This is the way of facts. My keys are in my pocket. This is a true fact because my keys are in fact in my pocket, and that is the truth. — unenlightened

First off, the statement you quoted was directed at 180.

Parsing whether or not non-moral claims are or are not facts is to change the subject, as I'm not making a statement about the qualities of truth and falsity in general (or how we know facts to be true). I'm also not claiming I have knowledge of any actual moral facts, but rather that the alternatives and the assumptions they make aren't sound, and that is more reasonable to think that they might exist.

If you have some moral facts in your pocket, you can describe them and we might believe you, or we might think you are describing unicorns. — unenlightened

I don't have to produce moral facts for them to exist, and I'm not even claiming they necessarily do exist. But I am claiming now, in light of yours and 180's comments, that there is nothing incoherent about moral realism and error-theory's treatment of moral statements as facts. Incidentally, there is also nothing incoherent about the claim that unicorns exist.

Doubting the existence of moral facts, as well as unicorns, is of course reasonable, but to rule them out (the moral facts) is not, imo.

You haven't made any points. You just assert that moral facts don't exist because they just don't.

And what, exactly, is incoherent about my assumptions? Can you actually explain how, without resorting to "because morals are norms"? My only assumption is that moral claims report facts about reality. I'm not even committing to the idea that any of them have to be correct.

So, I ask again: If morality is only a useful set of norms, what reason does anyone have to obey said norms other than because they are useful - "useful" being something that is entirely subjective?

You are not an emergent god in the OP, you are the god that some humans choose to have faith in, to imo, try to, sate their primal fears. — universeness

Right.

So not an eternal god then, an emergent god that knew less than it did before it became god.
What label do you want to assign to this emerging god. — universeness

I see. I think it is open to interpretation if he is saying it is emergent or you are becoming the actual God many believe exists.

I'm saying that if we had some means of making someone God, it would be wise to go in with some sort of plan formed by science and ethics and such. I don't see that as a paradox.

But your god would surely fail at what I am convinced (with my fallible human brain) would be its first thought. Why am I? — universeness

You would retain the information your brain contained before becoming God, probably. It wouldn't be qualitatively different from the rest of the information you would acquire when acquiring omniscience.

Yes. Famous last words - What could possibly go wrong. Problem is, if you change anything, you have to change everything. — T Clark

But you could just formulate a new reality instantly that has the changes you want with minimal changes elsewhere. The real problem is what to change.

If it was impossible to unbecome God how ought you make yourself not exist without making everything not exist? — Benj96

I would make myself exist as something that could cease to exist and then end it.

Unless perhaps the only way to not know yourself as you truly were is to exist in finitude within yourself. — Benj96

I guess that would suck significantly less.

If you chose to wipe your own memory of self clean then you could exist as an individual questioning the entire universe like anyone else. — Benj96

Good point. But I feel that something could bring it back.

What do you mean by "no longer exist" if existence as God is all you have ever known. Would you ha e to settle for merely pretending you don't exist? — Benj96

I don't like arguing in favor of such a thing, but I think that the only solution would be to end my own existence, as a truly omnipotent God could give themselves back omnipotence.

I thought about it some more, and I would actually make a committee before becoming God and consult with them about what to do with my Godly powers. The committee members would represent the interests of the people, and I would only do what we agree on, and nothing more.

Actually, it would be impossible to unbecome God potentially, so I would just make myself no longer exist so as to maintain whatever world everyone wants after it is over.

No, because I do not know what is the meaning of "good" — javi2541997

Well, I guess you don't care much for ethics.

Oooh. Yes I agree a failsafe is a good thing to have in place. I mean as God I'm sure you could undo anything, reverse time to any point. So you could rest assured that any mistake you make you can simple rewind and restart.
Wipe the slate clean as it were. — Benj96

No, I would set things in place and then unbecome God with a failsafe in place. The less time spent as God, and the more minimalistic the changes the better, as T Clark correctly points out that anyone would likely fuck it up if they tried to fix anything significant. Or maybe anything at all.

You would just fuck things up. Anyone would. I hope there's a reset button. — T Clark

Yes, definitely.

If you wish to continue Im curious to see how it evolves. Are you? — Benj96

This whole thing makes me uncomfortable, but yeah, sure.

Hmm okay I'm following. Perhaps instead of replicating them might I suggest you could merely choose not to know what they're thinking and ask them what they think? As that would be entirely in your power, to bestow them with privacy of mind. — Benj96

Sure, that sounds even better.

In my earlier comment I added that I would make a failsafe that would default the world back to how it was before I became God if the majority of people wanted it to be so. I think that that would make things less scary.

, what would you do with your time as this entity?
— Benj96

Nothing. Why the people should expect something from me for being God? — javi2541997

Damn dude. You don't think you would do anything good if you could?

