When I say this:

There is no scientific theory that does that! — Frederick KOH

an example of a non-sequitur is this:

Which is precisely why you must seek some deeper reduction base -- a more "fundamental" theory -- in order to disclose at least one of the multiple "arrows of explanation" the alleged convergence of which ground Weinberg's grand reductionism. Weinberg's "arrows" always point from one law or principle of a theory to laws or principles from another theory. Else, in his view, the first theory (and its laws) would be freestanding and grand reductionism would fail. — Pierre-Normand

The Maxwell equations formalize the laws of electromagnetism in a coherent and consistent manner. They don't explain why those laws are valid. — Pierre-Normand

There is no scientific theory that does that!

I don't see this as a clear case of one theory being reduced to another. — Pierre-Normand

I am beginning to think that I will have to use the same reasoning as the proverbial judge who had to rule on what pornography is.

Again, when you have a point to make, if would make our discussion less cumbersome if you would just make it explicitly, rather than rely entirely on the mere asking of rhetorical or gotcha questions. — Pierre-Normand

Thank you for bringing this up. This is because you seem to want to define your way out of any counter-argument. How else do I pin down what you mean when you use terms that I have never seen any philosopher of science use?

As an exercise to anyone else still reading this thread, google "autonomous law" and see what you get.

That's not true. I took some pain to explain the sense in which individual laws can be said to be autonomous relative to the laws that govern the interactions between the material constituents in the lower-level theory. I had explained this here and here among other places. — Pierre-Normand

And in the four laws I gave an example where what the material constituents were is not clear. Especially when we know the classical theory that came after.

This complaint is rather fuzzy. In what way should the sense of the word autonomy "include instruments and experimental set up"? — Pierre-Normand

What use is a theory, autonomous or not, it it does not come with means to connect it to experiments.

Each theory has its own set of observational concepts and relies on specific types of experimental setups. — Pierre-Normand

Those concepts and setups exist prior to and motivate the theories in question.

You were postulating that your question regarding the autonomy of those laws was being asked in 1835. One would have to look up what the status of each of those laws, and of the broad theories they were a part of, were at that time. When a law is first being derived empirically from the identification of some regularity, or of manifest causal networks, in a set of observations and experiments, then the question of the autonomy or derivability of those laws relative to another as of yet unknown theory is an open question. In the case of the laws of electromagnetism and electrodynamics, the question of their potential reduction began to make sense when quantum field theory was developed. It turned out that relative to their "realization base" (higher-energy effective field theories) the laws of quantum electrodynamics were partially autonomous since they involved different degrees of freedom and were, in a sense, multiply-realizable. — Pierre-Normand

There is something wrong when a specific question is asked and generalities are proffered in response. Especially when we know exactly what happened to those laws.

It is interesting that you managed to get from "the laws of electromagnetism and electrodynamics" to "quantum field theory" without mentioning Maxwell's equations. I am going to be charitable and assume that somewhere in "the laws of electromagnetism and electrodynamics" you include Maxwells equations. In either case it is either disingenuousness or ignorance that no mention how those four laws relate to Maxwell's equations.

I've already explained the sense in which it is autonomous. — Pierre-Normand

But also a sense which does not include instruments and experimental set up in a theory meant to be empirical.

You often present alleged examples of reduction, which I then proceed to analyse. You then ignore my analysis, ask more rhetorical questions, and then challenge me with more examples. What's the point in me analyzing and discussing your own examples in details if you are just going to ignore the analysis again? This new Gish gallop of yours is you answer to my request that you would give me some inkling of the meaning of your claim that: 'It means that "fundamental" theories have two means of being "transported" from their original birthplace to other areas of inquiry.' — Pierre-Normand

The gish gallop was from you. From your own switch from "autonomous theories" to "autonomous laws", deftly, and with wiliness, hoping no one would notice that the term used has changed without you characterizing the difference.

I suspect the reason you are not answering is because these four laws developed in a way that is very different from the ones in chemistry.

