Can you put Isaac's argument in your own terms? Can you show that you have at least tried to understand it? — Banno

Can you? You call me disingenuous but can’t even direct me to one argument against the privacy of subjective experience, and then you expect me to summarise the discussion for you? Piss off.

Run along now, Banno.

Try supporting your claims for once. If I’m being disingenuous then prove it by directing me to one argument against private experiences. Of course you won’t, because you only came here to call me disingenuous.

So you’re not going to direct me to any arguments despite your accusation of disingenuousness? Left and right are not subjective experiences. You and Isaac both think that private experiences can be dismissed with the private language argument. Experiences are not language.

33 pages and you claim you still haven't seen an argument? Disingenuous. — Banno

Not against the privacy of subjective experience, no. If you think I’m being disingenuous, then feel free to direct me to one.

the point is that if the way things seem to you is a sacrosanct model of the way things actually are — Isaac

You keep saying this, but I've already rebutted it. You might have noticed that if you had actually addressed the content of my last three posts, Since you're not addressing my arguments and you don't have any arguments to offer against the privacy of subjective experience, there's no point in continuing.

We're going round in circles here. You seem to want to insist on only using a language which makes mental functions as they seem to you the same as mental functions as they are. — Isaac

I don't insist on using language only this way. I have never said "this isn't how "awareness" is ordinarily used" about your use of the word. You are the one attempting to restrict language use and eliminate the first-person perspective in favour of the third-person perspective. OTOH, I am attempting to make room for both perspectives. It's a bit rich, then, that you should accuse me of attempting to eliminate the third-person perspective in favour of the first-person perspective.

Besides, to whom else can my mental functions (as opposed to my behaviour) seem a particular way? How else can I talk about how the location of my arm seems to me?

I you cannot find any language tools to differentiate then there's no point in discussing mental functions with other people at all, you already have 100% exhaustive and accurate knowledge of everything in the field, as do I. What possible benefit could us talking to each other about it possibly yield? — Isaac

We're not doing "the field" of neuroscience, we're doing philosophy. You might recall that the original point of our disagreement was whether or not subjectivity is private.

Your actual arm is in location X you report is as being in location Y so the signals leaving your actual arm are not accurately being represented to your conscious awareness. — Isaac

What I am conscious of is that my arm is in location Y. It is part of your own scenario that I am conscious of things seeming this particular way. If things didn't seem this way to me, I wouldn't be able to report it as such, which means that you wouldn't be able to describe this scenario or the inaccuracies of my reports (and then there would be little point in detecting brain lesions). You should acknowledge that this perspective is fundamental to your scenario.

My reports, of how things seem to me, are public. But you can never have the same (token of) experience of how things seem to me. You might even have the same type of lesion and give the same reports, but you can't access or research whether our experiences feel the same (unless you have an argument to present to demonstrate that you can). As I said prior to us becoming sidetracked by your claims that I make inferences about my own sensations, and that I am consciously aware of signals being sent from my thalamus:

You don't see someone scream in agony and also see their pain sensation, do you? So how do you verify a person's sensations? Do you have anything more than inferences from their behaviour? — Luke

If not, then why shouldn't a sensation/feeling/experience, which is inaccessible to others, be called private (in that sense)?

Well, it seems to me like I think and wonder in language, if that's any different. I'm never aware of myself thinking and wondering using neurons.
— Luke

No, I don't suppose you would be. I don't suppose you're aware of your kidney's functioning either, but that doesn't mean they don't. — Isaac

Does this imply you are no longer arguing that I'm aware of my brain signals?

Whatever goes on in your brain, you're going to post hoc re-tell the narrative to fit the model you're expecting it to fit, in this case "all my thoughts were words". — Isaac

I never meant to imply that "all my thoughts are words"; only that I experience/have at least some of my thoughts in words. The main point I was trying to make was that I don't notice myself having thoughts in the form of brain signals; the occurrence of my brain signals is not something I am conscious of as brain signals. Much like the kidney function you mentioned, I don't see or feel the actions of my brain chemicals or neurons, so I don't notice it happening; I am unaware of it.