What would you consider good? What would you consider bad? How would you define your godly morality? In what way would your power and wisdom manifest? What say you of free will and determinism? — Benj96

Okay, I'll take this seriously. I would allow anyone who no longer wants to suffer (perhaps in a specific way) to elect to no longer suffer, whatever that would entail. That is the main thing I would do.

Ah interesting indeed. You would give them the contrast to a super cool afterlife, a paradise of sorts, so they could appreciate it by contrast through the imperfections of living? Seems clever and rational. — Benj96

It was a joke. I wouldn't do that.

And then I would make a cool afterlife for everyone in which they could leave whenever they want.
— ToothyMaw

Where would they leave to? Living again? Or some purgatory of total non-awareness and oblivion. Would some memory wiping be in order here? — Benj96

Whatever each individual person would want. I could easily determine what each would want with omnipotence. I would actually replicate each person and then ask their replicas what they would want, because it would be too creepy to just create new realities for people based on mind-reading.

I would unbecome God as quickly as I could, then, as I have no desire to be (a) God.

edit: furthermore, I would set some failsafe by which everything would default to how it was before I became God if the majority of people agreed they would like it to be so.

Seriously though, I have no idea.

First, I would extend my time as God until I no longer wanted to be God.

Then I would peer inside 180 Proof's head to see if he actually thinks the way he writes.

And then I would make a cool afterlife for everyone in which they could leave whenever they want. But everyone must still live out a shitty life on Earth first, so they can appreciate just how cool the afterlife I made for everyone is.

If I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday, then on Monday there ought be a rose garden. — creativesoul

I think I overcomplicated this. Semantically it could be amended to being a moral claim, but it is too simplistic in its current form as it cuts out the necessary step of justifying the claim that one ought actually plant the rose garden.

Norms are useful or not useful for some purpose ...
— 180 Proof

Commands are not true or false, they are obeyed or disobeyed. Morality is not made of claims of fact but commands, demands, exhortations, pleas, advice to act thus and not so. It is not 'truth apt'. — 180 Proof

What, then, is the claim "one ought not double down on shitty arguments"? It is structured in such a way that it could be true or false, and to say that it is merely a command, and that all moral claims like it are merely commands, is to commit to the claim that it is impossible for any moral claims to be true. As I pointed out to unenlightened, this results in a summary implosion of morality, as there are no grounds for resolving disagreements. Furthermore, if moral commands cannot be true or false, we have no real reason to follow any commands.

Would you like it if someone disregarded the commonly held injunction against harming others that one ought not do it and kneecapped you? I mean, we have no reason to believe that the man who disagrees with such a command is wrong, according to you, or that he ought obey any such commands we might impose on him at all. Is that really what you want to commit to?

If I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday, then on Monday there ought be a rose garden.

Is this correct? Is it a moral claim? Seems to me that the answer is clearly yes to both questions, so some moral claims can be correct. — creativesoul

That usage of "ought" is not the same as the usage of "ought" people incorporate into moral claims. Your usage is vaguely justified because it predicts what is going to happen. The way it is used in morality is to represent a command or instruction, even if the statement into which the "ought" is incorporated can be true or false. You are deriving a "this will probably happen" from a promise. To move from an "is" to an "ought" in terms of moral claims is to derive moral instructions from an "is".

So, that isn't a moral claim, but I agree that moral claims are propositions.

You could say: "if I promise to plant you a rose garden, I ought plant you a rose garden, because people ought follow through on their promises", which would definitely be a moral claim and a proposition.

Would you like to address the points I am making? Or are you going to continue to stick your head in the sand?

How are moral realism and error-theory incoherent in the way they treat moral claims as propositions? Yes, such a claim about the truth-aptness of moral statements is incompatible with your extraneous assumptions, but moral realism and error-theory are internally coherent, nonetheless.

Some ways of life are better than others, and one of the worst for humans is a life that concerns itself entirely with its own benefit - the proof is in the joy and misery of life, not in the pontifications of logicians. — unenlightened

I didn't know logicians were telling people how to live their lives.

Do you know what meta-ethics is?
— ToothyMaw
A mistake. — unenlightened

Meta-ethics is definitely an unlikely mistake, yes.

"Taking candy from a baby is wrong." has the grammar of a proposition, but it does not have the meaning of a proposition. It has the meaning of a command: 'don't do it!' Commands are not true or false, they are obeyed or disobeyed. — unenlightened

How is "taking candy from a baby is wrong" a command? It is implicit in such a statement that one shouldn't do it ("you shouldn't take candy from a baby because it is wrong"), which is a command, but if the proposition isn't true, why ought we obey the command at all (disregarding that we would additionally have to derive an "ought" from an "is", something you would have to do to have a command that ought be obeyed)?

