Good question. If everything is flux, you make stuff out of the flux, although the permanence of the stuff you make is never true permanence. But if everything "just is," then any change is only apparent. That choice of words was very deliberate. — Pneumenon

Sounds like change is "apparent" either way, which is a good basis for an intuition. What basis is there for the intuition of permanence?

Take these two:

1. Reality is fundamentally flux, and permanency is constructed
2. Reality fundamentally is, and change is an illusion — Pneumenon

In 1, why is it not "and permanency is an illusion"?

1 seems like a cop-out, as if refusing to really consider the question. — Pneumenon

What question?

I'm now convinced: chairs don't exist and we should stop teaching children about them.

I meant that the concept "apple" is one and the same as the object "apple", which is the word "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying that words grow on trees?

Apples and oranges come from trees not horticulture. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've said that "the concept and the object are one and the same thing" and that "both...are created by the application of boundaries". Apples and oranges are not the same thing, despite both being created by trees (the object, not the concept).

both concepts and objects are created by the application of boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

1. Apples and oranges are created by the application of horticulture.

2. How is the concept of "boundary" created by the application of boundaries?

I have not said that time has a "preferred directionality". I have said that you can remember the past and not the future. Which direction is "preferred"? The directions just have different properties due to the laws of thermodynamics. Laws which are not affected in the slightest by eternalism or presentism. — Douglas Alan

Let's just say you implied that time has a direction, or that there is an arrow of time, if you will. How is this consistent with your agreement that "time doesn't flow at all"? No flow should entail no direction.

Why don't you give it a rest and find something else to argue about? — SophistiCat

Okay, sorry.

I don't assume that time flows from ordered to disordered states. In fact, since I have stated that eternalism is true, I have stated that time doesn't flow at all. — Douglas Alan

You implied that time has a naturally preferred directionality when you stated that we remember the past and not the future, which "follows plainly from thermodynamics and information theory." I don't see how you can consistently argue both that time doesn't flow and that time has a preferred directionality.

SInce physical law is the same under both eternalism and presentism, our brains are going to be in the same states either way for any given point in time. And because they are going to be in the same states either way, our minds are going to represent things the same way regardless of whether it is eternalism that is true or presentism that is true. — Douglas Alan

If nothing moves or flows, then how do we get from one brain state to the next? Are there any theories of how our brains work (e.g. to produce our minds and represent things) which do not require motion?

The eternalist view has no experiencer. — noAxioms

Is a great novel static? Or is it dynamic and full of exciting and interesting events?

You tell me! — Douglas Alan

Whether a novel or a book or the world is static or dynamic is not the right question. Let's assume that the world is static, as per Eternalism. Then the question becomes: how are we able to perceive it? That is, why do we perceive the world the way we do (dynamically) if it really is static? Furthermore, how do our perceptions and/or our bodies work in those conditions? It would seem to require a complete overhaul of our understanding of human physiology to discard dynamism. This includes if we were to consider our perceptions of motion to be an illusion.

In order to perceive/understand a book or a movie, we must read it or watch it, or have someone describe it, or read a summary of the plot; all of which require dynamism as far as I know. Fanciful examples of aliens outside of time, or in a motionless world, who can perceive books, movies and/or the world simply pushes the problem back a step. It then needs to be explained how the perceptions of those aliens works in a static world.

why do we have such a different relationship with the future than with the past

One hugely important reason for this is that we can remember the past and not the future. This is true in eternalism just as much as it is true in presentism. It follows plainly from thermodynamics and information theory. — Douglas Alan

This begs the question. Why assume that 'time flows' from ordered to disordered states? Because that accords with our perceptions? It remains unexplained why there should be a preferred directionality to our perceptions of temporal flow if nothing really moves.

I don't think you understand how philosophy works. You pointed me at something that putatively needs to be explained, and I provided my putative explanation. It is now your job, should you chose to accept it, to provide your putative explanation for why what I argued is wrong.

Instead of doing this, you just repeat the same thing, as if I have said nothing. — Douglas Alan

I am only trying to get some acknowledgement from you and others in this discussion that Eternalism entails a static world devoid of any temporal flow, change or motion.

You appear to maintain that the world works the same way whether Presentism or Eternalism is true, but it remains to be explained how anything works if nothing moves. You and others appear to maintain it is unproblematic that we find ourselves now at one time and now at another, or that we find ourselves aging, when according to Eternalism nothing moves from point A to point B (or from time A to time B).