You think too fast to form full sentences, but we're so embedded in language that the language centres of our brains convert the stuff we think into words as we go assuming we might need to communicate it at any moment. Since the thoughts are too fast, it only has time to select a few key words - hence the incomplete sentences. Your brain (if it has been enculturated to do so) interprets this association as 'thinking in words' and so it suppresses the data with the alternate sequencing because it's not expecting it. You end up with the narrative that you thought in words. — Isaac

This seems like further evidence to support my argument that we are not consciously aware of our brain signals. You speak of our brains "converting" brain signals into language. If we assume that we are already aware of our brain signals, then they shouldn't need to be converted into language in order for us to then become aware of them. Furthermore, we are not aware of them as brain signals, but only as language. Therefore, according to this model, we are not aware of our (pre-linguistic) brain signals.

I'm not disputing that your use is common. — Isaac

You were until now.

What I was trying to highlight is the (what I believe is unjustified) special pleading with which 'awareness' os used differently with regards to the mind than in all other cases. I don't dispute it's common use, I dispute it's revealing anything useful about the way the mind works. — Isaac

What special pleading? I don't follow what connection you are trying to make between the meaning of "awareness" (as 'conscious of') and this alleged "special pleading" with regards to the mind.

Give me an example answer to the question "how are you conscious of your brain activity?" that you would accept as a satisfactory series of steps. — Isaac

I've already offered an answer to this: it can be achieved by viewing the output of a brain scanner so that you can see your own brain signals/activity. That's how one could be conscious of one's own brain signals; otherwise, they are not typically within the realm of one's perception or attention.

I typically think and wonder using language.
— Luke

No you don't. You think and wonder using neurons. You talk using language. — Isaac

Well, it seems to me like I think and wonder in language, if that's any different. I'm never aware of myself thinking and wondering using neurons.

what I'm consciously aware of does not have the nature of, or is not in the form of, a brain signal
— Luke

It obviously does. — Isaac

How is it obvious? I know what I'm consciously aware of and it isn't brain signals. And neither is it in the form of brain signals.

But you seem to be missing the point I raised a few posts back (Shakespeare/Milton example). Common use of 'about', or 'of' when it comes to awareness assumes one can be wrong in identifying the object. — Isaac

I think there are two different meanings of "awareness" at work here, and both are "common use". You want to restrict "awareness" to mean (only) "knowledge", such as with your Shakespeare example. Although I do find the question "Are you aware of the works of Shakespeare?" somewhat odd. It seems more natural to ask "Do you know the works of Shakespeare?" Nevertheless...

On the other hand, I'm using "awareness" to mean "present to mind" or simply "conscious (of)". I don't believe this is an uncommon usage. Merriam-Webster defines "conscious" as "perceiving, apprehending, or noticing with a degree of controlled thought or observation". The Wikipedia article on Awareness opens with: "Awareness is the state of being conscious of something."

Yet here you want to say that whatever you think is the object of your awareness just is, purely by virtue of the fact that you think it is. That seems contrary to the way we use the expression in all other areas. — Isaac

In terms of conscious awareness, the fact of the matter is whatever is present to one's mind or whatever one is conscious of, including one's own sensations/feelings/perceptions. It needn't be public knowledge nor amenable to public correction.

But I said "...because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'". That's how. — Isaac

All you have done here is to identify brain activity with conscious awareness; it doesn't explain how you are conscious of your brain activity. As I said earlier: "The awareness of my arm movements might be the result of my brain function, but that doesn't mean I have awareness of my brain function".

The process by which you become aware is as described, but it is absolutely evident that it is not 'your arm' that you become aware of.
— Isaac

Then what is it that you are aware of?
— Luke

We could say neural signals, or we could perhaps also talk about models, or features of perception to get away from neuroscience terms. — Isaac

Since you didn't actually apply any of this to your arm example, I don't see how it helps. Clearly, the person is aware of - that is, conscious of - their arm being in a particular location, even though their arm isn't in that location. Otherwise, what did you mean by the italicised part of "you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another"?

Yes. They're both things you do unconsciously. You may have a conscious feeling of having initiated them (you could even have your 'free-will' version of having actually initiated them), but the process itself is subconscious. — Isaac

I typically think and wonder using language. Are you suggesting that the signals carried to and from the brain are linguistic?

