People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.
— ToothyMaw

:sparkle: Happy New Year! — Mapping the Medium

Yes, Happy New Year to you too. You doing anything special? I'm not.

edit: you don't have to answer that, lol. That kind of puts you on the spot. My bad.

we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind. — ToothyMaw

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s). — ToothyMaw

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be. — Mapping the Medium

I think that this line of reasoning indicates the existence of the continuum is necessary if sweetness and properties like it exist so open-endedly in mental representation - even if those mental representations arise partially from physical observation or experience. People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated.

I like where you're going with this. Are you now envisioning a fractal-like nature of sweetness that maintains that thread in the continuum? — Mapping the Medium

I'll have to think about what you mean by that, unless you can expound a little?

even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

It also helps to think about the commonly understood definition of 'a property'. Is a property a static characteristic? — Mapping the Medium

I might be overreaching here, but this is what I think:

What you are getting at here is that we have abstract qualities like "sweetness" and "hardness" that gain meaning through relations determined by the process of hypostatic abstraction, and, thus, affixing the relevant quality to a subject requires human judgments. As such, certain relations humans might make seem to be rooted in mental phenomenon as any continuum or relation referenced by the process of hypostatic abstraction originates mentally. If that is the case, then the existence of sweetness, for example, only really exists as a cohesive whole in one's mind.

If that is the case, then some properties are not static, while others are. I'm thinking that the properties related through hypostatic abstraction are not static unless the subject possesses the quality of "y-ness" referenced in the original predicate intrinsically. So, while sweetness could take as many arguments as propositions indicating something is sweet exist, whether or not something possesses sweetness statically relies upon the qualities of the relevant subject(s).

Okay, this is how I see it:

If there are many propositions that could express that certain things are sweet, and sweetness is constructed from the properties of things being more or less sweet, then to turn the predicate "honey is sweet" into "honey has sweetness" seems valid, as it indicates a relation between one thing (honey) and a tangible property that corresponds to the original predicate being turned into a relation (that is to say the relation between things being more or less sweet and those things having the property of being sweet).

Therefore, it isn't really a category error, as this new "predicate of predicates" is derived from a physical reality: things are more or less sweet, and, thus, those things that qualify as being sweet are themselves more or less sweet depending upon a judgment. That is to say they possess sweetness - even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness.

So, my theory is that the "has" in "honey has sweetness" just represents a judgment that honey exists according to some measure of being sweet such that it possesses the more general property of sweetness by virtue of things being more or less sweet.

I think that it might be useful to look at the examples @Mapping the Medium has provided.

In terms of the honey example, this is my understanding: you can say honey is sweet, and that may be regarded as true depending on the perception that honey is indeed sweet, as you are stating a simple predicate. When you perform the hypostatic abstraction, however, you take that predicate and turn it into a relation between honey and the object "sweetness" (honey has sweetness). The logical functioning of introducing "sweetness" consists solely in the truth values of those propositions that possess the property of being sweet. This last part indicates that there is a collection of propositions that might indicate certain things are sweet, including the one we started with, and they must possess sweetness if sweetness is itself a measure that exists on a continuum that entails the property of "sweet".

If you guys think there is something wrong in there just say so; I'm sure there is.

I'm reading about him on Wikipedia and the SEP and it appears he just transposed firstness, secondness, and thirdness (terms he used when he was feeling appropriately abstract) onto a bunch of categories because he liked threes.

I think one could easily come up with some sort of relation that might justify more names. I mean, I read what he said about it, and he said that he just "thinks not" that we could endlessly perform hypostatic abstractions to derive more "intentions". So, I suppose that is the closest we might get to insight: he doesn't think it is useful to repeat the process past twice. For whatever reason.

I suppose in a concrete example of the type we talked about in this thread it would be useless to go past one or two applications of hypostatic abstraction, though. So I guess the examples might fit into the triad.

But I could be wrong on all of this, so take it with a grain of salt.

