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You're thinking like a lawyer, not a philosopher. Except that we're at a philosophy forum. — baker

Even philosophers manage to live as part of the world, whether they want or not. Some even hire lawyers when they encounter problems of a certain kind in that world. Never philosophers, I think. Why not?

But must these judgments amount to a certainty that justifies burning people at the stakes? — baker

Judgments made with the understanding that they cannot be made with absolute certainty aren't made with certainty. Your thinking of religion, not the law.

People who are not lawyers and otherwise not in the business of professionally judging others, can get by just fine without pronouncing definitive judgments upon others, and can instead live with tentative. — baker

Lawyers don't judge, unless they're judges as well and their function is to judge, except in matters within the authority of a jury. Good judges know the law, like everything else, is uncertain. Even legal precedent isn't binding, as our Supreme Court Justices like to say when it suits them.

That was actually the prevailing belief back then: that children are just like adults, only smaller. The belief was that children were only quantitatively different from adults, but not qualitatively. — baker

Ah, well. They were painting them quantitatively then.

The quotes are because the term ‘create’ has connotations beyond what is intended in this context. There is no simple way to convey the gist. The basic tenet I’m criticising is the instinctive notion of the mind independence of phenomenal objects. — Wayfarer

Well, if it's instinctive, it must be wrong.

Minds 'create' the objects of perception, not in the sense that they're otherwise or previously non-existent, but insofar as they're object of cognition (and reason, for us.) — Wayfarer

Which is to say they don't create them, eh? Thus the quotation marks. It's a metaphor only. The problem arises when we (or others) don't recognize that's the case, or disregard it. Perhaps analytic philosophy is aware of this in a way phenomenology and enactivism is not.

A better answer is the obvious point that there are different ways of using an expression such as "I see the flower". — Banno

And one of those is an affected way.

There is no flower with four petals , or any other visually identifiable object, until we first establish these relational interactions between ourselves and the world.
— Joshs
I don't agree. The flower has four petals regardless of what you suppose. That we see, feel, count or believe that it has four petals is incidental, post hoc. — Banno

I think what's at work here might be called a "hypertechnical" approach to questions, and meaning. What do we mean when we say "I see X"? To answer (if indeed we can answer) requires detailed and specific knowledge of how we see X, which requires consideration of anatomical, neurological, physiological processes within our bodies, the quality of and nature of the object X, its ecology and that of the person who sees it, the experiences of that person and the culture in which the person lives...indeed, the consideration of all aspects of the world itself. Many of these factors will vary from person to person, of course. The result is we don't see X. We see whatever it is that's the result of their interaction.

Ah, if only we were in a court of law. I would object to your "response" as being unresponsive, and I think any Judge in the external world would sustain the objection.

In the rarefied realm of philosophy, so removed from the world of the sensible (a little pun on my part), there's no need for you to respond to direct questions, of course.

Have you ever thought that those children in pre-Renaissance painting actually were little adults? Or just that the artists who painted them thought they were?

A history of art book offers a chronology of changes of socially shaped ways of perceiving. In many respects, this has involved leaning to ‘unsee’ previous socially formed notions of how things present themselves to us. Greek sculptors unsaw the rigid, depersonalized statues of the Egyptians, Assyrians and Mesopotamians when they discovered the inner dynamism of human beings. Renaissance artists had to unsee the inherited idea of a perspective-free landscape, no unifying light source and children depicted as tiny adults. Impressionist painters learned to unsee objects reflecting only a narrow band of colors onto the eye in favor of trees, skies and seas composed of every color in the rainbow. Expressionists taught themselves to unsee scenes in which subjective mood played no part in how things appear., giving us Van Gogh’s Starry Night and Munch’s Scream. — Joshs

Are you claiming that the ancient Egyptians and others perceived each other as rigid and depersonalized, expressionless? That the Greeks discovered the inner dynamism of human beings (whatever that may mean)--those before them were unaware that humans could do more than stand and sit (referring to statutes) or could laugh or cry? People before the Renaissance thought children looked like tiny adults--that's why they drew them that way? That before the Impressionists, people didn't perceive all the colors of the rainbow?

