But the poor war did have some consequences. — ssu

Yes, indeed, let's sacrifice every single Ukrainian for a chance to "have some consequences".

As an observation of the legacy of the war, you maybe right, who knows, but how does that benefit Ukrainians in either case?

Let's see then how triumphant the victorious Russian forces are then, shall we? — ssu

Exactly, this is the position you're supporting along with the other pro-NATO policy and Zelenskyites:

See if the Russians lose for as of yet unexplained reasons at the cost of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives and the near total destruction of the Ukrainian economy.

And not only that, but lose against a smaller force that now needs to be on the offensive, seen as the Russians have already conquered a large majority of the territory they mean to annex (they clearly still want to conquer the rest, but they don't need to).

In addition to being able to shutdown the Ukrainian grid at any time and have nuclear weapons to deal with problematic situations if they want.

We're been out of the loop Isaac, to comment on geopolitics one must know every single living language, as well as all the dead ones for context.

Once the 'referenda' have run their course and the occupied territories are integrated to Russia, there won't be anything left to negotiate. — Olivier5

There is the rest of Ukraine to negotiate over and avoiding or inviting the use of nuclear weapons.

It's sad that so many on the left fall for the pro-or-soft-on-Putin crap, but not all do. — Jamal

Being "hard on Putin" NATO could have done by sending NATO troops into Ukraine before the war to defend a dear ally, create a standoff and then negotiate a resolution a la Cuban missile crisis (which would be easy to do).

Otherwise, the available means to be hard on Putin is to nuke him.

If you're not willing to nuke Putin then the only available options are soft options.

As for sanctions, they have never been demonstrated to bring about regime change.

So, what are the hard options available to "deal with Putin"?

The "hard on Putin" position since over a decade is simply incendiary rhetoric which, at the end of the day, only serves to support US imperialistic policies and not harm or deal with Putin in anyway.

↪ssu I’m not a big fan of boethius’s view, but I have to say, your reaction to his statements of fact is just bizarre. — Jamal

Unfortunately, most of this debate is arguing with obvious denial of facts (there are definitely more Nazi's in Ukraine with more power than in the typical Western army and government) or then unsupported hypotheticals presented as likely (such as Russian state on the brink of collapse), and I try to keep my arguments focused one positions I intend to defend.

Furthermore, the purpose of the denialism and unsupported hypotheticals is not to argue them in any sort of good faith way, or that their proponents even believe them despite the lack of supporting evidence and analysis, but rather to tease out a normative agreement for the purposes of tribal-group think.

For example, if I disagree that Putin is literally Hitler, I am supposed to annex my argument with "but of course Putin is super evil and bad" or then if I disagree that the Russian state is on the brink of total collapse I am supposed to preamble that with "of course the Russian state should collapse!".

I don't play into that because I don't like propaganda.

Furthermore, the moral evaluation of Putin should nevertheless have supporting arguments. The "hyperbole", as one poster refers to himself, followed by "of course Putin is still bad" is a way to get agreement on a moral evaluation of Putin without any facts, analysis or values.

If I say "Putin is bad", the standard I set for myself is I have reasons I'm willing to explain for saying that.

My priority in this discussion is a diplomatic resolution, and morally evaluating Putin is not necessary for a diplomatic resolution.

If other's have as their priority the moral evaluation of Putin, they are free to present an argument and if it's convincing then I can just say I agree to it.

My purpose in pointing to the Nazi's in Ukraine is that obviously many Russians are upset about it, which is important to understand their world view which is important in finding a diplomatic resolution.

That there are too many Nazi's in Ukraine and therefore we must invade and destroy them, is, for me, a completely sound argument: the conclusion follows from the premises. Of course, maybe the premise is false, that there aren't enough Nazi's in Ukraine to satisfy the Wests own definition of "appeasement" of Nazi's; that is a complicated journalistic and political question. How many Nazi's with how much power are in Ukraine exactly? And where do we draw the line between "not relevant" and "too many" politically speaking.

Again, people who's priority is merely condemning the Russians in order to justify any and all Ukrainian suffering (and the world for that matter) should present their argument (the sources that plausibly establish "how many Nazis" and the political theory that answers "how many is too many"). It's their priority and not mine, if their arguments are compelling I can simply agree to them.

My priority is a diplomatic resolution and for that solutions must be found that are also reasonable for the Russian perspective, and what the Russian perspective "ought to be" is hardly relevant in that.

To take another example of something taken for granted in the West but no argument is ever presented to support it, the current votes in South Ukraine are simply announced as "a sham".

However, although on the surface it may seem a vote carried out under an occupying force is coercive and illegitimate, or then the "real law" there is Kiev's, these are not so easy positions to argue.

Both positions the West would not support in other contexts. For example, votes in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the US invaded and occupied are completely legitimate according to the West. And, obviously, if conquest was not a valid form of changing legal systems then the entirety of America would be given back to Native Americans and all the borders of the world would radically change overnight.

It would be a complicated task to resolve these sorts of questions without resorting to "it's legitimate when the West does it because we say so!"

If the people of these Southern Oblasts genuinely want to separate from Ukraine and join Russia, then it is indeed liberation according to the Wests own standards (that Iraqi's genuinely didn't want Saddam's form of government, and Afghani's genuinely didn't want the Taliban's).

Of course, how do you establish what people genuinely want (on average) without a vote? But how does an occupying army, such as the US, carry out such a vote if no vote under occupation is valid?

The answer to that is of course the vote is valid because we already know what the population feels about it.

Which sounds circular reasoning, and formally it is, but the world is a lot messier than formal arguments and we can get an idea of what a population thinks by both culture and journalism.

Ok, applying all this to Southern Ukraine, we do know there are a lot of ethnic Russians there that speak Russian and, we can safely conclude, based on "cultural knowledge", that they maybe genuinely upset about the Russian language being banned and other cultural genocidal practices; which the West may support this sort of cultural genocide when "we do it" but maybe the Russians feel differently (again, how people see things and feel about things is critical for finding a diplomatic resolution).

Of course, with the right journalistic evidence we maybe convinced that only a tiny majority support joining Russia and therefore the votes are illegitimate. Point being, things are not so simple as they appear in Western media.

