I'm implying that if there is an unfortunate accident, let's say Russian aircraft shoots down a NATO aircraft of vice versa, things won't automatically escalate. — ssu

We agree here. If we are only considering Zelensky lying to us; I think what matters is the intention. Zelensky's intention is clearly to escalate tensions between nuclear powers in a way that he certainly has in mind may go all the way to nuclear war; either as a desirable thing or then just a risk he's willing to take.

An act of criminal defamation and fraud with intended damages.

Certainly Zelensky is so delusional as to think his words matter outside what is convenient to his backers, but I don't think we should minimise the intended consequences of his actions.

What you describe, if true, simply puts into sharp relief the extent of Zelensky's delusions, which we should take into consideration in our analysis that Ukraine is lead by an out of control maniac willing to cause extreme damages on false pretences and lying to us.

You're right, we should be very worried about what damages he can practically achieve out-of-the-blue given his unstable and delusional mental state, thinking two polish citizens killed by a missile could be anything more than raising a few eyebrows even if it was Russia. Now that he's discovered this particular plan doesn't work, and no one cares what he has to say about it, we should be worried about what reckless and damaging options are within his grasp.

- I said nowhere that I used the word precondition as Zelensky. — neomac

The thread is discussing Zelensky and his preconditions for dozens of pages. I write my views about it, which you then respond to in a way perfectly consistent with the discussion so far as well as what precondition means in the discussion so far and also in the dictionary.

Only after your point is wrong do you go on an endless "axchually" diatribe explaining how you use the word differently to make an empty point.

It's the most boring, bad faith, cowardly way to debate: retroactively dilute the meanings of words to most the goal posts of your claim to something so trivial and tautological it is not wrong ... but also just dumb if that was actually your original point and you're not lying about it now.

But you seem to take yourself for a clever chap, and it's far more clever to lie than to just be an idiot.

For your new story about the word to make any make sense at all, you're asking us to believe you were simply not following the discussion and just-so-happened to use the word in a different sense to make an empty point about how people generally make decisions (taking into account the situation; in this case who has nuclear weapons and who doesn't, although of course having nuclear weapons isn't an actual precondition for anything we've talking about as people without nuclear weapons do the same things).

Unfortunately for you what I claimed is very much consequential wrt what I argued since the beginning (and you misunderstood) and in line with standard understanding of international relations as applied to Ukraine:
Rasmussen characterized the proposed security pact as part of a long-term answer to the West’s long-standing challenge with Russia, rather than as an act of charity to Ukraine, as Washington tries to pivot more resources to geopolitical competition with China. “If we get this right, the security guarantees to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem, because it is in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks.”
Volker said the best way to secure Ukraine over the long term was to focus on the country’s eventual accession into NATO, rather than working out an interim option. “It’s good to have this [Kyiv Security Compact] as an alternative that people can chew on,” said Volker, who also served as U.S. special envoy to Ukraine. “But when you start stacking it against actual NATO membership, and you start considering this as a possibility at a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better.” — neomac

Do you even understand what you are reading?

This is a proposal exactly in the understanding of international relations I've described: whatever the US does, now or in the future, is because it's in the US interest and no Ukraine. There's no charity towards Ukraine now nor in the future.

So first of all, what's the corollary to his idea? Well, if his theory turns out to be wrong for whatever reason, then the US would cease supporting Ukraine, and look out for number 1 as it always does.

You can also see clearly the ornamental nature of guarantee. For, if it stopped being in the US interest to carry out this plan, maybe the dust settles and Russia offers a good deal to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to cease arming it, the basic premise of the entire proposal is the US is going to do that: the only way for Ukraine to benefit from interaction with the US is if Ukraine's interest aligns with the US' interest and here's an idea for that in the long term. Consequence? If this alignment of interest were to break down for any reason, Ukraine would not be able to rely on these "guarantees" and would discover that the word guarantee in this context is purely ornamental.

"If we get this right, the security arrangements to start and are in no way guaranteed down the line to Ukraine could fix the Russia problem," is the exact same meaning as "guaranteed" in the context. Diplomats and political analysts like calling them guarantees, as it seems nicer.

As for the theory itself ... it's just really stupid.

Even according the author, you could only finalise this plan at "a time when Russia will have been defeated and accepted to live within its own borders, NATO is better".

But if Russia has accepted to live within its own borders after a long and bloody war and eventual "defeat", in some sense that doesn't involve actual defeat in Ukraine v Russia, then Ukraine can be slipped into NATO as Russia will be so weak as to be unable to oppose it.

However, if Russia has accepted to live within its own border ... why would it be "in the interest of the U.S. to have a strong and stable Eastern European partner as a bulwark against Russian attacks."

Why would a nation that has accepted to live within its own borders attack anyone?

But, I'm sure you have some new boring diatribe explaining how this proposal is self contradictory and stupid ... if words mean what they they say in the dictionary!!! But they obviously don't ever!!!

No. Even at the time there was no media panic. The out-of-the-blue engagement just raised eyebrowse. — ssu

So you would agree that Russia could employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine "out-of-the-blue" with zero fear of any US response.

... And you'd even make the stronger claim that our media wouldn't even be all too worked up about it, no worries, certainly no reason to panic, just raise some eyebrows at best?

As if?

The UN? OSCE? WTO?

Or is it that artificial countries run by neonazis aren't part of a collective? :smirk: — ssu

If also want to change the meaning of words around to make boring discussion, be my guest.

"Collective" is a strong word in political analysis, and Zelensky is clearly using it in exactly that very strong way of a collective strong enough to act in common military defence. "Collective security is under attack" is Zelensky's words.

Of course, he certainly would like to be part of the collective he's talking about, but isn't, and obviously you know that. Zelensky know's that too, so the next best thing would be being able to tell NATO what do do, which he tries in his statement.

But, even saying the obvious:

The UN is not a collective and doesn't define itself like that:

The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945. Currently made up of 193 Member States, the UN and its work are guided by the purposes and principles contained in its founding Charter.

The UN has evolved over the years to keep pace with a rapidly changing world.

But one thing has stayed the same: it remains the one place on Earth where all the world’s nations can gather together, discuss common problems, and find shared solutions that benefit all of humanity. — UN about page

Certainly capable of collective action, but through this process of gathering together, discussing common problems and finding solutions.

The OSCE literally describes itself as a forum:

The OSCE is a forum for political dialogue — OSCE

And the WTO is quite clearly about trading and not any sort of collective action.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. — WTO

Your examples are far from describing themselves as "collectives", much less any kind of collective that has mutual security and it would make sense to say "attack on collective security".

Of course, you can always join the game of bait-and-switch the meaning of words in order to say nothing and try to bore other participants out of participation. Does the UN involve a "collection" of nations, yes, is that collection a "collective" connoting a pretty strong political bond, far beyond a forum of dialogue, and presumed collective action? No.

Again, Oxford languages as the first result in searching "define:collective"

collective
/kəˈlɛktɪv/
adjective
done by people acting as a group.
"a collective protest"
noun
a cooperative enterprise.
"the exhibition showcases the work of art collectives from more than 20 countries" — Search engine search for Define Collective

Quote whatever you think was my original claim so I can claim it again and then you explain its meaning to me, dude. — neomac

I have little doubts you're actually in such a self-delusion, perhaps on some level vaguely remembering your original point and thinking it was a good one, but now completely within an emotional state that you believe you're rewriting your memories of this conversation is a "good trick" and you deserve a medal or something.

It's extremely boring, but I will entertain it further as my primary purpose on this forum is to develop methods against bad faith debate. Just boringly repeating your delusions is a common bad faith debate tactic, so let continue.

To cite the point under consideration again:

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.
The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached.
— boethius

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Now, unless you're now claiming to have zero reading comprehensions skills, of your own words or anyone else's, at this point in the debate the word "precondition" had been the focus of discussion for several pages with a clear meaning; Zelensky uses the word and everyone in the discussion was using the word in exactly the same way, exactly how the dictionary describes it.

So, if you want to say now that you didn't read any of that, just happened to drop into the discussion completely randomly to say absolutely nothing, and just "accidentally" used the word precondition but in an unusual and meaningless way without any intention to reference anything in the debate you were joining, yes, zero reading comprehension would be one explanation. But, in that case you're unlikely to be able to comprehend your lack of reading comprehension through reading. It's also unlikely as you've been engaged in this discussion for a while, and clearly know the bare minimum of "what words mean" in order to take part.

The issue under discussion is "precondition" for negotiation (such as "trusting Putin" or "security guarantees" etc.). You are clearly a partisan to Zelensky jumping in to defend his claims to require preconditions to be met to negotiate, contradicting my claims to the contrary.

Your point is clear, Zelensky's preconditions can make sense even if the deals between the US and Soviet Union are a counter example (on the issue of trust), because there is a difference between them and Ukraine. They have Nuclear Weapons "but Ukraine doesn’t have!"

Which is a meaningful argument. Would make sense (if it was true) as a rebuttal to my claim, that there is a critical difference in the counter example and the situation at hand, supporting Zelensky's insistance on "precondition".

Now, you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" all the way to a tautology that in a deal about nuclear weapons the US and the Soviet Union took into account nuclear weapons (the idea, who has them, etc.) just like every other state, nuclear power or not, would do exactly the same, and actually having nuclear weapons was obviously not a precondition to agreeing to the deals that the US, Soviet Union and most non-nuclear states also agree to.

If you didn't think you were making a meaningful point, you'd make it clear that non-nuclear states of course "rationally pursue" the same kinds of deals and "not-having" nuclear weapons is a precondition for doing so (in the way you are using term), and that your use of "pre-condition" means absolutely nothing as the contrary to the precondition in question may result in the exact same actions, which is not what a precondition is (how it's described in the dictionary, how Zelensky uses it, how we were using it in this discussion about Zelensky's use of the term, until you retroactively invented a completely unusual and bizarre meaning that is obviously a lie, and boils down to the the tautology of a "a factor under consideration").

But, anyone who is actually a fan of reading comprehension can clearly see that the structure and meaning of your original claim was that having nuclear weapons was a precondition to enter agreements with untrusted parties and, therefore, it's not "rational to pursue" doing the same if you don't have nuclear weapons.

The intended purpose of your statement is to defend Zelensky's various preconditions as "rational to pursue" given Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons. An argument you continue to make, clearly arguing Zelensky understandably is going to want guarantees in any deal and taking issue with my claim that any "guarantee" will be purely ornamental (perhaps a nice ornament to have, but ornament non the less).

