I was talking about the line between the Ukrainian and the Russian lines. You do have the "front" stretched quite long now in Ukraine. — ssu
Yes, but if you're trying to encircle the enemy, the priority is the salients and the rest of the front doesn't really matter (especially in this situation where Ukrainians can't really advance to any strategic objective; such as Moscow).
So, commanders would be focused on the salients and send their best officers and troops to do that, and the rest of the front would be less experienced officers and troops with the orders to skirmish and just pull back and regroup their positions come under pressure.
Let's see how it develops then. And let's be honest here: the Western intelligence has been very good. — ssu
Definitely US has a ton of intelligence and satellites and so on, but Russians would take that into account. Since, as we agree, there's a huge fog of war and deception element, it's difficult to evaluate a lot of things.
First example of this is organizing the war in a week. Yes, US knew the invasion would happen as soon as orders started flowing, but Russia knowing the US would know of any detailed invasion plan may have done everything in a week so Ukraine couldn't mobilize in advance.
Or, it could very well be as the Western media reports that it was an act of hubris ... but, even if it was an act of hubris on Putin's part, Russian generals may have made sure their plan B would work anyways.
Second example, just leaving a disorganized convoy on the high-way to Kiev could be incompetence or it could be a tactic to make a significant force look nonthreatening. Now, had the Ukrainians been able to destroy the whole convoy, then obviously it would have been a mistake, but since they didn't it's possible Russian commanders were confident the convoy was at no risk and leaving it like that for days created this "incompetence" narrative by the West that, if your actually
It's very difficult to evaluate things during the war, other than critical strategic objectives that are clearly better not to lose. But everything unimportant strategically you can never tell if forces were.
Of course, I don't think we have any actual disagreements, we both agree that we'll see what will happen. Russians could very well break under the sanctions pressure, or oligarchs "take out Putin", or things unravel militarily. My fundamental point is that all these criticisms and risks facing Russia also apply to Ukraine. Russia hasn't achieved air superiority ... but neither has Ukraine for instance.
However, opposing the different scenarios I think is useful for us to understand things, but especially for people who maybe reading a long and less familiar with Russians.
And on that point, people accuse me of supporting Russia .... yet I've been trained to kill Russians, and I would if it came to that. However, I much, much, much, much, much prefer the countries leaders to avoid a war with Russia in the first place, and I also don't want to fight Russians if there is no longer a military objective to achieve. I don't view Russians as literally the Mongol hoards of the 12th century who will rape and then murder every last person if they choose to resist; in that scenario, ok, fight to the death regardless of the odds of winning.
But, certainly, Ukrainian commanders may have some sort of plan to achieve a great victory. The Russians themselves organized a massive counter offensive against the Nazi's in secret despite literally no one outside that planning believing it was possible for the Russians to do.
So, I am for sure not saying war is predictable, just that we don't know what Putin, the Kremlin Russian commanders are seeing, view as important and unimportant, acceptable losses or not. Certainly, just rolling into Kiev would have been preferred, but since that didn't happen the calculus for (totally agreed, naked imperialism) is what justifies the losses: more losses, more land must be shown for it.
The initiative is still with the Russians. But if the continue inflicting similar damage to Russia as they have done now, that's really good for them — ssu
Certainly Russia has major losses that they'd prefer not to have (fighter aircraft, tanks, obviously men too), no dispute on that.
However, we don't know the losses of Ukraine. Ukraine must keep gaining relative power in order to reach a stalemate. I don't think it's remotely possible for Ukraine to take back all the land Russia has taken, but a stalemate would be a better negotiating position than continued Russian advances.
Normally, the risk of this kind of costly war with a smaller but fiercely defending country, for an Empire, is not that the small country is any strategic threat (Ukraine isn't going to take Moscow in any scenario so far discussed), but rather that the other Empires see opportunity and invade and now you're also fighting the Persians all of a sudden who can inflict strategic defeats.
