That being said, I claim that the best course of action in almost all cases as a human to comport with the best life, is to live a life of withdrawal. It's quite the opposite to civic duty and engagement. It's quite the opposite of the modern belief that socialization is necessary because of "flourishing" and we are a "social animal". Rather, due to the nature of animal/human relations, it is mostly struggle when two or more beings interact. — schopenhauer1

This reads a lot more like a psychiatric diagnosis all gussied up with philosophical cosmetics rather than philosophy itself.

Social engagement leads to more attachments, and more conflicts, and more frustrations, litigations, manifestations, allegations, contortions,
and complications, in short, drama and disappointments, all of which serve only to entangle the individual further in the suffering. — schopenhauer1

As I often end up saying in any discussion with you, many of us, most of us, don't see the world and relationships this way. This is your personal, idiosyncratic reaction to your own personal idiosyncratic problems and your solution is your personal, idiosyncratic solution. Doctoring it up with Schopenhauer doesn't change that.

The ultimate step is complete abstention from food, moving beyond mere limitation of intake. Eating fuels the Will’s endless cycle of craving and satisfaction, tethering us to desires that perpetuate suffering. By choosing abstention, we reject this cycle altogether, severing our dependence on physical needs that only serve to bind us to the body's relentless demands. — schopenhauer1

You usually say that you aren't proposing suicide, but now it appears you are.

Good post. Welcome to the forum.

I am not sure I can argue with someone who thinks a person has a right if and only if the government of any community of which they are a member says they do. That view is so plainly false to me that I am at a loss to know how to argue with someone who is willing to embrace its implications. — Clearbury

If you’re only going to argue with people who agree with you, you probably don’t belong on the forum. I think you’ll find that many, perhaps most, people understand that rights don’t really have any meaning except in the context of someone or something that can protect them.

I explained why 'worked' is question begging. You either mean by 'worked' - achieves justice - in which case by hypothesis it does work, or you have some other goal in mind, in which case you're simply not addressing my case and your point is irrelevant. — Clearbury

We've clearly taken this as far as it makes sense to go.

That is to say, does a species of animal(s) that has the ability to conceptually "know" that it exists, entail anything further, in any axiological way? — schopenhauer1

This is the kind of question that only a species of animals that has the ability to conceptually know that it exists would ask or answer. What would be the value of a response from that kind of animal?

There's no rule that says you get a choice, either. In fact you don't get a choice; you live in an anarchy and people set up governments and mafias everywhere. And they will do it on Mars too as soon as two or three are gathered together there, because that's just the kind of arseholes we are. — unenlightened

Alas, tis true.

And if you think Musk is something other than a wannabe Mafia Godfather and divine emperor of Mars, you must be already living on the dark side of the moon. — unenlightened

I don’t think Musk wants anything in particular. He just wants. And it’s the far side of the moon, not the dark side.

There are not, nor can there be, any rules that forbid the setting up of any government, and you do not have to obey any governments that set themselves up. — unenlightened

This is true and would be meaningful if there were some way for people to choose not to be part of society. There are hardly any remaining frontiers on Earth. That's probably why Elon Musk wants to go to Mars. That's not an option for most of us.

The concept of "rights" only makes sense in the context of a governing body which can establish and protect those rights against negative actors. Otherwise its simply a value you hold, which has no bearing on anyone else but yourself. — Ourora Aureis

For me, this is the fundamental truth of political philosophy.

where has it worked before? — Tom Storm

@Clearbury thinks this is irrelevant.

By and large, reasonably civilized societies tend to be democracies, — jorndoe

I was with you up to this point.

I'm with @ToothyMaw on this - I really enjoyed your OP. Do you write poetry? This feels like a poem. Truthfully, I'm not sure what it means. There certainly is a lot going on. I'll have to read it again. Maybe then I'll have more to say.

I don't see how you're addressing the argument I presented. I am defending anarchy. Anarchy does not involve anyone 'organizing' us. It's the opposite of that.

