I quite understand that you'd rather not be an advocate for the claims that were made about Christianity. There's no reason to be concerned about that, really. It's quite alright.

A discussion of the contributions of the Christian religion to Enlightenment values and the rights of individuals--especially those of women--seems to me out of place in a thread about incels. It's true, though, that the conduct of many Catholic priests serve as examples of the potentially harmful results of sexual frustration, though primarily to children, not women. So perhaps there is a connection of a sort.

Regardless, I'd be happy to discuss those supposed contributions if anyone cares to do so.

No, not ironic. Impervious to irony, it seems.

But I would think it should still be obvious. I think your comments regarding Christianity (which some would say includes Catholicism and Protestantism) are mistaken, remarkably so, in fact. But I didn't want to derail the thread by addressing them.

You know what CM is saying and you know they mean it. This is just passive-aggressive baloney. — T Clark

You seem an intrusive, prickly, sanctimonious sort. But I hope you're not.

In fact I even think Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism following it, played an essential role in the formation of enlightenment ideals of equality, giving rise to individual rights and feminism. In other words, It's not the realization that those traditional norms existed without reason that gave rise those progressive ideas, they precisely followed from and are a logical conclusion of christian values (who were an inversion of Roman values, and pagan values, that came before). — ChatteringMonkey

I'm hopeful you're being ironic, but fear you're not. But I don't want to derail this thread. I couldn't help but take note of these remarkable statements, however.

he argument I bring is that there is no logical reason why we should change the status quo of gender and sex being separate, and that one's gender has nothing to do with one's sex, or societies laws and divisions by sex. We should never be frightened and confused of asking questions or examining our presuppositions. I think fear and confusion comes when change is made without adequate reason and/or poorly explained. — Philosophim

My reference to being frightened and confused was a reference to an old Saturday Night Live skit involving the "Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer," a character played by the late, great Phil Hartman.

In fact, though, we should be careful what we do with the law. We're seeing laws, regulations and policies being adopted willy-nilly (as I said, I'm old) addressing gender already. No doubt there's more to come.

I am open of course to hearing whether society should change the meaning of certain words or laws and regulations. — Philosophim

I'd try to avoid changing or adopting law based on what people think themselves to be, however strongly and genuinely, myself. But I'm old, and your world frightens and confuses me.

Human consciousness of the law is generating the fear, not the law per se. — quintillus

The Stoics would say that what disturbs us are not things, but our judgments about them (to paraphrase Epictetus). That would apply not only to possibilities, but to what applies now. So, the law is the law, the weather is the weather, but how we judge them is in our control. To the Stoic, one need not fear the law. But one may know the law (the weather too) and assess its impact on potential action. I would say it's wise to do that, regardless of its ontological status.

I am simply saying that no given state of affairs, e.g. law, determines persons to act; nor do persons, nor can persons, determine themselves to act due to law. It is only out of the fear of serious punishment that persons do nothing of what is putatively prohibited by law. — quintillus

The penalty is a part of the law, though; it wouldn't exist but for the law. So, the fear is engendered by the law. It seems to me you're saying, then, that the law influences the choice.

iceroianus,
You, striving to validly designate something given as determinative of conduct, asked: "Is the weather determinative of human conduct? '' I decently explained why weather cannot be determinative of conduct. Hence, you situated me in an absurd situation. I was kind to you and politely answered you. Now, you unkindly radically insult me, by accusing me of uninteresting pronouncement, in response to your inane question. — quintillus

If you're making some claim to the effect that "the law must be changed" or "the law is ineffective" many would agree with you. If you're making some claim to the effect that "the law doesn't impact or influence human conduct" I think you're wrong. If you're saying something else about the law, I confess I don't know what it is you're saying.

Weather is wholly concrete physical substance which exists as entirely equivalent to itself; whereas a human being never coincides with itself, being always elsewhere, projected out unto a not yet, intended, future. Persons freely choose responses to given weather, weather does not choose human responses. — quintillus

Frankly, I may misunderstand you, but I wonder if your pronouncements (there doesn't seem to be another word for them, though "proclamations" come to mind) are, ultimately, uninteresting. Weather and law are givens (you say that about the law in another post). That much we may agree on. But we're organisms that are part of an environment, and our lives consist of interactions with the rest of the world of which we're a part.