If so, why not say so? I suspect you don't. You refer instead to how particular artists depicted people, something which may vary for many reasons, some technological, some cultural. On what basis do you conflate what we see with what we paint or sculpt? If you do that, I suppose it's easy enough to conflate what we see with what we dream or hallucinate.

I have a phenomenological state that seems to me to be elicited by an external stimuli, but I know that it can be elicited without it because people dream and some people have hallucinations elicited by brain injury, direct brain stimulation, drug use, or perhaps some sort of mental illness. — Hanover

Why engage in this kind of categorization? We're referring to processes, not isolated events or things. When a person is walking, the image of a person walking doesn't take form in their minds, which then induce their legs to move appropriately. They simply walk. People who dream are dreaming. They're having a dream (not encountering images coming into being in their minds). People who have hallucinations are hallucinating, for whatever reason. They have hallucinations (there are no images or sounds or things that they encounter). People who see a flower see a flower (not a sense datum or combination of them). People who look at a radar screen are looking at a radar screen (not an airplane, not a "blip").

Legal professional full time; back in school (conjoint LLB (law) and BA in Philosophy undergrad). — AmadeusD

You poor fellow. Exactly my background.

If I have an image of the flower in my mind after I close my eyes, I experience the phenomenal state of the flower with my eyes closed. — Hanover

Do you really think there is an image of the flower in your mind? Is that image the phenomenal state you refer to, or is the image distinct from the phenomenal state?

I don't disagree with that, but my point was that these ancient schools had metaphysical ideas which underpinned their ethical practices. It is arguable that different ideas, different metaphysical assumptions, work for different people. It is also arguable that none of them are truth-apt. Thus, their truth or falsity is not the significant issue, but rather their efficacy in producing misery or happiness is. — Janus

I'm uncertain what metaphysical ideas you think underpin feelings of pain or unhappiness and judgments regarding how to avoid it. If they amount to "ideas" such as that there is an "external world" which has things in it which cause us pain or unhappiness, then I think we're speaking of what I've been calling affectation. I don't think this sort of metaphysics was indulged in by the Stoics, at least.

The independence of that truth produces anxiety that we might fall victim to hallucination, madness, illusion. We doubt the reality of our world, which is different than saying we doubt that there is such a thing as a real world. — Joshs

How often does that happen? When was the last time you genuinely doubted the reality of the world, in general and not in a particular context? What happened when you did? I think our conduct is the best measure of the reality of our claimed doubt of reality.

I know next to nothing of phenomenology, but something of pragmatism (that of Dewey, at least) and OLP and related criticisms of traditional metaphysics and epistemology, and find them persuasive. I'm just trying to take a different approach; unsuccessfully, perhaps, but I think it's interesting.

Both Stoicism and Epicureanism had their metaphysics which are not empirically testable. It would seem there are as many "practical wisdoms" as there are practical pursuits; beyond demonstrable efficacy in those contexts how would we measure practical wisdom or test for its presence? — Janus

What kind of conduct and thought makes us miserable and how to avoid them seems demonstrable enough in most cases.

What would be absurd is doubting them in every instance. — Banno

Right. As for logic, unwarranted extrapolation is a logical fallacy, I think.

I'm not sure of the extent to which philosophy "goes beyond the criteria exercised in the empirical domain." There's practical wisdom after all, in which I think would be included the philosophies of ancient schools like Stoicism and Epicureanism, but I'm not sure what you refer to.

So why does he doubt? Quite simply to avoid the fate of Galileo at the hands of the Church. Doubt is for Descartes a rhetorical device. In the terms of this thread it was an affectation. — Fooloso4

That's an interesting view. An affectation of necessity, as it were. That demon would be very handy in that case. Thank you for that insight.

But in philosophy, where consensus seems impossible, as opposed to science where it is operative, who decides what is the best evidence or the best basis for judgment, or what wisdom consists in? — Janus

Unless we're content with philosophy being a kind of intellectual scrum or free for all, we should make the best judgments we can using the same general method we use to make intelligent judgments in life and in science.