Having initiated a recall, you don't then consciously follow the signals around the brain. — Isaac

This relates to the point I'm getting at: what I'm consciously aware of does not have the nature of, or is not in the form of, a brain signal, so how can I be consciously aware of a brain signal? I do not become consciously aware of a signal received from the brain because I am not aware of it in that form. This is why I keep asking you how I become consciously aware of the signals.

The part I was objecting to was "... of your arm", not "become aware...". — Isaac

That objection was prior to your more recent explanation of how one becomes aware of their brain signals. Your explanation only two posts ago was that "it feels to you like an awareness of your arm." In your next post your explanation was: "You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'." The latter doesn't at all explain how, or at what point, you become aware of the signal.

The process by which you become aware is as described, but it is absolutely evident that it is not 'your arm' that you become aware of. — Isaac

Then what is it that you are aware of? In this case, doesn't it seem to you - that is, aren't you consciously aware - of your arm being in one location, when it is, in fact, in another location? Otherwise, what are you consciously aware of in relation to your arm?

None of the process is consciously thought, no. You're only aware of the result. — Isaac

Then why are you referring to "thinking" and "wondering"? Those are not things you do unconsciously.

Not following you here. You don't become aware of the signal by having the feeling. — Isaac

I'm not following you here. I asked you whether you become aware of the signals via this process:

your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. — Isaac

You said, "No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm." Now you're saying instead:

You become aware of the signal because they're connected to the part of your brain for which activity therein is what we call 'conscious awareness'. — Isaac

This might be why someone is consciously aware, but I don't follow how they become aware of the signals. My question was how does someone become consciously aware of the signals? What makes someone aware of them? It's not by having a feeling, it's by...what?

If, perhaps, what you're getting at is that the feeling itself plays some part in inferring the signals, then yes, that's rather the point. — Isaac

You said earlier that the feelings are inferred from the signals. This is the opposite.

It's a two-way process. — Isaac

Not in terms of someone's conscious awareness. Conscious awareness only happens at one end of the process, and it doesn't typically include awareness of one's own brain functioning.

Do I need to be thinking about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in order to become aware of the signals? — Luke

Yes. What you think of as your awareness of physiological and sensory data is actually a post hoc narrative constructed in response to triggers from the hippocampus - in other words, you 'wondering what's happening'. — Isaac

So none of this is consciously thought/wondered.

the re-signalling of "those centres" feels to me like an awareness of [/]the signals[/i]? Is that it?
— Luke

No, it feels to you like an awareness of your arm. But it isn't. — Isaac

If you become aware of the signals by having the feeling, then the signals are inferred from the feeling, rather than the other way around.

When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awareness of...'
— Isaac

You'll have to be more clear about what you think is missing. — Isaac

Which part is you becoming aware of the signals? Do I need to be thinking about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in order to become aware of the signals? Am I meant to fill in the blank at the end of the quote (after the ellipsis) with "the signals"? That is (if I read you right), the re-signalling of "those centres" feels to me like an awareness of [/]the signals[/i]? Is that it? Is 'feels like awareness' the same as 'becoming aware', or why do you say 'feels like awareness of...'?

I just answered that. — Isaac

Please point out the part where you said you become aware of the signals.

Your working memory rehearses the connection between these signals and various areas of the brain dealing with sematic content of one sort or another. When you think about a "What am I feeling right now" type of question in any of it's many guises, your hippocampus enables a return to the working memory of a filtered selection of these signals - ie they re-signal those centres. That, to you, feels like 'awarenss of...' — Isaac

So, how do you become aware of the signals?

Infer them from what?
— Luke

Signals from your nociception system. I've already been through this. — Isaac

How do you become aware of these signals?

I don't follow. You keep slipping in words like 'you' as if they referred to something other than the brain that I'm talking about. If 'you' is just, by definition, the bearer of conscious awareness, then obviously 'you' might infer pain sensations or 'you' might not. — Isaac

Infer them from what? I don't figure out that I'm in pain by carrying around an MRI machine to see what my brain is doing and then infer from the scans that I must be in pain. I have pains without any MRI machine and without any inference.

