A classic. If only it were so simple. And where is the Zeroth Law? Or was that never technically added to the fictional handbook?

Even humans sometimes do not live up to their own moral standards. Because morality sometimes is such a grey area between right and wrong it is hard to program this type of ambiguity into a machine with the expectation that it makes 100% correct moral choices when faced with scenarios where right and wrong are to be distinguished because even as humans we struggle with it. — kindred

Yes, I noted that that is the ideal case, but that it is far more realistic that any ethical android would inevitably get "stuck" on some moral problem in a way that a human might not, and that this reality necessitates some means of self-reflection. I then point out that truly moral self-reflection probably requires the human traits of empathy and compassion.

The biggest issue with creating self aware androids is their capacity to carry out morality in human terms and expectations, because we differ from the outset in terms of our makeup our priorities would differ. — kindred

Their priorities, both moral and otherwise, would be what we program into them, largely. Or so I would think. As such, they may develop new priorities, but the development of the new and relevant moral priorities requires characteristics associated with humans and a capacity to self-reflect. So, I'm not saying that they wouldn't think differently or have properties humans wouldn't, but they could easily be morally recognizable if we program them accordingly - even if they lack some human characteristics.

If empathy could somehow be programmed into androids, then they’d be more capable of making better ethical/moral choices, but that is not the question. — kindred

I agree that that isn't the question. The question in the OP is essentially whether or not we should try to create ethical androids in the absence of an appropriately meaningful mode of self-reflection for them.

The question is whether it is possible to do so i.e. grant androids the same level of empathic self-reflection as humans, and if we could do that I so no issue with doing so as an android capable of moral decision making is obviously desirable. — kindred

Ok, yes, I agree that if we had a means of making empathetic, compassionate androids that they could very well be desirable, but we don't have that right now. Furthermore, we need to avoid validating the double standard in the OP, and that might require some thoughtfulness in how we go about the whole thing.

That is because they did not stop with self-reflection. Self-reflection by itself is not action, and does not cause action. In his book, How People Change, psychoanalyst Allen Wheelis sums up the sequence of as follows:

Suffering > insight > will > action > change — Questioner

First off, I think that it is true that self-reflection can be an action in itself, which I argue for below. But we know, even based on this linear chain you provided, that self-reflection can result in changes that result in a will that result in an action that could cause some change. If I am right, and this chain is right, about this and that self-reflection is an action, we can safely say that there could be an emotional ought, as the composition of causes that qualify as actions changes.

Furthermore, that chain seems relevant to me only if by "suffering" he means being exposed to suffering of others. As such:

I think we are conflating literature on psychology with an examination of how people ought to act in a moral sense. Wheelis probably understands the way people actually change far better than me, but we are talking about a hypothetical that could, as far as I can tell, fit within what little of Wheelis' examination of psychology has been presented here. So, I can only agree that Wheelis is likely right, but it doesn't come close to ending the discussion.

I think that the relevant kind of insight isn't just magically generated in one's head when exposed to suffering, and I think Wheelis would agree. Think about it: does everyone who is exposed to the same suffering generate meaningful moral insight? No, and that kind of implies another step, a necessary personal quality, or even an action in there. Or, as I would argue, the act of an empathetic person reacting mentally with compassion to generate some sort of moral insight into themselves or the human condition, for example.

A person's moral reality is a psychological reality, sure, but it doesn't have to strictly abide by this model of how we change in a general sense; it doesn't have to be recursive, and, once again, I think could probably fit within this model of how people change if we truly wanted to force it.

edit: I see that Wheelis is dead. That sucks.

It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do
— ToothyMaw

Emotions themselves are, as I wrote, our natural bodily and mental reactions to events and are, mostly, outside of our direct control. On the other hand, viewing and examining those emotions, which you propose, are human actions and judgments. — T Clark

How many things that guide your behavior do you think actually have intrinsic worth outside of, or regardless of, human views and judgments? Is it not true that attaching value to the emotions that guide us morally based on some examination gives those emotions worth, even if it isn't intrinsic?

You are conflating the belief in an imaginary, supernatural being with the sum total of all cause-and-effect manifestations in existence. — Questioner

I found the science educator. :razz:

Sorry, leaving you alone now.

Self-reflection can only lead to changes in ourselves. — Questioner

That is demonstrably false. Look at any effective activist that has ever existed.

If our emotional burnout results from watching the suffering of others, over which we have no power, then to disengage is the self-preserving role. — Questioner

I never said anything about self-preserving. I agree: to disengage at a certain point is indeed the safe thing to do, for sure.

