No, the question that Benkei assumed was that people would have more interest on the plight of Ukrainians because they are white than with the plight of black Africans. — ssu

Seems a true statement about Western nations and a majority of people in them to me.

If a war effects for example your work, I think it's obviously more important for you than something that just notice every once in a while in the papers. — ssu

Sure, but the comment was about Western nations generally, not individuals personally affected.

What I'm saying is that one can use common sense and notice the most clumsy lies. Because the fact is, which I remember quite vividly, was that the journalist covering the Crimean invasion didn't dare to say for days just who the forces were...because they didn't have the Russian flag and Putin said that they weren't Russian soldiers, but Crimean volunteers. — ssu

Again, can't say its clumsy lies without proof; and journalists not reporting what they can't prove is pretty usual.

You seem to believe there's some constituency denying the "little green men" ... it's more just doesn't seem to matter at all.

If stone cold proof dropped tomorrow that the picture is indeed of Russian soldiers on salary under the Russian chain of command ... what does that change? This just isn't the lie of the century and no one doubts Russian involvement and backing of the separation of Crimea.

Journalists didn't report things without proof (like they do now reporting war crimes and who's guilty before any investigation at all) ... which isn't some great crime journalists sticking to what's proven, isn't unusual, and isn't Russian appeasement of some sort, nor does anyone much care who these soldiers were "really working for" as it changes nothing, just frustrates anti-Russian parties wanting any accusation against Russia to be taken at face value.

Certainly Russia has done "bad things" and have "lied" ... well, like the US and like Ukraine, but it still matters what the actual facts, or to what extent they can be inferred, in understanding the world.

For example, it actually matters which war crimes exactly US committed in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, as it does Russia as does Ukraine.

However, that the US first denied torture and starting a war on fabricated evidence, and then got caught in that lie, doesn't mean absolutely every accusation against the US should be taken at face value, likewise for Russia and likewise for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the great powers (in particular US, China and Russia) lie all the time, but for the purposes of analysis the facts still matter and also actual proof still matters.

And, in the case of the takeover / invasion of Crimea I don't think anyone reported that Russia was not backing it. However, Crimean's also have agency and many and I've seen no credible doubt cast on the legitimacy of the vote of Crimean's to leave Ukraine after the 2014 coup.

So, although I, and I don't think really anyone concerned about this topic, would doubt Russia involvement (they literally have a military base there and certainly have intelligence agents in and around it since decades), the idea absolutely everyone walking around must be Russian soldiers and to say otherwise is a lie, plays into the idea that Crimean agency and self determination can be just ignored.

Now, the counter argument is that it wasn't "legal" for Crimea to exit Ukraine ... but shouldn't Crimean's be able to have self-determination? Why does a law outside Crimea matter? Why doesn't what Crimean's want matter?

For, as far as I can tell, there's no credible claim that Crimea and the Dombas regions aren't genuinely pro Russian, but a narrative of "what they want" not mattering in the contest between the far larger powers they are between ... hmmm, starting to sound a bit familiar.

That being said, I have zero problem with the idea Russia backed Crimea separation and annexation and Dombas regions declaring independence. It's a sovereign country so, presumably, can do what it wants, and, presumably, can also have clandestine operations to protect it's interests just like the USA and Ukraine.

All of which underscores @Benkei's really good breakdowns of why legalism doesn't apply to international relations.

If Ukraine has a right to self determination and so Russia is wrong in invading, then Crimea and Dombas regions have a right to self determination and Ukraine is wrong in refusing to recognise that and then attacking those regions, which makes Russia right in intervening to protect the rights of self determination of those people if they request it, just as, if you disagree and Ukraine has original just cause because only their right to self determination matters, then NATO is justified in sending arms and sending advisors to help Ukraine if Ukraine requests it.

Legal reasoning simply breaks down because there is no state to enforce the law when the perpetrator is a state with hundreds or thousands of nuclear weapons, or just a few, or indeed just a credible conventional deterrent, or then just no one cares to attack that particular country to enforce any rules anyways.

What does the delusion of legal reasoning applied to great power politics produce? Challenging the UN security council to fix the situation or "disband", kick Russia out because it's ... exactly like ISIS.

It's simply delusional and not how the world works. Normal people empathise because legal reasoning is relevant in normal life when one is effectively chaperoned by the state, and moral outrage can immediately translate to sympathy from friends if not cancelling the objects of dissatisfaction on social media or even the state doing something about it. More importantly, legalistic gripes are the only gripes anyone pays any real attention to for ordinary citizens, as maybe it is an issue of social concern according to society's own rules.

However, who's not listening to legalistic gripes are the great powers in complaining about each other.

I agree that the EU system is preferable to that of China, but I think "peaceful and democratic" is relative.
Certainly, in demographic, cultural, and other respects, the EU is far from all positive. — Apollodorus

Why I say "the most" peaceful and democratic, of the great powers. A choice between limited options.

Plus, the EU and its agenda are becoming more and more identical with NATO, a military organization (the world's largest, actually) that is known to have engaged in aggressive behavior. — Apollodorus

I agree that the EU did not take advantage of a world leadership vacuum (in the sense of great power competition) created by Trump, but just lazed about waiting for neo-con and neo-liberal policy to "return".

I mean only to argue the EU has potential to play a more peaceful and democratic global roll than China, Russia and United States.

However, it so far seems to express no interest in that and seems completely content to be subservient to US foreign policy, with rare exceptions, even suffering great harms to itself in promotion of the harms US imposes on others (join and cheer on disastrous US lead wars that lead to terrorism, economic and refugee problems in Europe and not the US ... indeed, seem the only purpose is to keep Europe unstable, weaker, and focused on internal problems that wouldn't otherwise exist without neighbour's being bombed to shit).

So, I wouldn't say I'm happy about EU and the European small powers policy, and I agree the moment seems to be passing anyways, but what I don't see is another great power politics player that's a better bet.

For your info, the right term for someone from Afghanistan is "Afghan". "Afghanis" are their currency. — Olivier5

Thanks.

We can also quantify how many words YOU wrote on TPF about the war in Ukraine vs that in Ethiopia or the famine in Afghanistan. If CNN is racist because they cover Ukraine more than Ethiopia, what does that make of YOU, who also cover Ukraine far more than Ethiopia? — Olivier5

This forum is one of many avenues of action available, and my time is limited in any event.

And again, the claims about racism aren't claims of internal state of mind or individuals time use, but rather about institutions that do have time and resources and simply objectively implement a skin colour based double standard.

There are many victims of many unjust things. Individually, people, if they care at all, can only do so much and are quickly path dependent on the causes they are already engaged in and know something about. So, sure, call someone bad faith for not having infinite time for every just cause that exists.