The first video, "Ecocide", was a little like being punched in the face. I definitely agree with the lyrics - I think they even capture an arguably appropriate attitude - and after reading about the band on Wikipedia I think I probably do agree with them in general, even the straight edge parts. I personally don't drink or do drugs (except caffeine) and think veganism is the way to go even if I have failed at it lately. I guess that means I'm not exactly living up to the wise words of Buechner at the moment. So, for me at least, T's all the way down. Cool that they like Peter Singer.

what Claude the A.I. tells you seems fishy to me.
— Arcane Sandwich

If you really think that I am trying to promote AI in my work, you are sorely mistaken, and there is no reason to discuss this further. — Mapping the Medium

No one is skeptical of you or your intentions, I think he just doesn't think much of AI.

If you carefully and thoroughly review my work, you will see how right you are and that nominalism is the problem. — Mapping the Medium

I don't know if I've said anything that goes against nominalism, honestly. I would just separate the abstract notion of hardness from something actually being "hard" in some cases, for example. I don't really think hardness as an idea is an independent entity, as it exists as a result of our perceptions and mental models of the world. No to mention, we couldn't have hardness if there was not a variety of things of various "hardnesses" as it might be measured, so these abstract continuums and such seem to arise naturally to me. Or maybe I'm being naive. I don't know.

Not that AI is useless. Maybe I'll read what you linked.

I got ChatGPT to tell me I solved the double-slit experiment once. Needless to say, it turned out to almost certainly be bullshit.

Taking your idea as a sketch, let me see if I can add some color to it. I would say:

(a) This honey tastes sweet to a human being.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness in itself, if by "in itself" we mean an object-subject relation.
(c) Any object-subject relation can be reduced (abstracted away) to a something-something relation.
(d) And in a something-something relation, there are two individual variables, "x" and "y", such that something binds them, and that something is a relation.

However, that relation itself, can be treated either as a unary predicate, or as an individual variable "z", but then you would need a fourt element to play the role of the ternary, binding predicate.

Does that make any sense? I'm not sure that it does. — Arcane Sandwich

Yes, I think that makes sense. The object-subject relation between the honey and perceived sweetness is provided by relations that should be able to be abstracted until we can isolate it as two variables bound by some relation in the form of a unary predicate or something. At that point I suppose we could say that we have achieved...something.

This is the most rigorous representation I could come up with quickly of the current status of the example with the honey.  

The following argument can be made when someone tastes honey:

[[tastes]] = {(sweet: -> T), (like honey -> T)}

We also have another argument that seems necessary that says that:

[[tastes sweet]] = {possesses sweetness -> T}

This second argument is backed up by the fact that we know sweetness as a measure is entailed by the things that make something sweet and that “sweet” as a judgment occupies a region on some sort of sweetness continuum.

Therefore, the person in question could make the logically sound utterance after tasting the honey:

(a) This honey tastes sweet.
(b) Therefore, this honey possesses sweetness.

This is, clearly, only valid from the viewpoint of the person making the value-judgment associated with the honey tasting sweet. That is to say that in this example we see that the hypostatic abstraction is only valid with a subjective judgment made by a human and even then it is still limited by that person’s experiences, as someone else might not believe that honey qualifies as sweet (hypothetically; of course everyone finds honey to be sweet).

Thus, objectively, we cannot say that honey possesses sweetness in a general sense, as we are measuring it according to an inherently subjective measure.

But it's somehow "unsatisfactory", innit. I mean, if that humble first-order formula is all that I can possible contribute to this conversation, then that makes me quite sad. I take that as a personal flaw about my own persona, though. — Arcane Sandwich

You definitely helped me think about it more rigorously. And as far as I can tell there is plenty of room for more conjecture, so don't be glum! :up:

edit: you introduced rigor to the conversation. I shouldn't have just framed that in terms of myself. Sorry.

I would have to buy them. Maybe this coming month when I get my check.

edit: didn't read the free account part

Does that make any sense? — Arcane Sandwich

Not on its face, no. But I'll think about it.

edit: yes, that makes sense

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.
— Mapping the Medium

Here's how I might go about this from a formal point of view (again, I might be wrong about this, so, grain of salt and all of that sort of cautionary talk).