The book from which this chapter was selected seems to be a textbook that a Philosophy professor would assign their students to read. Such treatises are often specifically designed leave certain questions unanswered, in order to allow for debate in the classroom and for students to write papers where they have the leeway to chose which position they want to argue for. — Douglas Alan

I consider Miller's article to be an even-handed presentation of the issues, and you might recall that it was introduced in the OP, not by me. Call it "argument from authority" if you like, but I am simply attempting to have it recognised that Eternalism entails a motionless world. Many seem to find this either inconsequential or incorrect. This is why I keep returning to the associate professor's article. It can be difficult pushing back against the orthodoxy.

I will point out that Miller also describes plenty of problems for presentists, and you are cherry-picking your argument from authority by ignoring the fact that Miller has more objections against presentism than she has against eternalism. — Douglas Alan

I have never claimed to be arguing for Presentism. I even acknowledged that Presentism has many problems of its own in my first post to this discussion. But it's not all bad.

The appearance of motion is something that is represented in your brain. Where else would there be an appearance of motion? Since physics is the same under presentism and eternalism, your brain is going to represent the same things under either presentism and eternalism. Consequently, if your brain represents the appearance of motion under presentism, it will do so under eternalism, and vice versa. — Douglas Alan

Except that there is actually no motion according to Eternalism. I would imagine that it's much easier to explain why we perceive motion if there actually is motion than if there actually isn't. My point, again, is better expressed by Kristie Miller:

For the eternalist, the key challenge lies in explaining temporal phenomenology and in explaining the apparent directionality of time. There has been significant work in this area, but questions still remain: why do we have such a different relationship with the future than with the past: why is it that effects typically precede their causes when the laws of nature are symmetric: why do we remember the past, but not the future: why does the present seem to us to have a particularly salient quality that other moments lack; what are the cognitive apparatuses that underlie our experience of temporality and how do they function to create temporal phenomenology; what is the evolutionary significance of the phenomenology of temporal flow and to what extent is the phenomenology of temporal flow essential for agency. — Kristie Miller

"Static" is an unfortunate choice of a word in Miller's article — SophistiCat

Then it must also be an "unfortunate" choice of words when Miller describes the B-theory of time as "the view that the world is a static block of events", or that a view which endorses the B-theory "rejects the dynamical thesis", or that "Eternalism...is a static view that rejects temporal flow."

But there is still time in the eternalist's account, just as in the presentist's! — SophistiCat

Of course there is time in both the presentist and eternalist accounts; they are theories of time. I have never disputed this. If you wish to equate time with motion, then perhaps Eternalism isn't for you.

Nevertheless, I get the message, and I won't interrupt the discussion any further.

The subjective flow of time is an illusion, illustrated empirically with the twins scenario in relativity. If people could detect the actual flow of time, then they'd be able to detect movement due to the subjective slowing of clocks when they're moving fast, wheras if it were an illusion, any traveler would notice no difference. — noAxioms

It's unclear to me what the illusion is that you are referring to. What 'movement' is going undetected? What 'movement' would be detectable if "people could detect the actual flow of time"?

Do you not detect any motion, notice yourself ageing, or find yourself now at one moment and now at another? If all of that is an illusion, then what is illusory about it? And how do you account for it?

Eternalists have such accounts: Time is real. It is locally ordered. (I word it this way just to account for Special Relativity.) For every point in local time there is an immediately past point in local time and an immediately future point in local time. — Douglas Alan

All you have stated here is that all points/moments in time exist. You have offered no account of why we apparently move in time from one moment to the next; of why we apparently age; of how change and/or temporal flow apparently occurs. I understand that these are very difficult to account for, but you said that eternalists had such accounts. It's one thing to tell me that Paris exists over there and another to explain how I can get there, especially if nothing really moves.

Under the spotlight theory, such an eternalist will say that time is like a movie reel. It's all there all at once: past, future, and present. Only there's a spotlight that runs down the movie reel illuminating one frame at a time, in chronological order.

Most eternalists will say, "Exactly! Only there's no need for the stupid spotlight." — Douglas Alan

I consider the moving spotlight view to be a hybrid of Presentism and Eternalism, since it contains all times/events (Eternalism) plus motion (Presentism). If you remove the spotlight, you remove the motion, and then you need to account for the appearance of motion. This is exactly the problem for eternalists.