The original meaning is clear and it clearly serves an important function in your overall position that security guarantees are a "rational" precondition for Zelensky to seek out in any peace deal; whereas the US and the Soviet Union didn't require such guarantees in their various peace making dealings because they already had nuclear weapons.

Your original rebuttal to my claim makes perfect sense to support your position and serves a clear roll in the argumentation structure you've developed.

The problem you've encountered is that your position is false: nuclear weapons are not a precondition to enter agreements about nuclear weapons and, more importantly, security guarantees do not exist and cannot be invented to satisfy Zelensky's desire for guarantees (even if we can easily agree he'd want them if they could and do exist and provided to him in any agreement and, even better, as a precondition to even start discussing an agreement; just as we can rationally want a lot of things that don't exist or can't happen or then so unlikely to not-happen that it is functionally the same as can't happen; impossible desires that are actually completely critical to decision making, as often we do not know what is possible or not and to check the feasibility of something, that we'd want it if it were possible, is generally a "precondition" to going and checking, otherwise why would we care? The exception being when we desire it not to be true, as it would present a risk to us, but we go check the feasibility to evaluate our risk mitigation; but this is really the exact same thing that our desire is something not-be-true even it maybe or actually is true, and we are still desiring "A" despite its impossibility, just A is best described as a "not-B" and A is impossible because B is actually true).

The reason to believe the peace deal will work is if one believes things in the real world do and will continue to motivate all the key parties to follow the deal, and will have little to do with what the deal actually says (because, as you've pointed out yourself, international law is "voluntary based" system). The wording of the deal maybe necessary to coordinate willing participants, and some plans are better than others, but what the wording of the deal will not accomplish is keep any party to their word if they decide it's better not to (such as the US, EU, Ukraine, Russia).

Now, the boring response to explaining the obvious to you again will be "Yes! both nuclear and non-nuclear states rationally pursued the exact same agreements, but I was actually talking about counter-factual agreements that didn't happen but could happen that maybe nuclear states might pursue only because they have nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states wouldn't pursue because they don't have nuclear weapons, we can imagine the difference in nuclear status resulting in difference of diplomatic outcomes! The 'pre-condition' I pointed out, although not an actual pre-condition, could nevertheless be a condition that can be different and lead to different decision making outcomes."

Aka: "people take information into account in making decisions, and different configurations of information can lead to different decisions, even under the same rational framework; I have discovered, after hundreds of pages of discussing diplomacy and warmaking, a basic description of the decision making process: people have information and make decisions, and the information, like if you have nuclear weapons or not, is taken into account in making decisions. Do I get a philosophy medal now?"

Like "pre-condition" I guess. BTW "clear" in the sense that is obvious to you or in the sense that we should really care about? — neomac

Yes, precondition is also a pretty clear meaning, just like attack.

If you say A is a precondition for B, the meaning is not-A isn't compatible with B ... it was a precondition so it should definitely be there for there to be B.

Saying A is a precondition for B but likewise not-A is also a precondition for B, that's the exact opposite of the meaning of precondition.

Lookup precondition in a search engine results in literally:

precondition
/priːkənˈdɪʃ(ə)n/
noun
a condition that must be fulfilled before other things can happen or be done.
"a precondition for peace" — search engine search for precondition

Notice the strong words like "must" ... and absence of words like "optional" or "nice to have, but not like, an actual precondition".

... Notice the example the search engine produces from Oxford Languages ... "a precondition for peace".

Try harder to explain my own words to me then. Here I claim it again: The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue
What's the exact meaning of it again? — neomac

That's simply not your original claim, and if it is it means nothing.

Notice the tautological nature of your new claim, which is, seeing as you agree having nuclear weapons isn't a precondition to any agreement about nuclear weapons in anyway, that people just basically take into account information in making decisions. True for pretty much any decisions.

Ukraine doesn't deterrence means ... but also took that into account in negotiating accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There's actually a long list of countries without nuclear weapons that have agreed by accession or ratification to the NPT, that you can consult at treaties.unoda.org.

So, countries having nuclear weapons is a precondition for these other non-nuclear states taking into account the deterrence means of themselves and other parties etc. etc. etc. in order to decide to agree.

All that's saying is the existence of nuclear weapons, or then their conception, is a precondition to an agreement about nuclear weapons, and people thinking it's a good idea to agree to the treaty (for whatever reason) is a precondition for actually agreeing. I.e. the tautology that if someone agrees to something ... they at least thought they had good enough reasons to do so at the time, why else would they agree. Certainly it's tautological for the "rational agents" you like to sprinkle here and there in these little exchanges.

By definition a rational agent does not do something they are entirely convinced a terrible idea in every way and in no way serves any of their purposes. Obviously. And that's all your saying: US and Soviet Union thought the NTP was a good idea ... as did all the other states that agreed to it who didn't have nuclear weapons.

You're attempt to water down your original claim, clearly trying to rebut my claim that trusting Putin was in no way a precondition to a deal with Putin, is just really boring at this point.

However, it's instructive because it's a good example for anyone following of how the "that's not what I really meant" defence works in terms of mental gymnastics the practitioner can engage in and likely genuinely believe on some level.

I'm sure Zelensky genuinely believes his meaning was not to try to escalate military confrontation between NATO and Russia without any evidence but was all entirely reasonable at the time and still is even if we have to stretch the imagination to the point of being stupid.

I see you understand the word "rationality" as arbitrarily as you understand the word "precondition". Still waiting for you to quote who believed in security guaranties in the sense of certainty. Try harder. — neomac

Shitting gold is not an arbitrary. Gold is worth a lot of money, it's rational to want money according to every economics text book I've ever read, therefore it's rational to want to shit gold if that were possible and safe. Arbitrary would be that I'm just as willing to defend "it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions", which I'm not. I do not think it's rational to want to be eaten alive by scorpions; seems completely irrational.

The point of this example is that stating its rational for Zelensky to want something, such as security guarantees, is not the same as stating it's a rational expectation or even possible for Zelensky to get.

We can agree that it's a rational desire on Zelensky's part, without agreeing he has any way to meaningfully get what he wants nor agreeing that anyone can even offer what he wants. Even if Biden were to swear up and down on his own son's coke, Biden may not be there in 2 years and the next US president not only care nothing for whatever Biden promised by even actively hostile to Zelensky's interests.

Your phrase "look for" is, true to form, ambiguous. It's of course rational to be on the lookout for the satisfaction of desires, even if one does not expect them. If I desire magic to actually exist (despite zero evidence) I may rationally defend being on the "look out" for ferries that have magic dust, of a coke or similar kind.

Where we can start to seriously question my rationality is if I start to put resources into attracting these ferries that I have no reason to believe exist, just would very much like the coke ferries to be an actual thing.

Likewise, if I start to make decisions, spending resources, taking risks, leading thousands of my fellow citizens to their deaths, in my quest to uncover the true magic of ferries, having zero evidence they actually exist, then, the rationality of my behaviour is, at best, highly circumspect and people may come to question my decision making process.

So, if there is no "security guarantee" that can feasibly be made for Zelensky, he may rationally rather that not be the case, but to act based on the expectation of something that cannot be offered would then fall in the irrational category.

It's only rational to make a precondition that cannot be satisfied by any party an obstacle as another way to simply say "no, I refuse to negotiate, more war please" and otherwise irrational preconditions simply a way of trolling people.

That is the issue at hand; the actual debate that is relevant to the discussion and the situation in Ukraine and Zelensky's negoitation position.

Now, if you concede the central point of contention that there is no guarantee available other than ornamentation to an agreement no one expect to be followed a week after it's signed, if circumstances emerge that render the agreement no longer in the interests of the key parties to follow, then certainly there are better and worse deals and Zelensky would want to be as confident as he can Russia won't just reinvade (or then act in his rational self interest and just be concerned about his own immediate political future and wealth, maybe take a bribe to sell Ukraine out to maximise his profits of this whole enterprise; maybe crack open an econ-101 book and look out for number 1 like a boss), but there is zero way for anyone to meaningfully guarantee they'll do what they promise or Russia will do what it promises in such a deal.

The reasons to take the deal are:

1. The alternative is losing on the battlefield and the worse conditions being imposed by force without any further leverage to negotiate conditions.

2. One genuinely believes the parties involved will follow the deal anyways, even without any guarantees (that do not and cannot exist), and that circumstances will stay that way, at least long enough that it serves your own purposes in making the deal.

3. One has no intention to follow the deal oneself, it's all part of a 5D military-diplomatic maverick statesmen move to buy time, track down the coke ferries once and for all, fly off to never-never land, track down the lost boyz and do an insane amount of coke.

4. One has been bribed to sell out ones own country for the next best thing next to magic: the fucking money.

I wasn't arguing to support Christoff's understanding of Zelensky (I find Zelensky's attitude toward the missile incident questionable). I was arguing against the claim that Christoff committed a fallacious attack ad hominem. — neomac

Sure, but this defence still requires Zelensky's words as somehow unclear.

And, if we were only talking about "action must be taken", that's ambiguous enough, but the context is incredibly clear, specifically the word "attack" is incredibly clear without alternative meaning.

There's no system of goal post shell game that can be played to turn the meaning of "attack" into "maybe it was an accident, no biggey, nothing to see here" nor "actually, we should probably investigate where the missiles came from".

There's really no other meanings available.

Now, if despite Zelensky's meaning being perfectly clear, you nevertheless see no ad hominem, I do not really care about the ad hominem in itself, wasn't directed at me and I wouldn't care if it was, but the meaning of Zelensky's words claiming Russia has directly attacked NATO does seem to me relevant to discussion.

Now, I would agree Zelensky's words wouldn't cause NATO to do anything anyways, but it is important information about Zelensky's character or if he's in control of his own forces. In Zelensky demanding the data, what is clear is that neither Zelensky nor anyone under his command has any data that indicates any Russian missile they were chasing.

Maybe Zelensky believed his own commanders "in good faith" without asking for the evidence before accusing Russia of having killed two Polish citizens (because he follows the maverick shoot from the hip play book of the league of extraordinary statesmen), but, even if this was true, the commanders in turn have no evidence for their claim.

Now you may "understand" the lying, "given the circumstances", as @Olivier5 would defend, but that is an extremely naive understanding of the circumstances.

Even if the West would never cause a stir about such lying in public, no one appreciates being lied to and that may have serious consequences, perhaps accelerating the "ally fatigue" Zelensky has already been warned about.

Even a liar only wants us to believe their lies but does not like being lied to in turn. "We're all the fucking scum of the earth" is not a team building argument.