However, media and political institutions are far more powerful and have far more resources (including rational resources to decide on resource allocation) and ability to manipulate people's perspective of the world. More importantly, such institutions are political accountable, one way or another, for what they do whereas individuals are not really accountable for failing to address every single problem in the world with time that doesn't exist.

Sure, why use force of arms when it's much easier to use economic, financial, and legislative means? — Apollodorus

This was a miss formatting of your quote of the person saying "We will rebuild the Roman Empire and this time through the power of ideas, not by force of arms," and not my repeating on behalf of myself (I've corrected the formatting in the original comment).

However, I totally agree that such a plan is possible, and the US Empire is largely based on economic, financial and legal means of domination and far less on direct military conquest.

And indeed, direct military intervention nowadays is not even used to conquer and extract resources and tribute as in Empires past, but simply to topple anyone who steps out of line into a disastrous civil war and, if things go well, a failed state.

And I would agree that some people involved in the European project have a similar ambition for Europe, but I would not say the European project reduces to that and has no (at least for the moment) democratic recourse to shape policy.

Additionally, at the moment anyways, the EU is still a voluntary based organisation (which Brexit does prove), and consensus driven on at least some critical issues. So, it is far closer to a diplomatic project than an Empire, at least for now and even if some people involved have Imperial ambitions.

Getting back to geopolitics, my general view is that the world can, for the time being, only hope to share great power politics and competition to be less, rather than more, harmful. For example avoiding nuclear war in the cold war wold be a geopolitical "success" from this realist point (it can always be worse, even if the great power system is pretty "bad" in itself).

So, if that's the case, shaping better rather than worse great power policies is a fruitful task in parallel to trying to undermine Imperialism as such and to also build alternative economic and political systems that could one day displace great power competition.

For example, however much I criticise the Americans and point out the damages they cause around the world (that includes pursuing omnicidal climate chaos ambitions, so pretty bad and heinous) that USA and the Soviet Union beat Germany and Japan, I nevertheless view as a geopolitical "good outcome". That being said, doesn't mean USA being better than the Nazi's 70 years ago makes them "better" in some sense today, but the example is to highlight the outcomes of great power competition does matter.

Today, of the great powers, EU is the most peaceful and democratic, and I rather see the expansion of such a system than the Chinese total totalitarian system. Of course, I'd rather see neither but true participatory direct democracy everywhere, but, until the "ground up" approach manages to compete with the great state powers, it does still matter what the great states do and some are more and less oppressive.

I think you only care for the Ukrainians because they are white. — Olivier5

You seem to think these observations are levied at individuals and just opinion of internal belief.

That's not the claim.

The claim about Ukrainians being white is to do with the establishment media and response of Western Governments, concrete evidence and actions and not just presumed state of mind.

These things can be quantified in how much reporting there is and what policies and actions are taken about different conflicts.

We abandon Afghani "allies" and then let them starve to death. Obviously that warrants attention and public discussion, and there is some, but a small and tiny fraction of the effort spent on Ukraine ... and basically no government action at all. It is obvious there is a double standard and it is obvious that skin colour has something to do with it. You can live in denial or then assume "everyone is racist" and mentioning obviously racist policies just has some ulterior motive if you want.

When (“Mr. Europe”) Paul-Henri Spaak signed the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, the precursor to the EU, he said: — Apollodorus

Well, put this way, definitely sounds a lot like the Fourth Reich to me too.

Obviously, they aren't going to put that in official documents, but the idea is being discussed unofficially, and has been from inception.

"We will rebuild the Roman Empire and this time through the power of ideas, not by force of arms." — Apollodorus

Hopefully such intentions and plans could be modified by democratic process and these are, in the end, opinions of a small amount of individuals that could be thwarted others.

Anyway, my point was that the EU's self-declared aim of rebuilding the Roman Empire tends to be seen as commendable but Russia's alleged intention to "rebuild the Russian Empire" is indicted as some kind of crime. — Apollodorus

Although the Third Reich called itself that for exactly this reason, and I would definitely agree there's plenty imperialist agendas within the EU, where does the EU self declare its aim as rebuilding the Roman Empire?

However, I do agree that if you're in favour of American Empire there's little moral grounds to condemn people making competing Empires. Actions by empires could still be condemnable and some Empires "better" than others, but Empire building as such is either just for all or just for none.

Is that why you care about the Ukrainians ? Because they are "white"? — Olivier5

I care about the Ukrainians because they are people, as well the Yemens and Afghanis and Ethiopians, Uzbeks, Chinese etc.

I also care about the whole world and avoiding nuclear armageddon.

I don't say Ukrainians are more worthy victims than the Afghanis, and I went ahead and posted a news report of babies starving to death in Afghanistan.

It just so happens that Ukrainians are the victims of geopolitical circumstance and great power competition (regardless of which great power you "blame most"), which could actually be resolved by diplomacy based on a realistic understanding of the geopolitical situation.

Since this topic interests me and I've followed it, I have something to contribute.

Again, I have limited time. But my standards don't change.

I also did commit serious time based on the same standards vis-a-vis the Afghan war during times when I had something to contribute to hopefully avoiding disaster (all the way back in 2006), much more effort than I have expended here and placing myself at risk of court martial in trying to represent the Afghani interests in the chain of command.

There are a lot of problems, I have limited time to contribute and must decide based on circumstances and my own capacities.

By happenstance, I even happened to be involved in business in Ethiopia when the war was brewing and did try to help avoid it in whatever small ways I was able to. But I was told again and again that the Tigray forces couldn't possibly win and there was no need for diplomacy and the war was in the North and would never affect the NGO's in the south I had some business with. So, within my tiny amount of power I did try to motivate people that had (certainly more than me) influence in Ethiopia to not dismiss the disruption and potential damages of a war (which they did offhand and no hesitation before, and then even the initial phases of the war; even though it seemed obvious to me the situation was more serious). So, I do what can when I can.

I am as disturbed by war and saddened by the victims of war (or about to be victims of war) wherever they are and I act on that concern whenever I can.

Again. Let's look at that picture. Do these look like volunteers, people that have lived in Crimea, yet in the days after the Maidan revolution have taken up arms against the new Ukrainian government? Or do they appear to be Russian soldiers? — ssu

I honestly don't get what you're even trying to argue on this topic of the "little green men".

Are you saying if we catch the US or the Ukrainians in a lie then we can assume everything they say is a lie?

Or when the Americans and Ukrainians do it that's just "winning the information war" and, you see, we need to understand that they have just cause so anything they do is explainable and understandable.

Ukraine and US have been caught in plenty of lies.

And, if we were talking basic military strategy, we'd obviously agree that deception is a large part of military tactics and intelligence services, which (I think it's safe to assume) that you'd argue that American and Ukraine certainly need intelligence services and information campaigns and it's normal deception and lies are used in that.

Of course, makes figuring anything out difficult. But doesn't prove anything about anything.

