But I would say that pressure is weakly emergent. It's perfectly understandable in terms of the properties of the particles. — boundless

Yes, this is correct.

I am not sure that I understood how is defined the concept of strong emergence. — boundless

It’s exactly the same. This is not a scientific way of speaking, it’s statistics. This is how statisticians talk about distributions of data points. As the number of points of a property that is normally distributed increases to infinity, the graph of the data points approaches a normal curve. If there’s only one or two data points, it’s impossible to tell whether the data is normally distributed or not. Typically, it doesn’t take a vast number of points to estimate the distribution. For example polls, intended to measure the opinions of all Americans typically include the data of only a few thousand.

Yes, but it is assumed that the mass of, say, the Earth is the sum of the masses of its components. The distance between, say, Earth and the Sun is approximated as a distance between the distances of their centers, because being almost spherical, their gravitational effects are approximately like the one of a point particle of their mass. And so on. Also, it is assumed that the gravitational force of the Earth or the Sun is the combined effect of the forces that each of their constituents cause. — boundless

I don’t see how this is relevant.

Try to see it this way. You can define energy as a property of both an individual object or a system of objects. If you consider the energy of a closed system you find that it's conserved. And this constrains the behavior of energy of the single parts of the system. — boundless

You and I have a different understanding of what the words “reductionism” and “emergence” mean and how the processes they designate work. I’m not going to change my understanding and I don’t think you are either. There’s probably no reason for us to continue this part of the discussion.

In my original response to this post, I wrote there are trillions of molecules in a container of air. That’s not right. When we deal with thermodynamic properties, we generally talk in terms of moles - 6x10^23 molecules. That’s almost a trillion trillion. Close enough to infinity for me.

More of your rabid anti-religious bigotry. In this case especially lame.

The author says that some (strongly) 'emergent properties', like violation of some symmetries, occur at the infinite limit of the number of the constituents.
So, the theory can explain the arising of those properties because they appear at that limit. — boundless

You're making the idea that properties manifest as the number of elements approach infinity seem more exotic than it is. The term is just shorthand for the number of elements necessary so that it makes sense to talk about specific macroscopic properties. For example - it doesn't really make sense to talk about the pressure of one molecule bouncing around inside a container. In a container full of air at atmospheric pressure, however, there are trillions of molecules bouncing around and off each other and talking about pressure is reasonable. Somewhere between one and trillions of molecules it starts to make sense to talk about pressure.

Newtonian mechanics is now understood as a limit case of relativity. And, in fact, one obtains Galileian trransformation by taking the limit where the velocity of light is infinite. But notice that there is a subtle difference here. The limit is taken to explain an approximation and to explain that, in fact, if you don't take that limit you actually get more precise results. — boundless

This is true, but a bit misleading. At normal human scale velocities, say 100 mph, length contraction will be less than 1/(1x10^14). Calling a value less than 1/(1/10^14) from the actual value an approximation or imprecise is a bit of a stretch.

That's why I think that weak emergence and reductionism are the same thing seen in different ways. — boundless

Agreed.

his worldview is far more sympathetic of intentionality, purpose, 'holism' and so on than a purely mechanicistic worldview. — boundless

I'm not sure he would agree with that. Then again, I'm not sure he wouldn't.

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity.
— T Clark

I'm not sure of what you mean here. — boundless

Newton's law of universal gravitation is specifically developed to address the gravitational attraction between massive objects. The physical properties considered - mass, distance, and time - are measured directly on those objects. There is no reduction.

the conservation laws are what is fundamental and they determine the behavior of the 'parts' of the isolated system. — boundless

I don't understand this. How can the law of conservation of energy be more fundamental than the idea of energy? Conservation of energy is a phenomenon that is understood by observing energetic interactions among physical objects. How can it be more fundamental? How do you observe conservation of energy? By making measurements of time, mass, and distance in various combinations.