There's no fact of the matter for us to discuss because you've defined it as being the bearer of whatever your conscious awareness happens to be. One might feel one is inferring everything, or not. Or feel like one is the King of Arabia, or in contact with God.. — Isaac

Again, I'm not claiming that there is only the first-person perspective. I've said that there are both shareable and unshareable aspects of subjectivity. On the other hand, you seem to want to eliminate the first-person perspective in favour of the third-person perspective. As @Marchesk pointed out, how can you speak of "neural correlates" if you only allow talk about the 'neural' but not the 'correlates'.

No. This seems to be a running theme here. You cannot declare something to be an awareness of... as a subjective truth. The awareness bit is the subjective truth, you are having an experience of being aware. What you claim to be aware of is an object in the shared world. It's a mutual matter, amenable to empirical evidence, whether you are in fact aware of what you claim to be aware of. That you are aware is without question. The fact of the matter regarding what it is you are aware of is not without question. — Isaac

You're saying this:

That you are aware is without question. The fact of the matter regarding x is not without question.

I'm saying this:

That you are aware of x is without question. The fact of the matter regarding x is not without question.

There's little difference between what you and I are saying here, except that your two statements have nothing (no 'x') in common. 'X' could be something you hallucinated or just something you thought you saw. That you were aware of 'x' is without question, even if there was no fact of the matter regarding 'x'. So your assertion that "You cannot declare something to be an awareness of... as a subjective truth" is false.

Similary, my awareness of my arm being at location A is without question, but the fact of my arm being at location A is not without question.

When it comes to someone's awareness of their own pain sensations or of how things seem to them, that they are aware of these things is the fact of the matter, without question.

You've just defined, quite clearly, that my first person perspectives are not about anything we can between us refer to as 'pain sensations' The only object that we could both agree constituted a referent for 'pain sensations' is a public object. If you only want to talk about subjective experience as being about objects as they appear to you, never relating them to public object, then the one cannot ever reveal anything about the other, they're two different objects. — Isaac

A reminder that the reason for our latest talk about pain sensations was due to your claim that all knowledge is inferential and my questioning what inferences you need to make in order to have pain sensations. Obviously you don't need to make any inferences to have pain sensations, but you changed the subject to talk about brain signals and the third-person perspective - a perspective from which pain sensations disappear - instead.

If you maintain that what you're aware of is 'the location of my arm', then you've immediately rendered all conversation about it meaningless. — Isaac

It was your example. Your example was about my awareness. As you said: "You're aware of your arm movements aren't you?"

I can't comment at all about 'the location of your arm' in that sense. I can't use the term, it has no referent I can identify. So what's it's purpose linguistically? — Isaac

Aren't we talking about what I'm aware of? You keep conflating my awareness of the location of my arm with the location of my arm. All I can say is it's your own example: "you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another."

There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware.
— Luke

Well then the stuff about which you are aware cannot have material form — Isaac

Why not?

If we talk about being aware of 'the location of my arm' in the non-technical sense (the object of my mental awareness phenomenologically), then any conclusions drawn from that awareness are about that object - the phenomenological 'location of my arm'. At no point can any analysis done on the non-technical object of your awareness reveal anything at all about the technical 'location of my arm arm'. — Isaac

I'm not trying to eliminate the third-person perspective in favour of first-person perspectives, like you are trying to eliminate first-person perspectives in favour of the third-person perspective. I'm just trying to get you to acknowledge that we have first-person perspectives at all. Do you have pain sensations?

If you want to maintain a non-technical sense of the objects of your awareness then that's entirely your lookout. But all the conclusions you draw from it remain in that realm. It cannot be said to be the case that these objects are private, or unique, or any other such universal. It can only be said that the seem to you to be private, or unique, or any other such, because the objects we're talking about are the mental representations as they sem to you.

I don't see how it's of any public interest how things happen to seem to you. — Isaac

There are no subjects or subjectivity? That's one solution, I suppose. I guess the discussion on the topic can be closed now.