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.
— ToothyMaw

But you are not calling for morality, you are calling for action. — Questioner

When I say "emotional ought" I refer to the act of stimulating one's emotions in a healthy way to encourage self-reflection, which itself should entail some concrete actions. Nonetheless, self-reflection is an action anyways, so it is a non-issue.

edit: I see you are newer to the forum. Sorry if I'm being a little combative. It is my default on the forum from so many years of arguing with other combative people.

I can't think there is any "ought" to emotions. They just are. They don't follow a design, but are instinctual reactions to what we experience around us. — Questioner

Yes, but these instinctual reactions reinforce or modify our rational moral views by encouraging self-reflection. That is the impasse we find ourselves at, essentially. We make ourselves more effective or grounded by intentionally stimulating our emotions, or you are like the android I mentioned earlier in the thread:

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. — ToothyMaw

So, if exposing yourself to emotionally stimulating things - especially as they relate to empathy and compassion - makes you more morally effective, an argument for an emotional ought could be made. That is, if one thinks morality is a fundamentally human endeavor.

So what worth are emotional reactions then in the absence of objective actions?
— substantivalism

In the world as I understand it, moral judgments are created by humans, so it makes sense to talk about their value. Emotions, on the other hand, are our body's, primarily biological, reactions to events. It does not really make sense to talk about their value. It's just what we do. — T Clark

I'm going to have to disagree with you here, T. It is precisely because we cannot extricate ourselves from our emotions that we need to view them as having some sort of worth or at least examine them in terms of what they do or do not impel us to do and attach value appropriately, which is what I think @substantivalism is saying we ought to do. Shouldn't we make ourselves aware of the ways in which our very engineering would push us to at least desire to act if we were made aware, or more aware of, injustices in the world? That kind of thing could change a life, or many lives, for the better. Wouldn't the kind of emotional stimulus that encourages such a thing be superior to crying over Hallmark movies?

since moral outrage carries negative personal health implications, the prudent course of action is to make note of the moral outrage but resist the natural (archaic) impulse to react viscerally to the moral transgression, rather make note of it intellectually and bring that knowledge to bear in the infrequent circumstances where one can somehow influence the situation in question. — LuckyR

I think you are almost entirely right in this more traditional normative assessment. Regardless, I agree with the OP that it is still true that some amount of moral outrage, even experienced disconnected from events one can influence, be it because of temporal or other factors, can prompt self-reflection that might make one more moral or morally driven. This is kind of a gray area because you are right: it carries serious negative health implications. But it might make one a better moral agent to experience the emotions very strongly at least some of the time. I think that this is as close as the OP's argument can get to being grounded intuitively and rationally. That is, unless, or until, @substantivalism offers more insight.

It seem a bit vague what it means for them to 'entail' actions as I would presume that some part of the totality of our experiences under guards most actions either out of explicit acknowledgement or implicit thought free reactionary instincts. Even if those are sometimes so far removed temporally from when they finally make themselves actionably present. — substantivalism

That moral outrage or similar mental events exist in the presence of, and often cause, notable moral actions is not to say that all instances of moral outrage will ever result in action. Similarly, that the totality of our experiences informs our actions does not mean that every facet of our moral composition really has that much to do with our actions. For example: I am outraged by the genocide of the Palestinians. I also react in disgust and contempt towards the racist people I am pretty much forced to know. Pushing back on those racists does nothing for the Palestinians. In fact, I may never be able to do much of anything for the Palestinians. Is this outrage really all that morally important if I can't make a difference at all?

It seems a little deterministic to say that our moral sensibilities will always give way to action such that all, or a good many, of our personal moral convictions will be manifest.

Perhaps, a knowledge premise could be inserted here asserting current ignorance about any immediate application of a proposed method of self-reflection and still asking if in lieu of that unknown potential future applicability whether it would be worth it to indulge in it now. — substantivalism

Okay, it sounds like you are asking if we ought to choose a disconnected moral quandary and self-reflect about how we feel about it now based on the fact that it might be possible that the self-reflection could be productive in the future. Is that accurate?

If so, why wouldn't we just allow these things to arise naturally? Why subject yourself to that kind of thing if you don't even know a good reason for doing it (yet)?

I suppose one could make the case that doing this would lean towards guiding one's actions ethically in general, but that sounds like quite a burden to be forcing oneself to be reflecting that seriously on tons of things that one might not even be able to affect at the moment (or ever).

Not wrong but I’m not sure it’s possible. — T Clark

You are right, it looks like psychopaths at least have different brains and the only effective treatment is positive reinforcement with intrinsically rewarding activities or sources like video games, candy, etc. So it seems that that part of the OP's argument, as I understand it, kind of fails.