And what holds for US and Soviet Union doesn't necessarily hold for other countries not possessing such weapons, like Ukraine. — neomac

Your exact word was "pre-condition".

Pre-condition for what? A deal concerning nuclear weapons. What's the precondition again? Having nuclear weapons, in your rebuttal to my point that the United States and Soviet Union were able to come to agreements despite not trusting each other (that "trust", such as "trusting Putin", is not a precondition to international agreements and treatise and so on).

You simply are unable to read and understand your own words.

Now you've moved the goal posts from "pre-condition" to "rational requirement" to "taking into consideration" all the way to "what holds for some parties may not hold for all parties", which is in no way an analogue for "pre-condition".

Maybe just admit you made a completely ignorant argument because in your own mind it sounded good the idea that US and Soviet Union, having nuclear weapons, don't need to trust each other due to their deterrence of actually having nuclear weapons (even underlining that "Ukraine doesn't have!" said nuclear weapons, so the pre-condition doesn't "hold" for them) and, at the time, you were completely oblivious to the easy and obvious contradiction to such an argument being other non-nuclear states entered the same agreements, so obviously it's not a pre-condition to have nuclear weapons to agree about nuclear weapons.

I totally agree with you if and only if you totally agree with me that is perfectly and pragmatically rational for Ukraine to look for "security guarantees" or equivalent to hedge against the risk of Russian adventurism at Ukrainian expenses. — neomac

It's rational to want to shit gold (in a rectally safe way and not a "careful what you wish for way"). It's rational for Zelensky to want to be king of the world. So, if by "look for" you mean "desire", sure, it's rational to desire a lot of things that won't happen, even knowing they cannot possibly happen.

If by look for you mean some actual objective ... and you are now placing "security guarantees" in quotations to emphasise the ornamental meaning of the phrase in the context we're discussing, then yes, we do agree. But all you're saying is that Ukraine (if it wanted to get a peace deal) should seek as good a deal as it can get, which is obviously true.

The basic point of international relations I have been trying to instruct you about, is that a good international deal if by "good" we mean is actually followed and implemented, is one in which the parties involved carry out their promises because they remain actions they would want to do anyways in the circumstances that follow. All an international relations agreement accomplishes in practice is coordination between willing participants and very slight resolutions of catch 22's where each party would do the actions in questions (such as reduce their weapons stockpiles for their own reasons) but only if the other party was doing so as well (solution, a system of fly over's and other inspections to see the other party is doing what they promised, in which case we'll do what we promised).

Vis-a-vis a peace deal in Ukraine, the primary factor of believing Russia would not simply reinvade is because one believes Russia would not want to, an entirely reasonable belief if one does in fact believe this war was a disaster for Russia and was premised on a total victor in 3 days. If one believed they had this current scenario in mind in launching the invasion (perhaps not as their preferred scenario, but possible and accepted), and were willing to pay the cost to achieve what they have so far, then it stands to reason they may pay a similar cost to accomplish as much in the future.

To believe the US would supply arms again in such a future invasion, again, is to assume they see that, again, as a positive cost-benefit to themselves.

All sorts of things could be in a deal that (if people kept their word) may increase or decrease the cost to Russia of another war, but none of these would be in any sense a "guarantee", except in the ornamental sense of "trust us bro" and not in a sense of certainty nor some legal sense of a court holding a party to their promise (embellishing the legal consequences to compensate the arrogance of someone who "guarantees" and doesn't deliver).

However, the biggest problem to a peace deal at the moment is that Zelensky has made a completely uncompromising position for himself, to justify further fighting at all costs, and that compromising would immediately result in the problem (for Zelensky) that it's a worse compromise than what was available before (in any deal we can imagine the Russians accepting). Of course, the West may have accomplished what it wanted in dragging out the war and damaging Russia as you point out they are want to do, but Zelensky also has constituents not only in Western parliaments but also in Ukraine who may not see the logic for them in such a resolution to the conflict.

He simply argued that Benkei's understanding of Zelensky's claims wasn't obvious — neomac

But it is obvious.

Fist Zelensky Larps as a NATO member claiming an "attack on collective security", as if Ukraine is part of some collective.

This is the key phrase, claiming NATO is under attack.

Second he says "action must be taken", which is perfectly clear what that means in the context.

It's like me yelling "The building is on fire! Action must be taken!" (having no evidence of this), and when my actions cause damages, even lives by causing a panic, claiming that "aha! I didn't say what 'actions,' I could have meant just the situation should be investigated, my statement that was based on nothing verified, and there's no cause for alarm; it's not like I said there's a fire and people should panic or act based on that belief! Where do I say that!?!?!?!."

The only other interpretation available than Zelensky claiming Russia is attacking NATO and therefore NATO must respond with some militarily escalation of one form or another, would be that Zelensky is claiming an attack on collective security by Ukraine on NATO, because Zelensky ordered an attack on Poland that took Polish lives and, generally speaking, Ukrainian actions and reckless subterfuge is a menace to NATO and European welfare since 2014. But, I seriously doubt Zelensky meant an attack on collective security by Ukraine.

If his meaning was Russia, then everyone would understand he means Russia attacked NATO and therefore NATO must respond, at least somehow. If Zelensky does not want peace (requiring compromise and breaking all his extreme exaggerated promises of victory to the Ukrainian people and accepting a deal worse than what was on the table first week of the war), then his best option is escalation ... but he doesn't control the weapons so he can't escalate himself, he needs NATO to escalate.

I continuously denied that you literally understood my quotes and I still do ("taking into account the deterrence means they both had" is the "precondition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" (like the NTP and prior to that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ). — neomac

You then make clear "that Ukraine doesn't have!"

It cannot be clearer that you are claiming the US and Soviet Union can make deals without trusting each other because of the nuclear weapons.

Saying "nuclear weapons" is a precondition to a deal about nuclear weapons, is a tautology. Obviously non-nuclear powers take into account the nuclear weapons of nuclear powers in making deals about nuclear weapons, as well. What else would you do? How do even propose a deal about nuclear weapons that does not take into account the nuclear weapons people do or do not have.

So either you're saying nothing at all, just that people have the idea of nuclear weapons in their head in making deals about nuclear weapons, or then you're saying something meaningful that would have been meaningfully connected to the point you are responding to: that actually having the nuclear weapons is "pre-condition" to making a deal about said nuclear weapons, as a substitute to the trust that gave rise to this discussion. A meaningful argument, just obviously wrong.

So what? There are three reasons your question is failing to take into account: — neomac

Again, reading comprehension.

We agree that the major reason for Russia to not reinvade is the cost of the war. For, if they could get Ukraine for free at no cost of inconvenience, I think we'd both agree they would do that.

So, the reason to not-invade Ukraine last February would be the cost of the conflict (sanctions, fighting and so on).

If there is a peace deal, the situation will be the same. The reason to enter a peace deal would be a bet that from Russia's perspective the cost of another war would outweigh the benefits and therefore they would not reinvade.

If we agree on this point, then we agree that this is in no war a guarantee.

If we also agree the US is not going to nuke Russia if they invade again (or at least not due to anything written on any piece of paper with the word "Ukraine" on it), then there is just no guarantees available. You can call something a guarantee; you can write down "the US will see to it that this deal is respected, that's a Uncle Sam guarantee!" but it's not a guarantee in any sense more than ornamentation added to the agreement for PR purposes. Wording and PR does have some consequence, it's not meaningless, just the US is not about nuke anyone simply due to PR optics of not-nuking them. They'll nuke Russia if they genuinely believe Russia is going to nuke them now or after some series of events they come to believe are inevitable. The decision to nuke Russia or not will have anything to do with any promises to Ukraine; I guarantee you that in the certainty sense of guarantee.

Now, you're whole list:

1. We are in the middle of the war so we don’t see the end of the war nor the full consequences of such war. The Soviet–Afghan War lasted 10 years, could anyone see the end of it and the following collapse of the Soviet Union while they were in the middle of it back then? No, because they didn’t happen yet.
2. Russia was complaining about NATO enlargement since the 90s, did Russia see NATO enlargement stopping for that reason? NATO/US can be as determined as Russia to pursue their goals in Ukraine at the expense of Russia. And since Russia, especially under Putin, took a declared confrontational attitude toward the hegemonic power, Russia made sure that NATO/US will deal with Russia accordingly as long as they see fit.
3. The end game for NATO/US involvement in this war doesn’t need to be to stop Russia or overturn its regime. But to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power (in terms of its economic system, its system of alliance, its capacity of military projection outside its borders, its its technology supply, its military and geopolitical status) to the point it is not longer perceived as a non-negligible geopolitical threat to the West. — neomac

Has nothing to do with my point. My point is simply that obviously Russia is willing to pay the cost of war with Ukraine under certain circumstances (such as circumstances that literally exist right now ... if they weren't willing, then they'd be withdrawing right now and the war would be over). Therefore, you could never reasonably assume such circumstances would not reemerge in the future regardless of any peace deal today. If there's no third party to keep Russia to its promise to not reinvade in the context of a peace deal (even ignoring the problem of why we'd believe such a third party would actually act), then there is simply nothing that can be remotely described as a guarantee of not being reinvaded available to Ukraine.

We may empathise why they would want such a guarantee in a peace deal, but it's simply not available. Therefore, if they want a peace deal, insisting on a guarantee in any meaningful sense (non-ornamental sense) is an irrational demand in negotiation, even more so an irrational precondition to negotiate in the first place.

What you list above has nothing to do with my basic observation that Russia is obviously willing to pay the cost of a war with Ukraine, has just happened and so may happen again. None of the third parties will be able to change this basic fact in any scribbling on paper process of whatever you want.

Of course, the alternative to a peace deal is more war, and in such a choice, as you say, maybe continued war is good for the West to "to inflict as much enduring damage as possible to Russian power".

However, if this damage is indeed significant, then it would be reason to assume that Russia would not restart a war that was so damaging. But, even if this is good for the West, is it good for Ukraine to be in a war forever with Russia and never make peace?

Since you can perfectly understand that there are implied and increasing non-negligible costs, especially when it’s matter of sunk costs and its psychological effects (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost#Fallacy_effect), talking about actual willingness or hypothetical willingness in conjectured scenarios doesn't suffice to reason about this matter. And for that reason I’m not sure that Russia could rationally want to aggress Ukraine again. — neomac

Agreements are about future scenarios and contingencies. If Ukraine is demanding "guarantees" ... guarantees for what? Obviously not being invaded again. That's the scenario being negotiated.