Do you agree that these four laws developed in a way that is very different from the ones in chemistry? Are they autonomous laws?

In what sense is QCD autonomous?

The data that theorists sought to explain and whose work resulted in QCD were created by instruments designed on principles that are not based on QCD.

When the discussion touched chemistry, you used the term "autonomous law" instead of "autonomous theory".

Suppose this question was asked in 1835:

Are the following what you consider to be autonomous laws:

Coulomb's Law
The Biot-Savart Law
Oersted's Law
Faraday's Law of Induction

I don't follow. What are those two means? — Pierre-Normand

Could be more than two - depending on how you use your terminology.

I have two sets of questions in this regard. I have put them in different comments to make clear their separation.

So? — Pierre-Normand

It means that "fundamental" theories have two means of being "transported" from their original birthplace to other areas of inquiry.

No, it doesn't entail that. The autonomy of whole theories almost always is merely partial, — Pierre-Normand

I was making a claim about areas of inquiry. We saw a stark example with a simple statement about acids.

Why not indeed! But the pluralist/emergentist admits readily of them. — Pierre-Normand

This means that areas of inquiry with autonomous theories are not themselves autonomous. Given a question, explanations do not have to stay within a theory, autonomous or not. So this gives a sense to the word "fundamental" as used by Weinberg whether you agree with his choice of word. The more "fundamental" a theory is, the more widespread the possibility and actuality of its use becomes (especially if you include the theories underwriting the instruments of observation).

He takes his observation about the apparent convergence of the arrows of explanation produced by science to furnish irresistible evidence for what he takes to be a fundamental fact about "the way the world is". — Pierre-Normand

Do you find the abandonment of vitalism in the life sciences equally unwarranted?

He takes his observation about the apparent convergence of the arrows of explanation produced by science to furnish irresistible evidence for what he takes to be a fundamental fact about "the way the world is". — Pierre-Normand

Nothing wrong with that. That's how hypotheses are formulated sometimes. You don't need the word irresistible to qualify the evidence you use to form hypotheses.

What Weinberg argues for is effectively the complete determination (which is a matter of metaphysics rather than epistemology) of the principles governing higher-level phenomena (e.g. animal behavior) by the principles governing low-level phenomena (e.g. particle behavior). — Pierre-Normand

He is more equivocal:
" Sometimes things can be explained by studying their constituents—sometimes not."
pg 111 Facing Up

Later:
Reductionism may or may not be a good guide for a program of weather
forecasting, but it provides the necessary insight that there are no
autonomous laws of weather that are logically independent of the
principles of physics. Whether or not it helps the meteorologist to
keep it in mind, cold fronts are the way they are because of the
properties of air and water vapor and so on, which in turn arethe
way they are because of the principles of chemistry and physics.
We don’t know the final laws of nature, but we know that they are
not expressed in terms of cold fronts or thunderstorms.

You read "complete determination" into "the way they are". I don't.

If the explanation were complete — Pierre-Normand

What does it mean for an explanation to be complete? We are talking about science are we not?

My point was that you can occasionally go sideways and still converge.

Why not indeed! — Pierre-Normand

So what is the term you would use when the question "why do elements have the valencies they do" is answered by a theory of quantum mechanics?

He can't admit of his "arrows of explanation" pointing "sideways" — Pierre-Normand

Converge.

For sure. — Pierre-Normand

But if it can straddle multiple autonomous laws, why not also admit the objects of the theories of physics?

So do you agree with this

Valid claims and questions can be made within chemistry that straddles multiple autonomous laws.

Yes, and so? — Pierre-Normand

A sentence like this is perfectly valid in chemistry:

"An acid is a molecule or ion capable of donating a hydron (proton or hydrogen ion H+), or, alternatively, capable of forming a covalent bond with an electron pair (a Lewis acid)"

What do you call the framework which provides the vocabulary to express it and also the conventions used to determine its validity? And is this framework autonomous?