As for Putin's moral character, again it's not so easy to condemn Putin.

If he's as evil as people in the West say ... why hasn't he nuked us yet. It seems incompatible with extreme levels of evil to have nukes and not use them.

Additionally, I try to avoid moral evaluations of people, but when I do my criteria is always comparing to a similar class of people and not some immutable set of actions I deem "moral". In this case, Putin's peers are other authoritarians ... but in Putin's case no one really disputes that he has the support of a majority of Russians; which definitely "sounds like democracy" to me.

Compare that to the US Senate ...

A national leader supported by a majority of their people is difficult to morally condemn. The people can be wrong ... but then it's the people that are condemnable and the leader a mere tool expressing that.

Of course, one may argue that the Russian people only support Putin because of Putin's propaganda ... but good luck trying to convince me there's no propaganda in the West.

We then therefore conclude that all nation-state leaders are morally condemnable, but then we come up against my criteria of comparing people to their peers; there being no reason to single out Putin in particular.

The reason we condemn Hitler, Stalin and Moa, is because their actions go far beyond their peers of national leaders (during the same epoch ... again, if British and other previous genocides are fair game, they become far more banal, just happen to be the last members of the same list: nothing more unusual than that, someone has to called out last in attendance).

Now, my point in explaining all this is not to present my views on these topics, but to point out they have not been debated and they are not my priority so I don't have time to evaluate these topics, take a position, present my arguments and have even more time to defend them.

They would be interesting to debate, but no one is actually debating these issues, but rather engaging in a series of factual denials and unsupported hypotheticals in order to argue against the position that diplomatic resolution involving compromise (sort of necessary for diplomacy to happen) is not the best possible outcome for Ukrainians.

Mere inconvenience. Putin Strong!!! — ssu

The idea that Ukrainians should keep fighting and dying for the strategy that Putin is weak internally and eventually the whole Russian state should collapse, yes, should have more than just virtue signalling as a basis.

Otherwise, the Russian army and reserves are far larger and now on the defensive and have all the benefits Ukrainians had defending Kiev, and the Russian army can disable the entire Ukrainian grid at will, and also has nuclear weapons that it can deploy at any moment. So, without the mechanism to somehow collapse the Russian state, there are not presently favourable battlefield conditions.

If the proposal that there is a mechanism to collapse the Russian state is wrong, then the cost of being wrong is literally hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and the entire Ukrainian economy: dead.

It's repeated over and over that it's their land and they can fight and die for it if they want. Ok, sure, but if the fighting and dying doesn't accomplish anything, is it still worthwhile as some sort of moral Churchillian gesture? (Churchillian gesture the whole West applauds ... but doesn't put their own soldiers in this noble quest)

Of course. A daily normal occurence in Dagestan. :blush: — ssu

I just was talking to an American a few days ago who was complaining about the love of people where she comes from for firing into the air on every holiday, (triggering PTSD of veterans was the gripe about it).

In Turkey the army fired into a crowd with a helicopter ... and that didn't bring down the government.

So again, feel free to argue that this one soldier in some random outpost firing into the air to warn a hundred or so people is some ground shaking political event in Russia that changes everything, or that compared to the protests at the start of the war "this is different" and will lead to full scale revolution.

Otherwise, it's just that "pointing out some true things for propaganda purposes" that you complain Russia does.

Vietnam comes to mind. — Olivier5

Vietnam is not an example of protesting a war leading directly to the collapse of the US government or ending the war or anything remotely similar to what's being continuously predicted will happen in Russia. US stayed in Vietnam for years even after the majority of the public was clearly against the war, of which large protests is more a manifestation than a cause (good arguments to question why the US was in Vietnam).

And even if you want to particular emphasise the role of protests (compared to other political discourse) then that's still one single example that does not serve as a good analogy: the war was thousands of kilometres away from US shores, North Vietnam was not a threat to the US, domino theory was speculative, and the war went on for years and years, before the US withdrawing under a ceasefire and not surrender conditions ... and, again, the US government did not entirely collapse.

Wars eventually end but there are no examples I know of where protests like we see in Russia somehow lead directly to the end the war.

More 'anecdotal' videos... — ssu

Firing into the air is pretty normal in some cultures. Certainly would be a "huge deal" in the West, but a good indication that it's not a big deal in Dagestan is that no one in the crowd seems at all alarmed.

There is zero reason to believe small protests are about to take down the entire Russian state.

We had massive protests in the West against the war in Iraq, all sorts of drama ... wars still happened.

There's almost no examples of protests stopping wars that the people in charge are set on.

Furthermore, Western propaganda is starting to be a broken record of protests, Russian lines collapsing, low morale, Putin about to die or be assassinated, logistical problems dooming their operation, incompetence and "miscalculations" at every level, and so on, with a few choice anecdotes.

People are free to argue that "this time is different" but that requires actually arguing that.

Otherwise, these positions are essentially "there's much less evidence for this belief that Russian collapse is imminent as there was 6 months ago ... and I believed it then and I'm believing it now."

And this is the Websites Isaac uses: — ssu

You criticise a source by posting an unsourced criticism of that source?

People are free to provide a different military analysis to the main points. Currently there's not really any debate because the other position here is simply fight long enough and the Russian state will just magically go away somehow.

On the diplomatic front, as I've said previously it's difficult to analyse as the trial period of "open source diplomacy" of simply reporting every meeting between world leaders in real time seems to have ended.

However, there are some signs of diplomatic advancement. There's this recent prisoner exchange brokered by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and now India and China are calling for a diplomatic end to the conflict, and also both Putin and now it seems Zelensky have stated they want an end to the conflict.

In particular the prisoner exchange seems super bizarre timing if it was not in the context of steps towards a diplomatic resolution.

Although it seems difficult to imagine what a compromise would be at this stage, it's of course always possible. If Ukraine is simply unable to sustain the current offensive (even regardless of US support) then that hope maybe simply dashed internally and also hardliners who promised some vast victory now sidelined.

For certain the EU has enormous leverage in the situation and can easily use it to broker a peace deal.

