Yes, thats right, and if the dilemma were previously framed as which course of action caused most happiness, changing it to which causes least suffering won't change the disagreement because lack of happiness can be framed as a type of suffering. — Isaac

Fair enough.

The former. They may talk as if they disagreed about the latter, but my argument is that such disagreements are superficial whether it's least suffering, or most happiness, or most virtuous, or most culturally acceptable, or most pleasing to God... The main thrust of the disagreement in moral dilemmas is not the objective, it's the means of getting there. — Isaac

Once again, fair enough.

If you define suffering as exclusively being an undesirable state of mind then it seems to me that not every metric can be converted to suffering, although almost anything could be seen to cause suffering.
— ToothyMaw

Seems contradictory. If anything can be framed by how much suffering it causes, then it seems to follow that every metric can be converted. All that's required is to measure the suffering caused by it's valence. — Isaac

That was a bit of a mindfuck. I suppose that that is true too.

So where does that even leave us?

I also personally thought that linguistics had more to do with the expression of ideas rather than the idea itself. Of course, certain ways of expressing ideas could yield promising results that can help us get better at approximating the actual answer. I was wondering what your thoughts on using linguistics for this subject were. — XFlare

Maybe analyzing applied approximate moral facts in terms of the semantics of their constituent parts and comparing the combinations of constituent parts to the outcomes arrived at by their application could yield a basis for combining said constituent parts into a more accurate approximation through trial and error?

Basically you would insert different combinations of chunks of meaning into an ever-closer approximation based upon how you know they interact from trial and error, and then check the consistency/closeness of the approximation.

(duplicated post)

Yeah, I definitely agree with all of that. :up:

But it seems to me many of these rationalizations are the result of or an interaction with deeper tendencies like tribalism, fanaticism, greed, hegemony, etc. - things that are both explicitly and latently dangerous.

For example, none of the neocons in the US can even give a fucking half-decent rationalization for their forever-wars, so the tendency towards hegemony with regards to the US is quite explicit.

I see now what you were getting at, but I think Cheshire meant something else entirely.

That's just it: feelings are not universal over some particular action or event.

For example: One nation's celebration of victory over the overlords is a sad day in the life of the overlord. The victory is moral on one side of the fence, immoral on the other side.

Or take the crucifixion of Jesus. Christians decry and hate the decision by the Jewish leadership to crucify him; yet without the act, people of Jesus' followers would never be saved. So should Christians thank the Jews for killing their god, or hate them for it? Christians by-and-large chose the hate part.

If my soccer team wins by one goal where the referee did not punish my team for being off side, then it's not a moral sin for the followers of my team, but it is for the opposing team. — god must be atheist

How does that relate to what you quoted? I think Cheshire was more talking about how we have to give a justification for why one act is better than another - and explain it in words; we have to be able to give
- at minimum - a rationalization about why we are right, if not a fully logical explanation.

Right, but Chaos Theory is almost entirely mathematical. I think linguistics is probably more important in this context than math because we would describe a moral fact, or the approximation of one, in terms of language, not, say, in terms of the curvature of the path of a body in the presence of other bodies. So I don't know if Chaos Theory could say a whole lot about approximating moral facts and the outcomes of doing so.

But it is interesting nonetheless, and the concept might be useful.

If the liking system were still in effect I would like that comment. :up:

Unless I'm mistaken that is a big thing that happens when running certain simulations.

Since every metric can be 'converted' to suffering, changing the metric doesn't resolve the fact that the measurement of it is unresolvable. — Isaac

If you define suffering as exclusively being an undesirable state of mind then it seems to me that not every metric can be converted to suffering, although almost anything could be seen to cause suffering.

If we could choose the option which causes less suffering it wouldn't be an extant moral dilemma, it would already be solved (like no-one is wondering whether we should torture children for fun). Moral dilemmas are dilemmas because it is undecidable which course of action causes the least (or most) of whatever metric you're using to determine 'right'. Since every metric can be 'converted' to suffering, changing the metric doesn't resolve the fact that the measurement of it is unresolvable. — Isaac

Okay, yes, I see what you are saying - if the dilemma is merely that which course of action causes less suffering then it isn't really a moral dilemma; it is a disagreement about facts about which course of action will cause less suffering.

Try it, by all means. Take a moral dilemma where people disagree with you about the 'right' course of action. Tell them how much 'suffering' you think the 'wrong' option causes and see if they disagree. If they do, where do you go next? To what higher authority do you appeal to judge the correct amount of 'suffering' in cases of disagreement? — Isaac

Do you mean they disagree about the amount of suffering caused or whether or not minimizing suffering is a good objective?

