I think the conversation regarding the existence of universals often overlooks a key topic, and that is whether or not properties even exist, as in, is there an ontological structure behind common concrete particulars. Because you can be a nominalist and still accept that there are properties, just that they are concrete particulars (tropes). It's taken for granted that "redness" is something that can be taken as a separate, independent entity from an object. It's taken for granted that "triangularity" is something apart from the triangle itself.

However, I don't see why there is the need to postulate the existence of a shareable entity, or even entities at all. I find it absurd that there are specific "properties" that "make up" something.

Things can be similar because they act similarly. A red object is just a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it reflects light. A triangular object is simply a piece of matter that is acting in such a way that it looks triangular. Instead of properties being like a metaphorical sticker that is applied to objects or coalesced to bring forth an object, properties are merely the manifestation of matter as it is changed. They are what matter is doing, not what matter is possessing.

Well, I recently quit my job so there's that.

I have recently read about Aristotelian Substance Theory. Aristotle argued that the fundamental thing is the Kind, and that by belonging to a Kind, an object was given as essence, or a set of necessary properties. Additional properties could be added on, but did not change the fundamental essence of the character.

I'm actually kind of leaning towards this theory, albeit ignoring his declaration that living creatures were kinds (he thought teleology explained by life could not arise from non-life, evolutionary theory would like to disagree). The fundamental, elementary kinds of the universe are like gluons, muons, electrons, or strings/quantum foam.

Anyway, I still am very confused on how this talk of universals is supposed to be compatible with modern physics. Say I have two apples. I see that they are both "red". They are quite similar in shade, in fact, they might even be exactly similar in color. But this doesn't mean that they share something. It just means they have exactly similar shades of color. So universals are a worthless addition.

So if the problem is that we are social animals and but other people are frustrating, how does one resolve this tension? Is it better to habituate ourselves to be alone or is it better to resign ourselves with dealing with the frustrations of other people as just the cost of being a social animal? — schopenhauer1

Honestly this seems like a question that can be answered simply by appealing to the general psychology of an individual.

I don't really like parties. I hate huge social events like dances and parades. I'm much more introverted.

Whereas an extrovert might enjoy those things.

However I do contend that a quite ironically large amount of our suffering is caused by our interactions with other people, interactions that we pursue because we are social animals. Regardless, an extrovert might say that it was worth is because they need these social gatherings to be happy.

So my prescription would be to have a balance. If you are frustrated with people all the time, then you need to find new people to spend time with. It is inevitable that you will be let down by other people, but realize also, that it is inevitable that you will let them down. The key is to find the right balance.

Maybe we can keep the likes/agree off but make it a notification instead?

The problem I see with universals is that they are seen as abstracta, and I'm not sure if I agree that abstract objects exist. I don't see any difference between them and NOTHING.

Furthermore, if I were to postulate the existence of abstract universals, they would be "fundamental" universals, not these bullshit universals like "Bob the monkey exemplifies the universal of having a tail." I can't bring myself to accept that floating around somewhere in ethereal, non-spatiotemporal world is an object that is having a tail-ness.

Yikes, I have realized that I have been severely misunderstanding universals, and confusing them with the qualia from the philosophy of mind.

However, I'm still confused on whether or not universals are seen as these ethereal things that exist in a different plane or universe. "Spooky"

But generally speaking the modern philosophical lexicon doesn't allow for the distinction between 'what is real' and 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

This is an interesting idea that I have never thought about.

Trope Theory is very similar to Realism, but simply posits that instead of abstract universals, there are only concrete particulars, and that properties are made up of "tropes". Each trope is unique.

Yes. By and large, I think women merely put up with men and do not really care for them. — The Great Whatever

I would tend to agree with you in that most women tend to be this way. Very machiavellian. But men tend to also objectify women instead of seeing them as people.

The world is all smoke and mirrors. If you want to understand the world, you have to understand that. — The Great Whatever

According to your perspective, the world is all smoke and mirrors. This doesn't strike me as a very strong argument.

