Hmmm, I always learned it that way and accepted it as a given it seems. I must have gotten it from somewhere because I was quite certain, but well pssible you are right. I thought they were the two branches of metaphysics. Maybe it is Collingwood actually. It does not make much of a difference to me though. Let's treat them as separate then... — Tobias

It's not in Collingwood, I checked. As I said, perhaps I'll start a new thread.

For philosophers, they are distinct categories. — Jackson

I'm thinking of starting a thread to examine my belief that they are inseparable. Really the same thing.

Common to mistakenly include epistemology within metaphysics, it seems. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Oxford English Dictionary; Metaphysics - The branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.

Merriam Webster's Dictionary: Metaphysics - A division of philosophy that is concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and being and that includes ontology, cosmology, and often epistemology.

My understanding is that epistemology is about the nature of knowledge and metaphysics is about the nature of reality. The scientific method as methodology is a useful framework that may not necessarily have a metaphysical implication. Though certaintly an epistemological. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It is common to include epistemology as part of metaphysics. It is also common to consider them separate. I don't think it make sense to talk about them separately. How can I talk about the nature of what exists without talking about how I know it? If there's any confusion in my posts, substitute "metaphysics and epistemology" for "metaphysics."

There are already an number of strands of thinking in philosophy and the cognitive sciences ( Peirceian semiotics, phenomenology, enactivism) that have redefined the natural in a way that that goes beyond the grounding of nature that physics offers. — Joshs

This makes sense to me.

I've seen other prominent posters point out the fact that the scientific method is a methodology not an ontology but is often mistaken for the latter. I accept this as an important point that clears up an area of confusion. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The scientific method is epistemology. Epistemology is often included within metaphysics. I believe that's appropriate.

Okay, guess we're done. — Jackson

Got it. Now explain what that has to do with the relation of science to metaphysics. — Jackson

A poet does not explain his poetry.

Then explain it to me. I do not think there are many scientists who think they are doing metaphysics. — Jackson

A recipe tells you how to cook something, it doesn't cook anything itself.

I am confused by that. His quote would seem to state the oppposite. — Jackson

Perhaps @universeness will tell us what he meant, but I stand behind what I wrote.

I think the scientific method employed by physics is fundamental as the most reliable way of pursuing new knowledge and testing its validity.
— universeness

I always find it amusing when people come to a philosophy forum to say physics is really where truth lays. — Jackson

I'm with @universeness. The scientific method isn't science, it's metaphysics.

Going back to the issue of Murdoch though, there is an essay in the volume 'Existentialists and Mystics', on the idea of perfection. I only looked at this briefly because the volume of writings is large and was pretty intense. So, I will have a reread of the essay on perfection, to see what light this throws on her understanding, because it does seem that she was seeing an important relationship between metaphysics and ethics. — Jack Cummins

Because of the conversation in this thread, I bought "Existentialists and Mystics." After reading one of her novels, I have been intending to read Murdoch's philosophy too.

Mysticism pantomimes metaphysics. — Mere Foolosophy

I might say that mysticism and metaphysics mistake each other for themselves.

God is the lawgiver of the universe. No thanks. — Jackson

Yeah, but f = ma.

I think too many terms like metaphysical, supernatural, spiritual etc can be and have been 'claimed' by those with theosophist leanings and I think philosophers and scientists should work hard to combat this by making the context within which such a term is used, very very clear. — universeness

People with mystical leanings, of which I am one, have as much right to use the English language as anyone else. The way they use it is as legitimate as any other. I certainly don't want to leave language about spirituality in the sole hands of science. On the other hand, yes, we should be clear about what we mean by the words we use.

Yes, a term never used by Arisotle. — Jackson

Agreed.

This may not be apropos of your comment. But I find Quantum Mechanics far closer to how I understand the world than classical, mechanistic physics. — Jackson

I don't know if this is the same thing, but I don't find quantum mechanics weird or strange. After all, it's just the way things are. I'm comfortable with it. On the other hand, I'm definitely a Newtonian kind of guy.

