed, or influenced by some kind of ideal leader. “the right people in the right position to lead”, as you write. — 0 thru 9

Well, are you prepared to be the president of the United States? Do you think I am? Would you trust, for instance, a bigot to do a good job? Or a career criminal? Some people are objectively more prepared than others.

And yes, I think the right leader can help us make things the way they should have been a long time ago; if the people could do it on their own it would have happened by now.

And who are these “right people”? Any examples? Are they ‘true patriots’?
Are you referring to the USA and its upcoming elections, or any country?
Some further description might help. — 0 thru 9

I think that if you are asking those questions you already have some ideas of your own. I'm not going to name anyone, but yes, I would like a genuine patriot to be in office - even if they have some less than excellent ideas.

Or they just another politician? — 0 thru 9

Definitely not. They cannot be another politician.

. If one is genuinely trying to instill a sense of duty for a good, substantial reason, then no.
— ToothyMaw

I think that's pretty much what a noble lie amounts to: it's technically a lie, but it's for a good, substantial reason of drawing the people towards what's good. Since your account asks leaders to instill goodness in others through manipulation it seemed to fit. — Moliere

I still don't see how that is a lie. They aren't brainwashed; they are convinced that there is a good cause and that they should take it up. I would say manipulation is not always via unsavory means, although it has that connotation.

A cynical exploitation would not be a noble lie, but just a lie. — Moliere

It could be a noble lie if one subscribes to the definition of duty as merely what one "ought" to do, exploiting whatever pre-existing sense of duty there is in a person or people, even if it is to good ends. That, I think, is the wrong way to go about it. One should lead by example, demonstrating that a cause is worthy even without such an appeal.

These concepts can be real to one person and not another and it doesn't diminish the importance of duty to those who are attuned to it.
— ToothyMaw

I'm going to try and do a little philosophy with this sentence, if you don't mind.

Something that's confusing to me here is "concepts can be real" -- not the relativism, but just that sentence alone. My guess is you're saying duty is not a noble lie because duty is real, in some sense. So duty is real for some people, and not real for others. Is that correct? — Moliere

Yeah, that was directed at other people. My bad. It doesn't relate to what I was saying to you, and I wasn't going to say something ridiculous such as that duty is such a real concept for some that it exists in a way such that it cannot be a lie. However, go ahead and say what you want about it. I kind of want to know what you were going to say.

So duty is a kind of noble lie, then? — Moliere

Not necessarily. If peoples' existing sense of duty is cynically exploited in the way Banno seems to think it is, then yes. If one is genuinely trying to instill a sense of duty for a good, substantial reason, then no. Also, what said. These concepts can be real to one person and not another and it doesn't diminish the importance of duty to those who are attuned to it.

If the "Third Wave experiment" supports what you say, then maybe you need to describe it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Third Wave

I contend that duty is perhaps the single strongest motivator for action I can think of, whether it is duty to the tribe, an ideal, a spouse, etc., and should be nurtured wherever it exists to good ends.
— ToothyMaw

As others have indicated,↪Banno, ↪T Clark, this is really incorrect. I would characterize the motivator for action as "ambition", or even "spirit", but that's just my personal preference of words. The important point is that the motivator has personal a base, not a relation to something external like "duty". — Metaphysician Undercover

When I claim that duty is the single strongest motivator, I do not mean that it cancels out every other motivator, or even that it generally prevails over other motivators. Furthermore, according to the way I define "duty" it is personal, as it involves both expectations and how one internalizes those expectations. I contend that what makes duty powerful is that duty leads people to put themselves in all kinds of horrible or uncomfortable positions and situations more than anything else. For instance, a man might get inundated with motivational messages about how positive masculinity can be and how he needs to be able to personally protect his family, which he might view largely as pushback against whatever modern feminist arguments might be cited. This could lead to a man adopting any number of life-changing, traditionally masculine activities, like martial arts or lifting. And if you think that getting up early in the morning and getting strangled over and over again in myriad, potentially painful ways doesn't require the suppression of some basic human instincts, then you haven't hit the mats.

I suppose it could also be viewed as a modifier for more basic motivations. For instance, one might love their child and feel they have a duty to do right by that child, but I would also say that those two things - the parent's duty towards the child and the parent's love - are inextricable, as the parent has certain expectations for themselves, such as that they must provide for the child and be emotionally present for them, that are derived from love. These expectations don't have to be external and still give rise to intense feelings of duty.

"Duty" is better described as a director of action rather than a motivator of action. A person with no sense of duty might still be highly motivated to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

That some people are highly motivated without feeling duty says nothing about the power of duty, just as the claim that, say, there are more roses in a garden than any other type of flower is not affected by the claim that there are other types of flowers in a garden. That this "garden" could hypothetically have a different composition I grant, but all of the flowers need not be roses for most of them to be.