For instance, that cup exists, this keyboard exists, the computer in front of me exists. When we speak of abstract objects, such as number, we are not speaking of something that exists, but something that pertains to the operations of thought itself. — Wayfarer

So do universals exist? I say they are real, but not existent; they pertain to the nature of reality and of thought, but are not concrete particulars and so don't exist in the same way that concrete particulars exist. — Wayfarer

You may be interested in Trope Theory.

I found a great, short resource that sums up the problem of universals for those who don't know it too well. It also has the perfect paragraph describing what I find to be troubling about universals:

"On the realist account, it seems a particular must either have a universal or not –
something is or isn’t a banana, is or isn’t yellow, and so on. But psychologists have
recently argued that this ‘either is or isn’t’ judgment isn’t how our concepts work. Are
plantain bananas or not? More or less? When does yellow become orange or green? Is a
shark a fish? Many concepts seem to work by comparison with a prototype, a defining
example (yellow, fish, banana), and other things are judged to be more or less similar to it
– which is what a nominalist would say."

From Wikipedia:

Brassier himself, however, does not identify with the speculative realist movement, and, further, debates that there even is such a movement, stating "The 'speculative realist movement' exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. I don’t believe the internet is an appropriate medium for serious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct a philosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students. I agree with Deleuze’s remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I see little philosophical merit in a ‘movement’ whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated an online orgy of stupidity."

Whichever question is better, there's nothing to stop me from asking, "What makes them the same?" And so I will: why are two tropes similar? If A and B are resembling tropes, but C is not a resembling trope to either, then why is that? — Pneumenon

I'm not sure, actually. The book I'm reading by Loux is actually quite confusing in this regard.

And what's a structure? Because if two objects can have the "same" structure, then you're appealing to universals again. Ditto for the "brain-interpretation" counter, which seems to be positively full of holes. Is the brain doing the same interpretation over and over? And even if red is "just" an experience, is it the same experience over and over? — Pneumenon

But doesn't this lead to the positing of some mystical "connection" between the brain and the realm of the universals? How do we, as concrete particulars, come to know about universals?

That's the central problem: if nominalism were true, then I'd expect my experience of things to be a completely chaotic flux of absolute randomness with no identifiable patterns whatsoever, because as soon as identifiable patterns crop up, universals have already snuck back in. But experience is not a chaotic flux of absolute randomness. — Pneumenon

Gotcha, makes sense. Like Dennett's idea of the Cartesian theater. If dualism is not correct, then thoughts exist, which means these abstractions exist.

Same for "names." Let's say that every name is an action rather than a universal. So what? The question then arises: if I say "Bob" twice, then in what sense did I say the same thing twice? — Pneumenon

This goes into the difference between types and tokens, I believe. Tokens are different auditory and visual representations of a name.

Which actually just makes names seem like universals. huh

I'll address the third man argument, as well as your last paragraph, later, because they're both almost worthy of threads in themselves. — Pneumenon

Cool, thanks.

Love is described as ineffable because it is the only thing that has the capability of fulfilling the hole in our lives. We are born alienated from the world and alienated from other people, completely metaphysically isolated for the entirety of our lives. To feel love is to come as close as is possible to merging the consciousness of two people; it is to feel more concern for another person than about yourself, and is the height of compassion. To love is to know that the journey of life is to be shared.

I've tried really hard to be a nominalist for a long time. What I've found is that, if you're too quick to reach for Occam's Razor, you slit your own throat. — Pneumenon

Haha, I like that. Ockham's Razor is one of the foundational aspects of nominalism, but is also heavily criticized.

That's the problem, really. I think that the reason for there being so many different kinds of nominalism is that nominalists tie themselves up in knots trying to reduce the non-concrete to the concrete without invoking the non-concrete, and failing, and then trying something else. If the problem keeps resurfacing like that, then you should probably take that as a hint that your approach isn't working. — Pneumenon

This, along with your example, I disagree with (tentatively at least). The Realist is demanding something to be explained that cannot be explained because it is not even anything at all; it's unscientific and an appeal to "common sense", which I don't find to be very convincing. I don't see why these "universals" can't be seen as a type of meme within language.

