It's not a very pertinent comment to make, but I'm struck by how the first sentence of the OP has reminded me, suddenly and forcefully, that I found works like Joyce's Ulysses and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury particularly annoying reads.

The body, physiologists say, responds by diverting the diminishing supply of blood away from, here's where it gets interesting, nonessential parts of the body to the vital organs. In other words, insofar as the body is concerned, the brain/mind is a nonessential i.e. it can be and is shut down in times of crisis. — TheMadFool

I'm curious which physiologists say the brain is "nonessential." And which of them claim the brain is "shut down." And which of them would treat any particular part of the body as something separate from the rest of it, for that matter.

The problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil and suffering with an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God
— Wikipedia — TheMadFool

So, it's a "problem" only when we make the assumptions required in order for the question, or problem, to be raised in the first place. In other words it's a peculiarly human creation--like evil itself. Get rid of God as traditionally conceived and things simply are the way they are. Natural disasters aren't caused by any agency. We're the source of the evil in the world as our conduct causes evil, as we conceive it, to exist (something harmful which may be avoided or mitigated by responsive or preventative action). It seems a waste of time to wonder why evil is allowed to exist when we're its source.

There's a giant jackrabbit waiting for us all, I think.

Pierce came up with more than one version of the pragmatic maxim, and he wasn't all that pleased by James' version of pragmatism. He famously began to call his philosophy "pragmaticism" to distinguish it from what James had made of it. But Pierce was a rather crotchety soul, and it took him some time to warm up even to Dewey, who understood him better than James.

Pierce was a logician, mathematician and chemist, and while all he wrote was interesting his focus was on logic, language and signs. James was, I think, first and foremost a psychologist. He was a great teacher, lecturer and writer, made a number of interesting observations and popularized pragmatism, but he wasn't the most precise and exacting thinker and so came up with statements like the one you quoted. Dewey had to defend him against attacks from such as Bertrand Russell, who attacked Dewey as well through a succession of straw man arguments based primarily on the assumption that what is true is whatever "works." I think Russell no more understood Dewey than he understood Wittgenstein.

For me, the maxim is usefully employed whenever we encounter a concept that is so vague and suggestive that it is subject to misuse. It's been a long time since I read that essay you mentioned, so I can't recall if he had particular concepts in mind.

Dewey thought that "true" carried so much baggage with it that it was best avoided. So, he took to using (in his writings, anyhow) "warranted assertibility." Dewey rejected the "spectator" or correspondance view of knowledge, and instead claimed that what we know results from our interaction with the rest of the world. Ideally, that would be the result of inquiry, through the employment of the scientific method in some cases, but could be the result of trial and error, solving problems, and seeing what "works" in particular circumstances. With enough evidence obtained through inquiry, we may be warranted in asserting that something is the case, and may act upon it in the future. "Truth" is better applied to judgments than propositions as a result. As a result what we consider "true" or what we think we "know" may change, as new evidence is received. Truth isn't static, therefore.

In response to the title of your thread, I would say yes--Dewey's pragmatism is misunderstood. That's in part because of his writing style but also I think because people don't like to accept his reliance on method in making judgments--the fact, in other words, that knowledge, truth, morality are contingent. This is confused with relativism.

That's my two cents, anyway.

You don't want to take on Granny from the TV show Beverly Hillbillies. — Athena

Not after her epic battle with the jackrabbit, which some call a kangaroo.

For one, he didn't speak to the nature of human reason relative to the relationships of human belief systems. — 3017amen

It would seem to me that the employment of reason under his definition would be the application of logic to the "relationship of human belief systems", whatever you mean that to be.

But to make them “care” is another thing, and the project must inevitably fail.” — Todd Martin

Ah, another exercise in futility. Must be a philosopher, alright. We can hope one of the last of them.

We're patient, we'll wait for mr. Wood to reply — 3017amen

Just what is it about his definition of reason that you are unable to comprehend? He did give one, you know. It was this:

I mean reason to be the application of logic to various things in various ways as appropriate to those things and ways, to the end of understanding them. The particular application being just the argument itself. I hold reason to preside because at the most fundamental level the details of understanding should make sense. And if sense cannot be made of them, then it is hard to see how they're reasonable.

The world, of course, from time to time shows us phenomena the facts of which seem neither sensible nor reasonable. But so far that has been just a challenge to adjust/refine the understanding itself to make it again reasonable. And where for the moment that seems impossible, then reason dictates we say we do not know. — tim wood

You actually see what you aim at. And not the rest. — Caleb Mercado

Very true.

with furrowed eyes. — Caleb Mercado

Those lines and wrinkles in your eyes must make it hard to see, though.