If the US is promising something, and for that guarantee to be meaningful, then that means asking the question of "would the US do this thing even if it otherwise wouldn't want to?". A promise is only meaningful if it actually compels you to fulfil your promise in circumstances you don't want to anymore.

Now, the answer to the question "Would the US intervene again in Ukraine even if it really doesn't want to, for whatever reasons, just because it promised Ukraine as much?"

The answer is: No, it won't.

It will just forget about the agreement under such circumstances, but more likely just negotiate the agreement in such a way as to not really promise anything anyways (because it can, as it has the leverage vis-a-vis Ukraine, so there's simply no reason to make potentially unfulfilled promises anyways).

Therefore, the reason for Ukraine to believe Russia would not invade is not any promise by the US, but simply the cost to Russia of another war being higher than the benefits. If the current war really was premised on the idea that it would be over in 3 days, and has been a disaster ever since, then obviously Ukraine has demonstrated it takes more than 3 days to conquer, so Ukraine can sleep easy with that fact being clear.

Can the agreement commit US to actions that further increase the cost of another war beyond simply fighting with the Ukrainians? Obviously yes, just I honestly don't see any interventions the US would reasonably do in a second war they aren't already doing (again, actions under which Russia is currently willing to wage war). More important to the subject matter, even if the US made such commitments, if the question is asked if anything holds the US to their word about those commitments (promises by the US are a meaningful guarantee), the answer is obviously no.

So, to summarise, not only is "guarantees" not a reasonable precondition to negotiate in the first place, but there is no guarantee that Ukraine can actually secure in any meaningful sense. Placing the word "guarantee" or "guarantors" on the agreement would have very slight PR differences on how any events would actually play out (such as a "super sorry bro" rather than a mere "sorry bro").

Of course, if you want to argue that more war is good for the West and good for Ukraine, then you need not justify Zelensky's unreasonable conditions (to talk peace), but just defend the actual decision of wanting more war and ignore Zelensky' bullshit or then justify it as clever trolling of his partners, the media and social media. It's not like the Western media is able to rationally critique anything he says, so he could literally say anything.

However, this configuration of Zelensky dictating what's true and false to the Western media is one of invitation and not power. What the CIA gives with its right hand, it can take with its left.

Zelensky's credibility can be placed at any moment at any level the US administration wants, without Zelensky having any say whatsoever in the matter.

US administration wants the world to doubt what Zelensky knew or didn't know, intentions behind his statements, about any missiles hitting Poland, paint him as a dangerous fool, done. US administration wants Zelensky to talk peace even if he doesn't want to because there is no peaceful end to the war compatible with the survival of his political career, and controlling billions of dollars of free money with zero accountability and zero "collect taxes and pay debts" requirements nor any governance services quality expectations by anyone ... or opposition media ... or opposition parties ... and win oscars for the performance ... is a pretty nice life style, literally a 2 day operation to have Zelensky start talking peace rather than "we will defeat the Russians".

That could well explain why they're now refusing to reveal their source. — Isaac

Could also be that Poland was gearing up for a big splash with "Russian missile!", and AP got the information when that was the actual plan.

Perhaps at the time Poland thought they could walk that back to "Russian produced" later, but then got cold feat when they realised that would make them look stupid, they have no idea how the US (not to mention Russia) would react to that, so better just stick to common sense justifiable statements navigating an event that could potentially lead to nuclear war between two super powers.

Poland's statements definitely look like they were originally written to say "Russian missile" but then someone added "produced" when they actually sat down and asked themselves if jumping out with "Aha! never said owned and operated by Russia!" later, was a good situation to be in.

The question is why the US would deliberately feed false intelligence to the press, then later deny the veracity of that information.

A split over strategy, perhaps? — Isaac

Definitely also a curious aspect of the case.

However, even it was a US intelligence official it may have been a legitimate leak of someone who legitimately didn't actually know. Also, it could have been just leaking what Poland then claimed that it was a "Russian produced missile", maybe AP even got the same info but left out "produced" for click bait effect.

In any event, doesn't need to have been any deliberate decision by the US administration. If it was a genuine surprise then some confusion is reasonable to go along with that on the US side. Intelligence agents may also have their own agendas, biases and sense of a lack of accountability anyways, opportunity to stoke tensions because why not. Has been known to happen.

There's also the circumstantial evidence to consider.

Missiles have been flying all over the place for over three quarters of a year, none of them falling in Poland, and shortly after Zelensky is warned of "ally fatigue" by the US ... "collective security" is directly attacked.

There is certainly motive and opportunity in any rational consideration of the evidence we have so far.

It seems unlikely that a stray modern air defense missile hits something it wasn't supposed to and also kills two people, across the border of a neutral country no less. Unlikely in terms of statistical probability, but also due to the fact that the S-300 system makes missiles self-destruct when they miss their targets. — Tzeentch

I had also been thinking about the odds on this. Poland is also in the opposite direction.

Of course, Russia has hit targets close the Polish border, so the setup isn't difficult to believe (of an AA missile chasing something towards the Polish border), but the odds of both AA missiles malfunctioning in addition to killing people rather than landing in some random field, is pretty low.

If it was done intentionally, sending two missiles would make sense if the story one has in mind is one was Russian and the other was chasing it. You'd want to do this for the plausible deniability that the Russian missile was missed by radar and so of course there's only the radar signature of the AA missile.

Two missiles is a liability if the US then insists neither came from Russia, as two not only malfunctioning at the same time but coming down in the same location and killing 2 people, creates this head scratching odds questions. Much easier to say one in a fluke than two. There's an old saying in Tennessee—I know it's in Texas, probably in Tennessee—that says, 'Fool me once, shame on...shame on you. Fool me—you can't get fooled again.'

If it's a rational plan, you'd have to bet US actually wants to escalate to go with the plausible deniability story that no one can prove the second missile wasn't Russian.

If you have no reason to believe that, then it's just a desperate plan with significant risks.

More claims and conjectures and ornamental blablabla. — neomac

What I describe is not conjecture, but a potential scenario that makes clear the ornamental nature of any "guarantees" to any peace deal concerning Ukraine.

I am not "conjecturing" that this scenario will come to pass, but developing such scenarios is how decisions are made. Ukraine's concern about "security guarantees" comes from asking "what if Russia reinvades later anyways".

For the word "guarantee" to be more than an ornament would mean that the US et. al. would fulfil whatever it is they promised to do, or make sure Russia doesn't do, even if it's no longer their policy to do.

For example, if it's policy to want to pour arms into Ukraine if Russia re-invades for the same reasons they did the first time or then entirely new reasons, then they don't really need an agreement. NATO wasn't bound by treaty to pour arms into Ukraine in February, they did so because they wanted to.

Now, imagine things change and NATO no longer wants to pour arms into Ukraine.

Would the agreement itself compel them to act (such as supply arms again) just in order to keep a promise, even if it's in total contradiction to their national interests and policies at this future time?

If the answer is ... yeah, no, they'd just "look out for number 1" as they always do, then all this talk of "guarantee" is an ornamental sense, adds nothing to whatever the promise the guarantee is attached to, just embellishes the promise, which may have some consequences as far as embellishments (they maybe really very sorry for breaking a guarantee, truly regret it, rather than simply be just sorry and regret it, breaking a promise that was not also guaranteed).

They may have some excuse, like " 'assurance' means absolutely nothing", which would be likely the case if there's a peace deal as the wording will be such that nothing was really promised anyways, for the simple reason that the US doesn't need to. Or, if they really are breaking a promise but they just can't fulfil it (consistent with their policies at this future time) then they may just say that it's unfortunate but they can't afford to try to rescue Ukraine again ... or, they just say nothing and do nothing.

The reason to believe Russia won't just re-invade is exactly as you describe: it's costly.

Of course, they were willing to take this risk and pay this cost once, so that's not really a "guarantee" just the reasons they don't invade is that it's costly, and the reasons they do reinvade is ... it's costly but they're willing to pay the cost.

The whole point of fighting a more powerful state is to demonstrate that there's a high cost to the use of force, to then negotiate a resolution using that leverage that, sure, Ukraine maybe entirely destroyed by the end of a war, but it's still a big cost and hassle to Russia too.

This is what Finland did with the Soviet Union, demonstrate war isn't easy and then negotiate a compromise ... but somehow Finland is only a model on killing Russians and not their diplomatic efforts that they carried out consistently, continuously, reasonably and earnestly in parallel to the fighting.

I'm not interested in claims, I'm interested in arguments. — neomac

I argue these points at some length, literally cite the claims I'm rebutting that you just continuously deny ever making.

It hasn't deterred Russia right, but Russia is paying and might pay more. So I'm not sure that what you presume is correct. Russia now knows better the costs of its adventurism. — neomac

Do you see Russia stopping the war of their own accord?

No. So, obviously the cost of their adventurism is a cost they are willing to pay.

So, what would be the reason to assume they are not willing to pay the same cost in the future?

Not really any. So, "rationally" it would be nice to have some better reason, such as the US nuking Russia on behalf of Ukraine and being deterred that way. The only problem is there's no rational reason for the US to sign up to that, much less actually do when called upon.

Which is the core fallacy of Zelenskyites: that whatever is good for Zelensky to be true (at least according to him) we should also believe is true, or at least nevertheless support whatever he wants and is trying to get in saying whatever we agree isn't true.

A nice connection to the missile issue. Is Zelensky talking out of his ass? Zelenskyites: Sure, maybe. But that's just all rational decision making that we should support and encourage escalation, if that's what Zelensky wants, it's just clever to use the missile issue to try to escalate. You see, he "believes it" so it's ok to say what you believe even if you have no evidence for it.

Never made such a claim. Quote where I did. — neomac

I've quoted it back to you several times:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Read your own words.

"this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" and you even note "Ukraine doesn’t have!".

The meaning could not be more clear that it was rational for the US and the Soviet Union to "rationally pursue" these non-proliferation agreements, despite not trusting each other, because they both had nuclear weapons ... and ... "Ukraine doesn’t have!"

It cannot be clearer that your implication is that it would not be rational for Ukraine to enter the same agreements without nuclear weapons.

An argument that is clearly false, especially as Ukraine and many other non-nuclear states pursued and signed up to the very same agreements.

Since, you moved the goalpost from "pre-condition" (the word you use) to "rational requirement" to "taking into account".

Yes, obviously all parties took into account the nuclear weapons other parties had or didn't have in negotiating and agreeing to non-proliferation treatise.

If you're really saying now that what you really meant was that the US took into account the Soviet Unions nuclear weapons, vice-versa, and non-nuclear states did the same, everyone took into account stuff, it's just a farcical level of bad faith.