R: So what's similar about our reaction in both cases? Are there not, then, "reaction universals?"
N: Perhaps they're just similar reactions.
R: What makes them similar?
N: There are aspects of each reaction that are the same.
R: Are the aspects universals, then? — Pneumenon

I think the best answer to this from a nominalist perspective is Trope Theory. Each of these properties are similar, but none are identical. They are unique.

Argh, this is a very frustratingly confusing topic. I think the best way of explaining what I'm getting caught up with the most is that, perhaps, the Realist is correct because properties are like the "life" of an object. I think actually a better question instead of asking what makes things similar is what makes things different. The nominalist would answer that what differs is the material structure of the particular, like the atomic structure, or the string/quantum foam/etc structure. But this begs to question as to why these different structures give rise to different properties.

However, it could be said that properties are just subjective experiences, right? "Redness" doesn't actually exist, it's just a photon with a wavelength of 620-750 nm that is interpreted by our brains. Which actually leads to the problem of qualia, not universals.

Furthermore, I don't understand how Realism avoids infinite regress (Third Man argument). If a is F, then a exemplifies F-ness. But F-ness also must be explained, by Super-F-Ness, etc. If universals are immune to infinite regress, why aren't particulars?

Additionally, I fail to understand how we can come to understand such things as "abstract" objects. To be perfectly honest they simply come across as spooky, superstitious ghosts.

Would it be incorrect to understand universals as "POTENTIALS OF EVERYTHING THAT IS POSSIBLE"?

It's easy to identify philosophy, but impossible to describe it.

I got glasses for driving today, so that was cool.

Smartasses tend to be dumbasses in disguise.

I'm sorry that was uncalled for.

Although I think many of these New Atheists and their kin are hateful of religion because they don't want the universe to be under the dominion of a deity, I also find that the concept of a divine order, in which there is a purpose and no way out, to be quite nightmarish. Not only do I find the concept of a deity or religious doctrines absurd, but the concept of a divine order is utterly scary.

Completely agree.

Most definitely a compliment. You used it in a previous thread. Perfect word to describe the scientism of today.

:)

Agustino, I'm going to copy-paste what I wrote the other night on a different philosophy forum over on Reddit regarding the relationship between science and philosophy:

This might be an unpopular opinion, and if you disagree I would love to hear your arguments. But honestly, many philosophers need to stop being so obsequious to scientists. I don't think scientists need philosophers to get by. I love philosophy as much as anyone else here, but I can't help but cringe when philosophers feel the need to justify their field or force it into a field. (Ornithologist-bird analogy). Scientists aren't worried about those questions.
People who say philosophy is worthless are philistines. Philosophy is great in coming up with interesting questions, but bad at answering them, which isn't a stab at philosophy, it's just the nature of the questions (as far as we know). They are outside the realm of empirical observation. But it needs to keep up to date with contemporary science, in case science happens to burst into the bubble of philosophy unexpectedly. But contemporary science doesn't necessary have to keep up with philosophy because science will keep plugging and chugging regardless.
The scientific method is a well-established method of obtaining data even if the operator is incompetent in analyzing it. But philosophy requires someone to have the cognitive capabilities to be able to analyze data like that and make interesting conclusions about it. And possibly this is a counterargument to my argument, that fields like theoretical physics rely on data to make theories, just like...philosophy?
But sometimes I often wonder if one day much of philosophy will become irrelevant, or a product of the past, kicked in the dust by the verifiable and reliable scientific method, which seems to be what is happening here.