A recipe for a resolution could go something like this:

- Ukraine enters the EU on some fast track process.
- Russia gets sanctions dropped and Nord Stream 2.
- Russia pays for rebuilding of Ukraine (which is obviously just recycling some of the massive profits of dropping sanctions).
- The territorial question is of course the tricky part, but that could be resolved by agreeing to have another vote after peace is restored, people return to these regions; something that the world community would accept as legitimate, outside observers etc. If holding onto the territories is an obstacle to a peace deal that Russia actually wants, "giving the territory back" is problematic after annexation, however, the various regions having another vote in x time could be a reasonable compromise for everyone. "Will of the people" At least in principle Ukraine is "fighting" for the right of self determination, and Russia is claiming these regions can leave Ukraine and join Russia based on a vote, and presumably the EU is democratic and maybe even the US, so there's at least no issue in principle. Of course, you'd want to come to this deal before these regions are officially annexed, as Russia wouldn't want the precedent of one of its territories being able to vote to leave.

Of course, a peace deal could be something else entirely, depends on who wants what and what people are willing to give, but my basic point is that there's always creative solutions to negotiation impasses when both parties rather a resolution than continued conflict.

"Strategic ambiguity" may not be a satisfactory response for Zelensky, to name one motivating factor.

And, even if there's nothing much to analyse, although other perspectives on this strange prisoner swap and China and India statements would be welcome, I like to repeat how diplomacy can work as the point of the military analysis is to evaluate the leverage on the table and what is a reasonable deal to take.

There is. Ukrainians are defending their country against a hostile invader. The Russians aren't. — ssu

Your point was about training and quality of skills, not motivation.

And, as from many Russian's perspective, once the 4 Oblasts are officially part of Russia then they will be defending their country against a hostile invader. Likewise, it's possible many Russians happen to share Putin's sentiment that NATO is an aggressive force against Russia and a threat to them.

Additionally, Russia has demonstrated it has highly motivated soldiers able to win in urban environments, so, as I already mentioned, the reservists can have a large impact simply supporting the professional forces.

Ukraine has sent fresh conscripts with little to no training into front line combat, but there's no reason to believe Russia will do the same.

Especially if the consequences are as terrible as talking heads in the West claim, why not just rely on the professional contracted forces in that case for the heavy fighting?

Wow. Sergei Shoigu couldn't say it better. Ukrainian nazis counting that NATO does the fighting for them. — ssu

It's also highly suspected and really little doubt about it, that "ex"-NATO contract soldiers man HIMARS and all the targeting is with NATO intelligence.

How is this not NATO fighting the Ukrainian Nazi's war for them? HIMARS being "the thing" that keeps them in the fight and their proposed path to victory.

a) Since coming into office Putin has tried to push away from a conscription army and veer the armed forces into an volunteer force, which hasn't happened. — ssu

This is definitely true, but this plan does make sense. Invading Ukrainian territory with conscripts / reserves is neither legal nor a good political move; especially at the start of the war where you'd have the current disruption and instability of mobilisation in addition to the sanctions in addition to the unknowns of what would happen in the war (they could not know 100% that they'd take South-East Ukraine so easily).

So, invade with the separatist militia's, Chechians (who "like" fighting, especially white people that dip bullets in lard to taunt them), mercenaries, with support of professional soldiers.

Then, once the front stabilises "enough" and effect of sanctions has smoothed out, annex these regions and mobilise to defend this new territory.

b) Even the Soviet Union had huge difficulties of mobilization it's reserves, which basically were just nothing else than a list of names in a vault. — ssu

Russia has 25 million potential reserves and conscripts and nearly 2 million standing army; I think it's far fetched to say they will not be able to mobilise 300 thousand. It's claimed these will be "low quality troops" but A. there's no reason to assume they'd be any less quality than much of Ukraine's conscript force and B. Russia still has professional and mercenary forces to conduct offensive operations and more man-power to support and defend quiet areas of the front can only help.

c) Russia doesn't have an organization for the mobilization of such quantities of troops and neither have reservists been trained. It would be different if Russia would have done refresher training to reservists after their military service and trained these as units. It hasn't done that. — ssu

Reservists have been trained. The usefulness of periodic 2 weak refresher training is debatable. A lot of military tasks require only following orders by average people, like just moving shells and boxes around.

A tiny majority? Let's see what that "tiny majority" is like? — ssu

I definitely say "tiny minority" and not "tiny majority".

IT-sector professionals and millionaires. Quite an irrelevant minority there. — ssu

I'm really just not so sure about how many such people will actually leave, and what the economic impacts are. Presumably they'll mostly still do work for their Russian company or for their contract clients, just at distance and more effectively without the stress and bother of war and all that.

Additionally, pretty much any intellectual work nowadays can be done at distance by Indian's and Chinese firms, and they can easily send their specialists when needed who will not fear mobilisation.

I'm just not convinced this is a big economic problem. Certainly the sanctions was an order of magnitude larger economic problem to deal with.

Russia is also not an IT driven economy, but sells commodities, so IT inefficiencies have few short term impacts. When brain drain matters its generally really top tier stuff of making the next unicorn startups and technological break throughs; silicon valley vs. various other competing tech hubs.

Just here in four days over 27 000 Russians have come over the border. Of course, some go back even here you are talking about thousands fleeing the mobilization. And Georgia and Kazakhstan it's far bigger. Finally Finland is tightening the visas to come here. — ssu

This is a tiny amount of people compared to the Russian population, mostly who don't have the option to flee, and, as you say, many who do flee will return as soon as the situation is clarified a bit and risk seems lower to them.

Spoken like a true Putin believer. Resistence is futile!!! — ssu

The issue was if Ukrainian fighting can lead to the collapse of the Russian state.

Feel free to propose a scenario where that is likely to happen.

Resistance was definitely not futile at the start of the war but could have lead directly to a negotiated peace on the best possible terms for Ukraine.

However, continuing to fight beyond that point to a mythical moment where the Russian state collapses for essentially unexplained reasons, indeed is futile.

Keep in mind that the majority of the Russian population have fresh memories of the last time they overthrew their government to embrace the West. West didn't hug them back, so I find it exceedingly unlikely they would do so again as they all know it would be an even worse repeat of the disastrous mafia state of the 90s and early 2000's.