"Transforms a predicate into a relation". Using "honey", "sweet", and "sweetness" as the three basic terms, I would symbolize "honey" as an individual constant, "i", next I would symbolize "sweet" as a unary first-order predicate, "S", and finally I would (controversially) treat "sweetness" as an individual constant, not a predicate. Here is how that would work. There's two steps to it. The first step is this:

1) S(h). This means "honey, as an individual thing, has the property of being sweet."
2) S(hs). This means "honey, as an individual thing, and sweetness, as an individual thing, are related by the relation of "being sweet".

The problem here, however, is that you cannot say (1) and (2) at the same time. You cannot define "S" as a unary predicate and then attempt to use it as a two-place predicate. Either you use two different predicates, or you go about this in a completely different way. — Arcane Sandwich

Your logic looks correct to me. S(hs) just reflects that honey is not intrinsically sweet. We know it isn't because the relation of being sweet in S(hs) is based in that we know that there are observable qualities that make honey sweet, and we also know what makes something sweet in general. Since we cannot prescind the sweetness of honey from the existence of fructose/glucose, we conclude that to measure the fructose/glucose in a sample of honey is to measure its sweetness. Thus, sweetness is not a static property, but rather one that can more or less be measured, and, thus, to claim that honey possesses the property of being sweet is an abstract value judgment based on a measure of sweetness.

What they have in common is where we need to focus our investigation into the rewards and pitfalls of hypostatic abstraction. — Mapping the Medium

That's a little vague.

I suppose you are referring to that we cannot rightly perform a hypostatic abstraction if the thing in question does not possess that trait intrinsically without some amount of subjective or linguistic value-assignment. Thus, I do think @alleybear is/was on to something.

edit: sorry for presuming you to be male.

edit 2: fixed the language I used.

I think he was just referring to the emission of light, which is directly related to the energy it emits. To take issue with the wording because it would require organisms to perceive that energy for it to technically qualify as "light" seems a little pedantic. But maybe he'll indicate what he meant.

The sun is bright. ... The sun has brightness.

Is brightness a static, intrinsic property of the sun? — Mapping the Medium

Yes, I would say it is intrinsic. There is either light or no light, and so long as a light exists it has a brightness. Therefore, the sun must have brightness so long as it exists. This is to say that anything that exudes light must exist on the continuum of brightness and must therefore have brightness. This is only negated when the sun ceases to exist, at which point it no longer needs to have the quality of having brightness for it to have possessed brightness intrinsically; that the quality of this brightness depends upon the sun's existence, and would persist for its whole lifespan, means it is intrinsic to the sun.

But is 'hardness' a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? — Mapping the Medium

No, because hardness is a trait associated with a continuum implied by our language and abstraction of the term. So, what is defined as hard can change, even if diamonds are probably hard by most measures.

Is hardness a static, intrinsic property of a diamond? ... Does a diamond possess hardness? — Mapping the Medium

I would start by seeing if the language indicates that the quality of hardness can exist on a continuum and if such a thing can be measured. In the case of hardness, it does look like it can exist on a continuum, and if we can determine that diamonds exist at some point on this continuum (presumably all diamonds are of equal hardness) such that they measure up as being hard, we can then say that they possess the quality of hardness. How we measure hardness I'm not sure, but I do think this makes diamonds intrinsically, or at least statically, hard.

I see sweetness and beauty, when used to describe something, as value judgements. Value judgements are analog; measures of fructose or glucose are specific and digital. Sometimes there is relevant correspondence between analog notation points and digital ones, and sometimes there isn't. — alleybear

So, do you think there is sufficient correspondence between fructose/glucose and perceived sweetness (value judgment)? It sounds like you must if you think sweetness is not a static property of honey. Or so it seems to me from the angle you're taking.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". In this example, it might be thought of that 'sweetness' is now a 'property' of honey.