What I'm conscious of is what I think my arm is doing, even if it's doing something else. What I am not conscious of are the brain signals that help to produce or inform my conscious thought about what my arm is doing.
— Luke

The second part is just a technical definition of the first. — Isaac

What do you mean by a "technical definition"?

I'm not aware of what goes on in my brain/body to produce my consciousness, and I don't need to be. I've hardly ever thought about how my brain functions, let alone been aware of it.

You cannot collapse the first- and third-person perspectives into one perspective. There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware. You definitely do not need to be aware of the bodily functions that produce your awareness. In fact, I believe it's very difficult to simultaneously be aware of the bodily functions that are producing your awareness without some very expensive technology.

These two perspectives are not the same.

Let's say you had some lesion within your cerebellum, you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another. What is it you're 'aware of' there? You can't say "my arm", you're obviously not aware of your arm. — Isaac

What I'm conscious of is what I think my arm is doing, even if it's doing something else. What I am not conscious of are the brain signals that help to produce or inform my conscious thought about what my arm is doing.

You're aware of the (faulty) signals from your cerebellum. You assume they're telling you about your arm. — Isaac

I'd imagine that I wouldn't need to make assumptions about my arm if I was already aware of the signals from my cerebellum. But why stop there? I don't see why I shouldn't also be aware of the lesion, if I were to actually have these superpowers of awareness about my unconscious bodily functions.

You're aware of your arm movements aren't you? Well, they're signals from your proprioception system through your cerebellum. — Isaac

My arm movements are not my brain function. Am I aware of my arm movements or am I aware of my brain function? The awareness of my arm movements might be the result of my brain function, but that doesn't mean I have awareness of my brain function.

I've not changed what you're aware of. — Isaac

Clearly you have.

How am I aware of the signals being sent from my thalamus? If I were conscious of it, I think I would know.

not following 'you' — Isaac

Well, you said that all knowledge is inferential. I asked what inferences you make to know that you are having pain sensations. You claimed that you made inferences from your brain signals. Personally, I'm not consciously aware of signals being sent from my thalamus, and I just have pain sensations without making any inferences. I guess I'm weird like that.

They're inferred by models in the primary somatosensory cortex. They're inferred from signals sent by from the thalamus (via nociceptor endings and transfer neurons in the spinal cord). These are then modulated, filtered and suppressed in turn by models in the frontal cortex which is where cultural mediation, semantics, other somatosensory feedback and environmental cues come in to play. — Isaac

Who is making these inferences? Not you. That is, not the same ‘you’ that is the subject of pain sensations, so I think this is a category error of sorts.

Seeing an object as red is thus a matter not of comparing it with an internal sample (or representation) but of associating it with red things in general. — bongo fury

Depends what is meant by “comparing it with an internal sample”. If it means no more than remembering what red looks like (to you), or remembering how to use the word “red”, then I’m okay with that. In that case it’s no different to “associating it with red things in general”.

All knowledge is inferred. — Isaac

How are your own pain sensations inferred? From what are they inferred?

I don't understand. It's like you're saying we can't access something in more than one way. I access my sensations by other neural circuits connected to my nervous system. — Isaac

You can obviously access your own sensations. I meant/implied how can you access other people's sensations (rather than their behaviour).

A sufficiently advanced neurologist could access them by fMRI, or microprobe, or whatever advanced technique is next developed. — Isaac

How does any of that give you access to sensations rather than mere behaviours?

...with the advent of neuroscience we can start to piece together neural correlates. — Isaac

Neural correlates are not behaviours? This is still inference.

when those models are sufficiently robust, we can start to make inferences even without behaviour. — Isaac

More speculation about the future. And still nothing more than inference.

If sensations were public, then you wouldn't have to make inferences about them.

Which of those are your private sensation of 'pain'? — Isaac


The one that hurts — Luke


'Hurts' is just another word for pain. Your answer is circular. — Isaac

If your position is that sensations are public rather than private, then how do you access/see them? Surely the distinction can be drawn (as Wittgenstein does) between pain and pain-behaviour. You don't see someone scream in agony and also see their pain sensation, do you? So how do you verify a person's sensations? Do you have anything more than inferences from their behaviour?