If I go ahead and demonstrate the US or Ukraine lying about something ... you'd just say that doesn't matter.

So how does this lie, assuming it's a lie, about the little green men matter?

And, in terms of uniforms, army surplus exists and anyone engaged in militia activity is going to want to look like a badass. So, as @Benkei points out the photo proves nothing and could be staged anyways, and Russia has as much right to conduct intelligence operations as anyone else.

US military and intelligence are on the ground in places they shouldn't legally be all the time (in a sovereign country helping and committing acts of war without a declaration of war by congress), media just repeats the euphemism "advising" ... which even if it really was just advice doesn't change the legality of it and committing an act of war.

Ah, the race card!

I think I would accept more the distance card here. This is an event happening in the neighboring country to me and for both for me and Christopher the events have dramatically change the security environment in our countries. — ssu

Sure, for people that are "close" ... but how is the United States any closer to Ukraine than Ethiopia or Yemen?

@Benkei is talking about Western countries, which in today's parlance also includes Australia.

You really think it's "distance" and not "skin colour" determining the wildly different reactions to war, or which presumably there's always one side in the wrong and at least somebody is a victim, in different continents?

I understand how unproductive any philosophical debate can be in terms of reaching agreement, but this is a 'productivist view' which I find a bit narrow minded. — Olivier5

That's why I don't say "reach agreement" but rather

before we even make any progress in such a debate. — boethius

... which does not include the word "agree".

However, whether you refuse for the purposes of deflection or then you genuinely don't understand, I am not against discussing moral issues from first principles.

It is simply not my priority and I have also pointed out no one here, including yourself, is doing so. If people wanted to do so, I could not "prevent them", but I would engage insofar as it seemed a productive use of my time (of which I do have a 'productivist view', despite even your disagreement), which, if it seemed to help reach a diplomatic resolution then I may participate in such a debate insofar as it does so.

Your argument was just pulled our of your behind in a futile attempt to prevent folks from expressing their views on the Busha crimes recently uncovered by the Ukrainians. — Olivier5

How did I prevent anyone expressing their views?

And, notice how the only mechanism available for me to prevent people from expressing their views .. is expressing my view, which, because you assume you have just cause without any scrutiny of the belief, my view (which was simply mentioning it does take investigations and hearing what the Russians say to even start some credible process) is somehow preventing other's from expressing their views about it?

Does it really though? Or does it simply take the edge off the circle of self adulation and pats on the back?

You clearly have no idea how long debating from first principles takes and that the war will be likely long over (hopefully long over) before we even make any progress in such a debate.

People have existing moral positions in which they are approaching the war in Ukraine and try to do, or a least promote, their moral objectives.

My moral objective is to contribute to a diplomatic resolution, which is just boring talking.

I don't see how debating just war from moral first principles would help arrive at a diplomatic resolution, but if you have a proposal on what is the ultimate moral first principles and how to apply them to believe what and to say what and to do what about the war, feel free to teach me about it.

And lo and behold, we have found it quite possible to have this discussion here, in spite of the war going on, so I don't see the link between a war going on, on the one hand, and a moral debate, be it on first principles, on the other hand. These are two very different things and I can see no causal mechanism between them, where one would prevent the other... — Olivier5

Time is limited.

Every word you consider saying you could first debate in your head 10 years the first principle reasons before saying it. Nothing prevents you from carefully reflecting in such a way.

It may however prevent other goals the word under consideration was intended to address 10 years ago.

I don't see how wars and events prevent a moral discussion. That's a non sequitur. — Olivier5

As for "preventing" that's a completely absurd representation of my position.

I said if you want the bloodshed to end (that's your moral objective in the here and now), then it will end by one side winning or then diplomatic resolution.

That doesn't prevent discussing from first principles just war theory and the moral theories upon which such just war theories would be built, it's just unlikely to help end the war one way or another (which I mention Ukraine "marching on Moscow" would be one way to end it, and does not require thinking about the Russian perspective much).

I don't see how wars and events prevent a moral discussion. That's a non sequitur. — Olivier5

You didn't read either of my comments.

I said moral discussion of first principles, which you are not doing.

You assume Ukraine has just cause, you are not discussing your moral theory about it nor anyone else's, nor why Ukraine happens to have just cause with respect to your moral theory.

You are not discussing morality, you are mostly just condemning Russians and praising Ukrainians based on moral ideas you already have, and accusing people you perceive as helping the former at the expense of the latter. I.e. you are implementing political objectives: to influence and shape perceptions.

A moral discussion would be circling back to issues such as how many Nazi's would justify invasion, to be confident it's not Russia who has just cause.

Which, each side claims they have just cause and therefore they can lie and their crimes can be excused, as crimes by soldiers and even institutions in warfare can be expected; either as "shit happens" or then the means justify the just ends and the warrior has to do sometimes difficult things, hard choices have to be made.

Or then, maybe neither side has just cause and individual soldiers are better off deserting.

Perhaps even both sides can have just cause in a moral relativistic theory driving identity politics ... which suddenly I don't see, where did it go? Is it under this rock? Nope, not under there. Maybe behind this tree? Nope, not over here either. Funny, I was certain it was around here somewhere.

If you actually look at the moral arguments, they essentially are structured around a sort of original just cause that justifies whatever deception or otherwise crimes that follows that. However, if original just cause justifies lying, the problem is it justifies lying about the original just cause as well.

In your system of reasoning that's solved by simply assuming you have just cause and even challenging that to see if it would survive critical scrutiny would undermine the belief in the just cause, a belief required to win the just war, therefore even scrutinising the original just cause would be immoral as it undermines the belief in the just cause, which you know is true without any scrutiny, which would be immoral to really cary out in a good faith way, but you know it to be true anyways.

No reason to expect the bloodshed to stop, nor to wait for the bloodshed to stop first before we can debate morality. — Olivier5

I said from first principles. If the bloodshed ended we could circle back to a lot of foundational moral issues that have been touched on in this thread, but it's difficult to really get into because of the war and events moving forward.

Wanting to end the war, is a moral position, be it militarily or diplomatically or via revolution in Russia, but we are taking that moral position for granted, not debating first principles about it.

From that shared moral position, people here are advocating different things—be them further moral differences or then just analytical questions of effective action; i.e. how best to achieve the shared goal.

For example, some have clearly stated the position that repeating Western media narrative helps Ukrainians, helps them fight and get support and so helping to end the war that way, and Russian points, be them true or false, should be ignored as even recognising "the seed" that happens to be true as true serves the Russian propaganda.

Others, have argued for a diplomatic resolution which requires a diplomatic framework.

And we have discussed "what we can do about democracy in Russia" such as provoke a violent revolution.

However, if one disagrees with that plan and doesn't see or hear any other plan to affect Russian policy on the short term (the here and now when people are dying), then, again, seems the best we can do is try to understand the Russian perspective and make the case of Europe and the US using their leverage and "statecraft" to reach a diplomatic resolution and the end to the current bloodshed.

