What constitutes it not being avoidable. If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? — Isaac
The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. — Isaac
measuring 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it. — Isaac
Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status? — Isaac
I did and so again ...Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion. — ToothyMaw
↪ToothyMaw Well, since you quote everything but what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that. — 180 Proof
It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. Such a person is firmly convinced that "the way things really are" is precisely as they view them. Such a person has no sense of their perspective, instead, they believe they can directly perceive the truth. Such a person is, for all practical intents and purposes, a solipsist.So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac
Do we create morality and then it takes on it's own existence? Or perhaps the whole of existence is aware and no event is truly unobserved. — Cheshire
It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. — baker
they believe they can directly perceive the truth. — baker
I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth. — ToothyMaw
The thing is that in the mind of such a person, there is objective morality. I mean this in the metaethical sense. Such a person has an unfailing conviction that they know objective morality. — baker
It harms a painting. I won't assume it harms a person, so it's not wrong(if I apply your criteria for you). Yet, it seems wrong to destroy a painting that commands some degree of intrinsic value. Is this inconsistency immaterial to your positions considerations?So it's wrong if it's harmful and not wrong if it's not harmful. — 180 Proof
Conclusion: There are universal and thus objective criteria upon which a person can act or judge his actions. It does not matter how he (for brevity) evaluates good or harm, this is always subjective. But from the moment that he believes that something is right or wrong, and acts according to those criteria, his actions are moral. "Be true to yourself", they say. Moral integrity is one of the most important things in human behavior and consciousness. The only thing one can do wrong is breaking that integrity! — Alkis Piskas
Can "a painting" suffer harm? (Category mistake.)It harms a painting. [ ... ] Yet, it seems wrong to destroy a painting that commands some degree of intrinsic value. Is this inconsistency immaterial to your positions considerations? — Cheshire
Interesting, I'm not trying to be difficult. But, you seem to include criteria that isn't necessary for making a judgement - in this particular case - and exclude criteria I would think is most informative. Specifically, you noted a preference for "sentients"; No sentients were harmed in the filming of the OP. Next, you discard "intrinsic value" from the decision. Seemingly in direct opposition to the meaning of value.No, but "intrinsic value" is not determinative, or the decisive factor. As I said "in relation to rather than in essence" – sentients over above non-sentients (things) because the latter cannot suffer – is an ethical criterion I find most reasonable and pragmatic. — 180 Proof
If it were a true conflation, I was aware you meant harm to people. I know you don't consider these uses of harm to be equal.Can "a painting" suffer harm? (Category mistake.) — 180 Proof
I took for granted that art of a certain quality has intrinsic value.How does it make sense to say that something which cannot value itself has "intrinsic value"? — 180 Proof
Or the opposite is true. We in fact already know and can't explain it.So what gives in the cade of inconsistency here, the premise or the conclusion? One of the two has to be wrong, but it's not given which. Either the moral theory is wrong because it produces a judgement that's inconsistent with some intuitive moral theory, or the intuitive moral theory is shown to be wrong because it's inconsistent with the rationally worked out answer. Doesn't seem like we've got any closer to knowing what's right. If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory? — Isaac
I strongly urge you (who ever YOU are) to read these papers. If you have a comment to make on the papers, please for god's own sake, leave the comment on those paper's forums, not here. This thread has enough exposure. My threads are ignored BIG time. — god must be atheist
If a destructive act harms a sentient, it's usually morally wrong; otherwise, it could be wrong on non-moral (e.g. instrumental or aesthetic) grounds.Is it still not wrong to destroy a thing or is it wrong to destroy a thing without having to favor a sentient in the process. — Cheshire
And I called into question taking for granted that "art ... has intrinsic value" in ethical terms.I took for granted that art of a certain quality has intrinsic value. — Cheshire
Why does my lone perception carry less moral validity than some one's imagined consensus with the universe? I expect the opposite to be true. If I had to convince some one what they were doing was wrong then my system is probably in error. In terms of not feeling emotionally insecure in applying moral judgements a belief in a objective source is helpful. I suppose I have resistance to the subtext and mixed thoughts on the surface. The king and I think what your doing is wrong. It does feel better.I think that for one's moral stance to be strong, one has to believe that it's not merely one's own, subjective, partial, biased view, but that it intimately has something to do with "how things really are", ie. that it is objective, beyond mere subjectivity. — baker
So, things can be wrong in a non-moral sense; and in this non-moral sense aesthetics are relevant.If a destructive act harms a sentient, it's usually morally wrong; otherwise, it could be wrong on non-moral (e.g. instrumental or aesthetic) grounds. — 180 Proof
I thought it was just a reflex to arguing with people in disagreement. An aesthetic ground is an intrinsic value in my understanding; which is subject to error. So, there is a separate non-morality system that includes right and wrong as it applies to things. If I am properly identifying the implications.And I called into question taking for granted that "art ... has intrinsic value" in ethical terms. — 180 Proof
↪Cheshire I'm only saying something can be wrong – incorrect, faulty, fails – for other than moral reasons. My reply to the OP only says that the questions posed are answered as morally wrong, as a negative utilitarian sees it, a person is harmed. That's all I've said about the OP. — 180 Proof
I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous. — ToothyMaw
But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units. — ToothyMaw
So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac
It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist — baker
1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood. — Cheshire
Maybe, morality is too broad or nuanced to be decided by axioms; we might be making a type of grammar by pretending patterns are rules. — Cheshire
People like their own ideas, so starting with a concluded matter that isn't pre-distributed is asking a lot. The most success I've had is when I truly don't have an answer, but rather a few premises. I hope that helps with the future attempts. In regards, to evolutionary pressures for morality; I think it is one of the most overlooked. It's been regulated to feminism by mistake or to some disservice. The idea that the preservation of relationships describes the basis for what is moral or immoral seems compelling to me. I'll take a read this evening. Cheers. — Cheshire
1. I present a moral theory.
2. You demonstrate that it can produce a permittable immoral act.
3. We agree the theory is flawed; but based on a shared theory that is unstated but seemingly understood. — Cheshire
I think this is the most comprehensive and clearly described point of view the thread has inspired. — Cheshire
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