Interesting inference.

The point is there is no reduction, no (supposedly) irreducible primary to which everything is reduced.

Truths are beyond a singular primary. Its objectivity is not formed by squishing everything into it, but rather by all sorts of different truths expressing it.

Rather, there are many irreducible primaries, sometimes in conflict, all at once-- it's not an irreducible primary that counts for everything, but merely a truth we might talk about. It's not an all encompassing viewpoint at all. There are viewpoints to which there is no truth at all. There are viewpoints where everything is reduced to an idea. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It sounds like you've forgotten that the logos is about reducing itself to the the truth, not being the truth. It's necessary for a representation of truth to do this, otherwise it contains non of that which is seeks to explain.

If postmodernism aims to be beyond a singular primary, it must then be truth -- not be aligned with truth, but be the truth. And that, of course, is not possible for any philosophy. Philosophy can, at best, represent an equivalence to truth. That's what modernism does, and what postmodernism does not.

You're highlighting only the flaws with postmodernism, don't you think?

With respect to that, I wouldn't characterize what I have as "my struggle with postmodernism."

I'd characterize it as "the struggle with postmodernism."

The subjective viewpoint of postmodernism is actually therefor the objective viewpoint of all postmodernism. It can be reduced to and equated to a nonstarter. All postmodernism is different, but exactly the same in the fact that it flies in the face of the very concept of an irreducible primary, even despite having one.

That makes it complete and utter nonsense, does it not?

Postmodernism is not a group of people. It's also of not inherently linked to the increasingly narrowing branches of study in centralized schooling.

It's a distinct branch of philosophy that is derived from and can (with it's unique set of axioms) find itself in direct conflict with existing modernism.

This thread is about determining which methodology (modernism or postmodernism) can be determined most correct.

My proposition would be that modernism imposes a higher standard for relevance to objective reality. That standard is the entire logos which science and mathematics are built upon. Postmodernism, on the other hand, has no standard; it does not even have an ethic, unless the work of the postmodernist clearly states so.

For these reasons I can only conclude that postmodernism is rubbish. The propositions of it, obfuscated by it's complexity, can not stand up to the slightest criticism. Not because the material is untrue, but because it makes no claim of truth. Instead, it imposes the question of whether or not truth can exist upon it's critic. If the critic is (the entire logical embodiment of) modernism, the modernism essentially reduces to state that truth is truth, and begins the introduction of logicism by next explaining how truth is the sum of parts. T=T, but T = T1, T2, so on and so forth until you've invented the foundation of mathematics. The explanation for why objective reality exists is fleshed out in all the splendors of logicism, but why logic works at all is a very exhausting explanation. Irreducible truth must be agreed upon before the interaction between modernism and postmodernism even begins, but this is what never happens in post modernism. To find an irreducible truth, proofs must be found at all levels: reduction, prediction and reproduction. In the absence of this process, you have a nonstarter.

The deceptive thing about postmodernism, is that it so borrows from all true philosophy on a nonstarter. It does not conform to the logos, period. However, the postmodernist inevitably seems right, having provided such a complex and loosely tied collection of modernist ideas. It appears as if the nonstarter is initiated by the critic, but it actually begins with the postmodernist's choice to refuse conformity with an irreducible truth. Without roots in the fundamentals of logicism, or a willingness to adhere to those fundamentals, we can immediately begin analyzing the main axioms of the postmodern philosophy. The next issue inevitably becomes the the lack of an irreducible primary of truth, other than of course an irreducible primary stating that truth is not an irreducible primary. Which is like saying 1 does not equal 1, without saying why.

In my view postmodernism can immediately be seen to say nothing. But that's the thing, people will often ask questions like "who's postmodernism?" or "what postmodernism?"

These questions are from a lacking understanding, in my estimation. It's not about the postmodernism, it's about postmodernism itself.

I'd say truth's sanctuary is an eternal compulsion to be.

Or more accurately, it's eternal compulsion to be. Truth can be reproduced. It has logos, prior to logos.

I have my own more advanced terms that I hold in reserve. The thing is, I'm looking for a deeper conception of the postmodern view of the problem. I, personally, find the argument superfluous. Post-modernism and modernism are a continuum. The post-modernism only flowers when it is expressed in reality, which then makes it modernism by every account. Postmodernism might still be logos, but it's not the expression of logos (like modernism.) The expression of logos is already in reality, whereas the logos itself isn't. The logos is the conception, and modernism will always require for the conception to have expression. Postmodernism, on the other hand, is an expression of the logos that can only exist in the logos. It is essentially the error of logos until it manifests itself in reality, and does (in reality) what it was predicted to do.

The greatest aspiration of postmodernism is to be modernism, basically. That's how lacking postmodernism is; which I think ought to be enough to prove it's inferiority to modernism. The postmodernist, then, of course, asks "is inferiority such a problem" .. his sad Nihilistic soul believes nothing. But in the same breath, you can't present any truth that a postmodernist won't shit on. Truth's only defense is being, and being is a fragile state.


If a postmodern idea comes into reality and does as it was not predicted to do, your postmodernism is basically in error. At which point, modernism takes over again to make a declaration of virtue. Modernism is still in error when it predicts results too, of course, but it's always right enough to express itself in reality (since that's required with a main axiom of truth -- it's evidence.)

Postmodernism ultimately has the least credibility for producing "good" results OR "true" results, in my view. I read "what's the use of truth" and found both of their arguments lacking, but the postmodern view was unsurprisingly more lacking. My problem is that I'm still not quite sure how to reshape the argument, but maybe I should just keep working on it. If that book can be interpreted as the pinnacle of debate on the issue, I guess it could be worthwhile.

In any case, I hope people keep arguing so I can sharpen my views on the topic.

One thing that inevitably works is sharpening your teeth. Heh.

Free will can be argued as immoral only with the reference to morality. In that regard, all actions performed consciously with free will can only be considered immoral if they are done with no regard to morality. When regard to morality is given and yet an immoral outcome is observed, a penance of reorientation to morality must be made. This might sound familiar, but you can leave religion out of it completely and still find that this applies to any virtue hierarchies that have rules.

In the absence of such a hierarchy, you can have free will without morality. Unfortunately we don't have any evidence to indicate that we live in such a hierarchy, so we must presume that we do or we will face obvious consequences.

Free will is not exactly free, thanks to that. Will has consequence.

If you like, you can take the issue up with an archetypal deity, like you did with your first post. Unfortunately, no such deity will respond to you. You could conclude that the deity is amoral because of this, if you wish, but not immoral. You can't prove that it's possible for the moral to exist in the absence of the immoral. In the absence of both, free will would only exist for you and you would be a God with only yourself as a subject.