Now, one can of course say that "I choose to wear a parka or something similarly warm when I walk through a blizzard on a windy day when wind chills are -20 Fahrenheit", or that "I choose to walk around a tree rather than walking into it." I could also say that "if I wanted to, I could choose to walk through a blizzard wearing a speedo", or "I could choose to blithely walk into a tree." I would in those cases be an imbecile, but I can choose to be one if I want.

So, the weather and the tree don't choose for me. Q.E.D.

If that's your point, it's hardly a novel or a remarkable insight.

Nobody would seriously claim that the weather or the law choose anything, of course. But the weather and other givens (including the law) influence or impact the choices we make in those circumstances where their application would have adverse consequences if particular choices are made rather than others. That may be the case only when we're aware of the consequences, and are intelligent enough to consider them, and capable of weighing means and ends and making an intelligent decision. It may not be the case if we cannot do so for one reason or another, or have desires which make the potential for adverse consequences or the consequences themselves irrelevant or of little or no concern, of course, If that's the case, though, it is because of other givens with which we must deal.

It is, ultimately, not merely incorrect to deem law to be determinative of human conduct, it is delusional. — quintillus

Is the weather determinative of human conduct?

Making laws is something we do. Homo juridicus, or something like that. Maybe homo legistoris?

Regardless, we won't stop making laws because they're "ontologically impossible." The law doesn't predict conduct, it assumes nothing. It's ascribed to, or it isn't. It's effective, or it's not.

The existence of a law is one thing, its merits or demerits is are another thing. Whether a law be, is one inquiry; whether it ought to be or whether it agree with a given or assumed test, is another and a distinct inquiry. The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. --John Austin

The Oxford Dictionary used to state that a mystic was 'one initiated into the [Greek] Mystery religions', although the definition has now been broadened. — Wayfarer

Much broader, in fact. Of course, if we define "mystic" as an initiate into the mysteries, there were one hell of a lot of mystics back then. There were a good number of mystery cults. But it means something more, now, which I think can't be associated with the Eleusinian mysteries.

Merriam Webster:

Mystic; noun
1: a follower of a mystical way of life
2: an advocate of a theory of mysticism

Mystical; adjective
1. a : having a spiritual meaning or reality that is neither apparent to the senses nor obvious to the intelligence
the mystical food of the sacrament
b: involving or having the nature of an individual's direct subjective communion with God or ultimate reality
the mystical experience of the Inner Light

Mysticism, noun
1: the experience of mystical union or direct communion with ultimate reality reported by mystics
2: the belief that direct knowledge of God, spiritual truth, or ultimate reality can be attained through subjective experience (such as intuition or insight)

Cambridge Dictionary

Mystic, noun:
someone who attempts to be united with God through prayer:

Mystic, adjective:
relating to magic or having magic powers, especially of a secret, dark, or mysterious kind:

I think we use the word differently, now. What distinguished the ancient mysteries was knowledge of a sort, which was arrived at through rituals which were secret, hence mysterious.

Cicero wrote of the Eleusinian mysteries in his On the Laws:

For it appears to me that among the many exceptional and divine things your Athens has produced and contributed to human life, nothing is better than those mysteries. For by means of them we have transformed from a rough and savage way of life to the state of humanity, and have been civilized. Just as they are called initiations, so in actual fact we have learned from them the fundamentals of life, and have grasped the basis not only for living with joy but also for dying with a better hope.”

A more ecstatic, magical mystery cult was that of Dionysus. From what we know of the mysteries of Eleusis, they were more refined. A kinder, gentler mystery cult. The revelation wasn't received in the mist of frenzy, or in a sudden burst of communion with God, but through contemplation and ritual, over a period of days.

Interesting fact: Plato was a mystic, as defined by textbooks: 'initiate of the Greek mystery religions' (probably one of the orphic cults). — Wayfarer

Those of Eleusis, by my understanding. Eleusis was quite handy to those in Athens; not far away at all, relatively speaking.

But being an initiate didn't make one a mystic, at least as we understand the word. Many were initiated, including Alcibiades who is infamous for mocking the mysteries in public. Augustus, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius and even Commodus among the Roman Emperors were initiated to those mysteries; Julian as well, of course, being one of the last to be initiated. Cicero too. Aristotle also. I'm not sure any of them would have been called "mystics" as we use the word, with the exception of Julian.

