Then God is not an Omnibenevolent being. Its a being that simply creates laws for others to live by. If God says, "It is good to torture your babies and eat them," then that's a law. It doesn't mean God is perfectly good. What is good is independent of God, that is why God is omnibenevolent. God follows what is good, despite being all powerful. — Philosophim

God can be omnibenevolent even if he determines arbitrarily what is good by adhering to the laws he creates, or by stipulating that he has his own set of laws to follow, according to your reasoning here; you just add the step of creating objective moral laws and, optionally, a set of rules only for god.

I mean, if god never breaks a moral law he must be omnibenevolent, right? Regardless of who makes the laws?

Reason trumps revelation, for either you have a reason to believe you have experienced a revelation, or you do not. And in the latter case you have no reason to think in the truth of the supposed revelation. And in the former case, Reason is acknowledged to have the greater authority. — Bartricks

How on earth can one have reason to believe that they have received revelation other than some sort of subjective experience? Furthermore, how would reason have greater authority than the revelation received? It is quite literally the word of god, so it cannot be challenged. Maybe reason can aid in its application, however?

What our punishments must be for our guilt is already known by god, so he knows exactly what each of us is going to be exposed to and could arrange the world in such a way as to make the punishments make sense if he wanted. Yet he doesn't do this. He just allows it to be determined by luck, as you say. Which isn't actually luck, because he must have known all of it ahead of time and could change it. If you say he doesn't know what we are are going to do because free will, then he isn't omniscient.

Thus, god punishes unjustly, and therefore is unjust. I don't know how that ties into omnibenevolence, but an unjust god seems undesirable.

If one freely does wrong, one thereby comes to deserve harm. That does not, of course, entail that others are obliged to give one the harm in question. It does, however, mean that it is not unjust for you to receive it. — Bartricks

In line with your god-theory-of-everything and the aseity argument contained therein this makes sense. But some choices are demonstrably unfree. If you want I can supply an example.

What we deserve, it seems to me, is to run the gauntlet. God made us run the gauntlet, and from there on in it's down to luck precisely what happens to us. — Bartricks

I sincerely doubt that anyone who has actually "run the gauntlet" would believe that others deserve to "run the gauntlet", even in the presence of a compelling argument for such a thing.

And if you want confirmation that we are living in a prison, just look around you at others, or look inside yourself. Notice that pretty much everyone you meet has some vice or other. And notice that you do too. — Bartricks

True enough.

I don't know. An evil god might allow innocents to suffer in ignorance, as the premise goes. Whether or not it qualifies as punishment requires motive. And if god breaks his own laws, even not via punishing people, then he could be considered evil. The point of my post is that while Bartricks' argument is sound academically, it requires some very specific revelation to make sense.



You might not have noticed, but Bartricks' argument gels a little too well with the idea of original sin; we are each given a static "guilty" value, equally weighed so that whatever suffering comes our way is well-deserved. He might keep his arguments vague, but they are almost always in service of Christianity.

Makes me wonder if he knows something we don't. Or, then again, maybe not.

And even if you have that specific piece of revelation, what makes it okay for god to mete out the punishments and not humans (or a chimp for that matter)? Guilt is guilt, and your comeuppance could reasonably come from anyone it seems to me - unless god stipulates that it is only he who can punish certain acts in certain ways. And if god doesn't make that stipulation, then, according to his own laws, he might be rendered not so omnibenevolent, and thus not exist. Or be evil. .

Furthermore, I don't see why guilt would necessarily require punishment in the mind of an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent being. You must have received a specific piece of revelation supplied by god to come to the conclusion that guilt => punishment. And if you have that my other post applies - people who are innocent according to god might be being punished or punished more than those who are more guilty.

Great OP.

What about revelation? According to the holy texts supplied by the Christian god, for example, one could indeed be demonstrated to be totally innocent in the presence of a supposedly omnibenevolent god. And if one is innocent why would they potentially suffer more than someone who isn't innocent? This disjunction seems to indicate very little thought on the part of an omniscient, omnipotent person. And surely determining one's guilt against a set of interpretable but still infallible laws is a function of reason?