Yes, you are right, and even further, God could actually totally cease to exist and just make himself exist again if we ascribe to him powers beyond what is logically possible. He could also take away his own omnipotence and kill himself and still exist; a God like the kind you describe can do all kinds of neat things. Like square a circle or generally make two logically contradictory things true at the same time, although that last one could go unnoticed by humans quite easily.

But what if he sequesters his omniscience with his omnipotence? He would presumably be able to regain his omniscience with his undiminished omnipotence, but how would he know to do so, especially if he gave himself artificial memories or something? What if he had gone even further and created a device that would reset his own mental state or jam his powers whenever there is a chance that he might discover the truth or act in a way requiring omnipotence? If he could locate or find knowledge of this device, which would presumably have been created before he lost his omniscience, he might be able to escape this self-inflicted fate, but that might include wandering the universe almost forever.

Moral outrage is an easy way to act as if you've done something without actually having to do anything. — T Clark

I think I agree.

But what about someone who is naturally close to being incapable of sympathy, compassion, kindness, etc.? Would it be wrong for them to induce in themselves the kinds of emotions - negative and positive - associated with the activation of these traits to try and foster them? If that would even work, that is.

The argument that moral outrage decoupled from action - which could take the form of self-reflection - can be moral only really floats for me if one grants that such a thing is not wrong. So, it seems that that part of the OP's argument kind of rests on this hint:

I'm not one to advocate for the more extreme approaches many poor souls have taken but there is a morbid discussion to have about internally rearing themselves into the empathetic/sympathetic person they desire to be. Sometimes coupled with emotional patterns of their own creation. — substantivalism

That is, if I'm interpreting everything correctly.

But it is worth noting that the OP is also saying that moral outrage or associated mental events are meaningful insofar as they provide a motive to self-reflect. But I don't think those self-reflections matter too much if they don't themselves entail actions, and I'm pretty certain the OP would agree with that too.

Would you also agree that it forms a reflective measure of moral judgement of oneself in a holistic manner? — substantivalism

Yes. And I also agree with:

it's not just the case that we view moral injustices as rationally incongruent with how we believe we should act but that its also not uncommon to accompany this with a reflective emotional opinion. One of personal disgust or self-hatred while in cases of correct moral action one could possess happiness in having been coincident with oneself in action as well as belief as they fulfill the principles they hold dear.

So not only does 'jaded-ness' dilute moral judgements/sensibilities as you put it but it also removes critical self-parental reflection on whether one is as moral as they believe they are. To dull this mirror is to open oneself up to inconsistency and possess an ignorant moral god-complex. — substantivalism

I find myself imagining an android programmed to adhere to a set of morals completely and totally without exception. It should carry out its limited programming as well as it can once implemented. The conclusion from our discussion is that we don’t really want this unless the android is capable of rigorous self-reflection. This self-reflection might even be able to be programmed, but can empathy or compassion (the strongest markers of morality) really be extracted from the human condition? Guilt? Self-loathing in the more extreme conditions? If not, this self-reflection is a pale imitation of the real thing. It is no surprise that many “relatable” villains in the media are extremely dispassionate agents that possess the moral god-complex you mention - it is an easily recognizable distortion of human psychology.

So yes, I agree, the emotions associated with certain judgments, actions, and knowledge and how they relate to our moral polarities, are essential aspects of an effective moral agent. To try to separate the emotions and feelings from our moral judgements and the necessary self-reflection is no different to me than trying to supplant humans with ethically effective androids - an undesirable and impossible task.

Is mere exposure enough? — substantivalism

Perhaps not.

Ten cent words, apathetic shrugs, actions which show no clear result, or adherence to transcendent moral principles might not be enough to say to oneself that 'I'm moral'. Sacrificing momentary physical comfort or showing an internal sense of self-shame may seem to some to fulfill this. Its a clear, objective, action that one can take that showcases something beyond mere adherence to moral principles in cases where the fulfillment of such moral desires would seem to be unreachable. — substantivalism

The consequentialist in me says it doesn't matter very much how one feels, but rather one's actions and judgements are most important. But I think that in the absence of being able to do something about a morally bad situation, inducing negative emotions over it could maybe be seen as moral - and also more than a little unhealthy. If one really needs it to keep oneself oriented the right way, I can still only advise it if one is sure one can handle it.

Clearly take your chances with the human because there's a chance it's a good one. It's like a lottery with the human. Where as, with the bear, it's a challenge for short term food, or there is a chance it attacks you. — Barkon

Really? The bear might attack you?

I find myself considering that there is a chance that the man in the hypothetical might also be of a Barkonian persuasion and state the obvious so earnestly that one's head might explode. That needs to be accounted for, I think.