. 'Transcendence' is the impossible idea of concept without soundbody. 'Immanence' is recognizing what was thought to be transcendent as a 'form' that cannot be isolated from its 'flesh' (the breath or the ink in which we signal.) — j0e

I'd have to do some reading to be certain of what you mean, but would agree that the concept of "transcendence"--of something apart from the universe, like a transcendent God--is unreasonable if not impossible. We're part of the universe and incapable of even imagining something beyond it. When we purport to do so, we're saying that there's something outside the universe which is like something we've encountered in the universe, but better or greater in some sense. What we are, know, do, think, imagine and communicate are all "confined" in the universe.

First I will point out those cowboys were rugged individualists and Picard of Star Trek is not. — Athena

I wonder what you think a "rugged individualist" to be. If cowboys were, would others who earn a living by being part of a group moving commodities from place to place be rugged individualists as well? I assume that you believe there's something else about cowboys that make them rugged and individualists.

You can probably smell the Hegel in this. — j0e

Ah, the distinctive smell of Hegel! How can one ignore it?

I've probably come to late to this thread and may have nothing to add--I've only just smelled the Hegel--but would say, if I understand you correctly, that it also seems similar in some respects to ancient Stoicism (which has no smell), if by "breath" you mean something similar to the Stoic pneuma. But for them the deity was immanent, pneuma being a very fine kind of material, representing the generative and intelligent aspect of Nature. I've always found an immanent deity more acceptable than a transcendent one, but that may not be what you intend.

Without having read the book (and it doesn't seem interesting), but by just looking at the quotes from the book, the vitriolic stance is quite evident. — ssu

Judging from those quotes, the stance is also old, and tired. Nothing new there.

Oh yes. Wonder how would Nietzsche do here. — ssu

He'd be banned for excessive use of exclamation points. Well, I'd ban him for that, anyway.

mercan cowboys were also mostly black or Mexican.

Myth making at work again. — Banno

Yes. The vaqueros taught the whites how to do it.

Racists, homophobes, sexists, Nazi sympathisers, etc.: We don't consider your views worthy of debate, and you'll be banned for espousing them. — ssu

It's a good thing Heidegger isn't a poster, then. Chortle. I'm incorrigible.

Well, it's the perfect stylised cartoon of mid-century male identity - a rugged individualist who keeps his mouth shut most of the time, can handle himself in a fight and who opened up his nation with just a dream, his bare hands and a Colt. — Tom Storm

Cowboys were drovers, taking cattle from point A to point B. They traveled in groups. They probably weren't paid well, and their lives were likely dreary and monotonous, unless there was a stampede. With the exception of Rawhide, I don't know if any of the old westerns dealt with actual cowboys.
They instead focused on lawmen, gunfighters, bounty hunters, gamblers and such.

Until 1958 we educated for independent thinking. That gets you the John Wayne role model. — Athena

In the 1950s we became fascinated with the Victorian-era migrant workers called cowboys, and turned them into heroes of the large and small screens. I know Marion played quite a few of those roles, but it's never seemed to me to be much to aspire to, and I've always been a bit bewildered by the role played by the cowboy in our culture. Bewildered by Marion's role as well, for that matter.

I've wondered why the 1950s are looked upon as a kind of golden era, and think that very few who lived in that time were independent thinkers. It seems to me that people did as much as possible what others were doing, and that any independence in thought, personal appearance and culture was frowned upon. Perhaps that's why many find the ideal of the 1950s so attractive, especially now, when people who get attention are less and less like those we heard of, emulated and saw on TV back then. People who were admired as men and for their manliness were who, then, in realty and not in fantasy? Family men, bread winners, company men, golfers, Charles Atlas, Superman, Gary Cooper in High Noon?

Calling "the left" or Liberalism loony or something along those lines is an old tactic of those of "the right" (I won't say "Conservatives" as I think they've gone into hiding, and rightly so, though they indulged in this tactic as well). They perceive themselves as hard-headed realists, and those of the left as utopian at best. That self-perception is laughable now, of course. Mr. Bolton seems something of a loon himself.

The Man with No Name certainly must be taken into account.

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly is of course a classic, but of Eastwood's Western films I particularly enjoyed High Plains Drifter for its oddness and Eastwood's portrayal of its mysterious anti-hero.

Have Gun. Will Travel was also a radio show. You can hear it on Sirius/XM Radio Classics.

(If I am wrong please let me know!) — BigThoughtDropper

You're wrong. About me, in any case. About age, in any case.

If we are to use actors who played cowboys, or cowboy characters, as examples of masculinity, I'd choose Richard Boone as Paladin in the old TV show Have Gun. Will Travel. A hired gun or mercenary, and therefore dangerous when necessary, but urbane, well-read, sophisticated, and with a sense of justice.