(EDIT:)

I think philosophy has the potential to be applied, but I'm not sure if it has the potential to find "truth" (which is a metaphilosophical question itself). Can any system of inquiry find "truth", other than the Heideggerian way of knowing "how" to do something, like a blacksmith knows how to melt steel? But anyway, back to the point, political and ethical philosophy are definitely some examples of how philosophy has been applied. Just look at the Cold War, an ideological conflict. But in these cases, these people don't know that they are right, they just are very self-assured that they are right and feel concerns around them motivating them to act upon this assurance.
This is the problem with consulting someone who is an expert in philosophy, other than being able to explain the subject: there is no consensus on things.
Now, both a scientific and a philosophical theory have a potential to be disproven, the former by evidence and the latter by rational argument (or evidence as well I suppose). The issue is that in science, the data is collected, evidence presented, theories stacked against each other until we come to a consensus. This may take decades. But it happens. Often. With great success. You can go to Biologist A for an explanation of Darwinian Evolution and you will get the same explanation if you go to Biologist B.
But in philosophy, like I described above, there is no "philosophical method" that everybody follows and will get the same results. Theories abound and nobody ever seems to come together to a consensus. So how on earth can someone go to a philosopher for advice? Going to Philosopher A for an explanation for the problem of universals in metaphysics will give you one of many realist explanations, while going to Philosopher B will give you one of many nominalist explanations.
I can't understand how philosophers say they are needed in the process of science when science requires consensus on matters that philosophers cannot decide upon. This isn't a jab at philosophers or philosophy itself, but merely shows the limitations of the field.
I honestly think philosophers should not go into research wondering how it can be applied to the real world; to do this is the limit the scope of the field and make it philistine. I think philosophy should be something that is pursued for the sake of our own curiosity, not because it can yield results. But sometimes I find this answer to be lacking. :\

(EDIT 2):

I think I might have committed a self-defeating argument here, because theoretically if everyone agrees with me in my argument above, then technically philosophy has progressed. whoops. Maybe it's just very, very rare for it to progress.

, credit goes to you for the inspiration for the term "philistine".

I think we differ completely, then, on our conception of the mind. I come from a computationalist perspective.

For what it's worth, Schop, I've found many of your posts to be most illuminating.

The argument presented by the essayist is that NPCs can display actions to try to prevent "death" (i.e. a sleep state), which is argued to be not-preferable to the NPC.

Aren't we just machines as well?

Seems like it would be an interesting idea to compare the two philosophies. But I dislike these MMA championship-like smackdowns of other philosophies, the "my philosophy's better than yours'". It's not very productive.

But yes, Stoicism and Buddhism are very similar, I would even say they might be compatible in some areas. But Stoics traditionally argued for a teleology of the universe, and that rationality led to flourishing. While Buddhists (philosophically) don't argue for any teleological things (they leave that alone), and think that more emotional thinking is the path to contentedness (that's not to say Buddhists can't do philosophy, they just don't think reason will inherently lead to happiness).

But... pain, suffering, dissatisfaction, thirst, hunger--all those conditions where "things" are out of balance or intensely unpleasant, whether they be transitory or permanent — Bitter Crank

This is very Buddhist.

I agree that the physical pain can and should be relieved.

From what I got from your response is that existential pains are contingent upon the mentality of the individual. How much of that mentality requires willful ignorance, if any?

What is the motivation to "do something"? — schopenhauer1

Presumably this would be because one desires an outcome that would only happen if one does something. These desires are more important than the potential suffering that may come about with it.

I'm also shocked at how many handwaves are being done regarding Stoicism. I don't know too much about Stoicism myself, I admit, but from the people who proclaim they do, they aren't really providing many sources. Both sides here.

Well, there's a difference between discussing pessimism and breeding pessimism. Neither or us seem to be doing the latter so I think we're okay.

except not complaining too much. — schopenhauer1

Which actually does quite a bit, to be honest. To complain to the actualize your discomfort and spread it to others like a plague.

I just don't think people will think like that. People will not be happy with the inconvenience or annoyance. — schopenhauer1

I think it's more about being in a better state than one is currently in right now. Stoicism may not make you Captain Optimism, but it might just make you a bit less grim.