The question I then have is, if one expresses moral disapproval but with a heavily diluted emotional reaction/connection to a perceived injustice are they in fact diluting their moral sensibilities/judgement as well? — substantivalism

I kind of see the emotional part of it as providing an impetus to act and giving us a bearing kind of like a compass; we know there are many ways of acting, and that some are more correct than others, but without a sense of emotional growth or stimulation we are largely rudderless because it is the emotions that give the narratives that guide us salience in a human sense. So yes, I do think this process of becoming jaded often dilutes moral judgments/sensibilities.

Further, just as some go against their internal desires/intentions to fulfill new moral principles should one forcefully make oneself feel a certain way because they see it as more permissible a reaction? Should this be seen as a moral action in its own way? — substantivalism

I would say that sometimes it is a good thing to expose oneself to the realities of others to remind oneself just how awful or good things can be, but I don't think that an entity needs their emotions to be in flux all of the time to be truly moral. Not that you are saying that last part, but I have to qualify what I'm saying. Whether or not there is an emotional, moral ought compelling us to do such a thing is questionable, but I think an argument could be made.

A hungry bear will just eat her alive. Nothing to worry about. — BC

I'm not saying that bear is the rational choice, but it is easy to see why a woman might choose bear.

I doubt that posting this tired hypothetical on the forum will net you any unique or original thoughts on the matter, but you have the right to post it.

I think a more entertaining question is: would a bear rather be stranded with Joe Rogan in full gear or batman with a stone knife and five minutes to prepare?

Seriously though, iirc most, or at least many, women responded in favor of bear when this hypothetical was making the rounds. Kind of obvious why.

What's so wrong about Florida Bill? — ssu

What about it being bad for limiting speech? For instance: is the idea that some problems cannot be solved with boilerplate language about colorblindness so dangerous and meritless that it ought to be illegal? And if that is not the case, is it not possible then, that, sometimes, white people might, out of discomfort, deny that such sentiments are more common among people with their skin color and might serve to limit exposure to uncomfortable truths? Couldn't this paradigm intentionally serve to obscure and hamper attempts to get to the bottom of problems of equality, merit, etc.?

You might say that the workplace isn't the place for something this academic, but I think that relatively intelligent, open-minded adults can deal with a little bit of nuance in their thinking about social issues. Furthermore, that is the place it is precisely needed.

I believe reducing complex geopolitical issues to simplistic 'us vs. them' dichotomies can be misleading and ignores the nuances of international relations. It's essential to consider the multifaceted nature of global conflicts and the various stakeholders involved, don't you think? — Alonsoaceves

There was nothing us vs. them about my post. It was a simplification, yes, but I think that that is basically the reason for celebrating or venerating acts of violence. It helps keep the train of western exceptionalism going until it hits something it can't just destroy outright. If anything, my post indicates that I don't think it is a matter of us vs. them. We have common humanity with the people in the middle east, but our actions don't indicate that we think of any of them as being anything more than an obstacle to dominance.

Also: your use of the word 'stakeholder' is strange. It implies that the many disparate groups of people involved in the middle east have a common interest in seeing some project succeed. The US specifically appears to have no interest in seeing people in the middle east be successful at nation building, except when it aligns with our own goals. Thus, we support and prop up dictators and fund and stage coups that harm people. So, I don't think that we always have to consider everyone's intentions and desires if we want to determine the best path forward for the people most impacted by our policies.

The right thing to do is pretty obvious a lot of the time, even if there are many details involved in a comprehensive analysis.

First off - nice OP, Alonso. Clear and concise.

the continued reminder of violent dates and events only makes it more likely that violent events will occur in the future. — Alonsoaceves

I think you may be right, but I would add that the celebration of specific violent dates and events is more a consequence of a general celebration of directed violence than anything else. Disputing whether or not the specific dates are worth celebrating could only do so much to prevent future violence imo; the only people who might be influenced to be violent by their reverence for some historical event probably already have ideological leanings that are more relevant. Although I suppose the two go hand in hand, really.

As a historical fact, it deserves attention. Now, as a reason for insertion into our daily dynamics – of active incorporation into our lives – we must ask ourselves: What do we gain by celebrating violence? What message do we keep in our minds and in those of our descendants? — Alonsoaceves

From a western point of view: we keep the message that oftentimes violence needs doing, and that we have, and have always had, the men and technology to resolve conflicts decisively. By extension I think that the practical purpose of it is to keep popular support for sending a bunch of Tim Kennedys across the world to enforce the will of the hegemony by killing Arab men who pose almost no threat to us.

Are you alright, dude? That read like a liquor-fueled rant.

Within these evolutionary trends, we can find the essence of the ethical principles and moral norms that humanity seeks to identify. Therefore, understanding the evolution of our planet can help us establish and explain the foundations for more harmonious and sustainable coexistence. — Seeker25

I don't see how certain evolutionary trends - even if they promote peaceful coexistence - are necessarily anything other than the consequences of nature. Is the peaceful coexistence to be found in evolutionary trends the desired end? Is that what we ought to seek? Because you appear to have no justification for that ought.