I just felt that philosophy defined so generally or neutrally, and without the critical aspect (in the sense of social critique), was somewhat anemic. — Jamal

Dewey and other pragmatists (e.g. George Herbert Mead), proposed that philosophy should be applied to the resolution of social problems. I don't know if they engaged in "social critique" as you define it, though.

↪Ciceronianus That’s the spirit! — Jamal

Now that would be an "anemic" response, as in lacking substance. (Merriam Webster Online)

In fact, I almost used the word “anemic” in reply to Ciceronianus, the sensible no-nonsense pragmatist, but decided it was too rude. — Jamal

How thoughtful and kind of you to refrain from doing so!

But what an interesting, and revealing, word to choose. "Anemic" as in lacking force, vitality or spirit. Philosophy should be forceful, vital and spirited..powerful. Examples of proper philosophy would include Bergsonian proclamations of elan vital, then; or perhaps expositions of the Will to Power, or rhapsodies regarding the ubermensch. Something more manly, maybe, like Hemingway's "grace under pressure" or masculine and spirited or spiritual, like the English philosophy of "Muscular Christianity." I could go on and on, but don't wish to seem rude.

It's true we don't encounter such clamour (or glamour) in pragmatism or analytic philosophy. But we don't see it in ancient philosophy, either. In antiquity, such thinking would have seemed merely silly. It seems to have arisen in the 19th century. And perhaps that's what philosophy is, now. It strikes me that the appeal of such thinking is emotive, sometimes even mystic, sometimes even religious. For me, the expression of such ideas is best left to artists or the religiously inclined who are certainly better at it than those who call themselves philosophers.

Still, there’s something about it that makes me suspicious. The idea that philosophy is an independent ever-expanding toolbox, ready to apply to whatever exists—this is surely a fantasy. Philosophy is itself always historically situated, and part of what it does is to apply its tools to itself, even to its own tools, depending on the social conditions. — Jamal

Yes, but the pragmatist/quietist approach would certainly include among philosophy's purposes the application of its tools to itself. And if reason, critical analysis and the careful use of language are among those tools, pragmatists and quietists have been doing just that. Successfully, I think.

What's to be considered, I think, is whether we want such tools to be applied in and to philosophy. If they are, then philosophy probably wouldn't involve much in the way of proclamations regarding Truth, the Meaning of Life, Being (a la Heidegger and others), the Good, the Beautiful, Reality, God and other traditional philosophical concerns, because such proclamations require the creation and imposition of a system of ideas, and the application of the tools I refer to generally precludes the formation of a system that purports to resolve those traditional concerns.

When they're not applied, I think what results is mostly an expression of the wishes, intuitions, feelings and preferences of certain individuals, which may be inspiring and thought-provoking, which appeal to the wishes, intuitions, feelings and preferences of others. Perhaps that's what philosophy is, really.

I don’t have a specific question except: what do you think? — Jamal

The pragmatist in me thinks that philosophy should be devoted to the clarification of ideas and the application of critical intelligence to the resolution of problems of all kinds. The quietist in me thinks much the same, but would limit the problems to a particular type--those involving the pretensions of philosophy (those claiming special insight into Truth, Nature, Being, etc.) and their influence on thought and conduct in general. The stoic in me would say it also involves how to live a tranquil life.

What is faux about the doubt which he expressed? He doubted everything else (the entire external environment) and was left with himself, which he could not doubt, as "doubting" comes from something that doubts (self). No self = no doubt to be had. — Benj96

He "doubted" what he unquestioningly interacted with every moment of his life. Do you think he doubted the food he ate was food? Or that the paper he wrote on existed, or the pen (or whatever he used) did, as well, or doubted the chair he sat on? If so, it would be a very curious kind of doubt, one that was disregarded and that caused no uncertainty.

This serves to emphasize the wisdom of the greatest of sages, Popeye the Sailor Man. "I am what I am" he proclaimed, dispensing with "that" as a mere redundancy, expressive of nothing more than faux doubt of the kind Descartes indulged in. But he added "and that's all that I am." Thus, he not only affirmed his existence, but disdained to speculate regarding his nature, being and destiny. He is Popeye, singular and manifest!