I made my point about 'strong emergence' with reference to a reductionist paradigm - in fact, 'strong' emergence doesn't seem to me to sit well with a reductionist paradigm, where all properties of a whole can be explained via the properties of the parts. I admit that I went by memory but I thought that in strong emergence the mechanism of emergence is left somewhat unexplained and, in fact, I thought that, in contrast to weak emergence, strong emergence is based on the idea that some properties of the whole can't be explained with reference to the properties of the parts. — boundless

All this is exactly right. Strong emergence is not compatible with reductionism. That's the subject of the paper I linked. Perhaps I was confused. I thought you used reductionism/weak emergence as the necessary alternative to intention/teleology without considering another alternative - strong emergence. Was I wrong about that?

Regarding 'weak emergence' and 'reductionism', I know that there is a subtle distinction between them. A strict 'reductionist' would say that weakly emergent features are mere illusions. Instead, an 'emergentist' would say that they are 'real' but everything about them can be explained in terms of the properties of the part. — boundless

As I understand it, reductionism's focus is on analysis of the properties of higher level phenomena from physical principles at lower levels while emergence focuses on constructing the properties of higher level phenomena from lower level principles. The difference between weak and strong emergence is that, for weak emergence, it works but for strong emergence it doesn't. The thermodynamic properties of gases can be determined based on the behavior of the gases themselves but also on the basis of the behavior of their molecular components - both reductionism and constructionism. On the other hand, the properties of biological phenomena can not be determined based on physical properties alone. At least that is the claim.

I had a discussion with apokrisis about the emergence of life. IIRC, he or she argued for a non-reductionist physicalist model of such an emergence. Such an emergence was understood as a sort of phase transition, which of course generally is a paradigmatic example of weak emergence. unfortunately, I don't recall the specifics of their model but I am sure that it wasn't understood in a mechanicistic way. — boundless

I like this description. @Apokrisis is a smart guy. When he says "non-reductionist physicalist model" I think he means one without reference to just the intentionist/teleological explanations this thread is about. Keeping in mind that I often misunderstand him.

I guess that I think that I should point out that IMO even something like 'Newtonian mechanics' isn't necessarily reductionistic. — boundless

I don't think it's reductionistic at all. That's because the properties and behavior of phenomena described are determined by the physical principles at the same level of scale. Newton's cosmology is based on observations of the sun, moon, earth, and other planetary bodies acted on by the forces that act on them directly, e.g. gravity.

I linked to the source, it has ample documentation. — Wayfarer

I did what I will admit was a quick scan and I didn’t see any answer to my specific request which was show me some evidence that “no amount of chemical evolution can cross the barrier that divides the analogue world of chemistry from the digital world of life”

I've had my say. I'll leave it at that.

The philosophical point about the irreducible nature of life, is that life is not reducible to chemistry. — Wayfarer

No, life is reducible to chemistry, it's just that it is not constructable from chemistry.

...no amount of chemical evolution can cross the barrier that divides the analogue world of chemistry from the digital world of life,. — What is Information? Marcello Barbieri

Says who? Show me some evidence. Give me some inkling of a reason to believe this might be true.

But I am not sure if all the properties that we observe in living beings (i.e. behaving as a distinct 'whole', goal-directedness, striving for survival and so on) can be explained in terms of the known chemical and physical laws. I really can't see how such properties can be understood in a reductionist (or 'weakly emergentist'*) paradigm.

*BTW, I think 'weak emergence' is a form of reductionism. Nothing really 'new' arises in the case of 'weak emergence'. What 'emerges' is just a convenient abstraction that allow us to make simpler explanations. — boundless

This really confused me. You say that weak emergence is the same thing as reductionism. I'm ok with that, although I don't think it's quite accurate. I'm not a reductionist. I asked myself - "Well, how come you don't talk about strong emergence?" So I went back through your comments in this thread and found this:

It is understandable why some try to explain away the intentionality, 'holism' etc which seem to be present in life as illusions (i.e. living beings behave 'as if' they have those properties...). It is perhaps the only consistent way to account for these properties. Some, instead, try to explain these things in a 'strong emergent' model, which seems to be unintelligible. So IMO these difficulties point to the possibility that, indeed, the reductionist/emergentist models are wrong and we need something else. — boundless

You write off strong emergence as "unintelligible" but your fall back position is a universe infused with intentionality. You reject an established, if sometimes controversial, scientific principle with a wave of your hand and then point us at elan vital as the answer to our questions.