My problem with stoicism I guess, isn't necessarily whether it helps people (whether by delusion, habituation, or otherwise), but that pain is elusive in ways that stoicism doesn't necessarily solve. — schopenhauer1

Schop, I'm not sure if Stoicism ever claimed to be able to solve these problems. This might be an issue of individuals claiming they've found loopholes. As far as I'm aware, Stoicism is about nurturing the virtuous life, not necessarily mitigating suffering. It just happens that it does it fairly well for many people.

Stoicism isn't going to stop a branch from falling and breaking your leg, for example. But it can help with how you deal with the situation, and oftentimes how you deal with a situation directly influences how much you actually suffer (runaway emotions like despair).

the scorn that I didn't use examples of "real" pain — schopenhauer1

Losing your phone is a good example of pain. Pain caused by loss. Buddhism happens to also have a lot to say on this (attachments).

What really will happen is a series of annoying events that follows.. — schopenhauer1

Personally, I'm under the impression that life itself is usually a big annoyance. That's the whole point of philosophies like Stoicism and Buddhism and the like.

he never followed it himself! — schopenhauer1

This is the biggest turn-off for me for Schopenhauer. I respect his philosophy and agree with many of the things he wrote, but man was he a dick and antithetical to the "compassionate ascetic" he championed. It made me look for more inspiring and "role model" philosophers like Camus and the Buddha.

I honestly don't think "stoicism" really works. — schopenhauer1

I'm still kind of having a hard time understanding "why" exactly you don't think Stoicism works.

Whether in hindsight, one has mental techniques, visualizations, and ideologies that try to mitigate the pain, does not make the fact that it is there in the first place go away. It is continual and ceaseless. — schopenhauer1

I agree with you here. No need to reproduce.

This also goes into another thing of temperament, predispositions, and environments. — schopenhauer1

These are always in change. Don't trick yourself into thinking that your temperament (whatever that may be) will always be that way or has to be that way.

Not all "treatments" for pain are going to work the same on everyone and what might work for one might not work on another person. — schopenhauer1

I think you pretty much just summed up the entire thread, then. /thread?

I feel like images are helpful to people who want a direction to point them in, but ultimately they can be disastrous to the learning of the pupil. It's far too easy to simplify complex ideas and ignore important areas for the sake of aesthetic appeal.

And when I brought up the likelihood of those millions of people being deluded in that respect, given evidence to the contrary, he mistakenly took that to be the fallacy of appealing to the masses. Of course, masses of people have turned out to be deluded in various respects throughout history, but we can still make a reasonable assessment given various factors: the content of the belief, the number of people that beleive it and the basis for their belief, the available evidence... — Sapientia

In this specific case, an appeal to the masses is actually a logical argument, because if Stoicism didn't work, nobody would have followed it. It's why using the same appeal for a suicide cult doesn't work at all...since they're all dead.

And Stoicism wasn't a religion, either, so it's not like they were deluded or anything. It was exactly meant for dealing with suffering, and people decided to go with it if it worked for them.

But if you want to know why there is suffering to begin with — The Great Whatever

I would answer by referring to

If you ask what the cause of suffering is, on the one hand you could just list particular things that make people suffer. — The Great Whatever

What causes suffering is sufficient to explain why it is here. Like you said, much of suffering is unnecessary. Much of it could be avoided.

Of course, it's arrogant to claim a position is wrong, but not to claim that it's right (which is, in effect, to claim that another one is wrong). 'Intelligent' people believe whatever you please: it's beneath a philosopher to appeal to authority and/or popularity. I think everyone upset in this thread knows that, but on the other hand has literally no better defense. — The Great Whatever

What a load of rubbish. tgw, it's not arrogant to claim a position is wrong, nor is it arrogant to claim is position is right (stop martyring yourself). This is a philosophy forum for Pete's sake. It's only arrogant, no, silly, to claim a position is wrong without any real arguments.

Insulting someone is the last refuge of a person with no argument. — The Great Whatever

So is martyrdom.

I'd like to suggest a somewhat silly but actually quite interesting essay: Do Video-Game Characters Matter Morally?.