Hmm, not in the same sense, morality polices thoughts and intentions as well, and it is used as the logic of groups. Any form of social control will be coercive in some sense, but it's mostly just policing actions, it's not quite the same. I also think that they're much less controversial because, unlike many moral views, social ideas such as the social contract, manners and rules of conduct aren't beneficial to any particular group, they're benign. Most people should be able to agree on them, and some moral ideas are like that too, but not always. — Judaka

I'm not sure I agree with this, e.g. sex roles and racial prejudice. I don't think these are not generally, or at least not always, expressed in a moral framework. I think they have to do more with psychological comfort, the need for standardization, and some sort of feeling for the smooth operation of society.

Well, I used it as an example, AI is a complicated issue that I won't get into here. I'm just saying we can't know whether they care or not because the environment is coercive, and that the incentives to find AI moral or immoral are playing a significant role in the debate. — Judaka

AI is just one example - climate change, nuclear weapons, opposition to non-fossil fuels...

I know what you mean, but such thinking is perhaps lacking in subtlety. Society has little choice but to hold people responsible for their actions, so there is pragmatic, even if not purely rational, warrant for that. To hold people responsible is not necessarily to blame them, though, but would necessarily entail restraining them by whatever means required, in order to stop them committing further crimes, or in the case of lesser infractions, shunning them or shaming them, in the hope of discouraging them and others from committing undesirable acts. The point there of restraint and even punishment, if necessary, would be to act as an example to others, hopefully persuading them not to commit similar socially unacceptable acts. Whatever works. — Janus

As I said previously, I know that people are affected by things that happened in their past, how they were socialized, and what they've learned. I think it makes sense to keep those things in mind when holding people responsible for the consequences of their behavior. I read that one state, I think it was Texas, doesn't allow evidence of childhood neglect or abuse to be presented during murder trials, but they do allow it to be used during the penalty phase when appropriate punishment is determined.

All that being said, I think that's a whole different thing than what I typically call determinism. I don't doubt that the upcoming events can be predicted with a certain level of accuracy. We can predict weather more or less accurately up to about a week ahead. On the other hand, you will hear squawking in my house when it rains when weather reports say it is supposed to be sunny. Even the best predictions tend to be probabilistic rather than definitive.

Anyway, what I'm referring to can be found on this page starting with my post which is about the tenth one down on that page. — wonderer1

I looked at all your posts on that page and all I saw was you trying to piss off another poster. Is that what you mean by determinism, the ability to predict what will make people angry. That's a pretty weak branch to build your tree house on.

This was a short discussion of the flips and flops off idealism and realism, which is really basic, but is a starting point for anyone interested in philosophy. — introbert

For what it's worth, I thought your post was clear and easy to understand.

As for idealism vs. realism, you didn't make a distinction between matters of fact and matters of values or morals. I think many people apply different approaches to different situations, e.g. realism for facts and idealism for values.

As for flip flopping, I think it's important to know that metaphysical approaches like idealism and realism don't prevent you from having any particular understanding or think any particular thoughts about how the world works, so there's not necessarily any reason for people with different attitudes to misunderstand or disagree with each other. On the other hand, different metaphysical visions might make you more likely to be drawn to particular interpretations of fact. I have read that mathematicians tend to be idealists and physicists tend to be realists. I don't know if that's true.

I'm not against formal morality, I'm just pointing out the obvious, that morality is coercive and unrealistic. — Judaka

Isn't all social control coercive and unrealistic in that same sense? Society wants people to behave in a way that promotes the effective operation of society.

It shouldn't be that controversial to say that morality is coercive and that it's a very specific way of thinking that excludes various categories of ideas. — Judaka

Yes. I agree.

Well, I'd be lying if I didn't say that I do despise the way people view morality, and how romanticised the concept is. If my way of phrasing things pissed some people off who wanted to argue against some of the basic features of morality with me, then I was here for it. — Judaka

I think I just misunderstood what you were trying to say.