Here's a link to a famous paper on emergence "More is Different" by P.W. Anderson. It's not long.

Hardly, right? It doesn't seem like our era should be unique. It's just that ideology is more transparent when one lives within it, especially when it has "gone global." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've already acknowledged that societal values and political considerations influence what is considered worth studying, knowing. And you're right - same as it ever was. But you didn't address the main point of my comment. This intrusion of societal influence into science is exactly the opposite of what you call "this sort of separation of value and purpose from a wholly mathematized world (which, of course, excludes value by definition, axiomatically)." It is the intrusion of values into science that has corrupted it.

Ha, well that was exactly the point I was trying to make. "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth) only exist in your head, as a privatized projection, a sui generis hallucination produced by the mysterious, but ultimately mechanistic mind," obviously isn't neutral. It is not a view that arose through sheer substraction, i.e., just "stripping away old narratives and superstitions," to get to the "clear view of reason." It is itself an ideological construct, a particular tradition. And the motivations for it have been variously political, economic, religious, etc., as well as philosophical. The idea of freedom as primarily being "freedom from constraint," and "the ability to do anything" (i.e. freedom as power/potency) seems quite relevant here too (and it's a notion of freedom that comes out of early-modern theology, man being the image of a God who was sheer will). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's really frustrating I can't get you to acknowledge that the characteristics you seem to deplore - a bias for reason, mathematics, and freedom from constraint - are human values just as much as "Goodness, Beauty (and sometimes Truth)" are.

I agree in principle, but I would question the exact way in which this is "mainstream." I don't think it was ever overwhelmingly popular as a position accepted by your average person on the street, or even a majority of people. It was dominant within the narrow silo of Anglo-empiricist philosophy and with some scientists, and I think even that is less true today than it was in the 20th century. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's true. The metaphysics of everyday life is different from that of science. Why would you expect anything different? Scientists are trying to do different things than insurance salespeople and truck drivers. Something around half of Americans don't believe the human species developed from previously living organisms without outside influence. That doesn't prove evolutionary biologists are barking up the wrong tree.

We focus on 'description'" (where "description" is axiomatically assumed to exclude value, which is privatized). This isn't true for all science though. No one expects medical researchers to do this, or zoologists, or even evolutionary biologists, let alone social scientists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I see it, the difference between physics and the sciences you describe isn't primarily that physics excludes value while the others don't. It's that for the others, it is much, much harder to exclude outside influences on the results and so it's much, much harder to get clear, definitive answers to questions. Of course all science is value laden - values control what is studied, what questions are asked, and who gets funded. Beyond that, sciences that deal with people directly have to, theoretically at least, deal with those people humanely. The scientific method varies depending on what is being studied, but the basics are the same. It requires standing back and looking at phenomena from a suitable distance, objectivity if you will. That's true of psychology as much as it is chemistry.

If one looks back to earlier epochs, one sees that shifts in the "scientific model," that predominates in societies, what C.S. Lewis call the "backcloth," were often resisted for political and ideological reasons. I don't think our own era is any different here. A view that makes all questions of value and purpose "subjective" aligns with the hegemonic political ideology of our era by effectively privatizing all questions of value, all the way down to the level of metaphysics and "what science says is true." It's worth remembering here that the current model grows out of a particular theology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So, science is embedded in the society it operates in and takes on many of the values of that society. Sure, but you make is sound like some sort of conspiracy. The difficulty some scientists have in getting society to accept their well-studied and critical understanding of the world makes it hard to accept the claim that politics is unfairly hindering the inclusion of human values. It is exactly human values - money and power - that is muddying the water.