The West loves laughing at the Russian misfortune after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Russians themselves do not join in that laughter but, for the most part, would rather avoid repeating it.

The situation is not the same where Soviet citizens started to truly believe Western propaganda and that they'd all be living like Finns in a few years if the wall came down.

It's a "Fool me once, shame on... shame on you. Fool me—you can't get fooled again," kind of situation.

Wow. Sergei Shoigu couldn't say it better. Ukrainian nazis counting that NATO does the fighting for them. — ssu

That was clearly the plan from the beginning, handing out small arms to civilians, committing to a total war with maximum harm to civilians, and then begging for the no-fly zone.

The Ukrainian Nazi's who really wanted and still want total war certainly believed that NATO would see their righteous plight and come in with their planes and "show the Russians". They would not have been begging for the no-fly zone for so long, even after very clear no's, if they didn't genuinely believe that was possible.

And now, faced with the next disastrous escalation of the war, Ukrainian Nazi's and other "ultra nationalists" and their Western sympathisers, seem to truly believe UN / NATO will nuke Russia in retaliation for Russia starting to use nukes.

The delusions of NATO responding with Nuclear weapons if Russia uses them have been present on this very forum; for example the belief that NATO would give nuclear weapons to Ukraine ... at least a couple to Nuke Moscow and St. Petersburg. How much more delusional can you get?

I see... But NATO is a tool of the devil, isn't it? So since Zelensky is a puppet of NATO... he's one of the devils in any case. Small devil, or big one, I don't know. I leave that to specialists, better introduced than I am to/by the Lord of the Earth in the East. — Olivier5

I'm not following your theology, but please elaborate.

I am new to all this line toeing, you see? Can't seem to get it right. It's like... I put one toe on the line, and then the other toes fall on that side of the line or the other! Maybe if I turned my feet inward? How do you guys do it? — Olivier5

It's not following a line: Russia's leverage in the situation is factual. All the US says about it is "strategic ambiguity," you, or anyone else, is free to speculate what that ambiguity involves that's in Ukraine's favour.

Another way to understand the situation is simply that the West finally picked a fight with someone they can't bomb.

But has the West developed any other way to deal with their problems and "feelings"?

No.

They haven't.

Feel something, bomb something. That's just how we roll baby.

Now, you may say Russia hasn't either; fair, but they have picked a fight with someone they can bomb.

And that my friends, makes all the difference in the World.

Even in the context of environmental crisis denialism, even Jordan Peterson can see the obvious.

Only delusional propaganda supports the current narrative and policies vis-a-vis Ukraine, and it doesn't matter your politics to see these particular obvious facts if you stop eating lies.

Which ... what does Peterson's observation that totalitarianism involves everyone lying to everyone on every level apply to in the current situation?

Zelensky is obviously wrong about everything, since he is a ridiculous comedian, a puppet of NATO, and the devil incarnate. — Olivier5

I don't know man, I don't think the devil's a comedian nor a puppet.

... or are you saying satan works for NATO, the money's just that good?

↪boethius Der Spiegel makes a broader point, that Putin is becoming dangerous for many, including for Russia herself, with all these civilians being sent to the meat grinder. He's also becoming a liability for his allies, such as China. — Olivier5

Definitely Putin is taking large risks and the whole war is a big gamble and makes lot's of people nervous.

However, what matters in material relations, such as business or international politics, is much more actual leverage than emotion.

The West has become accustomed to focusing on the emotions, but only because the material leverage is taken for granted in Western policy decisions. For example, the decision to support revolution in Lybia and then bomb the place may have been due to the simple reason Gaddafi wanted to make a African bank and needed to be punished and Libya (the most prosperous African state by some metrics at the time) needed to be made a failed state so as not to be an example of how to escape Western debt peonage. Let's assume that's true, well it's far easier to just make some emotional story of people struggling for freedom or whatever, to explain the bombing to the home audience for the show (and just completely ignore the question of why bomb Libya rather than any of the other dictatorships around).

Or maybe it really was from the "goodness of their hearts" of the policy makers.

Either way, the perception that results is that it is emotion that drives international and warmaking policy is only possible because the leverage was there. NATO could bomb Libya, could invade and occupy Afghanistan for 2 decades, US et. al. could invade Iraq, drone strikes can be carried out all over Africa and the Middle east, proxies financed and armed etc.

In other words, the leverage exists to carry out these policies, so the emotions drummed up, whether by propaganda or genuine grassroots sentiment, can match the policies because the policies can be done.

But all this emotional driven policy making is not so possible when you don't have the leverage.

China needs Russian energy and commodities ... that doesn't change regardless of what Xi or anyone in China feels about it. So, the West obsesses over how people may feel here or there, but only because Westerners live in the delusion that emotions matter the most.

It's a pretty typical psychological result of too much power and prestige: the "diva".

The situation in Ukraine is simply that the West doesn't have the leverage to get what it wants, so it cries about it, but that doesn't help.

Russia does have the leverage: energy, food, military, nuclear weapons.

What we feel, what the Chinese feel, what the Indians feel, what the Ukrainians feel, and to a large extent what the Russians feel: doesn't mean a thing.

Only when you have the power, the leverage, can you simply translate your feelings into actions. If you feel like fucking up a country that had nothing do to with 9/11 to express your feelings about 9/11? you definitely can if you have the power and leverage to express your emotions that way. You want your servant to do some humiliating task? You definitely can if you pay them enough or they have no where else to go.

Everyone that doesn't have the power in the situation: learns to bite their tongue and digest their feelings: because that's how the world actually fucking works.

It's been that way for a long time.

The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

With all due respect for Zelensky, I don't believe the nuclear escalation is likely to happen. — Olivier5

... Well, well, well, if Zelensky is wrong about this, what else maybe he wrong about?

And it's not even me saying we should prepare for Russia to use nuclear weapons.

Who's saying it?

Zelensky:





So, if you're a supporter of Zelenky's analysis and decision making, and uncompromising devotion to the gods of war, then you should support my message, which is the same (just with the added caveat that Ukraine is not an ally to the US and will be left out in the cold ... or then the fierce heat of the nuclear sun, or why not both!).