I don’t think it’s coincidence that Peirce buttressed his epistemic realism with a belief in God. I should also mention that Dewey, James and Mead ‘doubted’ the grounding of Peirce’s ‘pragmaticism’. — Joshs

Peirce famously doubted James' Pragmatism as well, and so began calling his philosophy "Pragmaticism" to distinguish it from that of Wild Bill. I think Peirce came to accept Dewey's views as similar to his in some respects, though, and that Dewey would agree with his criticism of Descartes' faux doubt among other things. I know nothing of Mead's views of Peirce, or Peirce's view of Mead if he had any.

I mentioned earlier that your own grounding of everyday knowledge in assured belief may be susceptible to doubt on the part of certain contemporary philosophies. — Joshs

I'm not sure what you mean by "assured belief." I like Dewey's somewhat clumsy phrase "warranted assertability." All judgments are subject to revision, though.

It seems to me you’re trying to arrive at the conclusion these two reach without taking the extra step they take in bypassing epistemic belief entirely. — Joshs

Well, in this thread I've been interested in exploring a different route, i.e. why it is that some even take the position that we can't know what's "in the external world" given the fact that our conduct, and indeed how we live, belies that claim.

By giving up epistemic belief as the ultimate basis of knowing in favor of language games, you eliminate skepticism concerning the existence of the world, but you turn that world into a place of relativism. After all, if evidence is no longer the adjudicator of the real, then my culture’s world doesn’t have to jibe with your culture’s world. — Joshs

I don't understand why you think I take the position that "evidence is no longer the adjudicator of the real." Our interaction with the rest of the world and its results are the best evidence we have of the real.

https://www.thoughtco.com/vice-admiral-horatio-nelson-2361155

The bigger question is why did he take to wearing his bicorne to match his shoulders? Was this to assert his yet to be articulated status as a Nietzsche's superman? — Tom Storm

The "side to side" bicorne hat was actually quite popular at the time. Here's Admiral Nelson wearing his version. The new-fangled "for and aft" bicorne hat eventually became more popular.

That sure looks Russian to me.

For Descartes God ensures that we have rational facilities which allow us to tell truth from error in our dealings with things. For Kant, it was our innate categories which steered us in the right direction. — Joshs

And don't forget George Berkeley, the Irish priest who thought material things were just malarkey. God saved us all in his thinking as well.

I'm with Peirce in thinking that we shouldn't doubt in philosophy what we don't doubt in our hearts (which I take to refer to how we act and what we do, regardless of what we may say). So although the philosophers in question may figure something out to remedy their "doubt" the question remains why they "doubt" in the first place, which it seems comes down to a belief that we just are incapable of knowing by nature.

There is no guarantee that these appearances give us exhaustive knowledge of how things are or that the nature of things is not (at least partially) hidden from us. — Janus

No guarantee if one is one the Quest for Certainty, I suppose. But in this unhappy, imperfect universe we must make judgments without the benefit of absolute knowledge, on the best evidence available at the time we make them. And we do, in real life, if we're wise.

One of my favorite stories of Diogenes. The other is the one where he held up a plucked chicken and said "Behold Plato's Man!"

I think Goethe, and other admirers of the Emperor, became inclined, after he fell from power, to acknowledge that he was extraordinary but also flawed. I suppose that's consistent with being a Romantic Hero. Even many of Napoleon's enemies respected his abilities, such as Talleyrand, who said of him that it was a pity such a great man had such bad manners.

Ah. I see what you mean.

I think (but I'm not certain) that painting is supposed to be of Napoleon at the head of his army during the 1814 campaign, before his exile to Elba.

He certainly wasn't the "World Spirit" incarnate, whatever that's supposed to mean. He was a great hero to the Romantics. He was enormously talented and intelligent in some respects. Perhaps if he remained First Counsel and limited himself to putting France's affairs in order after the Revolution he'd be remember as more than just a conqueror. Though it seems none of the European great powers were willing to tolerate a France ruled by anyone but a Bourbon.