Such a view, by making all questions of goodness, usefulness, beauty, etc. "subjective" also helps to support the anthropology assumed by classical liberalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Does your whole argument rest on the basis of absolute, i.e. non-subjective, morality?

the anthropology assumed by classical liberalism. This thin anthropology ("utility" as a sort of black box which decides all intentional human action, but which cannot itself be judged, i.e., volanturism) is hugely influential in contemporary economics and public policy. The entire global political and economic system is organized around such a view, and considerable effort is expended to make man conform to this view of him, to positively educated him in this role (e.g., highly consequential economic "shock treatments" aimed at privatization and atomization). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you're example makes a point exactly in contradiction to the one you seem to think it does. It is the human values embraced by classical liberalism that corrupt the process. It seems your problem isn't the exclusion of human values, it's the exclusion of the particular values you share.

It isn't clear how can the intentionality which is present in life arise, in an intelligible way, 'out of' the inanimate, which seems to be without any kind of intentionality. So, either some kind of teleology was present even before the arising of life or it just 'started' with the arising of life. In the latter case, how was that possible? If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology? — boundless

The origin of life from inanimate material - abiogenesis - is not some mysterious unknowable process. It can be, and is, studied by science. It's not a question of certain chemicals happening to combine in very, very unlikely ways by the random action of molecules jiggling around. There are some who think life is inevitable given a suitable environment. I recommend "What is LIfe - How Chemistry Becomes Biology" by Addy Pross. It's definitely pop-sci, but it's interesting and thought provoking.

This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world. — boundless

It's true, life can't be explained using physics. The structure, development, and behavior of living organisms operate according to a different set of "rules" than physics - the rules of biology. At the same time, all biological phenomena act consistent with our understanding of physics.

If you're ever bored :rofl: perhaps you would be interested in "playing along" with it. "For the sake of argument, let's say you're right..." I don't know how to finis — Patterner

I don’t know if you’ve paid much attention to any of my posts. If you had you would find I am obsessed with metaphysics and the difference between metaphysics and everyday knowledge of the world, including science. As I understand it, what you are talking about is exactly that - metaphysics. And for me, metaphysics is not about what’s true or false, it’s about what is a useful way to think about things.

It doesn’t seem to me that kind of a discussion is really what you’re looking for in this thread.

I think we ought to consider that what we know as the Universe, is a construction of human minds, and as such it was created with purpose. What modern physics demonstrates to us is that much of reality is far beyond our grasp, not even perceptible to us. What we take to be the Universe, the model we make, is formed and shaped by usefulness and purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I really like your post. I guess it helps that I agree with you on just about everything, but I don’t know that I could have expressed it as clearly as you have.

↪jorndoe I'd already avoided saying that. — Banno

You’re just jealous because I think @jorndoe is cute too.

In short: Consciousness is subjective experience. I have heard that wording more than any other, but I prefer Annaka Harris' "felt experience". I think feeling is what it all means. When Nagel asks "What is it like to be a bat?", the question is really: "What does it feel like to be a bat?" Not how does it feel physically, although that may be a part of it. Not how does it feel emotionally, although that may be a part of it. It's the overall feeling of being. — Patterner

I like your thread a lot. My biggest gripe when it comes to discussions about consciousness is that people never get around to defining what they really mean. It pleases me that you’ve been so careful to do that.

A rock experiences being a rock. What does that entail? Well, not much, from my point of view. A rock doesn't have any mental characteristics or processes. It doesn't think about being a rock. It doesn't have memories of being a rock. It doesn't have preferences of any sort, to any degree, in regards to anything. It doesn't have perceptions, of itself or anything other than itself. It doesn't even have any activity that's what we think of as purely physical. No part of a rock is moving relative to any other part of the rock. If a rock is scratched, the discussion of its experience of the scratch begins and ends with the simple fact that it was scratched. The rock's experience of its existence is different after the scratch, because some of it was scraped away. But there is no discussion of the rock being scratched, because it has no memory, thought, or feeling of the event. — Patterner

I especially like this. It’s not that I agree with it. It’s just the clarity you’ve put into saying what you mean. You’ve made me feel a little bit of what it might feel like to be rock.