↪boethius Not just to the Ukrainians : to the world. — Olivier5

If US / NATO retaliate.

Provide one argument that they would?

Ergo, what's likely? US / NATO will scale back their support for Ukraine as they have no response to Russian tactical Nukes in Ukraine.

The war has achieved US policy generously informed by US arms manufacturers as @Isaac cites above, so why continue?

Let winter pass and by the spring everyone will be so fed up with energy prices that peace with Russia will just be the normal, competent, level headed thing to do by politicians wanting to be reelected. Russia certainly learned its lesson and are sorry, time to turn over a new leaf.

The alternative is not simply that Russia uses tactical nukes in Ukraine, but likely then keeps using them until Ukraine unconditionally surrenders (since Ukraine maybe able, with time, develop their own nuclear weapons or WMD's of some sort with their nuclear material and remaining biolabs).

The other thing to consider is that even Eastern Europe may get cold feet now that they're faced with the consequences of their fanatical support for more war, such as Volkswagen saying they will leave Eastern Europe if the energy situation there doesn't improve (aka. the war with Russia does not come to an end).

Talk is cheap, but we'll see soon enough who has their money where their mouth is.

As I've stated before, your arms dealer is like your drug dealer: you need them for your next fix to keep on going, but they're not your friend.

Dangerously weak — Olivier5

I don't speak german, but I'm pretty sure the key word in that phrase is "dangerous".

Dangerous to Ukrainians, and no one is coming.

↪boethius Sounds legit. :up: — apokrisis

Yes, you can be confident this analysis is legit.

The only retaliation available to the US / NATO for a Russian tactical nuke in Ukraine would be something like striking a Russian base with a tactical nuclear weapon ... which would be followed by Russia striking a NATO base, followed by further tactical nuclear exchanges until it's WWIII and full scale strategic exchange.

Or then NATO strikes a Russian base and Russia strikes a NATO base and ... no response? What does that accomplish?

The only available move is to do nothing. Ukraine is not part of NATO and there exists no legal obligation, national self-interest, much less military reason to strike Russia with nuclear weapons in retaliation for an act in a war ... in which you are not legally at war.

Given this state of things, why wouldn't Russia use tactical nuclear weapons? Spot a tank column: blow up the tank column, is a pretty big military advantage.

The "consequence" of Russia using nuclear weapons last year, for example, would be total sanctions and cutting off the cash cow of selling energy to Europe ... well that lever has already been pulled.

The protests against mobilisation and people leaving the country result in not many people being left willing to protest the use of nuclear weapons.

As has been discussed already, there is a sizeable part of the Russian population that are nationalistic and (just like the Americans) will be happy to see nuclear weapons used for their own national benefit and pride.

Or then that implosion can come from that 'New Army' that is now created. — ssu

War is messy and chaotic, you're going to find pretty much anecdotal evidence for pretty much anything.

Also, keep in mind a large proportion of Ukrainians speak perfect Russian.

The videos you post seem genuine (and mean absolutely nothing in terms of evaluating the war), but it's worth noting that Ukrainians can easily fake pretty much any kind of propaganda material they want and it will just be immediately posted to Western front page news as "Ukrainian intelligence says".

There's a huge effort to do that. By Putin, actually. — ssu

↪boethius :up: — apokrisis

If you think the Russian state is on the brink of collapse because of a few protests and a tiny minority of people leaving the country, you are truly living in fantasy.

Even if it was remotely feasible, it would cost hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives, perhaps millions, and for zero benefit to the average Ukrainian accomplish, certainly not to attempt and fail.

And from what I understand from Ukrainian Nazi planning on this issue, the idea is not that Ukrainians themselves would defeat Russia but that NATO would do it for them. From this perspective, Ukrainians being nuked is a good thing because they believe NATO would nuke Russia in turn.

That is extremely low odds of happening. Very high odds now of Russia using nuclear weapons; they've basically said they are going to do this, said they are not bluffing, and are now setting up the laws to make it essentially legally obligatory for them to do. Logic will be exactly the same as the use of nuclear weapons in Japan: that it will save lives on both sides compared to more fighting.

How will NATO respond? Likely, diddly squat.

How can NATO respond? They've been flexing their sanctions and weapon supplier muscle, but if they actually wanted to a nuclear standoff with Russia they would have sent boots into Ukraine before or then anytime during the war and dare Russia to nuke them.

Since that has not happened, nuking Ukrainian military positions is not an attack on US or any NATO member and there is simply no legal mechanism in which to retaliate. Neither the US nor any NATO member is in a legal state of war with Russia; there's really no way to just nuke a country out of the blue that you're not at war with.

What about the Ukrainians? You may ask ... well, what about them? Afghanistan government was a literal ally of the US, just let's not put labels on things and this "non-committed relationship"; what happened to them?

Ohhhh noooo!!! but they're brown muslims Boethius, you may cry out! The literally live in a "corrupt stan"! It's right in their name, at the back, see!! Stan! S. T. A. N. spells Stan!

Sure, that's true, but US military and NATO are pretty woke nowadays and have non-discriminatory and equal opportunity throw your "allies" under the bus policies.

US cares not for Ukrainians, but want cold war 2.0 and a irrelevant EU on the world stage.

Nukes in Ukraine accomplishes that, and both the US and Russia get what they want. Why would they bicker about it?

I was talking about the implosion of Putin’s regime following a failure in Ukraine. Different thing. — apokrisis

If the implosion of Russia follows failure in Ukraine, that's definitely one way to defeat Russia.

If the war is with the Russian state and through war the collapse of the Russian state is caused and is no more, that certainly qualifies as victory over the Russian state.

And who's stating "He's [Putin] in trouble and he knows it"?

Jame Clapper.

The very same James clapper who was Director of National Intelligence and also ...

Following the June 2013 leak of documents detailing the NSA practice of collecting telephone metadata on millions of Americans' telephone calls, Clapper was accused of perjury for telling a congressional committee hearing that the NSA does not collect any type of data on millions of Americans earlier that year. One senator asked for his resignation, and a group of 26 senators complained about Clapper's responses under questioning. — Jame Clapper - Wikipedia

Why should we take the words of James Clapper at face value, and how does he know what Putin "knows" to begin with?