If the bloodshed stopped, then there would be plenty of time to debate the morality from first principles and what longer term policies may prevent and minimise wars in the future, including policies with respect to Russia. War crimes should be investigated, for various reasons, including that it hopefully dissuades more war crimes in the future.

I don't need to worry about balance. So most of the stuff you're saying is just misunderstood by me. I don't have the same concerns you do, so I don't get the intent. — frank

Our, certainly my, concerns are the hundreds of military bases and toppling government and interfering in democratic political processes even in Europe as well as overt military threats and actions as well.

Which, the US, having the most military and covert power, does the most of, in addition to the integration of this power system with multinational corporations that implement these policies in a sort of quasi-legalistic way as well.

Are these actions justified by democracy? No. Democracy can still result in unjustifiable actions.

We can also question not only how democratic the United States actually is, but also question, given it determines policy and governments in many places around the world who don't get to vote ... if the US system is really democratic at all considering the case can be made that the United States imposing its will on poor countries is de facto governing without the consent of the governed.

Be that as it may, the question is one of scale. The actions of the US have far greater impact on the state of the world than Uzbekistan, so the utility of criticising US policy is simply more relevant and hopefully more fruitful.

If you say "but you don't criticise the others!" ... we do. I called China a totalitarian hellscape many times on this forum, and if you retort "ok, but not as much!" then the answer is in terms of scale and effectiveness.

USA, for now, has more influence on the state of the world than Uzbekistan and even China, so is more relevant in terms of political criticism.

Additionally, not only is criticism of USA more effective precisely because it's not yet completely totalitarian (I would argue pretty close though), so we can engage with American's such as yourself, but our own governments have far more influence over American policy than Uzbek or Chinese policy. A lot of actions the US want to be seen as "the US and its allies" and "the Free World" and so Europe has considerable leverage in such "Deciding for the Free World" conversations. Sometimes US goes it alone, but it prefers not to.

For example, certainly there is lot's and lot's to condemn and criticise about North Korea, I don't think anyone here would disagree, the problem is that the criticism doesn't go very far as we can't do much about it. If someone had a plan to make life better and more democratic in North Korean from the outside ... great, let's do it; the problem is the paucity of such plans and so there's little to scrutinise and discuss and little to do, and North Korean influence on the world isn't so great, so "the problem" can just be ignored insofar as no one seems to have a solution anyway.

However, contrast this to American policy and it's a different situation; the scale of the American War Machine and covert machine is global and massive, in addition both legitimate and illegitimate political and economic power; these policies can be influenced in several effective ways, so it's worth debating.

I see. I think you might be affected by media that I'm not exposed to. — frank

Sure, if all you read is this forum, then maybe it seems the case isn't made enough against Putin.

Do you watch televised news? — frank

I do not have a television, but I follow the major news outlets and aggregators to get an idea of what the mass media is saying.

How things are perceived and what the mass media is saying is a critical part of geo-political analysis.

Unfortunately, due to algorithm driven media, we basically no longer know what information "people" encounter in a general sense. There's no longer "the news paper" that everyone who discussed politics or world events would read as a common reference.

The "mass media" is more now a conversation with bureaucrats and technocrats and most ordinary people ignore it.

Indeed, mass media is no longer the best term, but "establishment news", whereas facebook, instagram, twitter, youtube and Tictok "personalised algorithms" are the actual mass media now.

So, I do agree it's hard to actually know what the real mass social media is even saying to most people, we can only really follow CNN, Reuters, BBC, Aljezera, al Jazeera, Times, Fox, Bloomberg, and co. to see at least what elites and bureaucrats are exposed to.

But he wouldn't have that attitude if the culprit was American. He'd happily go in the other direction of being as unfair as possible (I think). — frank

Because billions of dollars are already spent to make the case to defend the American president, there's zero need to "make it more".

Likewise, the case against Putin is already made extremely loudly and we're all expected to accept the verdict is already in.

Lastly, as Westerners we can affect Western policies, we can't affect much Russian or Chinese policies.

Sure, worse there than here ... but I don't see what I can do about that except through affecting Western policies, which requires scrutiny and criticism of Western institutions and power brokers.

So I don't think it's a matter of valuing fairness. — frank

This is exactly the false equivalence I point out.

The conditions going into a debate are not somehow preordained to be equal and different perspectives already equally heard, and we all have unlimited time to defend each case and develop every possible accusation.

If billions of dollars are already spent defending one perspective, I am not being fair by apportioning my time and energy equally to unequally represented parties.

For example, I say several times I am trying to represent the Russian perspective because the Western media and Ukrainian case is already repeated pretty loudly.

If it was the reverse, that everyone agrees with the Russians and doesn't understand why Ukrainians are fighting, calling them irrational, and cheering the Russians on to crush them, I'd present the Ukrainian perspective instead, try to understand them (their passion to defend their land) in hopes of a diplomatic resolution.

Now, if it's true, Ukrainian righteousness and the decision to fight a good one and it's true that the Russians are evil ... ok, go fight. Get in there NATO.

However, the problem is that even if it is true NATO is not going to fight and Ukrainians aren't going to defeat Russia (impose their conditions on Russia by force).

So ... even according to the Western narrative there is no military solution to achieve Ukrainian's just cause.

Conclusion: either Russia is going to win, or then there will be some diplomatic resolution at some point; the sooner the better, and diplomacy is not possible by only considering one side of an issue.

I'm trying to understand people who are quick to defend Russia. I mean people like Benkei, who may not qualify as apologist, but seems to jump to defend Putin in a way he wouldn't for other leaders, particularly an American president. — frank

I can't speak for @Benkei but he may have some bizarre legal idea that both sides of a dispute deserve to be heard, which you interpret as defending one side because that side is already guilty without hearing their point of view or verifying any facts.

If Western media is blaring 24/7 their accusations against the Russians, maybe focusing on those as "maybe true" (which, certainly many are "maybe true") serves no further purpose at some point than to repeat propaganda, but that representing the other side of things, indeed even mentioning that it may exist, is required for clear thinking.

Likewise, if the same Western media automatically gives the benefit of the doubt and simply straight up ignores Bush's crimes, many documented without any dispute about the evidence whatsoever and including straight up confessions by the head of state of the US government! ("So we tortured some folks"); so, again, maybe for the principle of fairness the other side of the story should be heard.

You are arguing from a false equivalence that we have already heard each side of the issue, we already know all the facts, and are simply deciding who we support morally without needing to make decisions or formulate policy: i.e. that if "Putin is bad" is one's moral opinion given the undisputed facts that are already established, then repeating that is the terminus of the critical thinking process.

For example, what I am completely convinced of is that children in Ukraine are certainly innocent and do not deserve to be killed, maimed and traumatised. I have mentioned this is and it's my emotional motivation to contribute analysis in the hopes of a resolution and end to the war.