My question to you is this .... In this example, is 'sweetness' truly a static property of honey? It is true that we can measure the amount of fructose and glucose in a specific sample of honey, but can we discern the differences in quality of sweetness to the taster? Consider the same with the word 'beauty'. — Mapping the Medium

I think that since we just predicated the quality of sweetness to honey, we have to ask what the degree of separation the quality of sweetness has from objective, scientific markers of what makes something more or less sweet - if they exist. It does indeed seem that the sweetness of a sample of honey cannot be prescinded from the amount of fructose or glucose that exists in that sample of honey (science has shown us that those things directly cause a perception of sweetness), or what would be causing that perception of sweetness? A hallucination? Therefore, the synechistic layer resides in that the sweetness of honey must exist on a continuum that relates smoothly to a scientific measure. As such, I would say that sweetness is not a static property of honey because we can measure the changes in intensity.

Okay, maybe; but why would any for-profit corporation or military organization ever build an "ethical android" that would be useless as either a slave or a killer? — 180 Proof

Think about this: if you were to have an android in your house that would help take care of your family or something, or even if we just had androids walking around doing things at all, people would undoubtedly want these androids to be able to behave morally because they would inevitably be in positions to act morally. And, if that is what the consumers would want, I think corporations would provide it.

So, while there is a difference between an android capable of behaving morally and an android that has substantial moral beliefs like a human might, corporations will have incentives to create some sort of android that can behave ethically. In the OP I'm just discussing androids that are internally morally comparable to humans.

Furthermore, an ethical android is no more useless as a slave or a killer than a well-programmed human, so already we see that people tend towards thinking about these androids inconsistently.

edit: also: when I say "beliefs", I really do mean beliefs comparable to what humans have, not just habits.

I find that poem very compelling and think things may ultimately play out that way. I think Brautigan said more about it in a short poem than I could in a book.

edit: to be clear this is the first time I've seen this poem.

edit 2: I get it. The further along the path we get to the end situation in which we are "watched over by machines of loving grace" the stronger the urge or necessity of getting there. What a brilliant poem. I suppose giving androids the same status as humans with or without a means of self-reflection would advance us towards that end.

A classic. If only it were so simple. And where is the Zeroth Law? Or was that never technically added to the fictional handbook?

Even humans sometimes do not live up to their own moral standards. Because morality sometimes is such a grey area between right and wrong it is hard to program this type of ambiguity into a machine with the expectation that it makes 100% correct moral choices when faced with scenarios where right and wrong are to be distinguished because even as humans we struggle with it. — kindred

Yes, I noted that that is the ideal case, but that it is far more realistic that any ethical android would inevitably get "stuck" on some moral problem in a way that a human might not, and that this reality necessitates some means of self-reflection. I then point out that truly moral self-reflection probably requires the human traits of empathy and compassion.

The biggest issue with creating self aware androids is their capacity to carry out morality in human terms and expectations, because we differ from the outset in terms of our makeup our priorities would differ. — kindred

Their priorities, both moral and otherwise, would be what we program into them, largely. Or so I would think. As such, they may develop new priorities, but the development of the new and relevant moral priorities requires characteristics associated with humans and a capacity to self-reflect. So, I'm not saying that they wouldn't think differently or have properties humans wouldn't, but they could easily be morally recognizable if we program them accordingly - even if they lack some human characteristics.

If empathy could somehow be programmed into androids, then they’d be more capable of making better ethical/moral choices, but that is not the question. — kindred

I agree that that isn't the question. The question in the OP is essentially whether or not we should try to create ethical androids in the absence of an appropriately meaningful mode of self-reflection for them.

The question is whether it is possible to do so i.e. grant androids the same level of empathic self-reflection as humans, and if we could do that I so no issue with doing so as an android capable of moral decision making is obviously desirable. — kindred

Ok, yes, I agree that if we had a means of making empathetic, compassionate androids that they could very well be desirable, but we don't have that right now. Furthermore, we need to avoid validating the double standard in the OP, and that might require some thoughtfulness in how we go about the whole thing.