If your point is that without some bosses there will be mayhem, then I explicitly addressed this point. I pointed out that, whether true or not, it misses my point, which is about what's just, not about what would minimize mayhem. — Clearbury

What do you mean by 'work' though? I am arguing that governments are 'unjust' (not that they don't work - whether they 'work' or not depends on what goals they're supposed to be achieving....if they're supposed to be creating a just world, then they don't work at all and it is question begging to say otherwise....if you conceive of them as having some other purpose, then maybe they work, maybe they don't...but it's irrelevant to the topic). — Clearbury

As I wrote previously, if what you propose hasn't ever happened, won't ever happen, can't ever happen, then your idea is a fantasy. Meaningless. If you can't see that or show me how anarchy might work, then we'll never come to any resolution. That's my best shot.

Yeah. No accusations, but sounds AI-ish, like a corporate memo. — Hanover

I understand what you mean, but I think even a Chat GPT writeup would provide more detail that what the OP did.

I think all forms of government are unjust. Governments claim a monopoly on certain uses of violence and threats. I take that to be definitive. Government policies are backed by the threat of prison. — Clearbury

Putting aside moral factors for a minute, do you believe it is possible for groups of humans to effectively and humanely organize themselves without coercive rules assuming no change in human nature, whatever that means? Answer that question in the context of modern society in a world of 8 billion people. Also describe how such a society could be established in an ideal situation where you can specify starting conditions, i.e. go back 200,000 (or 2 million) years? If you can't give a positive answer to those questions, your moral complaints are meaningless.

It is barely ever justifiable to threaten or use violence against another. It's normally only in extreme circumstances - where one's own life is in immediate danger - that it can be justified. — Clearbury

Do you really believe this? I would not be justified in using violence to stop someone from stealing resources - money, shelter, food, clothing - that I need? Or to stop someone from doing that to my family and neighbors? What if someone is dumping human, animal, or industrial waste in the river upstream from where I get my water? Or what if they dam the river and cut off my water supply?

But though it is correct that the state is entitled to protect our basic rights, it is not entitled to force us to pay it to do so. If, for example, someone is attacking you, then I am entitled to help you out and even to use violence against your attacker if need be. But I am not then entitled to bill you for my efforts and use violence against you if you refuse to pay. — Clearbury

Would it be acceptable for a group of people to get together and agree to give up some of their freedoms in order to ensure security and protection? Then, if someone didn't want to participate, they could do so, but they couldn't use any of the resources provided by the community - roads, police, fire departments, schools. This sort of approach was much more feasible back when there was a frontier where non-conformists could migrate. They actually do something like this in some communities. Fire protection is provided by non-government fire departments staffed by volunteers and funded by subscription. If someone refuses to subscribe, when there's a fire, the fire fighters will come to their house and make sure everyone gets out safely and protect nearby property owned by subscribers, but otherwise will not fight the fire.

If the government stopped doing both of these things, then it would - to all intents and purposes - cease to be a government at all. It would just be another business competing in an open market. And that's anarchy. — Clearbury

Do you really think that would happen? That it could happen? That it ever has happened? Ever in 200,000 years of human existence? My answer is "of course not," which means it's not anarchy, it's fantasy.

I want to head-off a misguided criticism at the outset. I think many will be tempted to object that if all government agencies just disappeared overnight, then disaster would ensue. Regardless of whether or for how long this would be the case, the objection seems wrongheaded. — Clearbury

As I noted previously, today we would have to live with the consequences based on conditions found in the modern world. Of course a disaster would ensue. Billions would die. Can you describe a mechanism by which society could transition from current conditions to your capitalist paradise?

mayhem that would otherwise (temporarily) result — Clearbury

Temporary? That's pie-in-the-sky. If it happened people would die, the most vulnerable first. Then order would reestablish itself following the path followed historically and 200 years later we'd end up right where we are now.

So. Maybe I'm wrong. Tell me how you would make it work out the way you want it to.

It's not merely a platitude, but a testable theory that predicts specific patterns of cultural and cognitive evolution. — ContextThinker

Your OP (original post) and subsequent posts provide almost no specific information. They include a vague and undetailed description of the elements of your ECMT and it's supporting information. You claim it is testable and makes specific predictions but you don't describe any specific hypotheses or how they might be tested.