The question will always be left open as to what extent the mind makes contact with external substance. We only escape this doubt when we cease to assume the idea of intrinsic substance, and opt instead for a radical interconnectedness of subject and object ( Hegelian dialectics, phenomenology, pragmatism, hermeneutics). — Joshs

It seems to me that the view that we can never know the extent to which we (I don't think our minds are separate from us) make contact with the rest of the world is far more radical than the view that we do. The latter is based on what actually takes place to our knowledge when we interact with the rest of the world; the former is based on the belief that what takes place when we do so doesn't matter. What actually happens when we interact with the "external world" is apparently of no value.

The salient point here is that sometimes we have to take it on trust that there is or might be something wrong with us, or that we have a blindness of some kind, even though we can at best recognize this blindness only indirectly. This having to take things on trust is a significant vulnerability. — baker

I'm not sure if "on trust" is entirely accurate. I think it would be more a case of making a judgment based on the weight of the evidence, which may be indirect. What's the probability that everyone without the problem would lie to us, or be mistaken?

Hegel saw Napoleon as well. Here's what he wrote about the experience:

“I saw the Emperor – this world-soul – riding out of the city on reconnaissance. It is indeed a wonderful sensation to see such an individual, who, concentrated here at a single point, astride a horse, reaches out over the world and masters it.”

Goethe said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue.

He was remarkable, in any case. I doubt I'll go to see this movie. If I see it, it will be from a comfy chair in my living room whenever it appears before me. I wish Kubrick had completed the movie of Napoleon he wanted to make.

Your question, as I took it, was why we should ever doubt the accuracy of what we see before us, and that should we so doubt, we do it disingenuously. — Hanover

There may be instances where doubt is appropriate. I'm trying to address the view that we should doubt in all cases, or cannot know in any case. That view may be based on unwarranted extrapolation from unusual cases to all cases, confusion, or misuse of language, as some philosophers have noted.

I wonder if there are other factors involved which incline some of us to question whether we can really know anything about the world. The reason I wonder that arises from the fact, which I don't think can reasonably be disputed, that we clearly act like we know something about, as we interact with it all the time, change it in various respects, create new constituents of it from existing constituents (furniture, cars, etc.), consume portions of it, and do many things with it all the time, simply by virtue of the fact that we live in it. We do that in most cases without any concern whatsoever that what we interact with may not really be what we think it is, or may be actually be something else. We have no concern, I think, because we have no reason to think that in most cases, and generally can arrive at any explanation in those instances when we do have reason. Why doubt when there's no persuasive reason to doubt?

The point of all of this is responsive to what I think is the larger inquiry, and that is whether folks like Descartes are foolish to question that which no one has a basis to question. I think the above discussion does provide such a basis. — Hanover

That's a fairly good summary of what I think--that's it's (generally) foolish to question that which no one has a basis to question. I disagree with you, though, as nothing I've seen in this thread provides such a basis.

There likely are things about the universe we can't know. We're not omniscient. We're human. These aren't particularly profound observations. It doesn't follow from this that we can't know anything, or can't know what is real.

Things we see are actually made up of things we can't see (though they have been determined). Very well. Again, we're human. We see in most cases exactly what we should see, being human. If that's the case, why is it that what we see isn't really what's there?

When we say we can't know what the world really or actually, I think we make certain assumptions, the primary of which is the assumption that there is something that is real behind what we experience which can't be determined. Something hidden from us because of our nature. It's a kind of religious view, perhaps.

We are in fact "blind in some regard" whether you believe. You can't see ultraviolet, hear high frequencies, taste certain flavors, feel minute variations, or smell certain smells. — Hanover

Which is merely to say that we're human beings. One might say the same of any living creature. Are they "blind" as well? We must be omnipotent, be God then, in order not to be "blind"? It seems a rather unusual way to use the word.

Again, by what criteria do you judge whether some belief or assumption or philosophy is an affectation? — Luke

In this case, by conduct; by how those who maintain that we cannot know the nature of what we deal with everyday, or experience it, or some variant of that position, act every moment. Conduct indicates we have no doubt at all regarding the nature and use of the cup from which we drink coffee (or regarding coffee, for that matter).