I didn't say you couln't measure it, I said it was nebulous and everything can be framed in those terms. Take any existing moral dilemma, then say 'we should look at this in terms of how much each option would cause suffering'. What is achieved by framing it that way. All the factors being considered (tradition, God's will, personal preferences, in-group bias...) can be framed as types of 'suffering', so no factors are being filtered or highlighted for consideration. The dilemma is exactly as it was. — Isaac

I'm not sure I understand. Unless I'm mistaken you are saying that suffering is caused by every action, so we cannot weigh one course of action against another. Well, sometimes there is a measurable tradeoff - one course of action might cause suffering, but less suffering than if it weren't taken. That is how many moral dilemmas could be solved: choose the option that causes less suffering, which, as you admit, can be measured. This seems exceedingly simple to me: trade more suffering for less whenever possible.

Or are you saying there is no discernible criterion for "suffering" since everything could be interpreted as suffering, so there is absolutely no way of navigating moral dilemmas? That seems incorrect to me too because we definitely can can develop a criterion - suffering is an inherently undesirable state of mind we all feel. Thus extraneous factors like God's will can be disregarded. But then again I don't really understand how God's will could actually be a form of suffering anyways.

Cool that you can take criticism!

But I get what you are saying.

The thing is that in the mind of such a person, there is objective morality. I mean this in the metaethical sense. Such a person has an unfailing conviction that they know objective morality. — baker

But whether or not morality is objective is still independent of anyone's feelings by definition. Just because I don't believe in god doesn't mean he doesn't exist and that the bible isn't made up of (contradictory) moral facts. The converse applies too.

But, once again, you are just claiming I was being uncharitable without engaging with me - an indication that you have no responses to my criticisms. It's fine; we all make bad arguments sometimes.

It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. — baker

they believe they can directly perceive the truth. — baker

I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth.

(not because it's wrong)

That was funny.

No, I criticized you before I said more succinctly that I didn't think you made a good argument for moral objectivity. Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion.

What constitutes it not being avoidable. If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? — Isaac

No, because living in poverty would lead to more suffering than someone stubbing their toe. Obviously.

The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. — Isaac

I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous.

measuring 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it. — Isaac

But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units.

Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status? — Isaac

Yes, I do have other preferences, such as a will to live. But at a certain point I suppose the will to live could lead to more suffering than would be incurred if one died, an unfortunate fact. So I suppose that is one circumstance where my intuitions lead me away from the negative utilitarian position; if you can take the pain then keep going, no matter how much it sucks.

Can you foresee any circumstance where the negative utilitarian position on an issue might, nonetheless feel wrong? If no, then no need for any moral thought at all, you already know what's right in any situation just by gut instinct. If yes, then what do you do? You only came up with negative utilitarianism because it's how you feel, so when it advises some course of action which clashes with how you feel in some other way, it has no greater claim to rightness. — Isaac

It does if I can actually make a case for suffering being inherently wrong. Which I really can't except for the idea of expanding my own experience to those of others - I have a preference to not suffer, and so does everyone else, so it should be avoided whenever possible, regardless of whether or not other people suffer in unique ways.

I can't think of any circumstances under which I would permit suffering if it could be avoided (or a greater amount of suffering incurred in exchange for a smaller amount).

Then reply to my criticisms, please. Saying I was uncharitable doesn't negate them.

I know. But I think moral absolutism might be possible, along with objectivity. I suppose I could arbitrarily specify that suffering is inherently bad, and then adopt a negative utilitarian position. That would lead to an absolute morality I think, even if not objective. I suppose that is more my position - but how I feel enters into me specifying that suffering is bad; I have suffered and don't like it a whole lot - like most people. Thus I think it is wrong.

If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory? — Isaac

That is similar to the two horned Euthyphro Dilemma. Either what god commands is arbitrary, or moral facts exist independently of god. Most theists won't just bite the bullet and say it is arbitrary - in fact the few theists I've proposed it to just claimed the dilemma was "ridiculous" and rejected it.

"worst possible misery for everyone" he calls it.

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac

Oh yeah, I just assume that minimizing suffering is pretty much indisputably right, because that is how I and many people other feel. At its base I have no justification for this other than that one thought experiment by Sam Harris (I don't like the guy that much, but his thought experiment about the worst possible world makes a lot of sense to me).