For those who want to argue the premise, I won't be participating. — Patterner

Since I can’t really buy into your premise, I won’t be participating anymore. But I did want you to know how much I appreciate what you’ve put into this.

Odd. That ↑ comment looked like a (low-quality) hand-wave to me. — jorndoe

Oh. @jorndoe. You’re so cute.

@Banno

Take a look at the video I just posted into the reply above yours. it is *exceedingly* interesting. — Wayfarer

Thanks.

The problem is precisely that 'the equation' makes no provision for the act of observation. — Wayfarer

In my understanding, interpretations of quantum mechanics, which do not make a provision for the act of observation are just as consistent with the mathematics and observations of behavior as those that do.

This doesn’t mean it has a mind in the conscious sense, but it strongly suggests that intentional-like behavior—orientation toward what matters to it —can appear even before anything like a nervous system arises. That’s part of what I meant by “intentionality in a broader sense than conscious intention.” It’s not about inner deliberation, but about the intrinsic organization of living systems around meaningful interaction with their environment. — Wayfarer

Is intention without a mind and nervous system meaningful? I’m skeptical, but I don’t know enough about this particular example to make any intelligent judgment.

Regarding whether organisms really act purposefully, or only as if they do - this is central to the whole debate about teleology and teleonomy. — Wayfarer

I don’t think the idea of a teleological universe is very compelling, but that doesn’t mean I see any particular value in the idea of teleonomy.

This is why I think the boundary between biology and psychology isn’t as clean as the classical model would have it. — Wayfarer

I’m not sure what to say about this. I guess I would have thought a clear delineation between biology and psychology is at the heart of the hard problem of consciousness that we’ve discussed many times.

A lot of the resistance to this idea, I think, comes from our folk understanding of intentionality: that it has to be something like what I am capable of thinking or intending. — Wayfarer

You call it the “folk understanding.” I call it the actual definition of the word. As I see it, you’re the one trying to change the meaning from how the word is normally used.

I just noticed I responded to your posts out of order. I’ll go back and respond to your first one now.

life, and indeed human existence, is a product of "pure chance, absolutely free but blind." He saw genetic mutations, the ultimate source of evolutionary innovation, as random and unpredictable events at the molecular level. — Wayfarer

I think this is clearly incorrect as a matter of science and not of philosophy. What we’ve learned about self organization, and abiogenesis since he made those statements shows there is structure and process intrinsic to the nature of the universe. Saying “structure” and “process” is not the same as same as saying “purpose” and “goal.”

What do you think about, and why? Do you think about things because they are relevant and meaningful to you, in relation to your goals and purposes? If so, then maybe you are thinking about life’s purposes all the time. — Joshs

I never denied that I have purposes and goals for my own behavior. I work with the purpose of making money to pay for my house and food and car. I go to the liquor store with the goal of buying wine. As I said to @Wayfarer, if that’s all we were talking about, there would be no argument here.

Because a scientific stance is itself a derivative or expression of a metaphysical stance, answering its questions is already to engage with the metaphysics that guides it. — Joshs

You and I have a different understanding of the meaning of the words “science” and “metaphysics“ and of the relationship between the two.

A scientific evolution is likely to also constitute a metaphysical revolution. — Joshs

That’s a question I’ve thought about and I’m not really sure of the answer.

Vague, unsupported, low quality arm waving.

The question of whether life, the universe, and everything is in any sense meaningful or purposeful is one that entertains many minds in our day. — Wayfarer

I'll acknowledge from the start that this is an unresolvable issue. I won't convince you and you won't convince me. As usual, my view is that this is metaphysics. You're not wrong, I'm not right. We just have a difference of opinion about the most useful way of looking at this. Although I have no intention of convincing anyone, I would like to present an alternative way of looking at this.