However, if I did no analysis, just repeated "children don't deserve to be harmed or killed" again and again and again ... at some point I am not serving those Ukrainian children's interests but my own emotions and people would just say "yeah, we get it, we don't like seeing children harmed either, but just saying so doesn't end the war." And if I continue and engage in none of the discussions about the military or political situation and decisions different parties can actually make, at some point I'd be accused of virtue signalling by only repeating the innocent and morally righteous case of the children in Ukraine.

And there's enough of useful idiots around then to confuse the issue and go along with the idea that everything was staged. Likely there's going to be the argument that Ukrainians staged this in order to get more sanctions put at Russia and to get more aid. — ssu

As @Benkei (an actual lawyer) has already pointed out, there does need to be some sort of credible investigation, chance for the accused to defend themselves, and, ideally, some sort of impartial trial to determine war crimes, or crimes in general.

Additionally, war crimes by individual soldiers or units (which I do not doubt has happened; it's essentially guaranteed in any war) do not automatically translate to being war crimes of the military or the government. It must be some sort of institutionalised policy or direct order.

However, an additional reason to reserve judgement and not break out the jump to conclusions mat, is the Russians may have exculpatory video evidence.

And the Russian's generally like to present what evidence they do have in whatever legal process it is, such as the evidence about the biolabs at the UN security meeting. The longer false-accusations are made, the more impact exculpatory evidence has, so waiting for the "proper" legal time serves this purpose. Not to say they have exculpatory evidence, just when they do the Kremlin's policy is to reveal it later, as then their accusers (i.e. the West) loses credibility (certainly for the purposes of muddying the waters when they are actually guilty as charged).

It should also be kept in mind that the Ukrainian strategy has been to garner sympathy with civilian casualties by not evacuating them from war zones and even giving them automatic weapons instead. So, it cannot simply be denied that there would be a motivation to create more atrocities if the Russian shelling wasn't enough (which, as horrible as it is, wasn't enough in terms of a no-fly zone). And, there are literal neo-Nazi organisations operating in Ukraine, and I definitely don't put anything past them in terms of treachery and immorality.

What is pause for thought though, is not only Western media automatically interpreting these tied dead civilians as executions by Russians (without any investigation, just circumstantial) ... but when there was many reports and even actual video evidence of Ukrainians executing alleged Russian spies, this was taken at face value as just executing saboteurs to "deal with them".

Why do we not extend the benefit of the doubt to the Russians and simply assume if they did execute all these people, they were spies and saboteurs and could be summarily executive in the same insane process as the Ukrainians have been executing people?

They applied pressure on all those dead civilians in Busha alright. — Olivier5

Why weren't they evacuated by those trains just mentioned as evacuating people because Kiev wasn't under a siege in any sense of the word?

Finland evacuated the entire Karelian region before fighting the Russians on it, by force: you didn't have a "choice" to stay and be brave.

Even grandma's were forced to leave. There's a famous story of soldiers coming up to one grandma's house to force her to leave before burning it down.

She says "no, I'll do it myself," and then takes the fuel and torches her own place.

Point is, she wasn't just left in the path of intensely destructive warfare.

So if Finland (who lost the war with the Soviets) is the model, why not evacuate civilians from war zones like Finland did?

What seems much more like obsessing over a point is going over analysis literally 4 weeks ago, which difficult to deny now, was far more accurate than what the Western media narrative was at the time (what my analysis was about: proposing other possibilities) ... and finding only the criticism that I predicted a "siege" and "encirclement".

Criticism that is simply wrong, as I was just explaining another purpose for the Russian operation there en lieux of entering Kiev and taking it with urban combat.

The prediction was simply that whatever is achieve militarily Russia can simply announce anytime they achieved their objectives (as they only ever stated fairly minimal explicit goals and demands), a prediction that has come true.

Had they achieved more (which would have included encircling all of Kiev or taking all of Ukraine if there was zero resistance) then they would have declared that mission accomplished.

As for whether the operation around Kiev was or is successful, and or whom, that will depend on what happens next.

And if posters here want to say Ukrainians "won the battle for Kiev" but may lose the war ... sure, I don't have a problem with that terminology either, but my military analysis is more focused on "winning the war" part.

Evacuation trains have been leaving Kiev every day since at least early March. But never mind facts, let's listen to some bullshitter obsessed with proving a point :roll: — SophistiCat

It's just part of actually analysing what is actually happening.

Russian military advances on Kiev, applies large amount of pressure (call a siege or a half siege if you want), media start reporting it as a siege, Ukraine publicly abandons (under pressure that includes a half siege) political objectives like joining NATO or "the right to join NATO even if you can't actually join NATO".

I'm not denying that one road was left in the South ... I even point that out. "Dictionary definitions" (if you ask the people that write dictionaries) do not define language and how terms are used in a given context, but try to record how language changes overtime ... so maybe the word siege is taking on new meaning to refer to Russian tactics in this war, as that's what the media keep explaining.

However, even so, if Russia has intelligence on what are resupply and what are evacuations (leaving the city ... so not supplying it), and just blows those supplies up (like intelligence there's a bunch of soldiers and weapons on a base and just blows that base up), seems to me is part of the evolution of siege tactics.

Likewise, maybe the modern definition of a siege to compel concessions (such as surrender) makes sense to now include other more modern day civilian pressures (... like, I don't know, living in a subway for a month), and not just literally starving to death in a castle.

And it's not me saying these things, media repurposed the word siege for this modern situation.

However, I don't care if you call it a siege (why I changed by language to "pressure" and "surround" to be more general of whatever was actually happening), but the media used the word siege all the time and that has a political effect.

Which are pretty obvious points to make, and if you don't care about them ... maybe you just don't care about the topic.

And, if the definition of the word siege interests you so much:

According to Wikipedia (after mostly talking about sieges in ancient times, medieval times, Mongol and Chinese times, renaissance "age of gunpowder" times, WWI and WWII times):

Post-Second World War

Several times during the Cold War the western powers had to use their airbridge expertise.

- The Berlin Blockade from June 1948 to September 1949, the Western Powers flew over 200,000 flights, providing to West Berlin up to 8,893 tons of necessities each day.
- Airbridge was used extensively during the siege of Dien Bien Phu during the First Indochina War, but failed to prevent its fall to the Việt Minh in 1954.
- In the next Vietnam War, airbridge proved crucial during the siege of the American base at Khe Sanh in 1968. The resupply it provided kept the North Vietnamese Army from capturing the base. — Siege, Wikipedia

... how are these sieges if there all supply wasn't cut, which obviously includes air as another "root" out.

and also

The siege of Khe Sanh displays typical features of modern sieges, as the defender has greater capacity to withstand the siege, the attacker's main aim is to bottle operational forces or create a strategic distraction, rather than take the siege to a conclusion. — Siege, Wikipedia

... Why isn't wikipedia sticking to a single dictionary definition of a siege but adapting it to modern context and purposes? Someone should inform them.