All he really did in that interview was say that the White house has been telling Putin "not to use nukes" but also maintaining "strategic ambiguity" about what the US would do.

News flash: US is extremely unlikely to strike Russia with nuclear weapons when the US nor any of its actual allies isn't attacked. Why would it?

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. — apokrisis

A racist statement all the more absurd that even in 2020, before the war, Ukraine ranks below Kazakstan on the Corruption Perception Index and well below several other Persian and/or Muslim and/or "others" filled countries (whatever "ethnicity" is being referred to by "ethnic state").

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. But in what way would the West be the bad guys in such a world? — apokrisis

And, so nobody misses it, this statement is simply accepting my main point since the last few dozens pages and the absolute madness of the view held by the extreme Ukrainian right, Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainians Nazi's as well as left-wing liberals in the West, that continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is justified.

For, indeed, that only makes sense if you manage to collapse the Russian state; i.e. defeat Russia.

However, if that's a delusional fantasy for which there is no evidence then all that is accomplished is tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands by the end, killed and wounded, and extreme damages to Ukraines economy and general welfare.

And for what?

If you can't actually defeat Russia (because NATO doesn't actually give a shit about you and isn't about to use nuclear weapons on your behalf and people employing Churhillian rhetoric ... at a distance, is just stupid), the alternatives to diplomatic compromise are: endless war or losing the war.

How would endless war or losing the war benefit actual Ukrainians that aren't Nazi who declare war their "way of life" and their mission in life to destroy Russia?

Well, if those options can't be explained as benefiting the average Ukrainian, then what would the diplomatic compromise be that Ukrainians are fighting for.

Which was the explicit policy only a few months ago: fighting to a better position at the negotiating table.

What's the plan?

Zelenskyites here seem to interpret an inability to answer basic questions about their position as "strawmanning", which is not what strawmanning is, it's how debate works: asking and answering questions.

If people never explain how continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is a justifiable and feasible plan of action, nor explain what diplomatic compromise they think is feasible and why more fighting (for now) somehow makes sense to achieve that compromise, pointing out that people never answer these questions is not "strawmanning", it is simply underlining their denial and delusions.

And what's that foundational delusion that supports the house of cards of their racist world view (which, so it's clear to everyone, "Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states" is a racist statement)? It's that somehow all this chaos and madness is going to lead to the destruction of the Russian state and any and all sacrifice (by Ukrainians) is a worthwhile if there's a one percent chance of achieving that possibility and even if the desired process risks global nuclear war world leaders now discuss completely casually ... like it's just Sunday afternoon tea with Nanna.

↪apokrisis Ah, the desperate need to strawman, when you cannot prove wrong the other one. — ssu

What strawmen? can you backup your assertion with any citations.

Furthermore, your friend @apokrisis spends several pages defending what he finally admits to be "hyperbole" ... well hyperbole to make what point?

The video also explains just why Russians have declared so many HIMARS systems being destroyed: — ssu

Again, if the HIMARS are so effective why doesn't the US send: A. more launchers and B. more missiles and C. different kinds of longer range missiles?

Combat-Proven Solution:
The HIMARS solution is highly reliable, combat proven, fielded system that has exceeded all performance requirements. There are more than 540 fielded systems worldwide that have accumulated over 2,000,000 operating hours.

Precision Fires Capability
With a recognised and proven range up to 300km. — HIMARS, Lockheed Martin

The 16 launchers given to Ukraine so far don't seem all that much, especially considering the US has other weapons that perform similar functions. But if the goal is the "defeat the Russians" why limit the range of the missiles given to Ukraine? Why bring the HIMARS in only after Russia stabilises the front from Kherson to Donbas instead of day one?

What's the evidence that the US and NATO are even remotely attempting to achieve the following:

If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. But in what way would the West be the bad guys in such a world? — apokrisis

How am I strawmanning this argument?

My counter arguments on the factual likelihood are simply pointing out NATO's own stated policy is only to allow Ukraine to "defend itself" and not enable Ukraine to attack Russia; whole justification for sending shoulder launched missiles, light arms and no heavy weapons that would have been needed for counter-offensives in the South (before tens of thousands of Ukraines best troops were KIA or casualties), in the first phase of the war was to not threaten Russia, much anyways.

In addition to the obvious policy and its implementation, there is no more evidence for the collapse of the Russian state than backed the chorus of predictions on literally day 2 of the invasion (which obviously didn't happen).

And clearly, by drip-feeding weapons systems to Ukraine NATO this is completely coherent with the "we won't let Russia actually lose" policy.

As for the goal of collapsing the Russian state no matter the cost ... is this really a policy that benefits Ukrainians? Is this even NATO or US policy? Is this even Ukrainian government policy?

Or is it EU-Nazi fantasy?

↪boethius For precision sake, I added Eurasian philosophic circles. — Olivier5

Yes, yes, keep the precisions coming. We might be getting somewhere.

because it is well known in philosophic circles that Russians are like little children who can't rule themselves. — Olivier5

... go on.

This is not true. China is an economic powerhouse ascending to superpower status. Russia has now lost its status as regional power and its economy is medieval. Any dream of equality with China is gone now. — Tate

As we've just seen with this gas thing in the EU, your factories don't run without the raw materials.

You cannot dominate a party that you are dependent on, and China depends on Russia for a lot of its raw materials. To free yourself from dependence you can go take these things you need for yourself, but in this particular situation you face the same problem NATO is facing which is nuclear weapons.

Russia also depends on China for components, but there are other potential suppliers of key components, like India.

No, it doesn't, at least not the news sources I see. It's just a little conflict in Eastern Europe. You can see parts of it live on reddit. That's about it. — Tate

It's been front page news on CNN and BBC et. al. for months at a time ... Putin just said "all weapons systems will be used to defend Russian territory" and then Blinken went and made a speech that this was "bad, bad boy talk" at the UN.

I honestly don't see anyone describing this war as a little conflict in Eastern Europe.

The highest article on reddit front page (for me) is about the Irish PM calling for Russia to be removed from the security council.