Which of those are your private sensation of 'pain'? — Isaac

The one that hurts. And my private sensation of red is the one that looks reddish. Does it feel/look the same to you? How would you know?

You have a whole range of constantly varying feelings at any given time. How did you know which ones were associated with the public concept 'pain' and which ones were unrelated feelings you just happened to be having? — Isaac

I've already answered that: I was taught the use of the word. But I don't see the point of your question. I'm not talking about the privacy of language, but the privacy of sensations.

I know which feelings are associated with 'pain' because I was taught the language and the use of the word.
— Luke

How would that work, if your feelings are private? — Isaac

Sorry, I was unclear. I meant: I know which of my feelings/sensations are associated with 'pain' because I was taught the language and the use of the word. I make my own association between this feeling and the concept. Which is why I went on to say:

I can't be sure that other people have an identical feeling to mine
— Luke

Then how do you know those non-identical aspects have anything to do with the public concept 'pain'? — Isaac

I didn't say they were non-identical; I said I can't know if they are identical. But the private aspect has nothing to do with the public concept anyway, which is why I made the distinction earlier between the unshareable and shareable aspects of a feeling/sensation. The expression of the feeling is shareable/public; the way it feels is unshareable.

Hm — Banno

?

...the way we usually do. The notion that feelings must be either public or private takes form from the erroneous idea that comparing feelings is like comparing phones and noses.

As if "I have a pain in my foot" were like "I have an iPhone" - the similarity is superficial, and disappears as soon as you ask for proof. — Banno

None of this explains why it’s wrong to talk about the privacy or publicity of sensations. The issue here is not about the different senses of the word “have”, which can mean either “to possess” or “to experience”. We’re all talking about “have” (having feelings) in the sense of “to experience” I assume. Is there a problem with talking about the privacy or publicity of sensations/feelings? Isn’t that something Wittgenstein did?

It's a private iPhone. I can't show it to you. — Banno

Just as I can’t show you my sensations. Privacy and publicity each have the same meaning regardless of whether we’re talking about a possession or an experience.

Avoidance — Banno

Not avoidance, clarification. You accuse me of a loaded question. I never posed the question. Get your facts straight.

We understand what it is to ask if your phone is the same as mine. We can bring the phones out and compare them and make a decision one way or the other.

Grammatical similarities tempt us to do the same with pain. But you cannot pull out your pain to compare it to mine. — Banno

Then sensations are private?

Otherwise, how should we be talking about sensations, according to you?

"Are your feelings exactly the same as mine?" is not a question? — Banno

It’s a question, but I didn’t ask it, you did.

feelings are not a something, and not a nothing, either. — Banno

More accurately, private sensations (represented by Wittgenstein’s beetle) are “not a Something, but not a Nothing either.”

"Are your feelings exactly the same as mine?" is less like "Do you have the same mobile phone as I do?" and more like "Have you stopped beating your wife yet?". — Banno

Yeah, I don’t see how. To start with, in order to be a loaded question, I would need to have phrased it as a question.

Right. Well, the same question to that then. How do you know which of your thousands of responses/feelings are the ones associated with 'pain' and which are associated with the room you happen to be standing in, or your mood, or some fleeting memory, or... — Isaac

I know which feelings are associated with 'pain' because I was taught the language and the use of the word. But I can't be sure that other people have an identical feeling to mine, just as I can't know whether the colour red looks the same to me as it does to other people.

Here, you're equivocating on your use of 'behaviours' Previously you'd said that neural activity counted as a behaviour. If so then it's not true to say that "we already know which experiences map to which behaviours". — Isaac

I'm not equivocating; I'm questioning your claims. It seems to be your claim that the use of the word defines the experience/feeling. For example you said: "I have experiences when I injure myself, but which of them are 'pain' I wouldn't know how to distinguish privately." This implies that the experience/feeling is defined by the meaning/use the word. That is, if you know how to use the word, then the experience/feeling should already be defined. So why does it require any further research/definition? Perhaps the use of the word does not define the feeling after all. Perhaps the feeling drops out of consideration as irrelevant to the language-game.