If you want a version of eternalism that works for you, start with the spotlight theory. And then convince yourself that you don't need a spotlight. Or remain committed to the spotlight if you wish. It's no skin off of my teeth either way. — Douglas Alan

I find the lack of a compelling account for the appearance of motion/temporal flow/ageing to be too problematic for Eternalism. You can pretend as though it's unproblematic if you wish.

Right, that was in response to your statement that entropy has implications for memory, which I viewed as merely avoiding the larger issue, which is better worded by Miller here: "the eternalist owes us an account of why it should seem that there are such features [of change, temporal flow] in the world when there are not."

I'm not talking about physical law here; I'm talking about whether things can evolve and change. This is not about Darwinian theory, but more generally about time.

So you accept that "Eternalism...is a static view that rejects temporal flow...and change." Could you explain how that is consistent with your earlier statement:

There's nothing in eternalism that precludes things from evolving over time, since in eternalism there is definitely time, and at any given point in time, there are future times and a past times. And things will be different in those future and past times. Hence things change as time changes. — Douglas Alan

You appear to be claiming that things can change and evolve over time, while also agreeing that nothing changes?

Then I take it you agree with all of the following:

Eternalists, then, hold that the world as a whole is static in two senses: which events
exist does not change, and there is no sense in which the present moves. [1]

Eternalists accept what is known as the B-theory of time. This is the view that the
world is a static block of events ordered by the earlier than, later than, and simultaneous
with, relations. [1]

Presentists endorse the A-theory, since they hold that it is a genuine feature of a
presentist world which moment is present, and that this fact changes over time so that
different moments are present at different times. To say that a view accepts the A-theory
is really to say that it endorses the dynamical thesis, and to say that it endorses the
B-theory is to say that it rejects the dynamical thesis. [1]

Eternalism, on the other hand, is a static view that rejects temporal flow. Since it certainly
seems to many that there is temporal flow and change, this is a cost to eternalism.
At the least, the eternalist owes us an account of why it should seem that there are
such features in the world when there are not. [4.2]

I'd be happy to read any articles by these other professors that provide an alternate definition of Eternalism, if you can direct me to them?

No offence, but I think I'll take the word of the associate professor over yours.

According to the Kristie Miller article cited in the OP, the difference between Presentism and Etetnalism is not only their differing views on existence, but also their staticity/dynamism.

You seem to want to have your cake and be able to move to eat it too!

My apologies for the lack of clarity. I guess what I'm getting at is that we have dynamic accounts for how memory and other bodily functions work (neurons fire, light enters the eye, blood circulates, etc), but I don't see how this could work in a static world.

The eternalist account is that at every point in time, a cognitive entity can remember events from the past and cannot remember events from the future. — Douglas Alan

Okay then, how are events 'made present' for a cognitive entity, such that they have a relative past to remember? I'm finding it odd for an eternalist to be using such presentist terms.

Because the way that entropy works implies that people (and computers, animals, etc.) will remember the past and not the future, where the past is defined as the direction of decreasing entropy and the future is defined as the direction of increasing entropy. This is just how physics works, emergently. — Douglas Alan

This seems to assume that "entropy works" in a dynamic way with a moving present moment, and that we are able to remember past times but not future times relative to that moving present moment. That is a presentist assumption. What is the eternalist account?

An arrow for time does not preclude eternalism. It is the direction of increasing entropy — Douglas Alan

Why is it not the direction of decreasing entropy? What difference does an arrow of time make in a static world?

I can only refer you to the first article cited in the OP which I quoted that says otherwise.

This is more evidence for eternalism if you ask me. E.g., why is it that "metaphysical time" just happens to agree with the arrow of time placed by the direction of increased entropy? What a fortunate coincidence, since it would be a crazy world otherwise.

For eternalism, there is no problem here. — Douglas Alan

Except that an arrow of time assumes a dynamic world?

Eternalists, then, hold that the world as a whole is static in two senses: which events exist does not change, and there is no sense in which the present moves. — Kristie Miller, Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block, A Companion to the Philosophy of Time (Wiley, 2013)

I appreciate that Presentism has many problems of its own, but it always amazes me that proponents of Eternalism so readily accept the static, motionless nature of their own temporal landscape. I'm no scientist, but much of science appears to be reliant on a dynamic world involving rates of change, momentum, spin, acceleration, velocity, etc.

#1 How can one know what truth is, without knowing what truth is in the first place? — Monist

How can one know what a door is, without knowing what a door is in the first place?