ECMT acknowledges ecological factors, such as resource scarcity and natural disasters, as exacerbating existential anxiety. However, it also highlights the role of cognitive and social factors in shaping coping mechanisms. — ContextThinker

Again, no detail is provided. "Acknowledgment" and "highlighting" do not constitute evidence or methods of testing.

Lastly, ECMT doesn't imply that existential anxiety drives the evolution of cognitive capabilities. Rather, it suggests that existential anxiety is a selective pressure that influences the development of coping mechanisms within existing cognitive frameworks. — ContextThinker

"Selective pressure" is a technical term for factors that drive evolution by influencing differential reproductive success and survival of populations.

ECMT builds upon this fundamental principle, providing a detailed explanation for the emergence of complex, culturally-mediated coping mechanisms in humans. — ContextThinker

Again, you have provided almost no detail.

Welcome to the forum. Some thoughts.

At its core, the Evolutionary Coping Mechanism Theory posits that as cognitive abilities increase, so does awareness of mortality and uncertainty. This heightened awareness triggers existential anxiety, prompting species to develop coping mechanisms. Religion and science emerge as two primary responses, evolving through cognitive, social, environmental, and cultural interactions. — ContextThinker

The idea that religion and science are methods by which humans attempt to deal with fears of uncertainty and death is commonplace. How is what you've described different? It doesn't really seem like a theory at all - it's more of a platitude.

Religion, in this context, serves as an initial coping mechanism... However, as cognitive abilities continue to advance, science emerges as a complementary coping mechanism. — ContextThinker

As far as I can see, there is no reason to believe it takes more advanced cognitive abilities to develop and apply a scientific understanding than it does a religious one.

Ecological factors, such as resource scarcity or natural disasters, can exacerbate existential anxiety, driving the evolution of coping mechanisms. — ContextThinker

Are you saying that "existential anxiety" can drive the evolution of cognitive capabilities? That seems unlikely to me.

It suggests that intelligent species, faced with existential threats, will inevitably develop coping mechanisms. — ContextThinker

All biological organisms; plants, animals, fungus; faced with existential threats will inevitably develop coping mechanisms. That's what evolution by natural selection means.

it would be absurd to apply economic theory to a hive of bees or termintes — Ludwig V

And yet...

The Economy of the Hive

Inside the hive there functions a vibrant community, with an economy similar to that of any other society. The bee economy is based upon the harvesting and processing of resources, the trade of products, doting care for the youngsters and parents, wise savings, deficit spending, a hierarchy of jobs, national defense, and an exquisite communication that allows democratic decision making. — Randy Oliver - ScientificBeekeeping.com

But it is not a question is once-for-all; it is pragmatic. — Ludwig V

But not just pragmatic, also ethical, moral.

What would the fact be, then? — NOS4A2

Applying criteria established based on observation and a consensus of qualified scientists, humans are classified as animals.

It’s fine to quibble about that but according Olson and animalism in general it is statement about our fundamental nature. — NOS4A2

As I noted in my response to Ludwig V, that's a matter of values and not of fact, which is fine as long as we recognize it.

So the question becomes why it matters, one way or the other. One obvious candidate is the belief in some version of the immortal soul. — Ludwig V

Well, there couldn't be a scientific reason for a definition that was made only for social, religious or spiritual reasons. But there might be good social, religious or spiritual reasons for some definitions. — Ludwig V

So the substantive question becomes when it is useful or appropriate to think of human beings as animals and when is it not useful or inappropriate to think of them as something else. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree. For me, the main point is that it is a matter of values and not a matter of fact. In that case, it becomes a question of whether humans should be considered animals rather than whether they are or aren't.

Animalists make the metaphysical claim that we are animals. — NOS4A2

It's not a metaphysical claim, it's a linguistic one. We can define an animal as anything we want. It's a question of values - some people want to separate humans from animals for social, religious, or spiritual reasons. There is no scientific reason to do so.

How about all the other species in the Homo genus? They've been around for about 3 million years and had increasingly larger brains and, assumedly, higher intelligence. When did they stop being animals and start being human?

there is a difference in kind between h.sapiens and other species — Wayfarer

There is a difference in kind between many different kinds of animals, e.g. tigers and nematodes, but they are still all animals.