Totally agreed. "Harming" the oligarchs actually removed their influence ... not motivated them to do anything about Putin.

The influence of the oligarchs is that they had wealth abroad and therefore could "arrange" certain deals within Russia based on wealth outside the control of the Kremlin. Placing all their wealth within the control of the Kremlin simply removes their influence basically entirely.

It also reduces, by definition, corruption if powerful people can't launder money around in foreign countries to get favours. So we have made Russia less corrupt.

If people don't know why a corruption-free democracy is better than the status quo, they only have the status quo to live for. — Christoffer

I'm pretty sure nearly everyone in this thread, if not everyone, shares this same opinion.

The only differences are that of how to go about achieving it, which I think both and already brought up some key point about.

We'd all like to see Russia and Ukraine and everywhere less corrupt and more democratic ... so, how? Is the key question as has been mentioned to you. Feel free to explain to us how we actually do anything about it, other than just complaining about it and assuming anyone "fighting it" has righteous cause (regardless of the outcome or how many people suffer and die).

However, it seems to me you are confusing support for what you want (which we also want) with opposition to Putin and the Western narrative of how that opposition can be carried out.

The reason us "geopolitical realist" camp is not on this bandwagon is simply because "where does that lead"?

For example, you say Yeltsin was better than Putin because some total chaotic shitshow in Russia is somehow going more towards freedom and self determination (than exactly towards authoritarianism to clean up the shitshow once people simply can't deal with it anymore and prefer some sort of order, even unjust, to chaos).

However, the realist view of Yeltsin was instability and chaos (including tanks firing on parliament buildings) in a country that has thousands of nuclear weapons.

That is really the key thing for the realists: "improving Russia" by taking down Putin ... first how? Nuclear weapons? Covert coup that results in total chaos and nuclear weapons?

The policy choices are very much limited and conditions by this fundamental and pretty big fact.

For example, Hitler didn't have thousands of nuclear weapons ... and if he did, I'm pretty sure we wouldn't have just shown up unannounced on D-day and I'm pretty sure Stalingrad would not have "held out" against a nuclear strike.

This is the key problem, nuclear weapons do change the situation, you can effectively blackmail the world with enough nuclear weapons.

The only reason this has not happened since WWII is because people think other people aren't crazy and immoral enough to use nuclear weapons and immense diplomatic effort put into creating a dialogue and "status quo" as you put it where nuclear weapons are simply off the table for tactical use.

Just like chemical warfare was simply tacitly agreed off the table in WWII, even though no one expected that to be the case given the massive use of chemical weapons in WWI there was no reason to believe no one would resort to them in the next war (indeed, Luftwaffa even designed their bombers as small and agile to deliver chemical weapons ... why drop tons and tons of bombs when a ton of nerve agents gets the job done).

The geo-political realists of today fear nuclear weapons and are willing to make concessions to limit their use, and certainly feel it foolish to actively provoke their use.

No one really knows what will happen once someone "breaks the ice" in terms of using nuclear weapons to make a point or win a battle.

Kremlin's negotiation position is basically: I don't want to go there, but I will.

There is nothing we can really do about that except return to good faith dialogue and deescalate demonising both Putin and the Russians.

We cannot "win" with sticks and stones, and therefore can only "win" with words.

Which words exactly is the question.

Basically the situation in Kyiv and in Mariupol are quite different. One is under siege, one isn't. — ssu

I don't care what you call it, and I never predicted Kiev to come under "complete encirclement" and "100% siege".

However, it's relevant anyways to point out it can be argued a siege mainly because lot's of media reported it that way, which affects perception and decision making.

Furthermore, if the purpose of laying siege is mainly political, then the objective end goal is likely to be more what the media reports than some physical situation on the ground: i.e. the mission is to encircle Kiev enough for media to start reporting it as a siege which achieves sufficiently the political objective, not only of serious pressure on Kiev (who, even if they don't feel it's a "true siege" would still want to break the false-siege enough for media to say they broke the siege according to the media) but also changing moods in European capitals and at home.

Sometimes media focuses on specific points on the map and builds it up as a big important battle ... whether it was true or not, it becomes a self fulfilling prophecy, as the fact that the media is focused on that battle and those positions makes taking or defending those positions suddenly of immense propaganda value.

Western narrative built up the Western highway as "the big battle to siege Kiev" and more or less framed things as Russia taking that highway would mean it has effectively has or inevitably can siege Kiev, and Ukrainians defending it would mean they were able to militarily defend and prevent encirclement.

The highway went back and forth several times but then ended fairly securely in Russian hands and media changed their reporting from "Russians advancing" to mostly "Kiev under siege".

Again, whether it's militarily true or not, or whether journalists even had any military basis for their claim or it's just more dramatic in a micro drama of the whole war, doesn't matter. Once a battle takes on symbolic value (Stalingrad being the most famous) then everyone knows each side has high motivations to win and the battle becomes a sort of litmus test of who has the better army. At the same time, there can be literally hundreds of back-and-forth, successes and losses, elsewhere that aren't reported and have zero symbolic value, just tactical retreats or then various wins-and-losses that tend to happen for both sides in a war.

Karkiev was also reported as under siege a lot.

In military terms, given long range and standoff weapons and also intelligence, the argument can be made that a modern siege must take into account these tactics as well.

Do I need to physically setup a roadblock on every single road if I can blow up weapons shipments on the road leading into Kiev ... or even on bases hundreds of kilometres away?

In terms of denying supply, it's no longer ancient times and even in ancient times "some supply" didn't mean breaking a siege.

However, if you rather, for the strict military analysis, say "partial siege" with "larger supply line attacks and disruption elsewhere in the 'battlspace' " ... doesn't matter to me what terminology you use here.

However, it's still relevant to the analysis anyways what terminology the media uses. So, bring your dictionary definition to the media.

And yes, definitely Mariupol was under a far more intense siege than Kiev ... that something can be more intense doesn't mean less intense things can't also share the same characteristic. "Less intense red" is still red.

Definition of siege:
a military operation in which enemy forces surround a town or building, cutting off essential supplies, with the aim of compelling those inside to surrender.
This hasn't at all happened, so what are you talking about? Quite baseless remarks. — ssu

You did not read my comments.

I explain that the I never "predicted" Kiev would be 100% encircled with 0 supplies in the first place, just explaining an alternative purpose (lay siege) the Russians may have compared to entering the city and taking it in Urban combat (the dominative Western narrative at the time).

I explain why Russia would be trying to do so (tie-up troops and apply political pressure), and I also explain that Ukrainians will fight extremely hard to avoid total encirclement, as it would be a big strategic loss and so Russians maybe doing thing slowly and cautiously.