That is because they did not stop with self-reflection. Self-reflection by itself is not action, and does not cause action. In his book, How People Change, psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis sums up the sequence of as follows:

Suffering > insight > will > action > change — Questioner

First off, I think that it is true that self-reflection can be an action in itself, which I argue for below. But we know, even based on this linear chain you provided, that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. If I am right, and this chain is right, about this and that self-reflection is an action, we can safely say that there could be an emotional ought, as the composition of causes that qualify as actions changes.

Furthermore, that chain seems relevant to me only if by "suffering" he means being exposed to suffering of others. As such:

I think we are conflating literature on psychology with an examination of how people ought to act in a moral sense. Wheelis probably understands the way people actually change far better than me, but we are talking about a hypothetical that could, as far as I can tell, fit within what little of Wheelis' examination of psychology has been presented here. So, I can only agree that Wheelis is likely right, but it doesn't come close to ending the discussion.

I think that the relevant kind of insight isn't just magically generated in one's head when exposed to suffering, and I think Wheelis would agree. Think about it: does everyone who is exposed to the same suffering generate meaningful moral insight? No, and that kind of implies another step, a necessary personal quality, or even an action in there. Or, as I would argue, the act of an empathetic person reacting mentally with compassion to generate some sort of moral insight into themselves or the human condition, for example.

A person's moral reality is a psychological reality, sure, but it doesn't have to strictly abide by this model of how we change in a general sense; it doesn't have to be recursive, and, once again, I think could probably fit within this model of how people change if we truly wanted to force it.

edit: I see that Wheelis is dead. That sucks.

It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do
— ToothyMaw

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

How many things that guide your behavior do you think actually have intrinsic worth outside of, or regardless of, human views and judgments? Is it not true that attaching value to the emotions that guide us morally based on some examination gives those emotions worth, even if it isn't intrinsic?

You are conflating the belief in an imaginary, supernatural being with the sum total of all cause-and-effect manifestations in existence. — Questioner

I found the science educator. :razz:

Sorry, leaving you alone now.

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves. — Questioner

That is demonstrably false. Look at any effective activist that has ever existed.

If our emotional burnout results from watching the suffering of others, over which we have no power, then to disengage is the self-preserving role. — Questioner

I never said anything about self-preserving. I agree: to disengage at a certain point is indeed the safe thing to do, for sure.

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.
— ToothyMaw

But you are not calling for morality, you are calling for action. — Questioner

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue.

edit: I see you are newer to the forum. Sorry if I'm being a little combative. It is my default on the forum from so many years of arguing with other combative people.

I can't think there is any "ought" to emotions. They just are. They don't follow a design, but are instinctual reactions to what we experience around us. — Questioner

Yes, but these instinctual reactions reinforce or modify our rational moral views by encouraging self-reflection. That is the impasse we find ourselves at, essentially. We make ourselves more effective or grounded by intentionally stimulating our emotions, or you are like the android I mentioned earlier in the thread:

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. — ToothyMaw

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions?
— substantivalism

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do. — T Clark

I'm going to have to disagree with you here, T. It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do and attach value appropriately, which is what I think @substantivalism is saying we ought to do. Shouldn't we make ourselves aware of the ways in which our very engineering would push us to at least desire to act if we were made aware, or more aware of, injustices in the world? That kind of thing could change a life, or many lives, for the better. Wouldn't the kind of emotional stimulus that encourages such a thing be superior to crying over Hallmark movies?

since moral outrage carries negative personal health implications, the prudent course of action is to make note of the moral outrage but resist the natural (archaic) impulse to react viscerally to the moral transgression, rather make note of it intellectually and bring that knowledge to bear in the infrequent circumstances where one can somehow influence the situation in question. — LuckyR

I think you are almost entirely right in this more traditional normative assessment. Regardless, I agree with the OP that it is still true that some amount of moral outrage, even experienced disconnected from events one can influence, be it because of temporal or other factors, can prompt self-reflection that might make one more moral or morally driven. This is kind of a gray area because you are right: it carries serious negative health implications. But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time. I think that this is as close as the OP's argument can get to being grounded intuitively and rationally. That is, unless, or until, @substantivalism offers more insight.