What do you think "everyone craves duty" actually means? People crave things, and this may or may not influence their ambition. It "may not" influence their ambition in cases of people who are lazy, or something like that, and so they still do not act on their cravings. But how would you say that "duty" relates to what people crave? Not only do I see no necessary relation here, but I see no relationship at all, due to the subjective nature of individuals and cravings. It's just like as if you are saying 'everyone craves chocolate ice cream'. It's really wrong on multiple levels. — Metaphysician Undercover

But if everyone really did crave chocolate ice cream whether they knew it or not, would it be wrong to say so?

duty is a conceptually odd critter. Your duty is what you ought to do; and what ought you do? Your duty, of course. It doesn't get us anywhere. Indeed, looking at how "duty" is usually used, it's more about what other folk think you ought do than what you think you ought do. "It's your duty" is used to cajole folk into acting against their own better judgement. — Banno

I literally define how I use the term, and you redefine it and complain that I'm trying to advocate for cajoling people into acting against their own better judgement? Nowhere do I say that duty is what one "ought" to do, but rather is a subjective motivator that can be manipulated by good leaders to good ends - which is what I'm actually advocating for here. I do, however, say that some leaders have a more specific obligation - which is the result of the tremendous amount of good they could do if they tried. If they want to ignore that, then so be it; I'm not telling anyone what to do.

I think you guys misunderstand - and this is not a call to militarism or nationalism. I'm saying that the leaders who can make a difference in the fight between two or more bad options, in a situation in which people are sick of choosing the lesser of two evils, those leaders who recognize their duty to the people they can benefit can inspire others to also do their duty - which I believe is to shrug off the mantle of US hegemony, a disregard for the working people, general befuddlement caused by the oligarchs' emphasis on the distraction that is the culture war, and the blocking of efforts to preserve the planet.

I'm calling out the leaders, not the people. And yes, I do maintain that duty is the most powerful motivator, as it can override just about any other consideration if the human is manipulated correctly. Remember the Third Wave experiment? In that instance it was used to harm, but such manipulations can be used for good. Many, if not most, of us have grown complacent, and good leaders with the peoples' best interests at heart need to intervene - before a nasty, fascistic one does.

duty ... exists only as a meta-construction - as recursive and a sum of its parts
— ToothyMaw

I'm sorry, but I won't die for a meta-construction, even a recursive one. — BC

I'm not suggesting anyone sacrifice themselves. I suggest that we organize strikes and consolidate our efforts around some good prospects and vote them in to effect change. No dying required.

A laughable OP. Only, it's no joke. — Banno

I see you stopped by to offer absolutely nothing, as usual.

If duty is such a strong motivator, and one such duty is to do good, why are the current circumstances so in dire need of "rising up"? Has that duty of good-doing been inactive until now? Was it impotent? — Judaka

The people are distracted, disillusioned, and misled in a system that presents false dilemmas and destroys any attempts the common people make to better their lives. We live under the yoke of the corporation and the billionaire, both of which have disproportionate impacts on policy such that getting anything off the ground is a tremendous effort - and just when we think we might win our prospects get shot in the back of the head by corporatist, career politicians. So, I say that duty has been here all along, it has mostly just lain dormant - but it flares up sporadically, giving us insight into what could be if the right man or woman came along.

You aren't the only one here being stupid, but you are the worst offender.

You appear to argue here and elsewhere that abortion should be a right for any woman for any reason, at almost any time, anywhere, regardless of the potential personhood of the fetus they carry. This argument is absurd.

First off, the freedom to kill seems to imply the freedom to harm in this context; after all, you go so far as to say a woman is a slave to the fetus inside her if we give said fetus any of its own rights. If the woman’s bodily autonomy totally overrides the rights of the fetus then why isn’t she allowed to drink alcohol while pregnant? Is it because the fascists seek to control women’s bodies?

No - it is because it is deplorable and would make you a fucking asshole, as does killing a genuine philosophical person for no compelling reason.

Others in this thread have pointed out that we do indeed regulate what goes in and out of peoples’ bodies. What about forcing people to get the vaccine? How many of you were in favor of that? Many of you, iirc. I actually agree that mandating the vaccine would be a good, but according to some of the specific logic applied to abortion no one should ever be forced to get a vaccine - even if it would save lives. How do you guys square that?

I concede I’ll never have to worry about getting an abortion, and women should indisputably be able to get abortions for rape, incest, serious psychological reasons, etc. at any point in a pregnancy, but the bodily autonomy argument is not so great unless one follows it to all of its conclusions. Or one can just continue to tilt at windmills, saving women from fetal slavery one grammatically impenetrable post at a time.