Do the people developing the AI even give two shits about that? It's hard to say - because morality is coercive and we can assume that they wouldn't want to deal with the consequences of admitting that they don't care. — Judaka

I don't it's that they don't care about creating something that may have very negative consequences. It's that there is enough uncertainty to allow them to justify acts they want to do for all the other reasons you listed. And then, if they need to to continue as they want to, they can deny the potential consequences.

Anyway, I dunno why I wrote so much when my OP says the same thing as my comment here, but now that I've written it I may as well post, hope it helps. — Judaka

I guess I didn't get it the first time around.

At the same time, I am not convinced that there is one true theory to rule them all at the bottom of creation. Which in turn makes it meaningless to ask whether the world is really deterministic or indeterministic. — SophistiCat

Agreed.

Did you happen to observe my recent demonstration, here on the forums, of how predictable people can be? — wonderer1

No. I'll take a look if you provide a link. I'm skeptical that the level of prediction you are talking about is as rigorous as what would be required to claim strict determinism. I don't doubt that events in the past have effects in the present and future. That's different.

A bathrobe and the dynamic of cultural evolution will help bring that technology into a better light. — Paine

Perhaps you meant that it is meaningless in the sense that it is of no significance to us whether or not the Universe is deterministic, and I would agree with that. — Janus

Yes. This is exactly what I mean. As I noted in my response to @wonderer1, above:

It's a simple pragmatic judgment. If a claim has no meaningful consequences in the real world, it is 1) metaphysics or 2) meaningless. As a metaphysical position, I don't see it as useful either ontologically or morally. Ontologically, I think it's misleading because it underpins the idea of causation, which I think leads people to look in the wrong places for the genesis of phenomena. Morally, I think it's misleading because it is used to justify a willingness not to hold people responsible for their actions. — T Clark

I'd be interested in hearing more about what you see as misleading. — wonderer1

It's a simple pragmatic judgment. If a claim has no meaningful consequences in the real world, it is 1) metaphysics or 2) meaningless. As a metaphysical position, I don't see it as useful either ontologically or morally. Ontologically, I think it's misleading because it underpins the idea of causation, which I think leads people to look in the wrong places for the genesis of phenomena. Morally, I think it's misleading because it is used to justify a willingness not to hold people responsible for their actions.

I don't see the idea of causation as misleading. — wonderer1

We've had a few threads here on the forum where I've made the case that the idea of causality is unnecessary and misleading. Admittedly, most people have found my arguments unconvincing.

I would think a better objection might be that, in light of the predictive issues, a hypothesis of determinism might not be falsifiable. Does that maybe get more at your objection? — wonderer1

Left out my response to this.

I intended my objection to be stronger than what you've written. 1) Except for in the simplest situations, events are not predictable even in theory 2) Therefore the idea of determinism is not unfalsifiable, it's meaningless.

I suspect that what people typically mean these days when saying the accept determinism is that they accept it as a corollary of accepting physical causal closure. So I don't see it as a meaningless idea inasmuch as it conveys such a perspective at the very least. — wonderer1

To take a step back, I see the whole issue of determinism as a metaphysical one, not subject to empirical verification or falsification. It's a matter of point of view, not fact. I don't see it as a very useful way of thinking - it's misleading.

For that matter, I think the idea of causation can be misleading except in the simplest cases.

This is usually explained by pointing to psychological adaptation, which involves changes in tool use, agricultural and hunting practices, animal husbandry, etc.

If consciousness is strictly a bodily function, we'd have to explain how it is that the body doesn't adapt, but the mind does. — frank

It's not a psychological adaptation, it's a technological one. When it's cold I put on a jacket. When it's hot I sit around in my lounge chair naked. Here's a picture:

Determinism, in its most general formulation, does not commit to computability. This, I think, is similar to the point made by ↪T Clark — SophistiCat

Yes. And my claim is that the idea of determinism is meaningless if prediction is not possible, even in theory.