The moment we ask whether something is meaningful, we’re already inhabiting a world structured by purposes. Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. — Wayfarer

You are begging the question here. You ask us whether the universe has meaning and then when we say "no" you jump up and say "Ah ha! You recognize that meaning and purpose are important." Well, for most of us, the answer to the question is not "no," it's "I don't think about things that way. Life's purposes and goals are not things I think about unless someone like you brings them up." I don't ever remember thinking about life's purpose except in a philosophical context. I think most people are like me in that sense.

Even the most rudimentary organisms behave as if directed toward ends: seeking nutrients, avoiding harm, maintaining internal equilibrium. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that "as if directed" is the same as "directed?" That would be about as circular as an argument can get.

This kind of directedness—what might be called biological intentionality—is not yet consciously purposeful, but it is not mechanical either. — Wayfarer

If you look up "intention" you find two kinds of definitions 1) a near-synonym for goal or purpose and 2) a mental state. If we apply the first type of definition, we're back in a circular argument. As for the second type, the idea that the simplest biological organisms, or that biology as an entity, has mental states is clearly unsupportable.

the living being is concern, and this concern is inseparable from its form and function. — Wayfarer

"Concern" here is just another word you're using for "goal" or "purpose." It doesn't add anything new to the discussion. In these discussions, it often seems that people use "function" as a synonym for "purpose." Do you see it that way? My heart clearly has a function in my body. Does that mean it has a goal? Of course, that's really the question on the table. We're headed back into a circular argument.

Much of the debate about purpose revolves around an ancient idea, telos. The ancient Greek term telos simply means end, goal, or purpose. For Aristotle, it was a foundational concept—not just in ethics and politics, where human purpose is self-evident, but in nature as well. "Nature," he writes in Politics, "does nothing in vain." He believed that things have intrinsic ends: the acorn strives to become the oak; the eye is for seeing; the human being is naturally oriented toward reason and society. — Wayfarer

I'm certainly not a student of Aristotle but, as I understand it, he saw telos as the result of final design and final design as the result of intention, which we've already discussed. Saying "Nature does nothing in vain," is just another way of stating your premise.

This way of thinking made perfect sense in a world where observation and common experience guided inquiry. — Wayfarer

I live in a world where observation and common experience guide inquiry and I don't think that understanding is necessarily the most useful way of seeing things. It certainly isn't true in any absolute sense. Again, it's metaphysics.

Throughout, they act as if they’re pursuing ends — Wayfarer

Again - as if.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution....(Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36) — Wayfarer

You quoted this from Nagle and then you commented:

But this universality came at a price. To attain it, physics had to bracket out the world as we actually live it: a world rich with meaning, embedded in time, shaped by perception and concern. — Wayfarer

You and I have been in enough discussions so you should know I am as skeptical of the idea of objective reality as you are. I even agree we live in "a world rich with meaning, embedded in time, shaped by perception and concern." And that's because we live in a human world. Those properties come from within us. If that were all you are saying, we would have no argument.

I think it is an important understanding for us to see that there is a difference between the world inside us and that outside us. I always imagine when I look at babies that that is what they are learning as I watch them wiggle, look at everything, touch their toes, and make noises. They're learning some things are them and some things are the world. I guess that's their first adventure in metaphysics.

In this light, the familiar claim that the universe is meaningless begins to look suspicious. It isn’t so much a conclusion reached by science, but a background assumption—one built into the methodology from the outset. — Wayfarer

Yes. Exactly. If you will acknowledge the way you describe things is also a "background assumption" then you and I will have no argument.