How can one know how to ride a bike without knowing how to ride a bike in the first place?

No, that wasn't a definition of the present moment. The person who wrote it was just saying what I'd already said, namely that if time is a kind of soup, then what we experience as the present moment has in fact already passed. — Bartricks

This is equivalent to saying that "what we experience as the present moment" is not really the present moment, because it "has in fact already passed". This is to define the *real* present moment as "what we experience as the present moment" minus the brain processing time.

These events - these ones - appear to be happening right now. I think they probably are happening right now, not a fraction of a second ago. — Bartricks

Sure, if you define the temporal property of "now" or "the present moment" as being simultaneous with our conscious experiences.

I wouldn't define it like that, as those definitions are circular (given that to say that 'it is the time of consciousness' is equivalent to saying it "it is the moment consciousness is present" ). — Bartricks

I would note that others have defined the present moment differently, as the moment consciousness is present minus the brain processing time of approximately 300-500ms.

Your use of "consciousness is present" appears to conflate 'consciousness is present in me' and 'consciousness is at the present moment'. Of course, I define the present moment as the (same) time that consciousness is present in me, but others in this discussion do not.

Time is a set of attitudes that Reason adopts towards events. It has nothing to do with us reasoning. — Bartricks

This seems like a contradiction. Are you making a distinction between Reason and reasoning? What is it?

The present moment is 'now' - the problem, as I see it, is that if time is an objective material, then the experiences you have in the present moment give you information about events that occurred in the past, at the same time as representing them to be occurring now. Hence why on such a view we seem unable to experience the present moment. We get the impression we are experiencing the present moment, but in fact the content of such experiences are past moments, albeit represented to be present. Hence we are subject to a systematic illusion of presentness.

The way to overcome this and respect appearances is to reject the 'objective soup' view of time. What I suggest replacing it with is an 'external attitude' view of time. According to my replacement, 'what it is' for an event to be in the present is for that event to be being thought about in a certain kind of way, albeit not by us but by some third party - by Reason. — Bartricks

I think we're both saying something similar or the same: you say the present moment is the time of reasoning, whereas I say it is the time of consciousness.

Of course, we only experience what's already past. Merely, light finite speed takes care of that by itself. Then there is the 300-500 millisecond delay required for the brain to make something out of what's happening. However, one goals continue across these gaps. Still, all in all, what consciousness thinks it is deciding right then and there has already been decided, which is bad news for hopeful free willers. — PoeticUniverse

The presumption seems to be that the *real* present moment is the time of consciousness (or the time at which we find ourselves conscious) minus 300-500 milliseconds of brain processing time. But why make this presumption? The word "present" is not commonly used in this way, and I see no basis for preferring the 'mathematical present' over the 'colloquial present' (to borrow 's terms).

Everything is flux, as Heraclitus rightly noted, including rivers and men. Despite that, we continue to refer to the Amazon River as 'the Amazon River' over time. We continue to refer to any river as a 'river' and to any man as a 'man'. What remains relatively stable and permanent through these continuous changes are the terms of our language. This is perhaps assisted by our perceptions of things being at the level of medium-sized white goods, and our tendency not to notice minor structural changes.

I didn't mean that there is never any agreement, in an absolute sense, only that in those instances there is no agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish. What does "in an absolute sense" mean here? What "instances" are you talking about? You said: "we use language and therefore "play language games" without any such agreement." There was no qualification; you meant that there is never any agreement. "The agreement is non-existent."

I accept your disagreement, but I see no reason accompanying your opinion. — god must be atheist

Likewise.

I was making an opinion on Wittgenstein's entire work, and not making an opinion on a specific quote or passage in his works. — god must be atheist

Well, it's my "reasoned opinion" that you are completely wrong about Wittgenstein.

I never said that agreements in ways of use are non-existent. I said that such generalizations about ways of use come about through retrospection. I do not deny the existence of generalizations, nor do I deny agreements in ways of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. I must have misunderstood when you said:

I use a word in one way, you use it in a similar way, and for the sake of simplicity we assume that we are using it in the same way. This, saying that it is "the same way", is the agreement which bongo said that we strive for. If you and I say that we will use, or do use, the word in the same way, then we have agreement. [...] In reality, we use words in similar ways, without any agreements. [...] The agreement is non-existent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't suppose you have any specific references, other than his entire body of work?