I don't see any 'wrong' or 'right' about it. The very question of it being right or wrong to have children is meaningless to me. I've tried to understand the AN point of view but there seems to be a disjoint in their thinking as some claim that they 'value life' yet, for all intents and purposes, wish human life to cease (quite literally). — I like sushi

I think they do value life insofar as they value people living on their own terms, something I got at earlier. People cannot always live on these terms - or even anywhere close to them a lot of the time, however.

Neither do they seem to understand that life without suffering is NOT life. Suffering isn't something inherently 'negative' it is just how we tend to view it overall. — I like sushi

It seems to me intense suffering and a strong will to live do not cancel each other out, and neither does the inevitable pain and sought-after happiness one will experience. Thus, the "overall" is not an equation to be balanced, but rather the sum of your often disparate experiences as you understand them, and, as such, if you believe that your perceived suffering is unnecessary, it is desirable to cut it out; no good is lost and the "overall" is still coherent. No one will cease living if they suffer less.

I get what you are saying though. Suffering is inevitable, but if gratuitous amounts of it can be prevented it should be.

Life is absurd. I'm okay with that and if it wasn't absurd I think I would likely have ended my life some time ago. The 'absurdity' makes it interesting. — I like sushi

Indeed.

It's true for me too. I've lived through some horrors. I don't regard that as any kind of justification for someone erasing my life once I hit that point of suffering ... if some understood what it was I felt they might likely think it 'better that I die, than suffer what I was suffering'. No thank you! — I like sushi

Of course.

edit: that was not sarcastic

This had nothing to do with having children though. A non-existent person is non-existent not a 'potential person'. Such word play may convince others and I understand that there are gray areas. I don't see the world as black and white though ... more of a gray mushy, marbled mess of interwoven shades . — I like sushi

All the more reason to believe that it isn't wrong to not take a great risk in bringing someone into the world. Or, if we do, to be careful about it.

If I was to take your point more seriously I can just as easily throw the same kind of thinking right back at AN thoughts. We have the instinct for procreation (evidence being we're part of a species that exists) and we also have a moral sense of responsibility in how we live (not in how we don't live). So the 'responsibility' is no more valid a point than 'procreating'. We have a sense of responsibility tied to our procreative abilities. I cannot see how it can be argued that these are separate to the point that one is on a pedestal but not the other. — I like sushi

Just because those two things exist simultaneously and without conflict much of the time doesn't mean that they do not conflict sometimes and that they are coequal. I am arguing that if reason is to guide our decisions and not instinct, which I think should usually be the case, then we should consider reasons for procreating - even in the absence of knowledge that the person conceived will or will not appreciate having been given life or suffer immensely.

As for responsibility being tied to instinct: I would say that instinct matters insofar as it creates a desire to procreate, but the reasoning behind whether or not someone should procreate is distinct; people rarely, if ever, admit that they are procreating merely out of instinct. They have all kinds of justifications: religious, ethical, practical, etc.

So while neither is on a pedestal, I don't think either one has to be for us to be prudent in giving life.

At its core it boils down to a self-contradiction or just an attitude that says because one, or more, persons suffer that it isn't a fair trade off. Life isn't 'fair' and it is silly to view existence as being 'fair' or 'unfair' - not that I have seen any AN admit this is basically where they are coming from — I like sushi

I agree that it is absurd to say that life is fair or unfair as if there is some part of oneself or one's experiences that is distinct from one's own life - or the self that experiences one's own life - that could somehow be compatible with a different existence; if your life was more fair it would be a different life and you would be different too. But as far as certain lives being genuinely horrible and painful, the idea of unfairness makes some sense - you aren't existing on the terms you would like to, which is true for a great many people, even if they are happy to be alive.

The question doesn't make any sense to me either. May as well ask if it is morally right that the sky appears to be blue. — I like sushi

We are not responsible for the sky being blue. It is just the way it is. But we are responsible for procreating - and we could stop or at least wonder why we do it; we can actually consider reasons for and against. I mean, do men get up on super-duper tall ladders in the wee hours of the morning and paint the sky blue every day? Maybe they would go on strike if we didn't pay them?

not all sentences with '?' at the end warrant a '?'. — I like sushi

Savage.