The effect: Ball 1's speed is reduced and Ball 2's speed is increased as a result of the collision.
The change: The difference between the speed of Ball 1 before and after the collision and the difference between the speed of Ball 2 before and after the collision as well. — MoK

Effect and change - Ball 1's speed is reduced by X m/s and Ball 2's speed is increased by Y m/s.

Again, you're just playing around with words.

Nuff said.

the cause and effect come together to allow a change. — MoK

I requested you provide alternative descriptions. I can see how that might be confusing. Instead, please explain how the description I provided is not correct for the effect, the change, or both.

the cause and effect come together to allow a change. — MoK

Let's take two billiard balls. Ball 1 moves across the table and strikes Ball 2, which is stationary.

Describe the effect - Ball 1's speed is reduced and it moves off at an angle to its original path. Ball 2's speed is increased and it moves off at an angle to Ball 1's original path. The changes in speed and direction are determined in accordance with the Law of Conservation of Momentum and the Law of Conservation of Energy.

Describe the change - Ball 1's speed is reduced and it moves off at an angle to its original path. Ball 2's speed is increased and it moves off at an angle to Ball 1's original path. The changes in speed and direction are determined in accordance with the Law of Conservation of Momentum and the Law of Conservation of Energy.

If you disagree with this, please provide alternative descriptions of the effect and change.

"Cause" and "effect" are nothing words in themselves, — tim wood

The cause and effect cannot lay at the same point of time since otherwise they would be simultaneous and there cannot be any change. Change exists. Therefore, the cause and effect lay at different points of time. — MoK

You're just getting tangled up in words. The effect is not some separate entity, it is the change.

Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science. — Shawn

I think I understand what Wittgenstein is trying to say here, but I think I disagree. As I understand it, the purpose of philosophy is to help us become more aware of how our minds work and how we think. What could be more relevant to psychology than that?

The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. — Shawn

Isn't this consistent with what I wrote just above? Doesn't it contradict Wittgenstein's previous statement?

I would like to point at a real life example of possibly what Wittgenstein would have agreed with. — Shawn

I don't see how your discussion of knowledge and education and their effect on identify is an example of what Wittgenstein discusses.

My personal belief is that knowledge is a form of "memory" encoded in the brain, more specifically the hippocampus. — Shawn

If you are saying that knowledge is actually stored in the hippocampus, I believe that is not correct, although it is true that the hippocampus has an important role in memory.

With the process of education a person carries the memories of what they ought to do or become in a form of narrative that educators present about how the world works or latter in one's formative process what domain of knowledge a person is apt at in relation to the narrative of the educator. — Shawn

As I understand it, although education may play an important role in forming our sense of identity, it is not the primary mechanism. A lot of our sense of self comes from our human nature built in by biology and neurology. In addition, much of who we are comes from what we learn from our day to day experience of our lives, especially when we are children. Most of that learning takes place with no particular intention or narrative. People with no formal education, unless you count normal socialization as education, still develop a sense of self.

I find education as one part of the puzzle of identity theory, or at least the part of the puzzle which is quite possibly the most important part of the bigger picture, — Shawn

Again, I don't believe this is true.

I did defend myself (and the original poster). If someone lacking expertise in a particular area will likely overestimate their abilities in that area, then someone lacking expertise in every area will likely overestimate their abilities in every area. Thus, if someone is stupid across the board, they will think they're clever across the board. Thus, characterizing the DKE as involving stupid people overestimating their abilities is quite correct. — Clearbury

Nuff said.

It's been read. — AmadeusD

I think you don't understand the DKE. — Clearbury

Too late. I've already said that four or five times about you. Anyway, that's not an argument. I've presented backup for my position and you haven't.

This is a plain-reading of the DK effect in action. I see no issue. It is meaningful, identifiable and quite specific. — AmadeusD

Yes, it seems like the way you've presented it is consistent with the definition in the paper. But it's not what the OP said. I remain skeptical of the value of DK in any situation, but that's a different question. I suggest reading the Scientific American article I linked.

it follows that if someone is stupid in general then they will overestimate their intelligence in general — Clearbury

No, it does not. It says nothing about that and the way the experiments were set up makes it clear. I think perhaps you overestimate your competence in scientific interpretation. I'm not sure, but I believe I might have made an ad hominem argument.