If the command has reason to be obeyed, the proposition "taking candy from a baby is wrong" would have to be true. You purport that it is impossible for the proposition to true. Well, then, we don't have a true proposition and thus no reason to obey the extrinsic moral claim "you shouldn't take candy from a baby because it is wrong". You are committing to (1) from the OP, and that results in an implosion of morality, as there are no longer any grounds for disagreement to be resolved.

"moral realism" is incoherent (re: assumption that moral statements are empirical propositions) — 180 Proof

That assumption does not lead to incoherence. You might argue, however, that we cannot verify if moral statements are true, as we have no effective means of discovering if they are true. This is a problem for moral realists.

But incoherence does not follow. Is the fact that biology is invented by people, is useful, and is used to certain ends, a reason to doubt the truth-aptness of biological facts? Biology is an edifice like morality, even if biological facts exist independent of the mind. Moral realists and error-theorists say that morality functions like that. No incoherence whatsoever.

edit: not saying morality functions exactly like biology, but rather that it has the similarities mentioned and reports facts like biology, even if not naturalistic ones

Once again, familiarize yourself with the relevant literature - something I should have done a while ago. And I don't know why you are here either, Smith.

My position is that if there is insufficient evidence to support a theory other than that there might be a motive by some people to commit a certain act, the theory fails for lack of evidence — Hanover

Shit. I misunderstood you. My bad.

perceived self-serving or malicious motives — Hanover

That seems too nebulous. We have to really know if they are malicious or self-serving according to some criteria. An interpretation of your comment towards Tzeentch could be that you think he is malicious and are intentionally undermining his theory based upon his perceived intentions, but I wouldn't make that judgement because I can't read your mind.

Such is a conspiracy theory in itself. — Hanover

I think what Tzeentch said can be said without it being a conspiracy theory: people are denounced because they are perceived to be conspiracy theorists, even if it isn't only to maliciously undermine them.

But isn't calling out a conspiracy theory of any kind an attempt to undermine? Isn't that the purpose of calling it out? And how does Tzeentch's supposed conspiracy theory actually constitute a conspiracy theory according to your definition? Are Tzeentch's motives actually malicious or self-serving here?

Look up "moral realism" and "error theory".

And what's the truth-maker? — 180 Proof

Okay, you obviously didn't bother to read and understand the OP. "Torture is wrong because it harms", for example, is an extrinsic moral claim that could be true or false based on a moral axiom such as "it is wrong to harm sentient creatures". The extrinsic moral claim is true if the axiom it is tied to is correct. The correctness of the axiom is the "truth-maker" for the moral claim.

I hope that is clear.

I know enough now to know that you don't. — 180 Proof

:100: :up:

That would just shift the power to whoever appoints the advisors. — Tzeentch

Probably, yes. But we do trust the mods of this site by and large, don't we? They have opinions, but when they get out of line they are reprimanded or even banned.

edit: and they are 100% essential, too

Some sort of advisory board like the mods of this website, apparently. Logistically unfeasible unless it is only applied to public figures.

For you to mention the Nazis.

I like what Karl Jaspers said of censorship. He knew a little about it, having lived under a Nazi publication ban. — NOS4A2

Took a little under two hours this time.

The alternative is to put the power to limit free speech in undeserving hands - those of the government. And rights were enshrined into constitutions and human rights declarations exactly because governments could not be trusted with protecting them. — Tzeentch

Hanover says he doesn't think the government should necessarily enforce the ethical standards he proposes.

Do you know what meta-ethics is?

They are norms or rules not propositions, so what do you propose any such "true moral claims" would even be like? :chin: — 180 Proof

"Murder is wrong" would be an example of a moral claim that could be objectively true (a proposition). "You shouldn't murder" would be normative. "Don't murder" would be a rule.

I would say that the discourse that develops with less limits on speech is somewhat stochastic, insofar as trends can be recognized - but you cannot always point directly to the cause of a bad outcome as it relates to the speech of someone specific. So, it makes little sense to go on a banning spree to reduce far-right extremism, but it makes sense to directly address speech found to be problematic, as it operates against that which is problematic from within the discourse, which is desirable.

free speech absolutism (a title Elon Musk has given himself) is not an ideal, but places the considerable power of the press in undeserving hands, whose objective isn't to seek higher truths and dispense with ignorance, but is for their own personal gain and self-promotion. — Hanover

Can we really evaluate intention so easily as to actually say that with any confidence? Musk would have Twitter open to anyone. He might remove the restrictions, but I don't see how that equates to giving power to anyone in particular, even if the worst oftentimes rises to the surface. It is not so predictable who will be heard over the din, and intent is not always apparent.

You advocated for relativism, even if you said that you would argue your ethics are superior, which makes no sense.