I have a feeling you might interpret him more charitably when I tell you he really hated Heidegger, philosophy and all. — Jamal

A remarkably perceptive fellow, then, after all.

His primary targets in this area were instrumental reason, bureaucratic thinking, and science and technology that considers only means, not ends. This is a critique of modernity from within, in a spirit of self-critical enlightenment, rather than an instinctive conservatism or a reactionary attitude. — Jamal

That's a far more interesting perspective, I must say.

Maybe, but the German student movement at the time was more than just that, even if—as Adorno says somewhere—it was partly that. There was police violence and an attempted assassination from the state, terrorism from the students (the Red Army Faction came out of it). It had a specific character and happened for specific reasons, rather than just students doing their thing. — Jamal

I may be thinking too much of the American experience of the 1960s. Our student rebels of that time are probably all Republicans, now. Some are probably even lawyers, God help them.

Far too long ago to remember well, really. I recall that we were forced to read Plato's Republic and Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when Freshmen. I don't know why. I suspect it was believed that if we were willing to read such books, we could be induced to read most anything and believe it to be rewarding in some undefined sense. And so we did.

What is particularly fascinating and at first glance puzzling about this is that he identifies the wild, empty, and irrational pseudo-activity of the students with the increasing “technocratization of the university”. What could he have meant? — Jamal

I'm unfamiliar with him, but I suspect this is another example of the technophobia we see in some philosophers. Just a guess, really. I also guess that academics sometimes think, mistakenly, that their students are more than privileged, self-important brats indulging themselves in various ways while they can do so in a more or less safe environment, one in which they're unaccountable for the most part. Just guessing, as I say.

Therefore, justice does not equate with a system of law. — Tobias

You would think this should be obvious, but it isn't, even to some lawyers. O.W. Holmes, Jr. famously noted that we have courts of law, not courts of justice. Some say he made this point to a young lawyer appearing in court: "This is a court of law, young man, not a court of justice." I like to think he did. It's one of my favorite quotes about the law, though I'm also very fond of this one by John Marshall: “The acme of judicial distinction means the ability to look a lawyer straight in the eyes for two hours and not hear a damned word he says.” I think most lawyers know there are judges who have this ability.

So, I think it follows that efforts to define justice as if it equates to the law are misguided. There is no "justice system." I'm inclined to the view of the Stoics that justice is, properly speaking, a virtue. It applies to how we act in our relations to others. Fairness to and respect for others are characteristic of just action. For the Stoics, justice is part of acting according to nature, so I suppose that they may be said to consider it as based on natural law, a theory which they had a part in creating.

I can't stop myself from asking if Chomskybot will participate. Sorry.

I mentioned it because it deals with Plato's friendship with Dion and the events in Syracuse.

Here is a good article on what he was doing there. — Fooloso4

Thanks for the reference. Sidebar, though relevant--ever read May Renault's The Mask of Apollo? I think her Alexander-worship is excessive, and she treat's Aristotle too harshly (in other works) but she's one of the best writers of historical fiction I've ever read.

Plato pointed to the attitude that philosophy is useless, but he did not attempt to make it useful. — Fooloso4

Whatever was he doing in Syracuse, then? Better to say he never succeeded in making it useful.

I've been grateful to Heidegger, nonetheless, since my earliest philosophical studies in the late '70s for his monumental oeuvre as a/the paragon of how NOT to philosophize - or think-live philosophically (as Arendt points out) - as manifest by the generations of heideggerian obscurant sophists (i.e. p0m0s e.g. Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Rorty et al) who've come and gone in and out of academic & litcrit fashion since the 1950s ...
— 180 Proof — 180 Proof

I like this. Well said.

As I've said, I'm listening to the book mentioned in the OP. There's a good deal left to listen to. I think its persuasively makes a case that there is a relation between H's political/social ideology and his philosophical works. The author professes to admire H for his efforts to provide the philosophical foundation for an alternative to nihilism and angst which, it appears, was rampant in European philosophy before Being in Time.