Security guarantees. — neomac

First, as a general principle, this is not a "precondition" or "rational requirement" as a state may surrender simply because they are losing.

Second, Ukraine will receive zero meaningful security guarantees in any peace deal with Russia, other than the ornamental meaning of "trust us bro".

Whatever Russia promises to do, and does not do, obviously nothing stops them, and there is no meaningful leverage NATO would have anyways that would actually stop them short of nuclear weapons, which obviously they won't be "deterring" Russia with concerning Ukraine.

We can be pretty sure of this because NATO has already applied maximum pressure of sanctions and arms supplies and this hasn't "deterred" Russia from their course of acton, so presumably if Russia invaded again then the reasonable bet is we'd (at best for Ukraine) just be back in this same situation; West angry about it, sanctions up the wazoo, providing arms ... and that's it.

Whatever US promises to do and doesn't do, there would unlikely be any consequences at all.

But whatever the consequences for breaking the agreement, they would not be "much" as some sort of contractual result.

The consequence for Russia of reinvading Ukraine would be war and likely sanctions and international pressure, perhaps from their own partners if it's a second time around of this mess for no reason.

This would be the reason to expect Russia to abide by a peace agreement, to avoid the negative consequences of war they have also experienced.

However, being nuked by the USA would not be a reason.

If there's a peace deal and then later war resumes, the reasonable expectation is that the parties to the agreement will do in the future whatever their policy is then in the future anyways.

For example, let's say in the future Europe's and US economy is really hurting, monetary crisis, real domestic problems, in addition to potential war with China invading Taiwan any moment, all sorts of messes all around the world, and they simply don't have the capacity for this same kind of conflict, pour in billions and billions ("carte blanch"), then what we would expect is that their policy then would be "sorry Ukraine, but you're on your own this time" regardless of what is written on any piece of paper.

If the policy in the future is not to intervene for reasons, then the answer about the agreement will be "yeah, well", as we saw about the Crimea annexation in 2014.

Why wasn't the word "assurance" meaningful? Well, it was just ornamental for and a stand in for "trust us bro". Why does a promise not matter because the word "assurance" instead of "guarantor" used to embellish it?

Because nothing actually legal is going on and the promises don't need to be kept, regardless of what words you use.

conditional on the rationality of the agent — neomac

I think the forum should nominate prizes for pseudo intellectual bullshit, and I nominate this phase.

Concerning Zelensky perspective I clarified my point: since Ukraine doesn't have nuclear weapons, the deterrence strategy available to Ukraine in negotiating with Russia (which has nuclear weapons) can not be like the one available to the US in dealing with the Soviet Union. Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like). — neomac

First, your idea that the US and Soviet Union entered non-proliferation agreements based on the idea they could deter the other from not breaking them with their nuclear weapons, is simply false. US and Soviet Union could sign a non-proliferation treaty one day, break it the next day, and the situation would just return to what it was before, neither would rationally (nor did in practice) consider nuking the other simply for breaking a treaty. They would nuke the other if they genuinely believed they were being or about to be nuked.

So, maybe think it through and see your delusion here about how the world works. Why would they nuke each other for breaking a treaty that was intended to lower the chances of nuking each other? Ok, treaty didn't work, situation returns to higher odds of nuking each other.

The US did not "use its deterrence" as a basis to believe the the Soviet Union would abide by the treaty. At no point did either party sign thinking the other would stick to the agreement or be nuked. The nuclear weapons, and their mutual fear of them, was what the negotiation was about (the common ground, common risk, they both wanted to lower), but not itself a way of "dealing" with the other party.

Read some history or maybe just think through the implications of what your saying.

As for seeking NATO deterrence because Ukraine does not have deterrence, this is certainly a rational desire, but it is not a rational diplomatic goal because NATO will never provide it.

There is no reason for NATO to nuke Russia if there is a peace agreement and Russia violates it vis-a-vis Ukraine. If Russia re-invades we'd just be back to where we are currently, there is no circumstances, and certainly no wording of any treaty, that would be some rational basis for NATO to nuke Russia for violating it.

Now, by all means, change your goal posts again to just "for Ukraine to agree, they'd need to be somewhat confident the agreement is better than the alternatives, and somewhat confident Russia would follow it due to a bunch of reasons".

For the sixth time, the general principle is the following: available deterrence means are taken into account by rational agents when engaging in negotiations. — neomac

That's in no way a "pre-conditon" in the sense Zelensky uses it, or the sense you clearly were using it.

Saying parties take information into account to make decisions ... is obvious.

The subject was if "preconditions" were reasonable, an example of a precondition mentioned by Zelensky and Zelenskyites here was "trusting Putin", I pointed out that's not a precondition to enter an agreement, parties (even states) that don't trust each other enter into agreements.

Your rebuttal to this was that US and Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, and "Ukraine does not have!" (Exclamation mark!) That this was a "precondition" in your words. So clearly some condition that made it reasonable of US and Soviet Union that Ukraine doesn't have so doesn't make it reasonable ... otherwise you would have stated "well, of course it's a precondition for the US and Soviet Union, a condition Ukraine doesn't have, but of course Ukraine could enter those same agreements without the precondition I'm talking about, especially because Ukraine itself signed some of the same treatise vis-a-vis nuclear weapons" but by then maybe you'd perhaps even realise "hmm, I'm either not making any sense whatsoever or saying nothing at all, certainly not rebutting Boethius' point".

Now, you've moved the goal posts to from the nuclear weapons being a "precondition" to the nuclear weapons being a "rational requirement" to now just "taking into account".

Obviously "rational agents" take into account what other agents can and cannot do.

You are saying absolutely nothing other than people make decisions based on the information they have, sometimes rationally according to your standard of rationality you're invoking.

So, where is the debate on this topic: obviously the "precondition" of Zelensky isn't some actual precondition that would prevent him from talking or agreeing to something, and if it's a "rational requirement" that would depend on a lot of things (such as if he can just go ahead and "defeat" the Russians or not, if the Russians can defeat him, if fighting for time or a better negotiation position later is worth the lives lost or not, if the Russian economy will collapse and Putin is ousted from power one way or another; in brief everything we've been discussing this entire thread).

Obviously decisions would be based on evaluating the situation and what one believes about the future, what people believe about intentions of people involved, trust and so on.

What Zelensky has been trying to argue is there is some basic short circuits around all that sober consideration of the circumstances that justifies his decision to have an uncompromising diplomatic position that would result in extended warfare into potentially the far future requiring Western support.

Now, we may see why Zelensky would want simple arguments that would justify his position to not compromise so his backers don't get angry with him. The subject under discussion is whether those simplistic arguments to basically not enter any discussion that may actually reach a compromise by invoking "preconditions" (such as won't talk to Putin, or US guarantees, or Russian forces must withdraw entirely, or won't offer any territorial concessions etc.) are "actual preconditions", as Zelensky presents them, or are just a way of saying he's not going to compromise and has no justification for not compromising, he's willing for another 100 000 of his citizen's lives "thrown into the abyss" (as apparently pentagon officers put it) simply to not compromise and perhaps not accomplish anything further militarily as perhaps everything they could reasonably accomplish militarily they have already done so (as another pentagon officer has apparently noted).

But, if there is some version of "precondition" that's not some vacuous tautology and is in some way connected to the subject matter (Zelensky's clear meaning and functional use of the term as justifying his decisions), then present an argument.

However, rebutting my point and then later explaining you literally have said nothing of substance whatsoever in relation to my point, just reminding us that decisions are in fact based on information the people making decisions have, or then at least "rational agents" base their decisions on what they know, you have literally said absolutely nothing.

I suspect you took pre-condition as "necessary condition" instead of "rational requirement", and "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue" as suggesting a one-to-many generalization between one type of deterrence (nuclear weapons) and states (with or without nuclear weapons) instead of a many-to-many generalization between types of deterrence and states. You were wrong in both cases. In other words, I didn't claim that possession of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for agreements between states (with or without nuclear weapons ). — neomac

Obviously it's not a "necessary condition" (which would obviously be false statement as that would mean it would literally not be possible to sign such an agreement). Necessary conditions would be things like "existing" as some deal making entity, and also "able to communicate" in order to engage in said deal making.

However, the fact that non-nuclear states both can for pretty clear rational reasons (of making the world as a whole a safer place and being unable to compete in the nuclear game anyways) and actually do engage in non-nuclear proliferation treatise, often the exact same ones as the nuclear powers, is pretty clear indication that your idea of a "rational requirement" is also obviously false.

Which, again, is what you state:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Now, the meaning of this paragraph is clear, that you are arguing US and Soviet Union could enter these agreements somehow due to having nuclear weapons, a "pre-condition" (rational requirement if you want to change goal posts there), and you even specify "Ukraine doesn't have" ... what don't they have? The pre-condition, therefore Ukraine should not enter the same sorts of agreements.

Which links up with the fundamental issue under discussion, which is the level of certainty Zelensky should (or even can) have for signing a peace agreement. Zelensky has been demanding certainty (which is certainly rational to want) but phrasing things in absolute terms like "pre-condition" (you use this term because Zelensky uses this term), but obviously eventual certainty, guarantees, etc. are not preconditions to negotiate.

Of course, parties have reasons to agree or not.

If all you're saying is nuclear powers had reasons to signup to nuclear non-proliferation, and non-nuclear states had other reasons, obviously. Likewise, both the US and Soviet Union and other states would have their own evaluation of their confident other parties will follow those agreements, maybe try to find out about it to do something (such as the network of sensors and radiation testing to detect non-treaty nuclear tests) ... maybe try to break the agreements themselves.

All you're doing now is moving the goal posts from defending Zelensky's statements of "preconditions" (which simply don't exist, as you yourself note they are obviously not "necessary", which precondition would usually literally mean in that if a precondition wasn't necessary then obviously it's not a precondition) to removing all meaning from your original argument so as just to say "parties have their own reasons to agree to something", which is pretty common feature of agreeing to something.

There can be lot's of reasons to agree to something; one such reason is that you will lose the war anyways so there's no point continuing to fight, there's literally zero confidence the agreement will be followed but ... continued fighting no longer serves a purpose. In other words, the "rational requirement" of confidence a party will actually respect an agreement, can literally be zero but still rational to agree to.

Right, and I took the case of the US and the Soviet Union both as a way to illustrate this general point, and to compare it to the hypothetical case of Ukraine negotiating with Russia. — neomac

What general point?