For those tempted to comment on this OP, there is a clear, erudite summation of metaethics, in the SEP article. — Banno

I will not be led into temptation to comment on "the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice" and so will be delivered thereby from considering the presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and practice regarding evil.

That said, John Dewey.

P.S. Amen

My response has been that you could have a legal system where that is not the case. I'd think the law within the limits of the Vatican are the sort that demand an analysis of a higher power. But to both yours and my experience within the confines of our system, the law is not stricken or claimed null and void simply because it violates the rules of nature. I don't think the same holds true within theocracies. — Hanover

It's possible I'm too inflexible when it comes to the use of the word "law." I may be too concerned that unhelpful confusion will result from what I think of as its misuse. You mentioned the "laws of physics." That's a common use of the word, and I shouldn't disregard that fact. I think of that as something of a metaphor, though. Those "laws" are readily definable, though, and even indisputable. I don't think that's the case with "natural law" or "higher law." I have the same concern regarding the use of the word "rights." I think we know what legal rights are, or can at least identify them from the positive law. I don't think that's the case with "natural rights." Here in the U.S. it seems some of us think they have the "right" to do what they please. I think we tend to think that what we believe are our rights are the same thing as legal rights, when they're not. Our "right to free speech" for example.

And to you. I suspect we'll dispute over some topic again. That's what lawyers do, after all; perhaps even former lawyers.

I would not only agree, but I would say that rests in competition for understatement of the millennium. :grin: — James Riley

Well, it took us a while, but we got there eventually.

What would ideally be a law, or what we hope the law and legal systems would be, are different from what is the law and what the legal system is, here and now. I don't think this can reasonably be disputed, and I think that is in essence all Austin and Ciceronianus said in the OP.

It doesn't ignore the law (one can't ignore a stick across the back), it just refuses to accept it as law (because it fails to conform to an assumed standard). — James Riley

That's a position which--I think--is similar to the position taken by the client who goes to court insisting that justice be done, even when told that it may not be forthcoming, only to find that what he/she thinks is a just result makes no difference to what takes place. The client may find the result is not right, that if "real law" applied the result would be otherwise. But it makes no difference to what actually is decided or how it's decided, except possibly in very rare cases. I think it's futile to insist on the "reality" of that which makes no difference.

[
I can't speak to what you or others think this thread is intended to answer, or what it's about, but I think the OP raised what I wanted to address. First I noted my agreement with this statement made by John Austin:

The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.

Then I made this statement, and asked what others thought of it:

The belief that the law must conform to an "assumed standard" of some kind, and isn't the law if it does not, ignores the law; it doesn't explain it. It leads to a fundamental ignorance of the nature of the law and its operation.

I remain convinced that what Austin said, and what I claimed in the OP, are correct.

You may find this surprising, but I agree with everything you just said. — James Riley

Really? Sometimes I marvel at my ability to misunderstand people.

I've always wanted to practice before a Tribal Court. I don't know why. Probably because it's something I've never done.

I've been a lawyer my entire adult life--or, at least, what passes for a lawyer in the uncouth, rude, semi-savage region in which I practice. It may surprise you to learn I've appeared not only in what we call circuit or county courts, but in the appellate courts of this state. I've even, from time to time, put on my best suit, hitched horses to my wagon and traveled to the big cities to appear before the Federal District and Circuit Courts which hold sway here, where one might spend a lifetime searching for a spittoon and not find one. Truth to tell, I've even litigated matters involving constitutional and civil rights issues over the years.

I tell this sad story in the hope of explaining that I view the law as I think a practicing lawyer does; as a vast, growing, sometimes changing, mass of statutes, regulations, court decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals, enforcement mechanisms, penalties and civil liabilities the interaction with which rarely, if ever, involves what I consider moral or ethical questions. I therefore sympathize with philosophies of law which study the operation of the law as a working system, not as something which must comport with or must or does rely upon "true law" or "higher law" or "natural law." I find speculation along such lines to be largely irrelevant to the operation of the law, frankly, and its operation and its impact on our lives would seem to me to be its primary significance. How the law developed seems to me to be a question for historians; why we make laws may be something the social sciences can address.

So, when it comes to the relationship between morality and the law, I tend towards the position taken, for example, by O.W. Holmes, Jr. in The Path of the Law. Holmes wasn't exactly a legal positivist, and is considered to be the father of American Legal Realism, but the view of legal positivism regarding morality and the law is similar. I tend toward that position based in part at least on my experience of clients who want to litigate expensively and endlessly in pursuit of justice, or the right or good, or over matters of principle, although warned that the result won't necessarily be just, right or good, because courts are courts of law, not justice, as Holmes once noted to someone appearing before him.