There is a also a level of porosity between "laws" not found in theories in physics.

For example (from Wikipedia)

"An acid is a molecule or ion capable of donating a hydron (proton or hydrogen ion H+), or, alternatively, capable of forming a covalent bond with an electron pair (a Lewis acid)"

In terms of what law is the statement above made?

But surely you recognize that the situation in chemistry is very different. There is no specific law of chemistry with the reach and scope of QED. How do you even stay within a single law when talking about a non-trivial experiment.

This binary question is much too crude. There are specific laws of chemistry that are autonomous with respect to the laws that govern simple molecular interactions. — Pierre-Normand

Then I am not sure how to use your terminology here. What are what you call "high level structures" then? Are they logically different for each specific law even it they refer to the same sort of objects?

What's your point? — Pierre-Normand

Do you consider chemistry autonomous from the theories in quantum mechanics?

It would be better to say that it's a more determinate theory. It is inferentially stronger and hence more falsifiable. — Pierre-Normand

So there is a directionality between the two, leaving aside what to conclude from this directionality.

Your first sentence is too vague. — Pierre-Normand

Example "why is the photon massless" is question expressible in terms of QED

In other words -- and this is the main point -- the actual values of those determinate parameters of EWT are irrelevant to the explanation of the structure of QED, or to the determination of its specific laws. — Pierre-Normand

In every theory there are open problems describable in terms of the theory itself. Does this apply to what you call autonomous theories?

Let's get one thing straight first. While EWT is a theory for energies above 246 GeV, it is also for energies below that. In other words it is not illogical to say that it is an alternative theory to QED at energies below that.

Do you disagree?

You are still badly misconstruing what I said. — Pierre-Normand

Yes. Because what you say is a bit unexpected.

You define an equivalence class in terms of an existing theory.

You do not define it in terms of a set of empirical data to explain

Have I interpreted you correctly?

It was meant as a definition of this equivalence class. — Pierre-Normand

So this is the criteria for being in the same equivalence class as QED:

All the alternative theories that would have been consistent with the validity of QED at the lower energy scale — Pierre-Normand

This is not more accurate, but characterizes what valid empirical theories should do:

all theories (QED included) would have been consistent with experimental results at the lower energy scale — Frederick KOH

Is there anything you disagree with here?

I found this worth exploring further:

All the alternative theories that would have been consistent with the validity of QED at the lower energy scale — Pierre-Normand

I made this remark in a later comment that I hope you don't disagree with:

So there is empirical data that QED consistent with.
Electroweak theory is also consistent with the same empirical data. — Frederick KOH

But you disagree with this remark of mine:

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say all theories (QED included) would have been consistent with experimental results at the lower energy scale — Frederick KOH

Saying:

No. That wouldn't make sense. QED is not part of its own set of higher-energy (and shorter-range structure) possible realization bases. — Pierre-Normand

Why? Some of that data was in existence before QED was even close to being a mature theory.

You can read Feyman's popular "QED" book, if you're curious; or Google the Wikipedia page, maybe. — Pierre-Normand

So there is empirical data that QED consistent with.

Electroweak theory is also consistent with the same empirical data.

Is there anything you disagree with here?

No. That wouldn't make sense. QED is not part of its own set of higher-energy (and shorter-range structure) possible realization bases. — Pierre-Normand

Since it is an empirical theory, what experimental data is it consistent with?

theory of the electoweak interaction (i.e. the effective quantum field theory that is found to be empirically valid, as well as theoretically adequate, above the 246 GeV unificaton energy) is underspecified by the theory of quantum electrodynamics. — Pierre-Normand

In plainer words, the theory of the electoweak interaction gives the correct results for experimental data at 246 GeV unificaton energy whereas quantum electrodynamics does not.

Is there anything you would disagree with here?

All the alternative theories that would have been consistent with the validity of QED at the lower energy scale — Pierre-Normand

Wouldn't it be more accurate to say all theories (QED included) would have been consistent with experimental results at the lower energy scale