Having nuclear deterrence was not a "pre-condition" to entering non proliferation treatise, as countries with zero nuclear deterrence (including Ukraine) enter the same agreements.

There are lot's of reasons to sign a treaty with another country, but that they are somehow guaranteed to follow the treaty is not one of them.

Presumably an agreement is good for both parties (otherwise why would both parties agree to it?) and the reason to believe the counter party will follow the agreement is whatever reasons for them to be in the agreement in the first place are really there and persisting (at least long enough for it to be worth it for your own goals; for example the non-aggression pact between the Nazi's and the Soviet Union).

However, there is simply no system of "guaranteeing" any party will actually follow any agreement.

In short, the alternative you are selling me is between “certainty” and “ornamental”?! Are you crazy?! — neomac

Please read.

There are two meanings to guarantee: certainty or then purely ornamental expression of confidence that is in no way certain.

If I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow or that we cannot time travel to stop the Ukraine war from happening, I truly believe that is certain and am using guarantee to express certainty. If I say I guarantee you'll have a great time at my party, that is obviously not certain and the word is purely ornamental; the meaning of the phrase "you'll have a great time at my party" doesn't really change if I add guarantee to it or not.

Likewise, if a company promises you something and doesn't deliver, you could sue them. Again, there would be little difference in such promises and their litigation with or without the word guarantee. The argument "aha! I said I would do it in the contract but I didn't guarantee it!" isn't a good legal argument. Words that emphasise but don't change meaning are ornamental in linguistics. Ornaments can still have consequences. For instance, if I say my promise is a "super duper, mega, no doubts, fantastico guarantee" and then don't deliver, judge will for sure not reward me for adding all these arguments to a promise, the basic legal decision would be about what the promise was and if I delivered it and what the liability is in the context. For embellishing my promise a judge may see it suitable to embellish the damages, but the decision would be about what was the promise, that I "super promised" doesn't really matter to the legal decision as such (did I promise, or didn't I, did I deliver or didn't I, was there good reasons for that, or not); a promise is a promise is a promise; adding "I guarantee it" to a promise doesn't change it's ontological or epistemological status.

In relations between states there is the additional problem that there are no judges that decide anything. Everything is "voluntary". So, in such a context, adding "guarantee" is even more ornamental than in private dealings, as you cannot even go to a judge and complain that this asshat not only promised and didn't deliver, but was an arrogant reckless idiot and claimed to be certain about it (so even more reason to not take mitigatory steps).

As I've described, the reason to assume other parties would follow the deal is not some legalistic reasoning that simply doesn't apply in a non-legal context, that the US "guarantees" something.

One maybe more or less confident a deal will be followed, but the evaluation has little to do with any legal wording or obligations (which simply don't exist in international relations).

So you think the Soviet Union would have gone fine on with unlimited weapons armament during the Cold War. One fifth going to defense spending wouldn't be enough? No. And on the other hand the West, which just was putting 5% into defense spending, it wouldn't have been detrimental to brush off any kind of talk of arms reductions and spending on other issues? Usually leadership of a country is rational, at least about it's popularity and survival. — ssu

By forced I really mean forced, and not "have really good reasons".

I think the Germans had really good reasons to agree to a surrender anytime before sending literal children to go fight in the front lines, but precisely since they weren't forced to surrender until Berlin was overrun.

Which was exactly my point, you can just not agree to things even if the alternatives are worse.

Not only you had a leadership that wanted Gotterdämmerung for Germany and Germans, but also because the Nazi government had no option. Remember Yalta. There was (luckily) the ability for separate peace for Finland, but that option wasn't open for Germany. Something that is a very good choice: if the allies would have stopped at the borders of Germany, it's likely that the Nazi regime would have survived and Germans wouldn't be such pacifists as they are now. — ssu

Are you really arguing the Nazi's government had no other choice than to send children to fight in the front lines?

Obviously they could have surrendered when the war was clearly lost and the outcome of occupation unavoidable. That's not what they want, but when you can't stop your enemy that's what happens.

I think that we are just arguing about just when a country needs to do a decision and when not to. I would just emphasize that a country that has started a war has gone to the extreme and doesn't back out of it's decisions for minor inconveniences. — ssu

I'm not even sure what we're arguing about.

The others were arguing there are valid preconditions for negotiating (such as "trusting Putin" or NATO will "guarantee" the agreement ahead of time, or Putin must no longer be president of Russia, or Russia pulls all forces out of Ukraine etc.).

Of course, nothing stops a party from throwing down preconditions as a negotiating tactic, but it's absurd to say that is some actual barrier of some kind. Obviously you can always negotiate without preconditions and this is the vast majority of negotiations. Lawyers even have an expression "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed!" and variations on that.

This whole preconditions thing is that whenever Zelensky doesn't want to negotiate, instead of saying he could but he won't, he says there's some reason he can't negotiate or then simply won't negotiate until such-and-such. People can defend such things as "good diplomacy" or that Ukraine will "win" so don't need talks and can just troll the media or whatever, but the disagreement here is people defending these arguments at face value; that there really is reasonable preconditions required for peace talks.

You can always ask for conditions to be met, either as a good faith gesture or then as a way to not-talk, but it's absurd to say you really can't talk due to this or that, unless there's some sort of actual practical barrier; which is obviously almost never the case between states.

Talks of course may not succeed but clearly parties to a dispute can talk if they want and see if there's enough common ground to work out a deal.

The alternative to talks is more warfare. If you don't need a deal, but can get what you want by force, then you don't need talks.

But the contradiction Zelenskyites get into is when they argue Ukraine wants a peace deal but refuses to talk, and not-talking is justified even if they really do want a peace deal.

The only position that coheres with wanting a peace deal is wanting to talk and try to work out a peace deal. The only position that coheres with refusing to talk is not wanting a peace deal that can only be achieved through talks, and therefore more war (which can be a reasonable decision if you believe you will get what you want at the end of more fighting).

Inventing some obstacles to talks, that is obviously not there, is just bad faith and ridiculous to anyone familiar with talking.

Dude, for the third time, you are mistaken about what I claim. I didn’t write anywhere that nuclear weapons is a “precondition of any agreement”. — neomac

You literally stated nuclear weapons were the precondition for the US and Soviet Union entering various non-proliferation agreements:

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

Which was your example: "Ukraine doesn't have!" nuclear weapons.

But obviously even in your example nuclear weapons aren't a "pre-condition" (your exact words), because plenty of other non-nuclear states entered the same nuclear non-proliferation treatise.

It's late here, so I'll get to the rest of your comments tomorrow, but ... maybe spend that time to read your own words.

You literally state "this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue".

What was the "pre-condition"? "taking into account the deterrence means they both had".

Which is obviously contradicted by other non-nuclear states doing the same thing, so obviously nuclear weapons isn't a pre-condition for "the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue", as other actors pursued the same agreements without having nuclear weapons.

Therefore, in the words of my sweet, innocent legal colleagues: Quod erat demonstrandum!

What's the point of your post?

Why not post news snippets to news snippet aggregators on reddit or wherever?

If it ever becomes relevant to the discussion, you can then just link to your aggregated news snippets about it.

None of the Russophiles want to come out and say it. I'm not sure why.
— frank

They say hypocrisy is the homage of vice to virtue. — Olivier5

Just so delusional.

If parts of reality just don't happen to be "good" for Ukraine, pointing that out isn't being pro-Russian, it's just understanding reality.

I think @Tzeentch has said it best:

Adhering to the "right" ideology, cheerleading for the "right" side, parroting the "right" narrative is all more important than acknowledging realities, even when the cost is prolonged war, human lives, etc. — Tzeentch

But to give an example of this, Zelenskyites would definitely take issue with my sentence:

What Ukraine is discovering is simply the reasoning behind why weaker states generally try to deal with stronger states diplomatically (accepting a worse negotiating position and accepting the stronger state can anyways more easily break whatever agreement is reached than themselves) rather than pick a fight with a stronger state on the basis of nationalist jingoism. — boethius

But this is just reality, simply what weaker states do.

For example, Finland has received praise upon praise for killing Russians in the Winter war.

However, not only did they "lose" the war, lose 20% of territory and need to pay reparations to the Soviet Union, but following exactly the common sense proscription for dealing with a more powerful neighbour was criticised by the West for decades! Literally named being nice and currying favour with the Soviet Union for the sake of not being invaded (again) after Finland and then expanded it to the entire concept.

Finlandization (Finnish: suomettuminen; Swedish: finlandisering; German: Finnlandisierung; Estonian: soomestumine; Russian: финляндизация, finlyandizatsiya) is the process by which one powerful country makes a smaller neighboring country refrain from opposing the former's foreign policy rules, while allowing it to keep its nominal independence and its own political system.[1] The term means "to become like Finland", referring to the influence of the Soviet Union on Finland's policies during the Cold War. — Finlandization

Notice what no one named Finland after was fanatical uncompromising war, refusing to meet with the "war criminal" Stalin, etc.

Why? Because that didn't happen, and both before, during and after the war Finland tried to make common sense diplomatic decisions to avoid conflict taking into account the Soviet Union being more powerful than them.

Say the three wise monkeys... — Olivier5

You agree that this situation is not anywhere close to being as bad as an actual military defeat in Kherson, positions overrun, lines routed, soldiers surrounded ... so how is the current situation a "strong signal" of military might?

Military might would be doing those things far more embarrassing to Putin. Or is your argument that Ukraine could have taken Kherson by force at anytime but not-doing-so was a 5-D chess move?

Because unless your saying not-taking-Kherson due to the Ukrainian offensives and just letting the Russians leave with all their soldiers, all the civilians that wanted to, and most of their equipment was a 5D Ukrainian chess move, the only signal we have is that Kherson was becoming more trouble than it was worth for Russia, in addition to avoiding the risk of the damn collapsing, so they left.

Maybe this allows Russia to consolidate forces and advance elsewhere. True, they no longer have this bridge head on the West of the Dnieper but they can invade from Bellarus anytime anyways.

And, just as continuously hitting the bridges across the Dnieper was a major problem for Russia, it stands to reason Russia can do the same to Ukraine in further fighting East of the Dnieper.

So, if Russia consolidates and launches their own successful offensives, the current embarrassment will quickly be forgotten and it was clearly a "smart move".

Likewise, if the Russian withdrawal from West of the Dnieper allows Ukraine to free up significant forces previously guarding any breakout operation there and continue sustainable territorial gains, then the Russian retreat was simply delaying the inevitable.

If you really think based on this withdrawal from Kherson we can deduce the "war is over" or the Ukrainians are clearly "winning", you simply live in wishful thinking land.