Err, I don't understand what you're responding to, but there is no functional difference between those things. — Judaka

I guess I've misunderstood. You seem to be against formal morality - you say it's coercive and unrealistic. As I noted, that kind of morality is just one manifestation of social control, what you call the social contract, about which you said:

I don't condemn society's ability to apply social standards to me, they are usually practical and beneficial for everyone. and I generally support these rules. — Judaka

@180 Proof

Are you familiar with Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation by Roger Ames & David Hall? If so, what do you think of it? I've found it a much more insightful reading (between the lines) than any other version of Laozi's text. I've been meaning to reread it for quite some time ...
— 180 Proof

Thanks for the reference. I hadn't heard of it. Went on Amazon. Bought it in Kindle. — T Clark

I've used this version of the Tao Te Ching some since you recommended it, but just the translated verses, which I've enjoyed, not the essays included. I just read the "Philosophical Introduction." It's so odd to read the Tao Te Ching interpreted in terms of western philosophy. I think I learned more about western philosophy than I did about Taoism. That's not a bad thing. Thanks again.

I agree morality is often overapplied. A completely amoral society would still have the social contract, it would still have laws, there would still be manners, things that were culturally unacceptable, expectations on your behaviour and so on.

I don't condemn society's ability to apply social standards to me, they are usually practical and beneficial for everyone. and I generally support these rules. — Judaka

I don't see a functional difference between a social standard that says I shouldn't throw garbage in my neighbor's yard and one that says I shouldn't engage in consensual homosexual acts in private. That doesn't mean I don't realize one is reasonable and one is not.

Do I really believe that? Let me think about it.

Additionally, a similar thread has been posted on this forum, I will include it here in case the reader would like to refer to it: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6478/determinism-vs-predictability/p1 — NotAristotle

Thank you for resurrecting this old thread. One of my favorites. My position on the subject hasn't changed from that original discussion. As I noted:

It feels intuitively to me that in some, many, most? cases unraveling cause is not possible even in theory. It's not just a case of being ignorant. Part of that feeling is a conviction that sufficiently complex systems, even those that are theoretically "caused," could not be unraveled with the fastest supercomputer operating for the life of the universe. There is a point, isn't there, where "completely outside the scope of human possibility" turns into "not possible even in theory." Seems to me there is. — T Clark

If something is completely unpredictable, does it still make sense to say it is caused. Isn't cause inextricably tied up with prediction? It may be possible to model and predict a coin flip or build a machine that can flip a coin with near perfect uniformity, but how about 1,000 flips using 1,000 random coins flipped by 1,000 random people? — T Clark

My conclusion - most events in the world are completely unpredictable by the standards discussed above. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to consider the world deterministic.

If determinism were true, the printout should accurately predict Ned’s actions; however, because it could potentially not predict accurately, determinism must be false. — NotAristotle

I don't think your thought experiment proves anything. Just because you failed to predict something doesn't mean it can't be predicted. A predicting device that didn't take into account the effects of it's prediction on the future would be a pretty crappy device.

It's very difficult to talk about morality without a group as a context because the group's motivations and values are critical. For example, what's fair and reasonable within the context of a competitive soccer team will be different from a casual kids' soccer team. Whereas the competitive team might think it's fair to let the best players have the most field time and ball possession because of everyone's desire to win, it might seem fair to allow all the kids an equal chance to play in the casual kids' team. — Judaka

I think there are two moralities—there are the standards I apply to myself, and those that groups apply to themselves and others. I think only the first of these deals with what is good and bad, right and wrong. The other deals with social control—standardizing behavior to make society run smoothly. Perhaps we should add a third type—laws and other formal standards of behavior. No, let's not.

I know right from wrong in a very personal way. It's easy to boil down—Do unto others as you would have others do unto you. Actually, it's more than that. We are human. We are social. We (generally) like each other. When I am in a social situation, I usually know what is the right thing to do, not because of some rule, but because it is built into me by human nature backed up by learning. Behavior that shows respect and concern for other people is good. Behavior that doesn't is bad. I don't need anyone to tell me that. As I noted, these standards apply to myself, not to others.