Which is honestly one of the dumbest parts of all this, the whole point of the UN was to avoid another world war, which means the big powers can veto military action. Otherwise, the UN would just be "my boyz when WWIII starts"; i.e. the mistake the League of Extraordinary Nations made and the UN was designed not to repeat.

Or as SuperGenius98K informs us:

The UN is the biggest paper tiger ever created. — reddit

I suppose they could engineer some sort of Hundred Years War, but their main ally, quickly becoming their master, is China. It will be Xi's call whether they can wage on indefinitely or not. — Tate

For certain the war is only possible with Xi's blessing.

However, Russia-Chinese relationship is far more equal than Western media presents. Russia has the commodities China needs and Russia also has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Definitely Russia is suffering a lot of losses, but the geopolitical game (that I'm sure few Russian actually care about) is pretty cunning. By waging an essentially war of attrition with the entirety of NATO and creating this madness in Easter Europe that then commits NATO buildup, pressure is taken off all Russia's allies and friends: China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and anyone else that has beef, big or small, with the US, which allows the creation of an alternative global payment and economic system to that of the US to be created between all these parties.

The Western media presents the war as Ukraine standing up to the "mighty Russia", while simultaneously calling Russia incompetent and in no way a danger, but geopolitically speaking the war is Russia standing up to the "mighty NATO" and that message is not lost on any leader outside the West.

And that would be Putin's final act as leader of Russia. I'm sure he knows that. — Tate

I honestly don't know what would happen, I doubt anyone knows.

Luckily, Putin hasn't wanted to find out yet either.

This honestly "feels" to be changing, but it could all be just posturing to just make NATO hesitate to pour in more arms, or then on the way to a diplomatic resolution (hopefully).

Well, they're losing previously taken positions, they're running out of troops, they've lost face with their allies. I mean, it looks like they're losing to me. Not to you? — Tate

Looks can be deceiving.

For months Russia was gaining ground, but obviously had not "won", and now Ukraine has gained some ground back. Obviously things can swing back and forth.

Ukraine has taken heavy losses in the recent offensives from everyone I've heard talk about it (including the Washington Post). Russia has just mobilised 300 000 additional troops. Russia could also use tactical nuclear weapons, which some claim would not be effective ... but I honestly doubt anyone walked away from Hiroshima saying "wow, underwhelmed, fail, so ineffective".

What is also critical is that Ukraine is now entirely reliant on NATO, so even making a real attempt to "beat the Russians" would be a NATO decision and not really a Ukrainian one.

It could be NATO is fully committed to pushing back the Russians (using Ukrainians) and calling Russias bluff about nuclear weapons or then actually wants Russia to use nuclear weapons for some reason (there being no other possibility), or it could be that NATO wanted to have a little moral victory before they either wrap things up diplomatically (something they can do anytime) or then guide things into a frozen conflict.

I honestly don't know NATO's intentions but not every NATO member is happy with the war.

Definitely Russias strategy is to hold onto these territories and see how winter plays out, and these are still long distances, 1000km front, so I don't see Ukraine being able to get some decisive victory by winter; and, as far as I can tell, the only "big" victory feasible, perhaps not decisive but big, would be cutting the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson, which there's no reports of the Ukrainians even trying to do. Of course, if you want a moral victory you'd avoid such a critical battle and focus on the areas your opponent is the least focused on.

As for "running out of troops," the Russian population is 144 million and Ukraines population is 44 million, and the Russians could mobilise 25 million conscripts.

Of course, there's political and economic impacts to mobilisation, we're already seeing some.

There is little question that if the Russian population as a whole really wanted to crush Ukraine they could, even with conventional weapons.

The question is one of motivation, why morale always keeps coming up.

Ukraine is in a total war posture and Russia certainly meant to win with a purely professional force (and that certainly failed), but considering Ukraine has fully mobilised everything they could and gone into total war and Russia has only now announced a very partial mobilisation, that's not necessarily a good sign for Ukraine if things are as tight on the front as they seem to be.

Of course, mobilisation could unravel the Russian state somehow, but as dramatic as mobilisation seems, it seems to me less pressure and risk to the Russian state than the start of the war and the sanctions, but of course it's possible. Protests don't seem to ever stop any war the state is committed to, so I don't see why Russia would be an exception to that rule.

It's pretty clear that Russia is losing this war. Exit strategy is what they should be thinking about. This was a disaster for Russia. — Tate

How is this in anyway clear?

Lol.

Oh really, it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not to you? Right. :rofl: — ssu

You're the one that contradicted my point that these votes are significant (to the war), saying that's nonsense.

Now your outraged by the idea it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not. So, seems pretty significant events to you after all.

It does not matter to the point we were discussing, of whether these votes are significant or not.

The significance in terms of these votes, whatever you think of them, is that it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia.

I explicitly say you are free to argue the legitimacy of these votes, that's a different topic as to their significance to the war and how the military and diplomatic situation changes.

Definitely appears to me that annexing these territories makes it exceedingly unlikely Russia would agree to give them back, which makes a diplomatic settlement likewise exceedingly difficult, which is a significant change to the situation.

For those curious of why the words "tactical retreat" have suddenly become such hot topic, it is because it is optimum military strategy to inflict maximum casualties while minimising your own.

In order to assault a location you need to move forward and are far easier to see. So a small group of even lightly armed defenders can setup in a location and then as soon as they see you fire ATMG's at your vehicles, sniper rounds and mortars at your infantry, and call in artillery and airstrikes. Then they can burry a bunch of anti-tank-mines, just retreat 5 kilometres and repeat the process. Likewise, a camouflaged tank that isn't moving is going to have a lot easier time seeing a tank that is moving, can fire a bunch of shells, pop smoke and then run away.

So, there's a large spectrum when it comes to retreat: from being basically overrun and most of your troops being captured and the rest retreating under fire and suffering high casualties, to a very well ordered staged fallback to inflict maximum casualties with the above methods.

Of course, the disadvantage of the tactical retreat is if you keep doing it, eventually you fallback to your backs against an ocean and it's difficult to continue the tactic underwater (or some similar obstacle).

Russian military doctrine and training puts particular high emphasis on the tactical retreat because they have a particularly large amount of space to work with.