[Have patience with me here, if you will. I've never understood why angst and nihilism were supposedly prevalent in 19th and 20th century Europe, and elsewhere to a lesser extent, and am inclined to attribute it to an overreaction to the perceived failure of Christianity, which resulted in people being deprived of the solace of its busybody, "Big Daddy" God, giving meaning to life and setting rules. So, I'm not inclined to think there was some kind of need H tried to satisfy, if there was one. I may not be accurately describing the author's views, or H's for that matter in this respect]

Assuming the author accurately describes what H wrote, however, he wrote a great deal about Volk, Blut und Boden, Arbeit macht frei. The author thinks this wacky (to me) glorification of Germany, Germans, the German language and culture and corresponding denigration of all other people and nations (especially Jews) is consistent with the entirety of his work and that this would be clearer still if his philosophical works rendered into English, including portions of Being and Time, had not been modified by sympathetic translators.

I haven't read Being and Time; certainly not in its entirety. I've read some of his other, shorter works such as The Question Concerning Technology and it seems to me that it can be inferred from them that he was something of a mystic and romantic. Perhaps that in addition to his rampant Germanophilia accounts for his reference to the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism, even in the 1953 publication of An Introduction to Metaphysics.

I think this was located in Arbeit macht frei. — Tom Storm

This charming slogan, which also graced the gate into Auschwitz (part of what Heidi called the "self-annihilation of the Jews" when referring to the Holocaust), is mentioned in the book.

Apart from the political aspect, the question is, is there any evidence
that such readings get the philosophy right? — Joshs

Well, one must read or listen. It seems that the author believes that to be the case. Thus far, the focus has been on Heidi's weird obsession with Volk, Blut und Boden, which seems a peculiarity of German Romanticism, and his belief in the superiority of Germans and the inferior status of everyone else, but especially Jews. Those views are, from what I can gather, more pronounced in the Black Notebooks and his efforts at licking Hitler's boots while Rector at Freiburg, and in letters to various and sundry, but we shall see. The author thinks that Heidi himself believed such scribblings to be part of his oeuvre, and that his previously published work was "sanitized" in some cases by fans.

I'm listening to Heidegger in Ruins. It's interesting to learn that he's become something of a hero among far-right groups in Europe.

Who is to blame? Or are we all equally to blame for different or specific reasons in each individual case - as unique instruments in the chain that lead to the whole/total outcome? — Benj96

The law is the law, and nothing more (or less) than that. It imposes no moral obligations. B is under no moral (or legal, for that matter) obligation to bring legal action. There is no "causal chain."

I can't help but wonder what other subjects taught in institutions of higher education would be subject to similar criticisms. I suspect there are several.

How would living people on Earth see death and killing from this point on? — Captain Homicide

Well, it may cause a problem or two for antinatalists. Would it still be wrong to procreate in all cases if, ultimately, eternal bliss will result? You couldn't be eternally blissful unless you lived for a time in this veil of tears, this house of horrors. Perhaps there'd be a moral obligation to breed like rabbits, so more and more people would die!

I still maintain that this kind of gesture exists. 'I can take you with one hand tied behind my back.' Or I can ride a motorcycle at high speeds without a helmet. Or I can drink mountain man booze. Or I can go without vaccines, without flattery, without apologies, etc. — green flag

Perhaps the Native American practice of "counting coup" would work here.

"Some Celtic warriors entered battle naked - a group which Roman writers called gaestae - and exactly why this is has perplexed scholars. It may be they wished to demonstrate their supreme confidence in their prowess and the protection offered them by their gods." To me it's intuitive to think in terms of pursuit and flaunting of status, something like conspicuous destruction or potlatch. Who can 'afford' to stand most naked, to question most radically ? Is this toxic masculinity? Clearly I'm approaching this in terms of the adoption of a fundamental hero myth. — green flag

According to Polybius they fought naked, at least in part, because they didn't want their clothes to be caught in the brambles. So perhaps their concern was more sartorial than anything else. But I imagine the trousers barbarians wore could be a nuisance in battle, sometimes. It's said they were mercenaries, which suggests their motives weren't entirely heroic.

The idea that acceptance of death results in freedom or least is freeing is ancient. You see it in Lucretius, Epicurus, Seneca and others. But I think the Christian focus on death and its disdain of life as sinful transformed death, making it particularly fearsome; far more than it was for pagan philosophers, making the acceptance of death seem peculiarly liberating.