I think the other kind of morality is the primary subject of this thread. The rules, formal or informal, of social control can be fair or unfair, kind or unkind, reasonable or unreasonable, useful or not useful, effective or ineffective. They are not really moral, although they are often dressed up in moral costumes, which can give them social and personal impact. There are always going to be standards of behavior, I guess the only issue is whether or not you agree with them. For me, the most important quality a good rule should have is fairness—it should apply to everyone equally.

I think moral conflict comes into play when one of the second, social kind of "moral" standards clashes with one of the first kind. My general attitude is to follow social rules unless there is a good reason not too. Often, I don't follow them because they are inconvenient, but that's because I am imperfect.

Do you condemn societies ability to apply social standards to you? I don't think there's anything you can do about it. It's human nature. It's sociology, anthropology.

@Jamal—I usually use hyphens for dashes but in this post—in your honor—I've used em dashes. What a pain in the ass they are.

Me too. Sadly you are still here :D — I like sushi

:chin: ….option 2. — DingoJones

Good choice.

What have you done with the real T Clark? — DingoJones

Two answers. Pick one.

Answer 1 - He is on vacation on Cape Cod, where the internet has not been installed yet. I'm just filling in.

Answer 2 - Buzz off fuzz nuts.

Banned Andrew4Handel — fdrake

Always sad to see an old-timer go.

No criticism of moderators intended.

Or if I buy a poster. The poster in itself doesn't bring value. The value comes from the idea of having a connection with the poster, that you are part of the culture it tries to depict. And the collection of these commercial objects creates the essence you present to the world as your delegation. — Levon Nurijanyan

What you are describing isn't true of me. I own a lot of things, most of which are useful or at least meant for use. Clothing, a house, a car, appliances, a computer, and on and on. I don't have strong feelings for most of these. There are a few things I really love generally because they are beautiful or have personal meaning - a rug, silverware, the orange pepper grinder my son gave me for Christmas.

I don't think I am so different from other people.

The Philosophy Forum is not a welcoming place or serious discussions of God. Really, only one question is allowable - yes or no. And only one answer is ultimately acceptable - no. If you try to take it farther than that, you will be met first by smug disrespect, followed by deleted posts and threads and finally, if you won't submit, by banning.

I wish it were not so.

Sadness is just sadness. Boredom is something else. We're not meant to get bored. It's a signal of something else going on. Something hidden. It's ok to just be sad, but with boredom you should pay attention.

Sadness is healthier, but boredom is more interesting.

However, physics is not suitable for describing living systems. — Wolfgang

Of course it is, although it's not enough by itself. As @apokrisis notes, the "other organizational principles than inanimate nature" you refer to have to do with the interactions of constraints from above and below. Life has to work thermodynamically or it doesn't work at all. Every discussion of abiogenesis I've read gets down to thermodynamics eventually.

[deleted]

I am referring to all law in my theoretical critique of law per se. — quintillus

Most law is not about motivation at all. It is about how things are to be done or who's going to pay for it, not whether or not they are done at all.

Not doing something is what is known as a negative act. — quintillus

As I noted, it may be true that law is not effective in motivating positive acts, that doesn't mean it can't be effective in motivating negative acts, i.e. preventing people from doing prohibited acts.

My proffer is that we first render everyone reflectively free. — quintillus

By which you mean:

...being in possession of reflective understanding of his or her existential ontological freedom... — quintillus

Easier said than done. Much, much, much easier said than done. Very easy to say. Perhaps impossible to do in groups larger than five people. It is not an achievable method of governance in our society.

[deleted]

Law is an existing written factual theoretical construct which, because it is a given state of affairs, cannot possibly be determinative of the acts of human beings, who act solely on the basis of not yet achieved absences. — quintillus

Some thoughts 1) You seem to be talking about criminal law, which is only a small part of the law. For better or worse, a capitalist society needs laws to regulate commerce, finance, and especially property ownership. 2) Criminal law is not primarily intended to get people to do things, it's to get them not to do things. Although I agree law is not generally effective in promoting motivated action, it often works to prevent unwanted actions, e.g. I don't always drive the speed limit, but I do drive more slowly than I would if there were none. 3) Criminal law is not only intended to act as a deterrent, it is also meant to figure out how to deal with the consequences of illegal acts, e.g. restricting future actions of people who violate the laws.