The US military, to contrast, doesn't train so much to defend a land invasion on US soil from Mexico or Canada, so if they deploy it is to capture territory oversees (so there's little use of battalion and division level tactical retreats; US deals with counter offensives by bombing the shit out of everything, which is why their doctrine is to only deploy ground troops when they achieve air superiority).

Of course, two can play this tactical retreat game, and so to deal with their enemy using this particular good idea, the Russians have developed the counter strategy of simply advancing slowly with masses of artillery. If you're a well hidden defender waiting for the enemy forces to advance into your firing line, it stands to reason "enough" artillery will eventually get you.

So, what we will see in the next days and weeks is if this whole doctrine "works" or if a sufficiently determined offensive by a foe willing to suffer high casualties simply pushes on and destabilises your entire defensive system.

Yeah, I was just referring to the fact that the major breakthrough started hours ago. It appears they are no longer trying for a break through, but have accomplished it and the encirclement of a lone BTG on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Even assuming all this is true and will result in encirclement of a BTG, this is still not what I would call a major strategic victory of penetrating deep into Luhansk. Most of river is still in Kharkiv region.

There were reports of units being encircled but then rescued in Kharkiv.

That's why it seems like a poor use of resources given other priorities. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who's to say what the priorities are. It could be poor use of resources, or then maybe Russian military is content with trading Bakhmut for some space in Luhansk. A lot of youtube analysis presents Bakhmut as some critical strategic location (though I have no idea if that's true).

Of course, maybe Ukrainians defend Bakhmut and advance into Luhansk, or maybe they trade or maybe something else happens.

However, for certain Russian commitment to defending all of Luhansk is very high, so if advances continue there beyond the edges then that is a strong signal Russian forces have a big problem.

If things stay on the edges, then it could be Russian forces simply implementing their doctrine of tactical retreats to inflict maximum casualties (of course, suffering some losses also in the process).

Russian commanders know too that it's a symbolic victory for Ukrainians to get back some of Luhansk territory, so instead of suffering high casualties to prevent that they could pull back knowing Ukrainians will then poor in troops to get that symbolic victory and then keep advancing for a real strategic victory. It very much depends on the casualties and losses on each side, until there is clear strategic locations taken.

Definitely continuing to advance in Bakhmut could be a false show of confidence, or then good strategy, or misallocation of resources as you say. I have no way to evaluate that from the information available now.

However, as I said weeks ago, taking Kherson would be a litmus test for Ukrainians offensive capabilities.

Now, knowing Russia is committed to Kherson, it's of course possible to develop some higher level thinking strategy of an offensive in Kharkiv and Luhansk instead.

My basic criticism of such a strategy is simply that Kharkiv and Luhansk are very close to the Russian border and don't threaten the land bridge. Cutting the land bridge and then blowing up the bridge to Crimea is what I would be worried about as a Russian general, and that doesn't seem to be threatened in these current offensives. So, maybe unfortunate loss of territory (that certainly no general wants to see) but does not seem pressure on critical military positions (but rather mostly political optics). Kharkiv and Luhansk are also the easiest places to re-conquer as they are so close to the Russian border.

The other data point is that certainly Russian generals were worried during the initial Kharkiv offensive (even if they ordered a withdrawal, things can still get out of hand), and so they ordered the strikes on the electricity grid.

I assume they would do that again if things are indeed falling apart and there's "irreversible momentum" as claimed by the West.

Just so weird.
— boethius

You tried narcissist - why not upgrade to psychopath? — unenlightened

Onwards and upwards I guess.

Wheel of progress never stops.

Unfortunately for Russia, the front has not remained still. There was a large break through across the Oskil, and the flow of liberation announcements and geolocated abandoned vehicles is reminiscent of the recent breakthrough on the other side of the river. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I literally say this:

To continue my analysis of the military situation.

At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there. — boethius

So I completely agree that:

Time will tell how serious it is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I also mention, while the Ukrainians are trying to make a major breakthrough into Luhansk, Russians are trying to take Bakhmut, and literally state:

We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much). — boethius

So we agree.

Definitely Russia is under military pressure or they would not have withdrawn from Kharkiv, not shutoff the grid for the first time, and not called up 300 000 reserves in a partial mobilisation.

And before anyone interjects, yes, they clearly had a contingency plan in place to withdraw from Kharkiv, shutoff the grid, and also bomb the damn in Kherson river, doesn't mean they "wanted those offensives to happen" just means they clearly had a plan in place as otherwise their response would not be immediate.

Another serious breakthrough and encirclement would suggest the poor morale that lead to the prior rout remains a serious issue, and newly mobilized forces are unlikely to change that (particularly those BTGs made from criminals or those arrested for protesting mobilization). You might see something akin to the disintegration of the Third Corps, who were worse than useless, essentially just handing over hardware to the enemy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not so convinced of the morale argument. There's morale issues in every army and general mood never stays constantly high. There has been serious morale issues on the Ukrainian side as well.

As for the current battle in Luhansk, I don't think it's really possible to tell what's likely to happen at a distance.

Definitely time will tell if the Ukrainians can continue their offensive deeper into Luhansk.

What I can say is that reports seem pretty consistent that Ukrainians are suffering heavy casualties in these offensives, so it could be that Russian operations are in disarray or they are simply letting these offensives exhaust themselves to inflict maximum casualties.

Anyone interested in the military analysis part, an important footnote is that Russian doctrine is literally to tactically retreat as much as possible, hit the advancing army with artillery and other long range munitions, make them go through mine fields, and stretch their supply lines, so this is what they train to do. Russian military trains this way because Russian territory is pretty big so their basic idea is to run around and exhaust any invading force and not risk armies in decisive battles.

So, except for strategic locations where we are sure Russians are committed to defending (such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas) it's extremely difficult to tell the difference between a tactical retreat and just being straight-up defeated. To evaluate these non-critical changes in the front we'd need to know the statistics of losses. Anecdotes don't tell us very much as we'd need to know the whole circumstances and result of the battle to evaluate things.

And when I point this out it is because I genuinely don't know. I do not know the current state of neither the Ukrainian army nor the Russians. Things could be a lot better or worse than they seem on both sides, or then suffering from exactly the same problems.