None of that were "predictions", just explaining a potential different plan that explains the convoy sitting on the road for example and the purposes of achieving said plan. I repeat several times that Ukrainians could potentially rout the Russians, just that I don't personally see how.

That being said:

Why it's arguably a siege (or then accomplished the intended purpose of a siege) anyways is:

And, key word "arguable"; I'm just pointing out the argument could be made anyways that there was a siege:

A. If all roads are cut off save one, and that can be covered by artillery, missile and air cover, maybe supplies are disrupted enough. As has already been mentioned, few sieges in history are perfect, so certainly Russia disrupted Ukrainian supply of Kiev, and with modern weapons and surveillance maybe a modern siege doesn't literally require a circle of guard and torches all the way around the city.

B. The media started reporting it as a siege once the West highway was taken, so maybe the definition of siege is changing to fit modern warfare (rather than medieval and ancient warfare).

But, whatever your definition of a siege, the operation may have been ended as the purposes were achieved before 100% encirclement was reached (whether the Russians could have advanced more or not): Mariupol seems essentially fallen, Ukraine accepts it won't join NATO, game changing moves like no-Fly zone are off the table, peace talks at least appear to be progressing (which, maybe disingenuous on Russia's part, Ukrainian part, or both, but the existence of the talks maybe one other purpose of the manoeuvre to lay siege).

Obviously, if purposes are achieved before an operation is fully complete ... there is no further reason to continue that operation. And, this is why I rephrased things as applying "pressure" to get these political concessions, of which total and complete encirclement may not be required; North, East and West maybe enough "pressure".

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg on Sunday said Russia is shifting its strategy in Ukraine, discounting the idea that it could be withdrawing from the war-torn country.

“What we see is not a real withdrawal, what we see that Russia is re-positioning its troops and they are taking some of them back to rearm them, to reinforce them, to resupply them, but we should not in a way be too optimistic because the attacks will continue,” Stoltenberg said during an interview with co-anchor Dana Bash on CNN’s “State of the Union.”

“And we are also concerned about potential increased attacks especially in the south and in the east. So this is not a real withdrawal but more a shift in the strategy, focusing more on the south and the east,” he added.

Stoltenberg discounted the idea that Russian President Vladimir Putin is scaling back his goals for the war that began six weeks ago. — NATO chief says Russia shifting strategy: ‘This is not a real withdrawal’

NATO's said it, so it must be true, right?

What follows has the same meaning: "I went to the shop yesterday, right. So, I was in the shop, I picked up this bottle. I dropped it and it exploded on the ground. I was so embarrassed. — Olivier5

Sure, nothing prevents you from placing everything in the past tense; it's just not obligatory in English and even the exception.

However, we're agreed that in many, many pages of analysis I carried out 4 weeks ago, the only criticism you can find is about grammar choices (that are not even grammar mistakes, but very idiosyncratic to English speech and writing).

Additionally, a criticism of grammar reinterpreting the conversation at that moment as being focused on to what extent "exactly" Russian forces will encircle Kiev without any intention of trying to conquer Kiev ... rather than the the Western media, and many here, claiming that the Russian column is on its way to a disastrous invasion of Kiev proper and they can't even get there! But once they do, oh boy, urban combat will make quick work of these bumbling fools stuck in the mud.

The only thing they leave out, or don't realise, is that multiple limited excursions and manoeuvres is a good idea to make appear like a full scale invasion. — boethius

The authors also don't include a second order analysis of what affect their, and similar, analysis may have on the Kremlin's decision making (regardless of whether the Kremlin have made the same conclusions independently or then just read the authors publicly available paper).

And, to be clear.

Losses experienced around Kiev is certainly a factor in the current Russian withdrawal.

However, if the purpose was to apply political pressure and tie-up Ukrainian manpower and resources (dig in around and within Kiev and committing to fierce fighting, through artillery and high casualty, in both defence and counter offensives), then whether this manoeuvre was successful or not, in military terms, will depend on successes elsewhere in the "battle space", such as holding the Crimea land bridge and, most of all, encircling Ukrainian forces on the Dombas line.

Withdrawing from around Kiev simply minimises losses if Russian generals calculate those forces can no longer effectively reinforce Ukrainian lines in the East anyways (there is no need to tie up people who cannot be effectively redeployed elsewhere).

The Russian salient West of Kiev is the most exposed, farthest from the Russian border and air cover, and not only closest to Polish resupply but also closest to the largest city that can easily house the most amount of Ukrainian troops relatively comfortably. I.e. even if Ukrainian forces cannot undertake significant armoured counter-offensive manoeuvres, they can still inflict the most harassing losses on the Russian salient West of Kiev, and if it no longer serves much of a strategic purpose, then it is simply optimum use of one's forces to withdraw that salient.

The current phase of the war could be "Russia is losing".

Or it could be that Russia is consolidating its gains to minimise vulnerability to Ukrainian weapons and tactics, stabilising the situation to see if a peace deal can be reached, and preparing for the next phase of warfare if peace is not reached (which could include new offensives employing lessons learned so far, or then setting up heavily defended lines that Ukrainians cannot easily assault, and withdrawing from positions that cannot be easily defended, due to positional or then man-power considerations).

This is not how the English language works.

For example:

"I went to the shop yesterday, right. So, I'm in the shop, I pickup this bottle. I drop it and it explodes on the ground. I was so embarrassed."

It was written last year. I didn't bother reading it. — Olivier5

Again, context matters.

If you care enough about an article to cite it, you should respect the authors enough to read it and be somewhat confident to convey their meaning accurately (as much effort as you'd consider honorable in other people reporting your own words).

More fundamentally, however, your dismissal of this analysis "last year" neatly exposes your addiction to the news cycle.

As I've already explained in previous comments, theories about the fog of war (what we see today) are fraught with both bias, propaganda and overfitting sparse and dubious data points.

What provides far more insight are theories about the situation before the fog of war descends.

For several reasons:

1. The further into the past a theory is proposed, and more it comes true, the more predictive power it has.

2. Analysis is much higher quality, generally speaking, in a stable situation. Not only does each analyst in the conversation have no particular pressure to come to any conclusions, as the situation isn't changing much, but as importantly each analyst can respond and scrutinise other analysts about a situation that is not chaotically changing, and key facts are far easier to verify in a slowly changing situation than a rapidly changing one. Once chaos emerges, there is high pressure to come to conclusions rapidly for the purposes of decision making or the influencing of perceptions, and each response and rebuttal to previous analysis must take into account what has been changing since (people are no longer really talking about the same thing, as the situation changes between proposal and response: what was a good decision an hour ago, may no longer be a good decision now; so past analysis may have been correct, but new factors must now be taken into consideration - this sort of mental tracking of a changing context and what was a good and bad idea at what time and for what reasons and what, if anything, can be preserved given the new situation, is a cognitively challenging task ... for most people).