At the moment, the inference from the actual information available would be that neither side can currently make any decisive and sustained gains, so Russia is attempting to attrit the Ukrainian electricity grid and Western appetite to continue financing the war and deal with high energy prices.

That we're hearing all this talk of a "peace deal" and Zelensky focused on this subject, could be some 5-D move or then could be that it's clear to the West that Ukraine cannot "win", energy situation isn't good for them, and they want to wind down the war (whether Zelensky wants to or not, as he has no leverage with his "guarantors").

The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue — neomac

The precondition of any agreement is that the parties involved have some reason to pursue an agreement. Having nuclear weapons is not a "pre-condition" for entering that "kind of an agreement".

Lot's of non-nuclear powers have entered the same non-proliferation agreements ... without having nuclear weapons.

What you are saying is both meaningless and false.

The only "precondition" to negotiating any agreement is being able to communicate. Just declaring preconditions is just a way of saying you won't negotiate, or then because you think the other party will give you concessions for free for some reason.

If the West is involved in this war there is a reason and they want to weigh in about this agreement, Russia must deal with it, even if Russia thinks its "unfair" to them. — neomac

This is what Russia wants: Negotiate with the West, the counter-party with the actual leverage (the weapons, the money, the economic sanctions).

So what? State powers (and even criminal organizations) ground their power not just in brute force but also in consensus and reputation relative to their competitors, for their own selfish interest! — neomac

Thanks for agreeing that Ukraine will not and cannot get any sort of guarantee from the US, or anyone else, in the "sense of certainty". I go on to describe that adding such language does create prestige states, that make matter or not.

Dude, it's not up to you to determine how these security guarantees are implemented. The security guarantees do not need to consist in the US swearing on their mother's head that they are going to nuclear bomb Putin's ass if he defects the agreement and act accordingly. It could simply require the forms and degree of military cooperation between Ukraine and its guarantors. — neomac

Again, if Ukraine signs, their guarantors sign, and then the "guarantors" don't do what they guaranteed, or did it in a bad faith way that is not fit for purpose. Is this a guarantee?

There are two meanings to guarantee commonly used: certainty (I guarantee you the sun will rise tomorrow) and a promise that is in no way certain (satisfaction guaranteed!). Now, the talk of US nuking Russia or doing something else, if they don't abide by the agreement or reinvade or whatever, if meant as a guarantee in the second sense (a promise that maybe kept, maybe not, the word "guarantee" just being an expression of confidence by a party that could be trying to deceive you), I have no issue. However, if people want to be able to actually visualise how Ukraine could be certain the agreement would be followed, and what the guarantee is in this sense, then we definitely seem to agree that there is no such guarantee.

Now, if such wording is useful diplomatically and adds some prestige reasons as additional motivation for parties to ensure the agreement happens, sure, have at it, add the word guarantee and "guarantor" after every sentence.

You are claiming that "these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental". — neomac

No, I said the word "guarantee" is purely ornamental.

Saying "the parties will do A, B, C" is exactly the same as saying "the parties will guarantee A, B and C" except for the prestige points.

The agreement themselves are useful and meaningful (otherwise no one would ever make one), they are just not "guaranteed" in any sense of certainty (which you seem to agree with).

For example, the EU exists based on a giant pile of international agreements, premised on the idea of mutual benefit to the parties involved (that they want to be "in" and want to follow what's "agreed", overall), but, as the UK recently demonstrated, any party to these agreements can nope out of at anytime.

I'm talking about https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
So if you have a problem with the standard usage of the term "international law", I don't care. — neomac

I explained how a "guarantee" (in the sense of some certainty Russia won't break the agreement) is impossible to implement, and such a reason is not, and never is, a reason to enter an international agreement (or any agreement for that matter).

You then say I don't know what I'm talking about and cite "international law" as a "voluntary" thing.

I say ... yeah, that's what it is, all these international agreements are voluntary, and likewise any agreement between Ukraine and Russian and anyone else. I point out your citation of international law as:

International relations include a legal framework based on voluntary acceptance — neomac

Is exactly what I'm describing to explain why "guarantee" in such agreements would be ornamental and not representing something actually certain.

I point our your explanation is the same as mine (Ukraine will never get any sort of guarantee from anyone, other than ornamental) ... and then you complain that I'm not using your definition of international law as entirely voluntary?

The signal is there alright: they were forced to withdraw from what their lord Putin sees as Russian territory. — Olivier5

The signal is not there.

The Russians are losing ground. — Olivier5

At what cost?

I've pointed out the obvious now several times: what actually matters is whether these territory gains are sustainable for the Ukrainians or not? because if they are not sustainable then they are not the first steps of defeating the Russians but, rather, exhausting force capability which can be easily counter-productive and the territory simply re-lost in Russian offensives.

The meaningful question is that after these offensives by Ukraine are they in a stronger position or not?

Are the losses worth the gains?

The next meaningful question, would be even assuming Ukraine has increased their relative strength ... is that "strong enough" to achieve their objectives through force?

Or ...

Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the case in internal meetings that the Ukrainians have achieved about as much as they could reasonably expect on the battlefield before winter sets in and so they should try to cement their gains at the bargaining table, according to officials informed about the discussions — New York Times

Which is another way of saying the losses aren't sustainable and so Ukraine should seek a diplomatic resolution to the war using the leverage they currently have (and, the implication being, won't get any better).

Yes, they avoided total humiliation. Most importantly, they saved a lot of Russian and Ukrainian lives by deciding to withdraw from a position they were unable to hold. So they lived to fight another day. — Olivier5

Then we agree, this is exactly what I describe: a "bad thing" but not some total disaster and strong signal Russia's military just can't compete with Ukrainian military and the current trajectory is towards total defeat in Ukraine.

I believe that the massive casualties among newly mobilized men incurred in the east over the past few weeks have taken a toll: all these wives protesting that their husbands are treated as cannon fodder and holding government to account... The mobilisation reduced Russian appetite for wasteful death. That's a positive. — Olivier5

In a war of attrition bad things are happening to both sides. There is no question bad things are happening to Russians; likewise, there is no question bad things are happening to Ukrainians.

In terms of projecting "who's winning" it's largely a question of how much badness each side can tolerate. Between the fog of war and disinformation and propaganda, unless a side start suffering clear "total humiliation", then it's just not really clear what the breaking point for each side is, and how close we are to each.

To say "Russia can't continue like this" is only meaningful if it comes with the argument "Ukraine can continue for longer" which is only meaningful if that comes with the argument "the West will cover the bill for however long that is".

The reason you have legal language in international agreements and arrangements is because if the states concerned intend to actually do whatever it is, they'll need to translate the agreement into actual domestic laws, and the wording being the same helps with that and was also a signal they'll actually do whatever it is.

If the party has zero intention to carry out the agreement, then it helps the deception to be all legal and shit.

My impression is that you have no clue what you are talking about: — neomac

You literally cite exactly what I describe:

Key words:

voluntary acceptance — neomac

International agreements are all voluntary.

And so, a "guarantee" is likewise a voluntary thing ... and therefore not any sort of actual guarantee. These sorts of words in these sorts of agreements are purely ornamental. US can guarantee whatever it wants, doesn't mean it's going to do that.

Now, if your point is just that Ukraine would feel better if this sort of language is in the agreement and adding this language does place a bit of "prestige stakes" for the US, sure, but that hasn't been what's being discussed. The talk of guarantees has been some sort of actual guarantee, like US using nuclear weapons.

The primary involved parties in the Ukrainian war are clearly interested in such “security guarantees”: Putin urges West to act quickly to offer security guarantees. (https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1067188698/putin-urges-west-to-act-quickly-to-offer-security-guarantees). — neomac

Because Russia knows:

A. It will be just feel good language and not the US nuking Russia if for some reason the agreement isn't kept.

B. Any economic leverage as a substitute consequence would require the West first scaling back the economic leverage its applied so far, which is basically a maximum of what it can reasonably do.

B. The West offering security guarantees means that they are at the negotiating table and a deal can be worked out with who actually matters in the situation, because, first it's NATO, not Ukraine, that is the more important party to the conflict (Ukraine being a complete military dependency at this point, just under a logo of alleged freedom), and, second, the following statement:

To the extent there is an international law and rational agents engage in it, there must be some reasonable application for it, independently from any arbitrarily high standard of reliability and compatibly with power balance/struggle concerns. — neomac

Is completely false, unless you're just repeating what I stated and what you claim to have issue with.

International law is not "law" (in the sense of law within states) and "legal framework" is not a "legal system" (in the sense of legal system within states). Same language maybe used, but referencing completely different things.

Actual law references the state's apparatus to enforce said law. "International law" references:

voluntary acceptance — neomac

Or then a war if that doesn't happen and bygones can't be bygones about whatever the dispute is about.

You misunderstood my claim. I was referring precisely to the following condition: “each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war”. The best interest of both US and Soviet Union was calculated by taking into account the deterrence means they both had (but Ukraine doesn’t have!), and this was pre-condition for the kind of agreements they could rationally pursue. — neomac

First, the deterrence means was not a pre-condition of the agreement but what the agreement was about (we both have too much deterrence to our mutual detriment).

However, the US and the Soviet Union could have entered into agreements that one or both pull out of the very next day; the situation would have then just stayed the same as before the agreement, no immediate negative consequences to a party violating, certainly nothing "forcing" them to stay in the agreement.

That Ukraine has no nuclear deterrence just means that it needs to consider the fact that Russia does.

If you feel it's "unfair" that stronger parties have more influence over events than weaker parties, I don't know what to say other than welcome to the real world.

If you're complaint is just that any deal Russia signs they can more easily break than Ukraine and that's "unfair" to Ukraine because they are the weaker party and less able to do anything about breaches to the agreement, then to make the situation "fair" you'd need a more powerful party than Russia to keep them to their word. Which is exactly what Ukraine is arguing in that the US would need to guarantee the agreement.

But, ok, the question then comes up of what would actually make the US enforce the agreement? Especially if doing so risks nuclear confrontation with Russia they have zero rational reason to risk that for the perceived benefit of Ukraine (risking nuclear war doesn't necessarily benefit Ukraine in any net-present-value calculation of any plausible metric of human welfare, but let's assume it does for the sake of argument).

Answer is nothing. Russia's promises can be empty and the US promise of "making Russia" do something can be equally empty.

What Ukraine is discovering is simply the reasoning behind why weaker states generally try to deal with stronger states diplomatically (accepting a worse negotiating position and accepting the stronger state can anyways more easily break whatever agreement is reached than themselves) rather than pick a fight with a stronger state on the basis of nationalist jingoism.