To speak of organisms is necessarily to speak in the language of function, adaptation, and goal-directedness. Biologists may insist that these are mere heuristics, that such language is shorthand for mechanisms with no actual purpose. — Wayfarer

To start, function and adaptation and not the same as goal-directedness. If I were going to pick a point when it would make sense to talk about an organisms goals, it would be when they are capable of intention. Intention requires a mind and a mind requires a nervous system. At that point, we've moved out of the realm of biology and into neurology, ethnology, and psychology.

physics was forced to reintroduce the very context it had so carefully excluded since Newton: the observational result was dependent on the experimental set-up. The result is the famously unresolved proliferation of “interpretations of quantum mechanics.” — Wayfarer

In my understanding, this is not exactly accurate. Some interpretations of quantum mechanics bring the observer into the equation, others do not. It appears that all the different interpretations are equally consistent with the mathematics and empirical results of QM. Since there appears to be no empirical way of decide among those interpretations, the choice of one over the others is, again, metaphysics.

The blithe assurances of scientific positivism—that the universe is devoid of meaning and purpose—should therefore be recognized for what they are: a smokescreen, a refusal to face the deeper philosophical questions that science itself has inadvertently reopened. In a world that gives rise to observers, meaning may not be an add-on. It may have been that it is there all along, awaiting discovery. — Wayfarer

This is pretty outrageous. You've lost track of the fact, if you ever recognized it, that you can't answer scientific questions with metaphysics and you can't answer metaphysical questions with science.

As I said at the beginning, there is no resolution to this issue. You and I have had at it enough times to know that. Now I've had my say and we can leave it at that if you want.

what rationale can be presented to justify the death of innocent civilians in Japan during WWII with the atomic bombs? — Shawn

So the death of 1 million Japanese civilians is terrible, but the death of 10 million Chinese civilians doesn't matter to you.

We’re done here I think.

the Japanese have been very stoic about it, regarding their loss of civilians. — Shawn

About 1 million Japanese civilians died during World War II. About 10 million Chinese civilians died at the hands of the Japanese.

You know how callous that sounds? — Shawn

As I noted - 50 million people, mostly civilians, died in World War 2.

Imagine the harm from the Castle Bravo test. Not spoken about yet. Then there's the problem of atomic nuclei from the absurd amount of atmospheric tests conducted. — Shawn

Acknowledging the harm done, I’m not sure that changes my first response to your OP.

have killed tens of thousands (from radiation exposure — Down The Rabbit Hole

I thought this claim was ridiculous, but then I looked it up and it turns out you were right.

Okay, so it looks like on your view there is "scientific knowledge" and there is "everyday knowledge," but there is no such thing as "philosophical knowledge." — Leontiskos

Well, there’s certainly is knowledge about philosophy, for example Aristotle was born on a certain date and died on a certain date. He wrote certain things. But as I said, philosophy doesn’t involve knowledge. It doesn’t work with knowledge.

I’ll admit, I’m just playing around with this idea. As I said in my previous post, I think I can make this argument. That doesn’t necessarily mean I believe it. I’ll think about it some more.

do you say that science involves knowledge? — Leontiskos

Sure.

is your knowledge of this philosophical? — Leontiskos

No. It’s just regular old everyday knowledge.

Can "philosophy" know that science involves knowledge? — Leontiskos

Philosophy can’t even figure out what “knowledge” means.

So the idea is that philosophers can't have knowledge, — Leontiskos

I think this is an argument I could probably make. Not so much that philosophers don’t have knowledge, but that philosophy does not involve knowledge. Certainly metaphysics doesn’t. Neither do aesthetics or morals.

Scientific objectivity is methodological - it's about designing studies, collecting data, and interpreting results in ways that minimize bias and personal influence. — Wayfarer

You’re right, in science, objectivity is methodological, but that’s not all it is. The existence of objective reality is the foundation of orthodox science, at least historically. That’s an ontological, not methodological, claim.

I feel bad about this, — J

Don’t feel bad. Getting lost in philosophy is nothing new for me.

Maybe read the quote from his p. 303 again, in the light of all this? — J

I went back and reread the OP and your response to my comment, as well as all the other posts on this thread. But I don’t get it. I can’t even figure out what the question on the table is. It’s frustrating because this is exactly the kind of question I like best.

Let’s leave it at that. I’ll follow along and see what I can get out of this.