Definitely will try it again sometime in the future, but, I wasn't really feeling it at the moment, especially towards the last 100 or so pages of my reading. — Manuel

As you've seen here, you aren't the only one who had to come back later. My suggestion - get a good running start and read as fast as you can. Whenever you think of stopping, just say la, la, la over again with your fingers in your ears.

Or, like me, wait till you retire to finish reading it.

It is impossible that 100% of the time when a UFO crashes, the government gets to the scene first and cleans it perfectly outside the presence of any witness or video. — Hanover

Also, no one has mentioned how crappy the alien pilots must be to keep crashing all the time. I can only think of two possible reasons 1)After you get three DUIs on Koozebane, they sentence you to Earth 2) Earth is where all the college kids on Venus go for spring break.

Oh it's a disaster for panpsychism! — bert1

In a previous answer to one of my posts you wrote:

Not being a panpsychist, looking for consciousness in inanimate objects is not something I would normally do, but since you brought it up... It seems clear to me the idea of consciousness originated to refer to a human mental process.
— T Clark

Maybe, but even that sentence is theory-laden. It's stipulating it's a process. And I'm doubtful that earliest thinkers about consciousness did necessarily restrict it to human beings. If we're going to start somewhere, I suspect it's not processes in human beings - that's a way down the road. The starting point is my awareness. — bert1

As I replied to that comment, I think you were right. The only way you can sell panpsychism is to look at it from the starting point of your awareness. Reading your responses to other people's comments in subsequent posts, it seems like you haven't followed up on that insight. The comments you are responding to are "theory-laden," but you haven't really tried to sell the self-awareness aspect. Or did I miss something?

I'd like to hear you try to make a chain of inferences from your personal self-awareness to awareness in rocks.

As an afterthought - As I see it, panpsychism is a metaphysical concept. There is no way it can be tested empirically. It's more a way of thinking about things, a point of view, than it is a statement of fact. So... why would I do that? What value or insight do I get from thinking of consciousness the way you propose? This is a serious question, no irony intended.

T Clark emoji. :roll: — Noble Dust

Maybe, but even that sentence is theory-laden. It's stipulating it's a process. — bert1

True.

If we're going to start somewhere, I suspect it's not processes in human beings - that's a way down the road. The starting point is my awareness. — bert1

That makes sense. Now I guess you're going to show us how what we experience as awareness can be observed in rocks.

As a panpsychist I have been asked a few times for evidence of consciousness in rocks and other such objects. — bert1

Not being a panpsychist, looking for consciousness in inanimate objects is not something I would normally do, but since you brought it up... It seems clear to me the idea of consciousness originated to refer to a human mental process. There have been lots of attempts to observe similar mental processes in other animals, with some success. What success there has been has come from comparing animals behavior with human behavior and inferring similar mental processes. How would that work with non-living entities? I don't know. It seems to me your job would be to show how what we recognize as consciousness in humans is also observable in rocks.

I think that's what's required - start by defining consciousness in humans and then show how that criteria is applicable elsewhere. To make that work, seems to me you have to either 1) show that rocks have mental processes or 2) show that consciousness in humans is not a mental process at all. If you can't do that, you should just come up with a different name for the process you're describing.

*Thumbs up pic* — Noble Dust

I think I like your riff on my thumbs up tclemoji better than the tclemoji itself.

If anything I think the concept is actually kind of pretentious. — Noble Dust

I didn't think it was pretentious, but it was definitely a one joke routine. Perhaps a short story.

I enjoyed The City and the City so much that I feel I owe it to myself to give him at least one more shot after failing with Last Days Of New Paris. — Noble Dust

Yeah. I just gave up on "Last Days of New Paris." It had that Mieville tornado of words and I could tell it was well put together, but it just didn't draw me in. It was a neat idea - a battle between the Nazis and the surrealists in Paris. I think it would have been fun if I were more knowledgeable about surrealist artists.

Perhaps I will go back to it another day.