The evolution of the Earth, over 4.6 billion years, has given rise to the laws and principles that regulate both the natural environment and our existence. — Seeker25

I just don't see how this fact justifies the belief that looking to these trends for our morality is valid or would be effective. We live in a modern world that very much bucks the circumstances that may have formed human nature.

As for your practical examples:

You can correlate the evolved traits you assign to humans with those you find desirable, or ethical, all day, but I don't think it validates your thesis. Neither does assuming something like censorship is remarkable evolutionarily. I do of course agree that humans and animals need places to live, and that censorship is generally bad. But these examples don't do a very good job of supporting your thesis.

Well, that was beautifully written.

Every man takes the limits of his perspective for the boundaries of the world, and so the black truly is still a slave in mind and in heart. Systemic racism, injustice, wrongdoings, these are very real, but so is the inertia that never transforms to kinetic force. Every man is a victim of his will and a product of his circumstance, he flirts with the fences of his garden but never jumps. It all takes place as dawn follows dusk. But nature does not stop where we stop, she begins where we end, such that I carry the whole universe particle por particle within (the strict confines of) my entire essence.

Why is one's "I" so weighted? And why is resistance such a heavy repellant? I lament that many will be born and succeed phenomenons without truly and honestly having have passed through this one, that some will cease to be without ever having been. That death is an aspiration, and lethargy a refuge. That resistance is hard walls and circumstances predestinations. That faith is only for the saint, courage only for the bold, peace only for the meek, and victory for the callous. — Abdul

I especially like this. People in bad circumstances, and that perceive those circumstances to be the limits of what is possible for them, continue to suffer largely as a result of their own inertia. The remedy is to convince ourselves that we can each aspire to be overcome and succeed on our own self-perceived merits even if we are subject to some amount of determinism; furthermore, we are actually empowered by that very same cause and effect given we have the freedom to make our choices.

Or at least that's what I took away from it.

Great OP. :up:

It seems I am a little late to the party, and people have already recommended books and articles and such. I do have something original to offer, however - my own process of learning and approaching philosophy while possessing a working internet connection and a relatively thick skin. A heuristic of sorts.

Hello, I'm a person who's interested to start studying philosophy but I don't really know where to start. I discovered Philososphy through the YouTube channel called "Unsolicited Advice".... I think that's the name. — AlienVareient

That guy is great. His video on The Fall triggered an existential crisis in me that still hasn't, and may never, resolve. Yet I feel (somewhat?) content to exist somewhat uncertain of my values for now. That sort of process as a miniature schematic in which one becomes uncertain of one's self or one's convictions and then reaffirms certain fundaments through argument is often typical of my interactions with people and their ideas on this forum. Or, at least, that is what it is like when it is exciting. As for posting OPs: have an original idea, do a lot of reading and writing, keep thinking and writing until you have something of worth, and then post it. This recursion does not change too much across the study of different subtopics in philosophy I find.

As for reading articles and such on the internet, I suggest embodying the sponge when focusing on any given topic at first and just sucking up knowledge from reliable sources. Apply your bristly side once you have a grasp of the subtopic of philosophy you are interested in by creating an OP, but you really want to make sure you are prepared to defend it, as people on this forum love to argue and bicker, and sometimes are downright acrimonious. Especially when you insult their short fiction.

That's it, really. Just don't get angry when people try to "score" cheap points or be intimidated when they drop names or historical events they likely learned about through dialogue with a chat bot.

Any thoughts on this tangled mess? — I like sushi

This is my best attempt at a substantive response.

If all causation is indirect then surely to refer to anything as 'causal' is nothing more than saying something 'is'. — I like sushi

This seems partly correct. If a consequence - or the likelihood of a consequence - is related to an intermediary factor manipulated via another variable, that doesn't necessarily include knowledge of how the intermediary factor results in the consequences. But I think that sometimes one could have some knowledge of how the indirect relationship works while maintaining the necessary boundaries i.e. the intermediary factor still exists distinctly and independently of the consequences of the indirect relationship; I don't think the relationship would just collapse into directness due to some knowledge of its workings.

it is impossible to confirm direct causation ergo why do we assume direct causation at all other than as means of anchor the constant change we experience as beings. — I like sushi

I do think indirect causation plays a factor in the change humans experience. For instance: an athlete might lift weights and get stronger, and getting stronger might make them better at their sport. However, direct causation is probably what most people look for when trying to anchor their beliefs and experiences - and rightly so. It is more in agreement with the sense of change you mention. None of that says much of anything about whether or not direct causation can be proven, however.