It seem a bit vague what it means for them to 'entail' actions as I would presume that some part of the totality of our experiences under guards most actions either out of explicit acknowledgement or implicit thought free reactionary instincts. Even if those are sometimes so far removed temporally from when they finally make themselves actionably present. — substantivalism

That moral outrage or similar mental events exist in the presence of, and often cause, notable moral actions is not to say that all instances of moral outrage will ever result in action. Similarly, that the totality of our experiences informs our actions does not mean that every facet of our moral composition really has that much to do with our actions. For example: I am outraged by the genocide of the Palestinians. I also react in disgust and contempt towards the racist people I am pretty much forced to know. Pushing back on those racists does nothing for the Palestinians. In fact, I may never be able to do much of anything for the Palestinians. Is this outrage really all that morally important if I can't make a difference at all?

It seems a little deterministic to say that our moral sensibilities will always give way to action such that all, or a good many, of our personal moral convictions will be manifest.

Perhaps, a knowledge premise could be inserted here asserting current ignorance about any immediate application of a proposed method of self-reflection and still asking if in lieu of that unknown potential future applicability whether it would be worth it to indulge in it now. — substantivalism

Okay, it sounds like you are asking if we ought to choose a disconnected moral quandary and self-reflect about how we feel about it now based on the fact that it might be possible that the self-reflection could be productive in the future. Is that accurate?

If so, why wouldn't we just allow these things to arise naturally? Why subject yourself to that kind of thing if you don't even know a good reason for doing it (yet)?

I suppose one could make the case that doing this would lean towards guiding one's actions ethically in general, but that sounds like quite a burden to be forcing oneself to be reflecting that seriously on tons of things that one might not even be able to affect at the moment (or ever).

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible. — T Clark

You are right, it looks like psychopaths at least have different brains and the only effective treatment is positive reinforcement with intrinsically rewarding activities or sources like video games, candy, etc. So it seems that that part of the OP's argument, as I understand it, kind of fails.

Yes, you are right, and even further, God could actually totally cease to exist and just make himself exist again if we ascribe to him powers beyond what is logically possible. He could also take away his own omnipotence and kill himself and still exist; a God like the kind you describe can do all kinds of neat things. Like square a circle or generally make two logically contradictory things true at the same time, although that last one could go unnoticed by humans quite easily.

But what if he sequesters his omniscience with his omnipotence? He would presumably be able to regain his omniscience with his undiminished omnipotence, but how would he know to do so, especially if he gave himself artificial memories or something? What if he had gone even further and created a device that would reset his own mental state or jam his powers whenever there is a chance that he might discover the truth or act in a way requiring omnipotence? If he could locate or find knowledge of this device, which would presumably have been created before he lost his omniscience, he might be able to escape this self-inflicted fate, but that might include wandering the universe almost forever.

Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

I think I agree.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is.

The argument that moral outrage decoupled from action - which could take the form of self-reflection - can be moral only really floats for me if one grants that such a thing is not wrong. So, it seems that that part of the OP's argument kind of rests on this hint:

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation. — substantivalism

That is, if I'm interpreting everything correctly.

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner? — substantivalism

Yes. And I also agree with:

it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex. — substantivalism

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. It is no surprise that many “relatable” villains in the media are extremely dispassionate agents that possess the moral god-complex you mention - it is an easily recognizable distortion of human psychology.

So yes, I agree, the emotions associated with certain judgments, actions, and knowledge and how they relate to our moral polarities, are essential aspects of an effective moral agent. To try to separate the emotions and feelings from our moral judgements and the necessary self-reflection is no different to me than trying to supplant humans with ethically effective androids - an undesirable and impossible task.

Is mere exposure enough? — substantivalism

Perhaps not.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable. — substantivalism

The consequentialist in me says it doesn't matter very much how one feels, but rather one's actions and judgements are most important. But I think that in the absence of being able to do something about a morally bad situation, inducing negative emotions over it could maybe be seen as moral - and also more than a little unhealthy. If one really needs it to keep oneself oriented the right way, I can still only advise it if one is sure one can handle it.