Ukraine's position now is basically "we'll start acting rationally if the world is changed to suit our irrational desires".

Basically both sides are simply forced to make agreements. And this is with this war in Ukraine too. — ssu

No. No one is forced to make agreements.

Even if a party can't possibly win, even then sometimes a party will not surrender and the other party does what they want by force without any agreement at any point about it.

Negotiations will be successful if both sides, Putin and the Ukrainians, have no option to continue the war or continuing would be a very bad decision. Hence very likely the war will continue. — ssu

In no way true. There is always the option to keep fighting, even in a hopeless military situation (see: Nazi's sending children to fight) and just having all your positions overrun and your high command captured and / or run away.

Certainly parties enter agreements because they think it's a good idea, but no one's ever forced to. The whole idea of an agreement is what you are doing willingly and are not forced to do. When police arrest someone we don't call that an "agreement".

Parties enter agreements for all sorts of reasons, that the results are "guaranteed" in some sense of certainty is never one of them. If a company "guarantees" something, they may still go bankrupt and be unable to actually fulfil their promise, if you go get that promise insured ahead of time for this exact scenario, the insurer may go bankrupt or fight it in court and win.

This whole idea of only entering an agreement if the results are guaranteed is not how any agreement works, and as we increase in the power of the parties involved, is less and less remotely possible to try to approximate. Whenever we think an agreement is somewhat certain, it's only because there's a third far more powerful party (the state) that we think will act on our behalf (that the agreement is actually an agreement with the state to enforce it somehow, and not something the state doesn't care about such as an informal promise, unprovable promise, or a promise of love or anything else the state doesn't concern itself with); however, nothing actually guarantees the state will do so, it is purely an inference of the state doing so in the past for similar things, but even then any number of things can go wrong in our quest for legal restitution (you may not have the money for a lawsuit, your lawyer maybe incompetent, the judge maybe corrupt; and what "should happen" is not what actually happens).

LOL... It did succeed in recapturing Kherson. :-) — Olivier5

Was I talking about that? Or was I talking about what I literally stated: routing the Russians and encircling them in and around Kherson.

Ukraine launches an offensive: if they were simply better and stronger than the Russians, then that offensive would have worked without the Russians being able to hold any lines.

The current scenario of the Russians withdrawing I literally describe as "embarrassing", but obviously not as bad as losing on the field, positions overrun and thousands or tens of thousands of troops encircled.

The current situation is not a clear sign of Ukraine being able to beat the Russians in the field wherever and whenever they want and on a obvious path to "victory". War is far from over and far from having any obvious outcome.

The only thing to add to your analysis is that the US will choose the interpretation that fits their existing policy choice.

If they want to escalate with Russia they'll blame it squarely on Russia, claim they have the Radar proof, even if they have zero proof or even if they are sitting on proof it was Ukraine.

If they want to basically exit the war they'll blame it on Ukraine.

If they want to make the situation even more confusing for some reason, they'll blame it on terrorists.

If they want to keep the current situation, they'll just never blame anyone and it will stay "one of those things", maybe just say it was certainly an accident wherever the missiles came from.

What actually happened is of secondary importance in these sorts of small and ambiguous events, that can be spun in different directions and no one really knows for sure anything anyways (and if they do they can't prove it in a way that can't be denied).

The Soviet Union couldn't continue the arms race and actually did collapse partly because of it (even if Americans tend to overemphasize this). Soviet Union was spending twice the percentage of GDP than the US was and it was failing to keep up in the technological race. You are correct in that the two Superpowers never trusted each other, but agreements could be found simply when there wasn't any other sustainable option. — ssu

You are just underlining my point that agreements are carried out in international relations not because of any sort of guarantee or legal system that would enforce those agreements, but because you think the other party's interest is to carry out the agreement, even without any or minimal trust.

For example, both the US and Soviet Union recognised it was not in their own self interest to have a nuclear war by accident, and that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons on each side was creating this risk.

So, even without any trust, both sides were able to "trust enough" that the other party saw it was in their own interest to abide by various nuclear control and proliferation treatise.

To tip the balance of the "assumption scales" both sides allowed fly over inspections of their territory.

US and Soviets had also deterrence means that Ukraine doesn't have though. — neomac

This is just foolish. At no point did either side threaten the other with a first strike nuclear launch if they broke or pulled out of any agreement.

The basis of diplomatic resolutions between the Soviet Union and the US was that each side saw it was in their best interest to avoid a large scale nuclear war, and each side was able to believe the other side believed that too, so some agreements could be reached. However, nothing kept each side in these agreements other than their own interest.

And this basic situation in international relations doesn't really change except in the direction of the more powerful party having zero consequences of breaking the agreement and the weaker party accepting the deal with zero belief the stronger party is forced somehow to abide by it, but because they have no other choice.

What matters is actual leverage in international relations.

For example, Japan had zero guarantee that the US wouldn't just arrest the emperor and execute him after accepting the conditional surrender, and largely Japan, being in the weak position at that point, had no choice. Nevertheless, executing the Emperor may create some endless Japanese insurgency, so even in totally losing the war the Japanese high command still had the leverage that their emperor (what they cared about in the surrender terms) was useful for an orderly transition, which presumably was in the US interest (seeing as the conflict with the Soviet Union is around the corner); which may seem like common sense now, but it is not some obvious thing as "holding the Emperor to account for Pearl Harbour and other war crimes" could be a good sell for the domestically, and you may calculate there will not be an insurgency (out with the old boss, in with the new, for the Japanese psychology). Point being, whatever the relative strength between parties in international agreements, there is no legal guarantee of any kind ever, but one must simply genuinely assume the other party intends to follow the agreement for their own reasons, has no choice, or then it is part of one's own intricate deceptive plan (as, likewise, neither the other party nor yourself need follow the agreement).

Now, if you have zero leverage then all you can do is make suggestions and argue what you want somehow also benefits the stronger party that has all the leverage.

If you do have leverage, then it would be this leverage that you'd be using to make clear it is in the best interest of the other party to follow the agreement.

But the idea that guarantees are needed to enter into an international agreement is just a high school level and completely ignorant understanding of international relations. There is never any guarantees. There's no guarantee anyone in normal life follows an agreement, only that there is a far stronger party that can be appealed to implementing or compensating the breach by force, aka. the state, but there is nothing that guarantees the state to intervene in your issue (due to not recognising an agreement it cares about, inefficiency, corruption or just not feeling like it).

Things people say and forget:

A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson
— boethius

taking Kherson would be a turning point.
— boethius

Losing Kherson would be both bad militarily (likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, stuck and captured troops) as well as intensely embarrassing.
— boethius — Olivier5

First, do you see thousands, if not tens of thousands, of stuck or captured Russian troops?

This was the scenario under discussion at the time. Ukraine had launched an offensive with this aim of taking Kherson by force and encircling Russian troops in and around Kherson.

That would have been "intensely embarrassing".

But that didn't happen. Russia left Kherson, which I have since described as "embarrassing" (compared to the "intensely embarrassing" worse scenario of being routed and encircled).

So yes, a sign of a "winning" army is that Ukraine's offensive operation succeeded. It did not. The goal of that operation was to take Kherson by force, which Ukrainian forces were unable to do (they did not launch their operation and "win").

Russian forces withdrawing from Kherson is embarrassing, but this was not Russian lines collapsing, being routed, thousands of troops surrounded and captured, break down of command and control and the whole operation in disarray, people demanding Putin's head for getting their boyz stuck in Kherson etc. (that was the scenario under discussion then, which is not the current scenario.)

What has occurred is not some catastrophe for Russia, but one step in a war of attrition. Ukraine has been attritting Russian held territory but at significant cost of men and material (at least people seem to agree on the point Ukrainian losses have been much higher in these recent offensives).

So, to evaluate the current stage of the war we'd need to know exact losses on each side, which we don't.

The second thing we'd need to know is the West's appetite to pour in more arms. This we also don't know.

Russia's plan was clearly to get to winter and see the effect of the gas situation, and Ukraine's plan was large scale brilliant operational success, routing the Russians and taking large amounts of territory with sustainable losses.

Both sides have accomplished some of their strategy. Ukraine has made advances and maybe losses are sustainable if the West replaces everything, while Russia has gotten to winter by simply withdrawing from weak points.

Not quite. One article might contain a promise from NATO. Who the supplicant is depends on the commitment the article is about.

As to enforcing powers, the UN pass for the closest thing we have to a global legal system. An agreement endorsed by the UN has a greater staying power than a bilateral one. — Isaac

Although I agree with your criticism of false dichotomies and barriers to peace tossed around to justify more violence without any coherent plan, I think it's useful for us and people following this thread to note that international relations are not legal relations, which has already been discussed by is worth repeating.

There is no guarantees in any international agreement as there is no world court and world police system that enforces agreements.

The reason to make an international agreement is one of three options:

1. You yourself don't intend to abide by it, but it serves some deceptive purpose. For example, some Zelenskyites boast that Minsk I and Minsk II agreements Ukraine never intended to honour but it was a clever deception to buy time to build up their forces to crush the rebels. I'm not sure if this is true, but it is said. People who deny Ukraine had such intentions claim it was in fact Russia never intending to honor the agreement and just buying time to ready their invasion force. So, a good example of making an agreement with zero intention of honouring it in either scenario.

2. You intend to honour the agreement, you hope the other party honours the agreement but you have no power in the situation and you can't do much about the situation if the deal isn't honoured. For example, losing a war and surrendering is such a situation; maybe the victors honour whatever peace deal was agreed, or maybe not and just do as they please once they take over administration.

3. You intend to honour the agreement only if you believe the other party will as well. One reason to believe they will honour the agreement is you think they just have that high a character, but, failing such an esteem (such as with you enemy you've been fighting a war with), the alternative is simply that there is a system of interests in place that would compel the counter party to abide by the agreement.

What simply does not exist is some sort of external guarantee to international agreements.

As you mention, the best that can be done is a UN resolution passed by all members of the security council (i.e. US and Russia agreeing to whatever it is).

This has no force of law, but simply increases the diplomatic cost of reneging on the agreement.

The argument that "Putin can't be trusted" as a basis to reject an otherwise good peace deal is simply an invalid argument. The trust in an international counter-party has little to do with reasons to enter an agreement or not. US and the Soviets never trusted each other, but entered into all sorts of agreements.

Indeed, the basic assumption of international relations is that countries don't just go ahead and trust each other, but the situation is more complicated than that.