Yes it does. The most popular argument for example, the "it's an unconsented imposition that can be harmful so it's wrong" that I hear very often has the side effect that giving gifts is wrong unless you ask for permission first. It would also prevent you from, say, sending a kid to school. — khaled

I am not an anti-natalist, but if I were, then I would uphold all of the implications of my beliefs.

No to mention the harmful consequences of giving a crappy gift or sending a kid to school are significantly less than the wide range of horrible illnesses/conditions/disorders than can be inherited or developed throughout one's life; there are degrees of harm; having Huntington's disease is certainly worse than being bullied, for example.

Not to mention, if we were all anti-natalists, there would be no children to send to school.

Is a philosopher, then, like a troll guarding the bridge to parenthood? He pops up saying, "You may not pass until you have answered my riddle!" — Srap Tasmaner

Of course not. You seem to think I'm an idiot. I'm not telling people that they shouldn't reproduce because some random amateur philosopher on a forum says they shouldn't, I'm asking you to actually acknowledge a counter-argument. Which you won't. If we are discussing philosophy we should be dealing in arguments and reasons - not sentiments and semi-fallacies about instinct.

"But the child might immediately fall into a pit of lava!" cries the troll, as people stream past him.

"What lava pit? There's no lava pit around here." someone calls as they pass by. "Why would I give birth in a lava pit?" asks someone else.

"Well," says the troll, "Life is kind of like a pit of lava."

The crowd is unconvinced. "No it isn't." They keep crossing 'his' bridge.

"But it might be!" responds the troll, sensing an opening. "You don't know for sure that it isn't."

"If life were kind of like a lava pit, I would have kind of caught fire and kind of burned to death years ago," says someone, and gives the troll a little shove so he topples back under the bridge.

It's a bit like the argument from error: because someone, sometime, in some specific circumstances, was 'deceived by their senses', everyone, always, and in all circumstances, must accept the possibility that they are, at that moment, in those circumstances, being deceived by their senses. — Srap Tasmaner

This is verging on disgusting - and you are yourself committing a fallacy: just because most people don't suffer enough to not want to live, to have not acted the same as the person who gave them life, does not mean that we shouldn't pay attention to this contingency. Just because people are ignorant of other's suffering doesn't mean that suffering on a level that would make someone not want to exist doesn't matter.

All I would argue is that reasons should always be considered when procreating, and that people do consider reasons for procreating more than you think. Furthermore, I've given it a think, and your claim that people just procreate out of instinct is more than a little condescending.

No one can guarantee anything. I claim it is perfectly reasonable to assume, without argument, that people want to live. And I claim that if you reflect upon humanity, then you do also have a reason in support of the premise. And if you think about it a little more, the fact that everyone seems to assume this about everyone else is only more reason to count on it. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't assume this of everyone, and I myself do not possess this intuition that everyone, including myself, ought to want to live - regardless of how many do and make this assumption. Maybe I'm defective; but I know that if one suffers enough, one will end their life or wish that they had never existed. Most people are just lucky that they don't suffer enough.

I'm not directly addressing the arguments for AN here. There's always two or three places to do that, if you'd like. I do think it's reasonable to discuss why I don't think I have to address them. — Srap Tasmaner

You made an argument in favor of an ethical theory, and didn't acknowledge my counter-argument. Why don't you have to address it? Did you even read my whole post?

You genuinely seem to be ignorant of all of the good anti-natalist arguments.

For instance, no great harm is at stake if one does not procreate; no one will be brought into the world that will potentially not want to live or suffer immensely. But if we procreate, we run the risk of bringing someone into the world who might wish that they had never existed but is unwilling to kill themselves because suicide is an unpleasant solution.

Thus, even if you might bring into the world someone who would have acted the same way doesn't mean you aren't at great risk of causing a lot of suffering or producing a person who regrets being born and that wouldn't have acted the same way. There is no negative outcome if you don't procreate, but many possible negative outcomes if you do.

Unless you consider not procreating immoral. Then you have the happy cows argument to contend with.

Ah, no, not really. I'm saying people behaving in this way do not experience themselves as needing a reason to do so, do not experience the need for decision at all. — Srap Tasmaner

That isn't an argument for anything. You are just explaining people's lack of thought given to whether or not they should procreate/save lives.