Meanders and needs re-formatting. A distinct thesis statement at the beginning might help - you only mention the "crux" of your paper halfway through.

Read your essay. It would help to change the format and have an introductory paragraph. It is difficult to tell where it is going; it meanders.

Plug your papers elsewhere please. And if no one wants to comment on your threads you should just write better OP's.

You've not given any reason why we'd prefer either of these outcomes. — Isaac

The one that causes less suffering seems best to me.

Really? It's not something I've ever encountered. I've sat on an ethics committee for a short while, permitting just about anything didn't come up, and absolute moral rightness wasn't even mentioned. The entire talk is about what people consider moral from different perspectives. What ethical committees are you thinking of where relativists say "anything goes!"? — Isaac

It is totally possible my perception is skewed - I mostly hear about people on ethics committees from people who have talked about ethics committees without being on them necessarily.

Indeed, tautologically so. And assuming a divine command theory stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would result in a happier God... Assuming a virtue ethical stance - advising a company to do what is more virtuous would lead to a more virtuous acting company... — Isaac

Yeah, I corrected myself. Sorry.

My former post doesn't totally make sense. I should have said: if there is an absolute morality and what is absolute is absolute because it causes less suffering then it would be right to advise a company to follow the course of action dictated by the absolute morality as opposed to simply saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it".

I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality? — Isaac

If they believe in absolute morality then they won't simply posit that ethics is relative - which is often equivalent to permitting just about anything within the scope of different cultures having different ethical beliefs. It seems to me that unless the application of the absolute morality posited caused more net suffering - assuming a negative utilitarian stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would cause less suffering and therefore be sound. It is also salient to recognize that this advisement is distinct from merely saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it", which is relativistic.

Which do you think is going to have the most normative force with the company? — Isaac

I'm not sure which of those ethical claims would hold more normative force with a company.

Are you familiar with Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral reasoning?

According to this theory, people at different stages of moral reasoning reason differently about issues of morality. On a metalevel, this explains the differences between people and how the same person can reason differently about the same moral issue, in different times of their life. — baker

That is interesting stuff; I remember being taught about it in psychology in high school. Many students appeared to be stuck at stage four of conventional morality - follow laws to maintain order in society.

An objective morality would still examine an action within the context it takes place. — Cheshire

Potentially, but not necessarily. There could be the law: "Do not steal", which has no context, as opposed to the law: "Do not steal on the Sabbath". Both could be objective.

Ignoring the context just doesn't seem reasonable. — Cheshire

Good point; If you still want to take into account context you need either objective laws that take into account context or some sort of relativism.

Whether morals actually are objective, absolute, subjective, or relative matters not one jot when it comes to people following them. They will do so on the basis of a little bit of biology and a huge slice of enculturation. No matter what philosophers think. — Isaac

There may be some truth to this but ethicists/bio-ethicists contribute disproportionately to the policies of organizations/corporations/government, and it matters whether or not they believe in an absolute morality. So it can be fruitful to search for an absolute morality imo.

We find a book clearly written by God called "All the Morals" and in it is a passage which say "FGM is immoral". People who want to do FGM say "Well we're Immoral then" and carry on. — Isaac

At the very least we could justify implementing laws that prevent things like FGM if there were an absolute morality.

Furthermore, there is obviously a connection to what the vast majority of people believe is permissible and their philosophical assumptions - even if those assumptions are naïve. Most people, even if they don't know what the term "free choice" means, for example, have a concept of what it is - or so I've noticed in some of my discussions with people who don't read philosophy - and it contributes to their conception of moral culpability.

The same goes for morality I believe: people often act on their beliefs, or believe them justified and thus try to codify them, based on the belief that their morality is absolute - an assumption many people share. If enough people believe themselves to know that their shared morality is justified they may push to outlaw abhorrent practices such as FGM.

I, once again, acknowledge that while there is nothing to guarantee that an absolute/objective morality would prevent people from acting counter to said morality, moral relativism gives cover for horrible stuff.

Well, since you quote everything but the what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that. — 180 Proof

What would a charitable reading look like? And yes, I am looking for a discussion, I just think you made a poor case for objective morality, that's all - otherwise I actually think your views on ethics are pretty solid.

Good point. I agree.



I was talking to Tom, I know you meant that.

What you just wrote is quite similar to the postmodern perspective of ‘religion after religion’ philosophers like John Caputo and Simon Critchley. — Joshs

That was unintended.