I think there are margins here. For example, we can generally recognize when someone is a bit smarter than ourselves. It's just when someone is a lot smarter than ourselves that what they say may sound indistinguishable from what someone a lot dumber than ourselves may say - that is, both those much dumber than ourselves, and those much more intelligent than ourselves, will think in ways that seem quite alien to us.

Plus if I can recognize that Jane is a bit more intelligent than me, and Jane can recognize that Janet is a bit more intelligent than her, then even though Janet may be so much more intelligent than I am that I can't recognise it unassisted, I can learn that Janet is really clever and not dumb if, that is, Jane tells me she is. What Janet says will still sound like gibberish to me, but I now have it on an authority I can understand that this is because Janet is very clever, rather than because she's very stupid. — Clearbury

This is all very nice, but as I noted in my response to the OP and your previous post, it doesn't have anything with DK. DK is not about who's smarter than whom. It's about who is more competent than whom in a specific area of expertise which may or may not have anything to do with intelligence, e.g. humor and grammar.

I don't think the poster has misunderstood the Dunning-Kruger effect. And isn't Wikipedia written by those who fancy themselves experts in matters they have no expertise on? — Clearbury

See below. In particular I suggest reading the Scientific American article. It's not long.

People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it. Across 4 studies, the authors found that participants scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and ability. — Dunning and Kreuger - Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments

Dunning-Kruger effect, in psychology, a cognitive bias whereby people with limited knowledge or competence in a given intellectual or social domain greatly overestimate their own knowledge or competence in that domain relative to objective criteria or to the performance of their peers or of people in general. — Britannica

The Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people wrongly overestimate their knowledge or ability in a specific area. — Psychology Today

The Dunning-Kruger effect is the idea that the least skilled people overestimate their abilities more than anyone else. This sounds convincing on the surface and makes for excellent comedy. But in a recent paper, my colleagues and I suggest that the mathematical approach used to show this effect may be incorrect. — Scientific American - The Dunning-Kruger Effect Isn’t What You Think It Is

That's very funny. — Tom Storm

I will say what my old friend Alesandro Battaglia, a passionate Italian, might have said in my place - the OP offended my essence.

On the Necessity of the Dunning Kruger Effect — Brendan Golledge

I think it is wonderfully ironic that you clearly don't understand the Dunning Kruger Effect very well and that your opinion of your competence in that regard exceeds your actual performance.

The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people with limited competence in a particular domain overestimate their abilities... the Dunning–Kruger effect is often misunderstood as a claim about general overconfidence of people with low intelligence instead of specific overconfidence of people unskilled at a particular task. — Wikipedia - Dunning Kreuger effect

First, a personal opinion - The Dunning Kreuger effect (DK) is pretty much useless if not actually meaningless. It has only reached prominence because people can use it to insult other people and their ideas. Thinking about it, I'm not sure any reference to DK can be used in any philosophical context except as an ad hominem argument.

So, as Wikipedia says, DK has nothing to do with smart people vs. stupid people, which means that nothing you've written about in your OP has anything to do with DK. I'm going to leave it at that and not go on to comment on the rest of your thoughts even though I think they are unsupported, mean-spirited, and wrong.

However, there is a lack of clarification about what exactly the references or type of understanding are being creating here. Are we understanding something about nature? Or merely the manner in which we mathematically model it? Are we referencing noumena or symbols on the black board? — substantivalism

Isn't this the question of all metaphysics, or conceptualization, or envisioning, or whatever you want to call it. Our concepts are never the same thing as what they describe, explain, or denote.

They are just manners of speaking which our mind has an obsession with partaking in despite the vexing frustration of physicists. They don't imply any grand philosophical consequences, — substantivalism

Everything that can be put into words is a metaphor. That's all thinking really is - metaphors piled on metaphors piled on more metaphors. That's what reality is. But that seems to me to be a much broader question than the one you were asking in the OP. I thought we were talking conceptual models vs. shut up and calculate specifically in science and even more specifically in physics.