On the one hand, I'm claiming that there is a way to construe our behavior as reasonable -- this is the claim that the person affected by our actions would want us to behave that way, because they have the same instinct we do. — Srap Tasmaner

But that doesn't make saving someone/procreating right; they might suffer intensely but still want to live, for instance. I think you underestimate this portion of the populace. And a person who procreates or saves a life cannot guarantee that the person given life will share their value system - what if they are a Schopenhauer? What if they don't have that instinct for self-preservation you seem to predicate to everyone? And what if there is no way of knowing if they will have that instinct, as is probably the case?

On the other hand, why? Why should it need justification? I claim that this is an assumption of the moral theorist, despite the evidence that most people do not believe these actions require justification. — Srap Tasmaner

Then we aren't discussing ethics, because reason is central to any ethical theory - or it sucks.

Sorry for the edits.

I never said so. I was implying that all the ways of reaching the antinatalist conclusion come with ridiculous side effects, and the best way to argue against it is to highlight said ridiculous side effects. — khaled

I sincerely doubt anyone starts with the premise that "everything is wrong". And you cited it as a premise leading to the anti-natalist conclusion, not a side effect of it. So what I said remains valid: typical anti-natalist reasoning doesn't have ridiculous side effects like "charity is wrong".

“Everything is wrong” also consistently leads to the antinatalist conclusion but also leads to charity being wrong which the antinatalist will disagree with, thus forcing them to re-examine their starting premises. — khaled

Just because there are multiple ways to reach a conclusion, and one of the ways is ridiculous, that doesn't reflect upon reasonable ways of reaching that same conclusion or the conclusion itself; you don't reach the conclusion that everything is wrong via typical anti-natalist reasoning.

Right. I'm not defending the instinct for self-preservation. But I am arguing that we can rely on all members of our species having the same instinct. — Srap Tasmaner

If you were making a direct argument in favor of natalism you would need to defend this instinct, but you are skirting the issue here, instead making more of an argument that natalism is natural - not right - then claiming that if it is natural it requires no reason. Thus, you say, giving life needs no reason. This is not a good argument.

I also claim that we already do this, in rendering aid to people in peril without analyzing whether they want it or not, and in most people who decide to have children not considering it a moral issue at all unless there are specific circumstances that raise the issue --- hereditary disease, a parent's personality disorder, extreme poverty. Such circumstances make it an issue; reproducing itself needs no justification. — Srap Tasmaner

But according to an anti-natalist it does need a justification other than the one mentioned above; if I make the argument that procreation is always wrong because people suffer in ways that are asymmetric with sources of happiness, cannot consent to existing, etc. then you need to give me a reason for procreating to counter that. That people like being alive largely does not contend with the harms of bringing a person into the world according to an anti-natalist.

You could look at this thread as an "argument" for starting from different premises. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that sounds about right.

I think our behavior can be described in terms of reasons or in terms of causes. If someone else talks about my reasons for acting as I did, they're at most reporting what I said; but they can refer to things I may not even be aware of, and that will sound more like a causal explanation than a rational one. (Is that obvious, or do we need examples?) — Srap Tasmaner

That makes sense.

To connect that with the talk of "instinct" I've been throwing around: I don't think we experience our instincts as reasons for behaving the way we do; I think we experience them as needing no reason at all for what we do. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, acting in instinct is pretty much always an action devoid of a rationale. But is the default - natalism - right? Even if it is true that it is instinctual to give life, and people are largely happy to be alive, that doesn't mean we shouldn't act without reason in this context imo. It seems to me that your argument is not so much an argument but an explanation; if you are arguing that we should act in a certain way then you need reasons - either abstract or personal. I don't see how instinct can make right.

I can come along, as an amateur philosopher, and I can look at the behavior people engage in without thinking, as the saying goes, and I can offer an explanation -- and in this case it's the bit about self-preservation and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

You correctly acknowledge here that you are explaining something more than making an argument. The only part of your argument that actually seems to be an argument is the reason that most people who are given life would have acted the same way as the person who saved them.

One oddity of my claim is that I've presented it as if our knowledge of self-preservation is itself a reason. That might be true, but it's a little weird. — Srap Tasmaner

Is this a reference to this?