We would like some sort of absolute knowledge, a View from Nowhere that will transcend “local interpretative predispositions.” But what if we accept the idea that science aims to provide that knowledge, and may be qualified to do it? What does that leave for philosophy to do? — J

The presupposition that a view from nowhere, absolute knowledge, objective reality, exists is the foundation of the orthodox view of what you are calling "natural science." It is metaphysics, philosophy, not science. Is this what you have called "one piece of philosophy which has absolute status?" The problem is that this is just one metaphysical view among many.

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy. — J

This is exactly backwards. Philosophical conceptions of "a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations" include Kant's noumena and Lao Tzu's Tao, along with many others in just about all philosophies. Science has nothing to say about this.

Since I was diagnosed with depression, I wanted to get a philosophical approach to why people suffer from this mental state; and on the other hand, if there is another way to get through it apart from medical drugs. — javi2541997

This has been an interesting thread with a whole range of viewpoints, including my personal favorite "Snap out of it." I have been diagnosed with a fairly mild form of bipolar disorder, formerly known as manic-depression disorder, but I am rarely depressed as I normally think about it. It usually manifests as anxiety. I do take drugs, but my advice to those of us who want to really deal with this problem is "Retire." I know @BC will back me up on this. For some reason, many people find this advice unhelpful.

Before I go any further, I want to make it clear that nothing I say is a denial that depression is largely a physical, biological, I guess medical, condition.

Some more or less philosophical thoughts:

I have come to see philosophy as a practice like meditation, yoga, or tai chi. It's goal is to make us more self-aware. I think this is true of all such practices. I also see psychotherapy as a practice. I was a very unhappy teenager and like many of those, I majored in psychology when I first went to school. Many people who study psychology are searching for answers to their own anguish. That's why so many psychotherapists are as damaged as their clients, why so many couples therapists are divorced.

Philosophy, especially western philosophy, is a practice focusing on how our minds work, our intellect, how we think. As such, it attracts smart, intellectual, verbal people. Philosopher's are people who think too much and the mental illness of choice for those of us who think too much is depression. And then when we look for a solution, we turn to words, even though it is words that got us into trouble in the first place. If psychology is where fucked up people turn for answers to their unhappiness, then philosophy is where smart fucked up people turn. As evidence, I suggest you just take a look at many of the posts here on the forum.

I think I came to a more focused interest in philosophy with a prejudice that modern, western philosophy, at least, is more a place to hide from our problems than to face them. Here on the forum, I met many people for whom that is true. What surprised me, though, is that there were a few people who used philosophy as a tool, almost a weapon, to take on their problems head on. The first time I remember thinking about that was in a thread with my friend TimeLine. She had a very difficult childhood but she was so smart and so self-aware that you could almost feel her struggle up out of the hole she started in using the ideas Kant, Hume, and all those guys. I found it very moving, inspiring. I still do, and it changed the way I feel about philosophy. That doesn't mean I don't think that for many of us philosophy is still a place to hide.

What do you guys think? — Bob Ross

What you have described is one of the primary arguments used by anti-religionists against Christianity. How can you worship a God who does such terrible things? I don't have the knowledge or the inclination to give an answer to that question. I'm not an atheist or a theist, although I went to a Methodist church with my family when I was a kid. I will note the difference between your seven moral imperatives and the 10 commandments. The Old Testament God seems to have had a different understanding of morality than you do.

I haven't read Dawkins, but I know he has a book called The Selfish Gene. Is that where her days that?

What is your perspective? — Patterner

Yes, I believe that is Dawkins’ book on this subject. I haven’t read it. I’ve only read what other people say about it. He certainly knows a lot more about evolution than I do but I guess I don’t get it. Evolution of organisms, and humans in particular, is what I am interested in. It’s not clear to me whether Dawkins’ perspective would add anything to that.

Googling "information theory and DNA" gave me this: — Patterner

OK. As I tried to make clear, I don’t know enough about this to have a worthwhile opinion.