But, as we all now know extremely clearly, if the other Empire on the block, US / NATO, "seize the day" ... we all get to die in a nuclear holocaust. Hence, the only real risk to Russia strategically is internal disorder and international relations, hence the sanctions.
When have you seen footage of American troops pillaging a supermarket to get food? When have you heard about British troops going from door to door asking for food from the people because their army is totally incapable of giving them rations? — ssu
This is an expected consequence of making a 1300 Km front. Experienced officers and unit leaders are a limited supply, so if hundreds of kilometres of front are in the hands of inexperienced lot's of confusion and mistakes and losses are going to happen.
Compare this to the Russians in Syria where holding fronts was left to Syrians with Russian air support, but what the Russian ground forces would actually go and take were very specific locations; so there's only really one fight commanded by the best people Russia has. A good commander can work with what he has in terms of number of troops and experience level, but bad decisions at a command level can lead to disorderly retreat pretty quickly.
For sure, down side of having a 1300 km front is lot's of it is going to be under inexperienced commanders who make bad decisions and suffer losses and their troops retreat in a disorderly fashion ... but if there's no strategic importance in play, the Ukrainians have no where to followup those disorderly retreats to, then the high command is just going to send yelling down the chain of command to not be stupid, while they focus on what's important in the war, such as main pincers to encircle Ukrainian troops in the East.
And the main pincers just advance pretty steadily and stably so far. If there was a process where the tip of the pincers kept getting cutoff and captured / destroyed or then large resources poured into rescue them, then that's clearly strategic setbacks; you'd never actually want your salients to be cut through in pretty much any strategic situation; whereas back and forth skirmishing can be for tactical reasons (lay down suppressive fire as a defensive line in being built).
Sorry, but this is really the typical Russian clusterfuck, just like the first Chechen war was. All that authoritarianism and corruption leads to stupidities like this. There simply is no hiding of it. Or to put it another way around, the Ukrainian/NATO propaganda isn't so omnipotent to theatrically portray these difficulties. This was a far too large military operation to perform for the Russian army, that it could succeed with flying colors as it did with the annexation of Crimea. — ssu
Oh, definitely I agree; I'm not denying that we see losses and mistakes and logistical issues that the Russians commanders don't want. No professional commander "wants" a vehicle to just get a flat tire and be abandoned, outside some 5D chess moves. No professional commander wants to see troops looting.
However, these situations can be viewed as an acceptable downside for the overall strategy of encircling the large part of Ukrainian forces in the East.
Every plan has pros and cons, and to evaluate things we'd need to know the calculus used to track progress as well as the political and military objectives, which we frankly don't know in any detail.
Yeah, despite it all, the Russian army can lay punches and isn't down for the count. But that this has been a really military "bordello", as we Finns put it, is the truth. No way to hide that — ssu
True, but Russia is also de facto fighting the CIA and NATO's best hand-held missile platforms.
There's this idea that Ukraine is a small country "taking it to the Russians" all by itself. Russia is fighting a proxy war with NATO (potentially at Ukraine's expense and total disregard for Ukrainian lives and even sovereignty) and winning a proxy war with all of NATO is a massive geo-political victory for Russia, almost regardless of losses.
Russia has also, at this stage we can clearly say, called NATO's bluff of "going all the way" with no-fly zone, sanctions escalations much less boots on the ground and tactical nuclear weapons.
Only about a third of Russia's banks (not sure on what metric, but point is not all) are actually cut off from SWIFT ... and I'm pretty sure I can feel Russian gas keeping me warm and supplied with reliable electricity as I type this. Certainly no one's going to escalate to the brink of nuclear war any time soon after this fiasco.
When potential client states come to Russia to discuss a deal, regardless of what we think of them, they want to know if Russia can deliver on it's promise to protect them from NATO. If Russia wins in Ukraine in a military sense, it's a big advertisement for what Russia is selling.
Keep in mind that right now we only see Ukrainian and US "information" about the war, but as soon as it ends Russia will start publishing video of it's victories with it's systems ... which certainly exist or it wouldn't be advancing.