Given the instinct for self preservation that all living organisms appear to share, and which can only be overcome by extreme experiences (resulting in suicide or self sacrifice), your actions are exactly the actions the person whose life you preserve would take if they could — Srap Tasmaner

You actually do cite a reason for giving life in absence of of a good reason not to: that the person you are giving life to would have acted the same in your shoes - which makes sense to me. Your OP was well-written, don't doubt it, we forum members are just being a little obtuse - or at least I was.

I don't think that's what I said. My claim, in a nutshell, is that we do not, as a matter of course, need a reason to save a life or create one. Under some circumstances, there may be an obvious and powerful reason not to, and then you can begin to weigh this against that, collect your pros and cons, etc. — Srap Tasmaner

So reasons for giving life only need be considered once there is a reason not to give life? That sounds specious; should we not always act for reasons? But I get what you are saying now - you represented it much more clearly.

Either I hit a nerve or you aren't trying very hard. My point, once again, is that in the context of whether or not someone should be given life, the most important factor is whether or not they will value their life. In my example the violinist didn't value their life, but there were reasons for the person to continue being the violin virtuoso they were, even if they were pretty crappy reasons. If you are correct in your OP and reasons for not giving life are basically the only reasons that matter, then that the violinist doesn't want to live - something that could have been predicted - is imperative. So it seems to me whatever reasons might be used to justify giving life are definitely eclipsed by good reasons not to give life. Thus, your argument is more an argument for greater prudence in giving life, and not in support of natalism much at all.

This is not even in the ballpark of what I've been posting. Maybe that's why I haven't been able to understand your responses. — Srap Tasmaner

Here I thought I said something worth saying!

An example to demonstrate why I believe your argument isn't what you think it is: maybe you want to bring into the world the next greatest violin virtuoso, but you know that they will have a rare disease that will cause them significant chronic pain - but not so much that they cannot become a virtuoso. You conceive the child and they become the virtuoso you so desired - but they don't want to live because of their pain; they wish that they hadn't been born. Does your pleasure actually give their life value? Perhaps it gives it some external value; but they don't value their own life, and I would argue that that is what matters if you are correct in your OP; you basically admit that reasons for should not do not compare to reasons for should.

if it is so likely that people will appreciate existing, and natalism is the default, then the most important factor is whether or not there is some sort of condition that will prevent them from appreciating existing after being given life.
— ToothyMaw

I really thought I had said almost exactly that. (But then the OP also mentioned instinct and people are still pointing out to me that it's instinct.) — Srap Tasmaner

My point was that there is no reason for should that is comparable to reasons for should not and that should not is the main consideration - perhaps the only consideration - that really matters when it comes to the act of bringing someone into the world and whether or not said person will predicate value to their own life. Which is not so much a sort-of argument for natalism but rather an argument for more prudent selection for giving life.

It seems to me should not is both more pertinent than should and exists independently of should.
— ToothyMaw

I'm not following this. Can you take another swing at it? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saying that life is only potentially given value after it is given, thus reasons we should not bring life into the world are more pertinent than reasons to do it; if it is so likely that people will appreciate existing, and natalism is the default, then the most important factor is whether or not there is some sort of condition that will prevent them from appreciating existing after being given life. Thus, once again, reasons for - such as the instinctual drive to procreate - are categorically distinct from more important reasons against - a child being brought into the world that will experience only pain and die shortly. And while I am no anti-natalist, I think that it is selfish to bring a child into the world merely for the purposes of furthering your genes if you cannot properly care for them.

So does this: you come to me with a toothache and I shoot you in the head. — Srap Tasmaner

Did I say that minimizing suffering is so important we should shoot people in the head for having toothaches? Did I even say anything about why we should minimize suffering at all? I see being promoted to mod status gave you mind-reading skills.

I think it reduces suffering. How does it save life?

Did I say we should throw more people of color in prison? Or did I say we should address violence in the black community in the most effective way possible?

I am taking a longer view of the consequences than you are. — Ennui Elucidator

Perhaps. I'll have to do more research; you are likely correct about how to best decrease crime.