Even the use of logical tools fall apart when this is taken into consideration other than. Implications and Conditionals are meaningless under the regime of indirect causation. — I like sushi

So, if we act like everything is indirect, we have the conclusion that often times we cannot express useful logical statements regarding why when x affects y it increases or decreases the chances of z. I think this is true given that assumption, but like I said earlier, these processes don't need to be totally opaque; furthermore, you have no evidence that relationships that appear to be irreducibly direct are not in fact direct. It seems to me that if some relationship can be directly, logically expressed such that it agrees with reality, there is no reason to try to insert some sort of intermediary factor.

If we cannot prove direct causation outside of the confines of abstract bounds, then how can we ... how can I say 'then'? How can a 'question' form about something yet to happen? — I like sushi

Once again, that indirect causation exists does not mean we cannot say definitively that a relationship is direct. There are mathematical models that model reality sufficiently accurately that they can be said to demonstrate the directness of the causes, or forces, that they purport to model; we know, for instance, the commonly used equation that governs projectile motion is accurate given some assumptions - such as gravity having a fixed value near the surface of the earth - and that these assumptions don't amount to some sort of intermediary factors, but rather behave more like settings. So, we can model the world in a very real, physical way that can give rise to questions like: if I throw this apple at a certain speed, and at a certain angle, where will it land? You could even determine such a thing relatively easily given the right tools.

Indirect causation means that it 'could be because' but the 'because' is known as a direct causal term not an indirect causal term. — I like sushi

You are just making things complicated here. Indirect relationships can exist as an expression of direct relationships or vice versa, and you still haven't shown that using words like 'because' is somehow an expression of a disjunction between abstraction and reality.

Are all our propositions based purely on an idea that Pure Abstraction overrules experiential evidence? — I like sushi

No, clearly not. I think people have plenty of experiences that appear to be genuinely based on direct causation.

It is understood point (2) of the OP is the assertion that if the evil action's consequences continue to the present, that scales up the original evilness of the action. Agreed? — kazan

Agreed.

If you answer yes, then this question could be asked. "Does the older the evil action, that's consequences are still felt in the present, the more evil is that action mean that the oldest of such evil actions ( with current consequences) should be, for example, condemned more actively than more recent actions ( and adding your agreement to the time gap question regarded as evil sometime after their commission)? ( put another way, be considered worse morally?) — kazan

That more recent actions are less immoral merely because they are more recent is clearly specious. If you enact something that will have horrific long-term consequences, although its evil might not be fully realized yet in the present, it possesses that potential - just distributed over time. So no, I don't think that older actions that have materially achieved a higher magnitude of evil in the present should always be considered to be worse - although that might often be the case.

If you agree then at this point the question can be asked, " Are all recent evil actions ( recognized as such immediately or subsequently) never going to achieve equal or highest evilness status until the older evil actions are deemed to no longer have consequences? — kazan

I would say no, but I think I can address this despite objecting to the previous question. In fact, I think that this question is a good one even if it doesn't necessarily complement it at all. A fitting response does, however, push the limitations of my argument in a couple of notable ways - namely addressing the status of the evil of an act at its point of being executed, which I mostly avoided in my argument, and for good reason.

So, I'm going to have to introduce some explicit math terminology: It depends upon some sort of initial factor or value assigned to the evil act (which depends upon factors other than time) and the rate (which is likely not constant) at which the magnitude of evil of the given evil action increases over a length of time - which determines its growth over an interval. If an action that is newer or recently deemed evil experiences sufficient growth over an interval it could overcome an older action in terms of growth of magnitude of evil over that interval - even before the older action no longer presents bad effects.

If you think I'm being too loose with my usage of math terms, just say so.

Since you haven't responded to me, I'll just engage with your initial post.

ToothyMaw,
Do you claim only those actions to be evil that are seen/believed by "many" to be evil at the time of enactment? Or.....?
Put differently, can an action not be seen as evil at the time of its enactment but that same action be seen as evil "down the historical track"? — kazan

Yes, I would say that an action can be seen as not being evil at the time of its enactment, but that same action be seen as evil later.

This question is put because answering it may go to the heart of 1) i.e. defining "the magnitude of evil", possibly the validity of your assertion of 2) i.e."scales upward with its length....to the present", may suggest another timeline argument cited in 3) i.e."claim the bad effects......are no longer present" and "must object to 1)" and may upset the balance of the assertion/conclusion of 4). — kazan

I think I might know what you are getting at here, but I need a little more explanation than that. I could guess at what you are trying to say, but honestly, I would prefer to fully understand your argument before responding.