He doesn't consistently use the word 'red' correctly. There are shades which can't be distinguished even from the intensity of saturation, and edge cases will have poorer contrast. If this were not the case, then how would we ever know anyone was colourblind? How would we ever have found out the function of cone cells if no public language could distinguish their proper functioning from their restricted one? — Isaac

It doesn't get discovered by being able to see how red looks to Richard. It gets discovered from his behaviour, including his inconsistent use of the word. How red looks to Richard is private and subjective.

No. Not by any means other than the public language. I have experiences when I injure myself, but which of them are 'pain' I wouldn't know how to distinguish privately. — Isaac

How do you know that the experiences you have when you injure yourself are the same as everyone else's experiences when they use the word "pain"?

Again, how are you distinguishing 'pain' from the entire milieu of experience at any given time without the public definitions? — Isaac

I acknowledged in my last post that pain is defined by the public concept. I'm talking about the associated feeling that goes along with it. The same associated feeling that you acknowledge is the study of neurology.

That's why he calls it a 'something'. — Isaac

Witt actually says: "It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said."

Yes, that's exactly the point. — Isaac

Isn't your position that the public concept completely defines the experience? If so, then why do you agree that we need neuroscience "to tell us exactly what feeling(s) corresponds to what set of neuronal activity"? If the public concept completely defines the experience, then shouldn't we already know which experiences map to which behaviours - and shouldn't it be the same for everyone who uses the word? What is the purpose of further research and how can Richard be colour-blind if he uses the word "red" correctly? His correct use of the public concept should imply that he has the same experience as everyone else, right?

Neuroscience doesn't work with behaviours, it works with neural activity, — Isaac

Isn't neural activity some set of physical behaviour(s) of the human body?

but that aside, what is 'the feeling itself'. Are we talking dualism, epiphenomenalism...? — Isaac

I'm hoping to avoid putting a label on the mind-body relationship, if possible. You know what the feeling of pain is, don't you?

The sufficiently advanced neurologist would see the neural activity, not the behaviours — Isaac

What distinction are you making here?

If 'pain' is not defined by the public concept (and so private that way) then it's only refuge is neurological activity. — Isaac

Pain is defined by the public concept, but the public concept has no need for 'the feeling that hurts', i.e. the subjective aspect of pain, even though this is largely what we consider to be what is important about pain. This is the point of Wittgenstein's beetle and the private language argument:

293 ...The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. — No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

296. “Right; but there is a Something there all the same, which accompanies my cry of pain! And it is on account of this that I utter it. And this Something is what is important — and frightful.” — Only to whom are we telling this? And on what occasion? — Wittgenstein

Otherwise you have private language. — Isaac

Not a private language; a private sensation - or the sensation object which "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the language-game. This is what's private: how pain feels, how the colour red looks to a colourblind person, how the colour red looks to a normal person, 'what it is like' to have perceptions and thoughts, qualia, etc.

Why do you need to introduce to the discussion the concept of a "sufficiently advanced neurologist"? Presumably, their knowledge must be "sufficiently advanced" regarding the relationship between the behaviour of neurons and our corresponding feelings. Maybe a neurologist that is "sufficiently advanced" will be able to tell us exactly what feeling(s) corresponds to what set of neuronal activity, closing the gap and eliminating the possibility that any feeling can remain truly private to the person who has it. But I take it that we are not yet this sufficiently advanced. I think you are begging the question if you assume that all feelings can in principle be publicly known like this. For the time being, at least, you must admit that there is an element of privacy to our sensations. This is the private aspect of our subjectivity.

Even to sufficiently advanced neuroscience? — Isaac

Neuroscience, like language, cannot get at the feeling itself; it can only work with the behaviours.

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. — Wittgenstein

You'll argue that it's not 'your' pain because it's not taking place in your body, but that makes 'pain' into the set of physiological activities (being the only part fixed to your body). — Isaac

I don't see how this follows.

I have no problem with labelling it that way, but it's then not intrinsically private, any sufficiently advanced neurologist can see it. — Isaac

The sufficiently advanced neurologist would see only the behaviours, not the feelings. The feelings are not directly accessible; in other words, private. The idea of a "sufficiently advanced neurologist" begs the question.