Very little rises to the level where it's at all likely that the receiver of the gift of life will disapprove of your actions and not be fiercely attached to the life you have given them. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that this happens more often than you might think. Not to mention one can only appreciate their life after having been given life; that someone will appreciate being alive after having been given life is different from there being an external, abstract motivation to give life before it is given (which doesn't exist). Thus, giving life is only given value after you you have made the decision; there is no should or should not at all until it is done - barring having knowledge that those you bring into existence will suffer and die and not appreciate having been given life. It seems to me should not is both more pertinent than should and exists independently of should.

Thus, black-on-black crime eclipses police brutality when discussing consequences.
— ToothyMaw

A claim you keep making but have yet to demonstrate. — Ennui Elucidator

Is 2,574 greater than 241?

My point, obviously, is that successful people of color are doing it almost entirely on their own without being given any of the advantages a young white woman or man might, and oftentimes totally devoid of governmental initiatives or aid. While we can't all be valedictorians, we can all at least finish high-school given we put our minds to it (usually). If we invested in the communities of people of color like we should, there would be more Ahmed's.

I'm not saying you are being obtuse again, but you are being a little obtuse. Of course I know he isn't a black separatist, or that he need be one; it is relevant however that he said he was successful because of other people of color, and not woke white people and the gobbledygook they often spew.

Question it all you want. I neither started nor am responsible any of the various anti-racist conversations/groups presently in existence. Tell them they are wrong and that there is no disparate impact that is presently measurable and meaningfully associated with race — Ennui Elucidator

Did I say there was no systemic racism, or did I say that we are less racist than ever? You are being obtuse.

A claim you keep making but have yet to demonstrate. When you look to the sociologists, they seem to be suggesting that creating a more just society where there is social buy-in would do even more to reduce black-on-black crime than trying to focus on typical crime reduction techniques — Ennui Elucidator

When did I say that there shouldn't be a greater social buy-in? I have said very little about actual strategies for solving black-on-black crime; I would just approach it from whatever angle is most effective.

And you are not refuting my claim by listing strategies for reducing crime. I am merely claiming that there should be movements coequal to BLM to end black-on-black violence via whatever means are most effective - be they symptomatic or systemic.

pretending like individuals are responsible for themselves based on merit alone doesn't even approach a level of serious conversation. — Ennui Elucidator

Never said they were. But we have to recognize that merit matters a lot, even if it is not the sole-determinant of success.

Do you know what farce is? Where do you think he would be if not for the 14th amendment, Brown v. Board, and the Civil Rights Act? Which levers of state power were pulled by non-whites to make them happen? — Ennui Elucidator

I'm starting to question your good faith. Obviously those changes were necessary, but the US is, as many people acknowledge, less racist than it has ever been; that was a totally different time, and issues of race were far clearer.

All I tried to address is that when you are writing to a non-specific audience (especially when the people/groups that are the presumable target of your message is exceedingly unlikely to read what you are writing), your arguments are fairly meaningless and presumptuous. — Ennui Elucidator

This is a philosophy forum, and I'm not a columnist; obviously no one is probably reading this stuff. Does that mean I can't talk about it on said forum? No. Neither does it make my arguments meaningless. I think the word you are looking for is "ineffective".

Further, I tried to highlight the way in which your methods are a performative contradiction of sorts - you say that "talking about x is not always a deflection" and want to focus on X, but you don't really stop to consider what x is alleged to be a deflection from. — Ennui Elucidator

I have said it isn't a racist deflection, yes, because if we are talking about how black lives are undervalued, then the incredible amount of black-on-black crime is relevant. When discussing consequences, such as the loss of black lives - something that is indeed being addressed somewhat by BLM and anti-racist activism - the source is not relevant unless it is being considered for remediation. Thus, black-on-black crime eclipses police brutality when discussing consequences.

I wonder how you might analyze those comments in light of your "racist" detection skills. — Ennui Elucidator

What are you even talking about here? My "racist" detection skills?

Anyways - what do you think of Ahmed Muhhamad, the first black male valedictorian of his school in Oakland? Do you think he achieved this because of anti-racist policies or through hard work? My bet is that he would've achieved highly regardless of whether or not he were the beneficiary of any social programs or initiatives.

The guy's a fucking hero in my book. Would you tell him to his face that black boys and men need white people's help to achieve highly? To extricate themselves from the violence plaguing their communities? He predicates his success not to anti-racist fanatics, but the community that raised him.