Its actually completely irrelevant whether its comprehensible or not at those scales. — substantivalism

I'm not sure about this. I've been thinking about it for a while. At human scale, the conceptual model, the narrative, the object; i.e. what you call "colloquial ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," came first. That's what we call "reality." Now, at sub-atomic scale, it is what you call "empirical virtues such as falsifiability, empirical adequacy, and the mathematization of nature" which came first. I think people just find that confusing, disorienting, and I'm not sure how big a deal it actually is.

the language of quantum mechanics are derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling — substantivalism

As I noted, all of what we call reality is "derivative of analogues, metaphors, and analogue modeling."

They are seen as a part of the previous generation which we have passed and are 'long dead' figuratively speaking along with their progenitors who are literally dead. — substantivalism

You said this before and, as I noted then, I don't see that this is true.

Interesting. A lot going on here. Some thoughts.

The Mainstream is rather consistent in stressing empirical virtues such as falsifiability, empirical adequacy, and the mathematization of nature in general. However, such approaches are usually met with a disapproval at colloquial ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation and in certain situations such notions are even seen as unscientific addons that in truly objective science. . . away from popular science articles, science fiction stories, or documentaries. . . can be eventually abandoned. Classical cases regarding this usually revolve around Special/General Relativity and Quantum mechanics/field theory where if any such colloquial understanding/explanation is found lacking they are directed not to 'better approaches' but to the mathematics simpliciter. Our language and our visualizations pail in comparison to the supreme abstract generalizer of mathematical/logical syntax... — substantivalism

This doesn't strike me as true at all. Special and general relativity are full of what you call "ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," e.g. space curved by mass. The only place I've heard a "shut up and calculate" approach is in relation to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Given all the interpretations of QM developed to help us picture what is really going on at the subatomic scale, this clearly is not a general prejudice in that area either.

It seems strange to advocate or better demand that science or physics in general be visualizable given the pop-cultural scientific mentality that nature is in some sense: Incoherent to our sensibilities, far stranger than anything we could think of, paradoxical, and esoteric in rather astoundingly unintuitive ways. We will fail if we try to view nature on our terms conceptually. . . so why even try. Better to abstract away far as possible from any specific notion. — substantivalism

I don't think science or even physics in general is seen as "incoherent to our sensibilities." People call QM weird, but as far as I understand it, it's just the way things are. Maybe dispensing with metaphysics, i.e. visualization and explanation, is the right way to approach it. Why should we have to expect that the behavior of the universe at that scale has to be comprehensible in the same terms as baseballs and toothbrushes.

Further, visualizability or an emphasis on analogical/metaphorical language as opposed to mathematical/axiomatic frameworks to understand scientific theorizing seem so antiquated. — substantivalism

Again, I don't understand the basis of this claim.

They object that, "Any approach that one could take to analogue model modern mathematical models are bound to fail." — substantivalism

Who are these "they?"

the ten cent phrase that, "Science ONLY deals with description and not with explanation." — substantivalism

I have never heard this. I have heard science only deals with how things work, not why. That's not the same as your phrase and it makes sense to me in most situations.

In the modern age of extreme theoretical abstract modeling (string theory, alternative models of gravitation, quantum gravity, etc) it demands GREATER attention, which has been neglected, as to how we construct and use such modeling techniques so that they can be used as powerful heuristic tools to get past the current mainstream gridlock. — substantivalism

As I noted, maybe at this scale it makes sense to dispense with metaphysics. Why kill ourselves trying to fit quantum gravity blocks in classical mechanical holes if they don't fit. I don't know. It's way out of my league.

Forms of reductivism which are so popular are easy to interpret as by-products of numerous approaches to visual models BUT perhaps the notion of STRONG EMERGENCE could be conceptually better understood by treating such language as having to do with some mental HIERACHY change of the models we use. — substantivalism

I'm not sure that this is an issue where the question of emergence is useful. We use different models of physical behavior at different size and energy scales all the time independent of whether they arise because of strong emergence, e.g. microscopic vs. macroscopic descriptions of the behavior of gasses.

I’ll look and see if it’s available on my streaming services. Thanks.