One might say "well, that's just how I act in everyday life, not when I'm doing philosophy" or "well, I really do doubt, I just don't act like I doubt" but such responses aren't persuasive, really. They're aspects of the affectation. What can be more natural to us than how we live, how we actually interact with the rest of the world?

My perception of the apple is blurred without the glasses. If I never had glasses, I would assume the apple and the blurriness were one in the same. My assumption is that there are other distortions between the apple and my perception that are not correctible or that they are correctible by means I don't yet know about. — Hanover

People who have significant eyesight problems generally know this is the case. Someone nearsighted will come to understand that what appears blurry to them at a distance won't appear blurry when closer to them, and as they live in an environment with others with no such problems, will come to know that they have a problem others don't have. Someone blind will come to know others are not. I think it's unlikely that the nearsighted and the blind will conclude that all are nearsighted and all are blind.

I don't understand the "controversy." Some individuals may be considered "great." Clearly, it doesn't follow from this that "we" are "great." Neither does the fact that "we" are great mean that each of us are "great."

I don't see how this addresses my previous post. — Luke

Again, I'm referring to "affectation" as defined by Merriam-Webster online as I said in the OP:

Affectation" according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, is:

"a. Speech or conduct not natural to oneself: an unnatural form of behavior meant especially to impress others; b. the act of taking on or displaying an attitude not natural to oneself or not genuinely felt."

I wouldn't consider it "natural to myself" to believe that someone across the street from me is 5 inches tall, but would consider it "natural to myself" to by surprised by, and to dispute, someone who did believe that.

I would presume that with my glasses off, I do not see objects as they are, but more as they are blurred. — Hanover

Well, does the fact that they appear blurred to you with your glasses off persuade you they are or may be blurred?

C: Look, there's Sulla across the street
X: I had no idea he's only 5 inches tall.
C: What the hell are you talking about?
X: Well, look at him. Look at my finger. He's only slightly bigger than it.
C: Are you serious?
X: Oh my God, he's growing!
C: He's just crossing the street towards us.
X: How do you know he's not growing? He looked small, now he looks bigger. If you're right, then we can't trust our own sense of sight.
C: Do you actually think he's growing?
X: Well, he might be. He might not. Why do you think differently? What's wrong with you? You're the crazy one.

Am I overmining too much from the Kennedy Assassination? Do you think in some counterfactual history, if Kennedy lived, the course of the very radical changes in culture would have went differently? Would the traditionalist mores of post war America the post war 40s, 50s and early 60s have continued into the late 60s ups and on into today? — schopenhauer1

We Boomers were, in general, uniquely privileged in American history (with some obvious exceptions). I'm inclined to attribute most of the American "counterculture" (not including the Civil Rights movement, which I think was something different) to those of us who were especially spoiled by the favorable post WWII economic climate. Our parents endured that war and the Great Depression. Most of us were relatively well off, thanks to our parents. Vietnam caused some fear in us, but many were protected by exemptions. We were remarkably free to do as we pleased. We had the opportunity to experiment in new ways of thinking and acting others never had. Now, we simply want security. And money.

Look at us now. Indeed, look at us most any time since 1975. Where are the protestors, revolutionaries of the past? What "radical changes in culture" have taken place, through our efforts?

I doubt the myth of Kennedy and Camelot. JFK was a pragmatist (small "p"). He'd do what was necessary to get votes, though he might do it with more style and wit than other politicians. I don't think he'd have withdrawn from Vietnam.

"Not everyone who says to Me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ shall enter the kingdom of heaven, but he who does the will of My Father in heaven." (Matthew 7:21) — Dermot Griffin

And then there is John 14:6: "I am the way, the truth and the light. No one comes to the Father except through me."

There is a strand of universalism in Catholicism — Wayfarer

Well, it comes with the name, of course, as you hint. Catholicus in Latin, katholikos in Greek, meaning "universal" roughly.