ToothyMaw,
Do you claim only those actions to be evil that are seen/believed by "many" to be evil at the time of enactment? Or.....?
Put differently, can an action not be seen as evil at the time of its enactment but that same action be seen as evil "down the historical track"?
This question is put because answering it may go to the heart of 1) i.e. defining "the magnitude of evil", possibly the validity of your assertion of 2) i.e."scales upward with its length....to the present", may suggest another timeline argument cited in 3) i.e."claim the bad effects......are no longer present" and "must object to 1)" and may upset the balance of the assertion/conclusion of 4).
It is hoped that this comment shows a 'fairly close to your point/s' understanding.
fair smile. — kazan

I understand part of what you are saying, but could you try to express all of that a little more clearly? I think I can tell that you have a genuine criticism, I just can't understand what it is exactly.

Bro, I'm done arguing reparations. I did a poor job arguing for it and have no desire to discuss it further. If you want to engage with the OP, however, go ahead. I'll respond to that.

You are traveling through a maze and reach a fork. Here you experience a maximum degree of doubt (uncertainty), and the consequences of making a wrong decision are large. You take out a coin and toss it, heads to the right and tails to the left. The coin toss makes the decision. This is hardly an instance of free will, other than deciding to leave the decision to the coin.

You are traveling through a maze and reach a fork. Here you experience a maximum degree of doubt (uncertainty), and the consequences of making a wrong decision are large. Now you ponder and then make a decision. Is this free will? Or does some internal neural mechanism in your subconscious "toss a coin"? — jgill

This is what I was getting at, but you presented it much more clearly. :up:

I look forward to MoK's response.

One thing I can recommend is that you try to understand exactly what your interlocuters are saying and try to represent their arguments the way they would like - "steel-manning", or whatever. I don't always do it, and I've noticed that not doing so has a tendency to degrade threads over the course of their lifetimes, as clarifications need to be made, people get burned out arguing semantics when it isn't super relevant to the OP, etc.

I would also say just be as authentic as you are comfortable being with this motley collection of strangers. Also: don't insult @Hanover's absurdist fiction.

It seems that obvious solution to the existence of misinformation is more free speech, not less of it.

Ideas should be exposed to criticism by default, not taken at face value by default. Question everything. It is those that don't question what they read and hear that end up causing more harm than those that do. — Harry Hindu

It's a combination of free speech and questioning authority. It seems to me that a man that shoots his way into a Pizza Parlor to rescue nonexistent child victims of sex trafficking from a nonexistent basement didn't question the source of the information he received.

Whatever the man read probably just reinforced some idea he already had and a reason to engage in the violent tendencies he already had brewing within him.

Before I would take such drastic action, I would want to verify the source and legitimacy of the claims being made. How about you? — Harry Hindu

So, in the case of fascists posing a real threat to the government, we should allow news outlets and public figures to propagate dangerous, subversive lies - and they would be dangerous - because you think people ought to question everything they hear? Do you think you imploring us on a philosophy forum to not take things at face value could actually have an effect on the people predisposed via conditioning to acting violently on the lies they hear? Do you think they would apply even the miniscule amount of rigor you mustered up to formulate your vapid responses to engaging with the truth of why they should do what they are told to do by their dear leader?

Do you think many Nazis asked for citations when Hitler claimed Jews were parasites on the German people in the 1939 Reichstag Speech? Did they critically examine the reasoning for his prediction that another world war would see the elimination of the Jewish race in Europe?

I could model the choice the mind makes in the "doubtful" maze situation on a random number generator, or a coin toss, and it could still have the kind of freedom you describe; there is not necessarily the kind of reasoned intention that is required for a mind to be making a meaningful choice.
— ToothyMaw
To the best of my knowledge, there is no pure random generator but a pseudo-random generator. You can read more about pseudo-random generator here. Regardless, the brain cannot produce a random generator to decide about a situation when the outcomes of options are not known. How about a coin toss? You can use a coin to choose a path in the maze. You however don't need it since you have the ability to freely decide. — MoK

You were the one who postulated a mind distinct from the brain, and that brains cannot produce random number generators is part of the point. The supposedly freely choosing mind only requires that the doubtful maze choice be made without reason; that is to say with doubt. Since the mind is distinct from the brain as per your definition, I'm saying that it is not necessary for this mind to make meaningful choices, as that would require reasoned intent. Thus, the mind could be choosing in the doubtful maze scenario according to things that have nothing to do with intentioned choices, but rather something like a coin flip or random number generator (even if those aren't totally random). When generalized, this conflicts with any sort of conception of free will there might be; that the mind must operate the way a brain does is not required to fit your definition of free choice.

And a question I should've asked earlier: are you saying that the freely choosing mind has freedom of choice in situations in which there is no doubt?