3. War, in particular, solicits intense amounts of propaganda and each side deliberately trying to deceive the other and shape public perception.

4. Active war creates significant amount of reporting of details (sparse data points) that not only do we not know is true, but are largely distracting for the purposes of analysis. Only insight into the large structures and factors have any predictive power; we obviously cannot predict every step, vehicle loss, advance, casualties and so on, in a war; so details on the ground have very limited insight and predictive power.

Hence, analysis undertaken in the past, in a calm and stable environment involving multiple people and even open scrutiny, will be higher quality.

The authors of the article in question, for example, do include full scale invasion in their analysis, explain the reasons it's a bad idea, explain the difficulties of limited excursion (response of the West maybe significant and so costs far outweigh the gains of a limited excursion), and correctly develop an "in-between" strategy that Russia does then utilise.

Although the authors can argue that their analysis of likelihood was correct (what they said was most likely was in fact most likely, but sometimes unlikely things happen), the counter argument to that is their own analysis more-or-less explains why Russia's current strategy is the optimum choice.

The only thing they leave out, or don't realise, is that multiple limited excursions and manoeuvres is a good idea to make appear like a full scale invasion.

In particular, if the Kremlin simply accepts ahead of time that pretty much any incursion into "unoccupied Ukraine" will be met with severe sanctions and Western arms supplies, that the West is bent on that, then there is zero value at all in a small limited excursion in the hopes of small and limited sanctions (sanctions will be severe and also arms will flood into Ukraine anyways).

Additionally, if the goal is to demolish Ukrainian war infrastructure, then a full scale invasion (that seems foolhardy) is an optimum choice in baiting the Ukrainians into a total war response and therefore opportunity to eviscerate their force potential long term.

In other words, escalate to a full invasion to then deescalate to just keeping a land bridge to Crimea that solves "a real problem" for Putin.

Escalate to deescalate, as @ssu has correctly informed us.

You mean ***was*** under siege? Ukrainian troops have retaken the entire Kyiv oblast. — Olivier5

Read the context:

Be that as it may, the Russians can be argued to have functionally encircle Kiev with only 1 remaining road for supply, and the remaining south route in range of artillery.

Kiev is arguably under siege. Few sieges in history are "perfect". — boethius

"Can be argued to have"

Key word "why". I'm explaining what Russia was attempting to lay siege to the capital.

Media even started to report Kiev as under siege, encircled, shelling everywhere.

So, if you want to argue it's not a "true siege" or "100% encirclement", sure.

What's important, however, is the the military, political and social dynamic did change once Russia more-or-less encircled and laid siege to Kiev.

In the build up to Russia cutting off the West highway, if you're able to remember 4 weeks ago, there was still talk of potential NATO no fly zone or even just accepting Ukraine into NATO spontaneously etc.

After media at least reported Kiev as "basically" encircled and under siege, mood started to change, NATO taken off the table, deescalation. — boethius

I am explaining analysis that was about the present when it was written, but in the past now.

The context of what I am explaining is clear, and in English present tense can be indefinite (not clear what time you're talking about, hence context matters.

Zelensky is now seen as a hero the world over and quite probably in Ukraine as well. Good job Vlad! — Olivier5

If you bother to read the context, the article predicts Russia is unlikely to undertake a full scale invasion - and if so, super limited incursions such as only in Dombas - and in that context the Russian buildup or then very limited incursions is to undermine Zelenskyy.

However, what the article gets right is:

The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Likewise, article also gets right:

Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion

The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing.19 Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

However, what the article gets wrong is that a full scale invasion for the purposes - not of occupation and dealing with insurgency in major cities - but for securing the land bridge and solve "a real problem", is one way to do it.

That being said, the article does go over the possibility of multiple parallel incursions, what it calls "Course of Actions subordinate to Course of Action I" (sub-COA's; COA I is the full scale invasion).

But he might also execute several of these sub-COAs on their own to achieve independent objectives without intending to go all the way to full-scale invasion. We will consider the major sub-COAs here ordered by the likelihood we assess for each and laying out the separate objectives each might pursue beyond setting conditions for the full-scale invasion. — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

So, correct analysis after all, only fails to mention the Russians could choose to have so many of the parallel "sub-COA's" that it appears to be a full scale invasion, but it's not.

The reason for doing so is more-or-less presented in the article, in that Western reaction is likely to be fairly strong (at least sanction wise) and a limited incursion to test Ukrainian and Western resolve and then pulling back has a lot of drawbacks (but the article mistakingly concludes that's more likely than major incursions anyways).

As for Zelenskyy, what would major incursions cause?

It would cause panic and crisis in Kyiv and drive Zelensky to plead for NATO help that would be unlikely to come — PUTIN’S MILITARY OPTIONS

Correct.

As an anarchist the root cause of this war and the wars you mention is the sovereign nation state system as we currently know it, from my point of view.

As a geopolitical realist, insofar as we have this system of nation states, these sorts of wars are essentially inevitable.

Everything is complicated and the process of contextualising why things happen, to try to really be sure who's to blame, is essentially an endless task.

In the current Western narrative Putin is essentially the only moral agent on the planet at the moment responsible for any outcome whatsoever, and everyone else involved is Putin's personal victim.

For example, Zelenskyy is certainly an agent in this narrative, indeed a hero and blameless, yet not morally responsible for anything that happens whatsoever. Indeed, if you have no responsibility you are by definition blameless.

NATO has the right to send arms, indeed the duty to do so, but likewise zero responsibility for the actual outcome of doing so.

The ratio of Ukrainian soldiers killed per Russians killed would matter if Ukraine was actually any kind of threat to Russia and diminishing Ukraine's military capability somehow benefitted Russia. — RogueAI

I agree from the perspective you are talking about.

However, just as the US mentions 100 to 1 kill ratios to explain military performance was great in Afghanistan, I am simply pointing out Russian military can use the same metric.

I have mostly been analysing the Russian perspective, so the cost-benefit from the Russian perspective maybe "worth it" if the casualties aren't too high and military performance was good in terms of ratios of things destroyed: yes you destroyed a bunch of our shit, but we also destroyed a bunch of your shit.

The importance of the the cost-benefit analysis from the Russian perspective is that it's the Russian perspective that will influence the ordinary Russian's opinion and whether they are for or against the war medium and long term (and military cost-benefit will tie into whether the economic sanctions were worth it etc.).

However, I agree that from the perspective of humanity the war is completely unnecessary.

Analysis pointing out the Kremlin can point to to the land bridge as an achievement, is relevant in evaluating if the Kremlin can convince normal Russians the war was worth it, which (regardless of what we think) has immense political repercussions (just like public opinion changing about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars being worth it had immense political repercussions regardless of what we may think, regardless of what is true).