There will be instances where moral concerns motivate legislators or judges. I would maintain, though, that the law has expanded so much since the days in which Riggs v. Palmer was decided, and now impacts so many aspects of life, business, and government, that at least as far as judges are concerned, those considerations only rarely form the basis of a decision. Recourse may be made to such considerations in the absence of law, but there's so much law now that this is less and less necessary.

I've now read Riggs v. Palmer and am, of course, a better and wiser person as a result. But I haven't been so impressed by it that I'm persuaded that legal positivism (as I understand it) has been refuted, or even brought into question. It is after all a single decision, and I'd like to think that philosophers of law wouldn't consider it determinative, or even representative of the law as a system on that basis. Its holding was based on several grounds, including what I think are well established rules that in construing legislation the end in view is to determine the intent of the legislature, and that in construing wills courts should determine and follow the intent of the testator. Interestingly, this maxim regarding the interpretation of wills is such that the testator's intent is to be followed even if that intent is contrary to the "natural objects of his bounty" as I think the phrase is. So, courts will enforce wills even if they result in natural heirs receiving nothing, and the estate distributed to a local strip club, for example. I'm uncertain whether that rule has its basis in natural law.

So, one of the questions raised was whether, since the law of probate is intended to promote the orderly conveyance of property of a decedent in accordance with a will, it would be the intent of the legislature which adopted the governing statutes that a decedent's murderer would receive the estate. That of course would depend on the intent of the testator. Would a testator intend that his/her murderer receive the estate? Probably not. Is that judgment dependent on natural, or true, or higher law? The court then proceeds to consider matters more properly defined as based in morality.

I don't know how much it matters to the law, as an operating system, why laws are generally obeyed. I think it's more likely people obey them, when they do, because they believe the consequences of violating them--potential civil damages, criminal penalties, costs of defense--make it sensible to do so, not because they believe them to be based on a "higher law." But again, I think the "higher law" whatever it may be is less and less a factor as the law grows, and other considerations, economic and social play a greater part in the functioning of the legal system.

This comment really deprives this debate of any significance. — Hanover

Okay.

You're right of course. I should have known that it's impossible to comment intelligently on legal positivism without being familiar with the case of Riggs v. Palmer. And no doubt the jurisdiction in which I practice isn't one worthy of recognition, not really. I'll retire from the field with what dignity I have left.

Sorry all, but I must depart this thread to actually practice law, which means dealing with laws that exist, not laws that I think exist, or should exist. It's a useful distinction for a lawyer to make. But not a philosopher, it seems.

Once a moral principle is employed in making a law it makes it a law. — James Riley

So, a moral principle becomes a law in that case?

So, Natural law is a set of moral principles. The law is not. Right?

However, there was nothing in the written law that prevented him from doing so. In fact the law of inheritance was crystal clear on the issue. The courts invoked a legal principle: "one should not legally benefit from one's own crimes" and withheld the inheritance. If we hold on to the principe of ciceronianus that law is law the courts have acted unlawfully. Did they? even positivists are hard pressed here. Dworkin argued that when law is as lawyers do we have to accept legal principles as a part of law. — Tobias

So, the law provided that someone who murdered X was entitled to his X's estate?

I don't know the case referred to. I don't think a legal positivist would be obliged to contend that the law, once adopted, can never change, however, or cannot be interpreted. Where I practice, those who murder a decedent cannot share in his/her estate by statute.

If there was nothing expressly prohibiting the court from ruling as it did, then it seems to me there was nothing prohibiting it from interpreting the law (statute) in such a fashion, e.g., that it would not have an absurd result--one in which a murderer is entitled to the estate of the one he murdered.

Regardless, though I haven't maintained that morals and moral principles are never employed in making or interpreting, or enforcing laws. My only point is that doesn't make morals or moral principles law.

You will have that feeling because of Natural Law. — James Riley

I wonder why you insist on calling such feelings "Natural Law."

I say all this because, as it seems, you're not objecting to what the law says. You're objecting to any claim that the law comes from anywhere other than the hand of man. You're also not denying that there are rules that derive from a source beyond man. You just refuse to call those rules "laws." — Hanover

I object to what many laws say. Alas, the fact I object to them has nothing to do with whether or not they exist.

I think it's a misuse of language to call something a law which doesn't have any resemblance to a positive law. I think it's possible to make reasonable judgments, of fact and value, and other matters in the scope of human conduct, but don't believe these judgments derive from a "source beyond man" or that in making such judgments we act in accordance with "laws" adopted or imposed by God. Nature, as I understand it, adopts nothing; it makes no laws, it simply is, and we're a part of it. We know things and can infer things from our interaction with the rest of Nature, but that doesn't mean that there are laws inherent in it which govern how we should behave in the sense that a law would.