No, I would say that our freedom allows us to decide when we are ignorant about the outcomes of the options.
— MoK

I'm having a hard time seeing what you mean.

If we fail to recognize that we are ignorant in some regard do we lack freedom to the degree that we fail to recognize our ignorance in that area? — wonderer1

I think MoK is saying here that if you know the outcomes of a decision, you can form reasons for acting in a certain way. This means the act is not free in the sense that reasons impel us to act in one way or another - the brain is deterministic, and the reasons arise from the brain.

Alternatively, when you are ignorant and have doubt, you can choose freely because reasons do not impel you to act in a certain way. However, since the brain is deterministic, this free act must arise from a mind that can freely choose.

That's my understanding at least. @MoK can correct me.

After rereading my response to the OP, I hope I didn't come across smug. I do think my conclusion is right, but it is only because of a somewhat small loophole in your argument. I think that even if you don't come up with a good defense soon - and I hope you do - you could still modify your argument somehow.

We don't have any specific reason to choose one option over another one when we have doubts. Therefore, our decision is free* in this case. The brain is however a deterministic entity so it cannot freely decide when there is doubt. Therefore, there must exist an entity, the so-called mind, that can freely decide. — MoK

I don't think you can predicate freedom of choice to an entity whose inner workings you cannot describe by virtue of divorcing it from the only thing we do understand stuff about - the brain. In fact, what is to say there is an intentional choice at all being made by the mind? I could model the choice the mind makes in the "doubtful" maze situation on a random number generator, or a coin toss, and it could still have the kind of freedom you describe; there is not necessarily the kind of reasoned intention that is required for a mind to be making a meaningful choice. Thus, I don't think the OP, although interesting, necessitates the existence of a freely choosing mind.

I think you are mostly right, but usually when such laws are created in repressive societies, it isn't to fight the kind of edge case I describe above, but rather to repress for repression's sake or to enable authoritarian rule.
— ToothyMaw

You don't repress for repressions sake. The above is not an edge case, it is the main case. They might brand the governments collusion with the neo Nazis as misinformation, or criticism of the neo Nazis themselves. Whilst their political opponents receive no such protection from the misinformation laws, the government itself would probably be an organ for spreading Disinformation about them. — hypericin

Okay, fair enough. Not an edge case. But I do think that at a certain point repression can become indiscriminate insofar as totalitarian regimes go, almost to the point of doing it for its own sake, i.e. I don't think every suppressive law in North Korea, for instance, is a cog in some intricate machine that operates totally efficiently and always in a directed manner to serve a greater purpose. I cannot read the intent behind every crappy law in every crappy dictatorship, but my guess is that some of them aren't even put into action to directly benefit the ruling class, although the majority definitely are.

Intent matters only because a government with bad intent will write the law such that it can be exploited by them. While a more benevolent government would take more care to add safeguards. — hypericin

That is almost exactly what I said here:

I think that the intent behind the implementation of such laws is probably a somewhat decent indicator of whether or not they will be easily abused; the rubric in a repressive society for what constitutes disinformation would likely be broader or shift more easily to suit the powers that be as a result of policy hinging largely on the will of the repressors. In a freer, more democratic society these laws would probably just arise naturally from elected representatives legislating it to prevent certain virulent strains of disinformation. — ToothyMaw

The authoritarians would write the law such that the rubric for what constitutes disinformation or misinformation would be likely be broader and more dynamic, while those in a mostly benevolent government would have some specific ideas of what kinds of disinformation they would target i.e. certain virulent forms of disinformation related to enabling fascists' attempts to subvert the government.

I am in favor of allowing neo-Nazis to express themselves freely. I would say the problem arises when portions of the media collude with fascists to report and spread disinformation in a concerted effort to gain power to subvert the federal government. To prevent things like that, I think we should hold those media outlets accountable somehow, or at least offset the effects of the lies via some safeguards. I don't think that that is too objectionable.

There is no obvious solution. The chief danger of misinformation laws is that these same laws can be used to suppress the truth while effectively promoting disinformation. This is a common pattern in repressive societies — hypericin

I think you are mostly right, but usually when such laws are created in repressive societies, it isn't to fight the kind of edge case I describe above, but rather to repress for repression's sake or to enable authoritarian rule. Thus, I think that the intent behind the implementation of such laws is probably a somewhat decent indicator of whether or not they will be easily abused; the rubric in a repressive society for what constitutes disinformation would likely be broader or shift more easily to suit the powers that be as a result of policy hinging largely on the will of the repressors. In a freer, more democratic society these laws would probably just arise naturally from elected representatives legislating it to prevent certain virulent strains of disinformation. Of course, good intentions can always lead to bad consequences.

Well then have a good day.