Aristotle did not call it "Metaphysics." — Jackson

Subsequent to the arrangement of Aristotle's works by scholars at Alexandria in the first century CE, a number of his treatises were referred to as τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά (ta meta ta physika; literally, "the [writings] after the Physics"). This is the origin of the title for collection of treatises now known as Aristotle's Metaphysics.

Meta-physics is to physics as meta-data is to data. Take for example a letter. The contents of the letter is the data. The facts about the letter - who it is from, who to, date sent, etc - are meta-data. So physics refers to the behaviour of the observable universe and the physically measurable and observeable entities which comprise it. Meta-physics is reflection on what it means, or what must be the case for it to have the meaning it does, and so on. — Wayfarer

I think this is a good way of putting it, although I think a lot of people would not agree.

So for example in current physics, the metaphysical debates revolve around the meaning of quantum physics - what the quanitifiable observations and predictive theories mean about the larger reality, what is implied by the theory. So too many of the debates about evolutionary biology. I for one would never debate the empirical facts of evolution disclosed by research and exploration - but what does evolution mean? Is it directional, or is it the consequence of chance? and so on. They're also metaphysical questions. — Wayfarer

This is something I'm struggling with. My intuition tells me that most of the excitement about quantum mechanics is not metaphysics. In particular, unless the various interpretations of QM can be tested empirically, it seems to me the differences between them are not metaphysical, they're meaningless. At the very least they are not useful.

As I've said, this is at the top of my list of things to try to figure out.

It seems to me that the term 'metaphysics,' is, to say the least, 'overburdened.' — universeness

This is definitely true, although I don't see that any of the posts you've quoted are necessarily inconsistent with each other. I think we're all, more or less, coloring inside the lines that @Jack Cummins laid out for us at the beginning.

Is there any aspect of your personal interpretation of the term that you associate with the supernatural? And do you see very different 'connotations' or emphasis if you associate the term metaphysics with 'after' physics compared to 'beyond' physics? — universeness

Keeping in mind that Aristotle called it "metaphysics" because it came after physics in his publications, not because it was beyond physics in subject matter or an addition to physics. I tend to see it as the framework for knowledge and understanding, which I guess is what you mean by "beyond" in this context. I had a strong feel for what I thought metaphysics means, or at least what I wanted it to mean or what I thought was needed. Then someone recommended "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. It really helped me tighten up my thinking about it.

As for the supernatural, that's always given me pause when the subject is metaphysics. One of the most important ideas for Collingwood, one that I strongly endorse, is that metaphysical principles are not true or false. That works fine for talking about God or gods in general, but when you get specific, it falls apart. Clearly, although talk of God fits squarely into ontology, specific religions deal with matters of fact too, e.g. the existence of the Christian God and his son Jesus.

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The reason I resisted using the phrase "two inseparable poles" is that I don't see science and metaphysics in opposition to each other. Metaphysics is the canvas and the frame. Science is the picture. They are certainly related. They need each other. But they shouldn't interfere with each other.

The noetic side contributes memory and anticipation, the reaching out into the event with a framing expectation, the seeing, knowing aspect. But the noematic object that is seen , known , experienced, fills out the expectation but never completely fulfills it. Thus the metaphysical is a pole , a subjective contribution to the act of seeing and experiencing. But it can never subsist in itself as its own ‘context’. — Joshs

I got lost here. For me, metaphysics is context.

But if it's the godlike elemental primacy of parents in early childhood, then it's true, I thought this was shared experience. I can't say I've discussed it much, but I've seen the notion several times in literature. — hypericin

No. It's not true. Clearly this is not a shared experience. "Seeing the notion several times in literature" does not constitute evidence.

I agree, but neither is puppies and chocolate chip cookies. — Tobias

I agree.

When you eat the chocolate chip cookie for instance one might ask when the chocolate chip cookie ceased to be, or whether there is something of the cookie remaining even after eating it, — Tobias

Then your friends all say "Just shut up and eat your cookie." Although if you're a professional philosopher they probably won't.

whether there is something that chocolate chip cookies and puppies have in common. — Tobias

Well, I'm sure puppies like eating chocolate chip cookies. Perhaps cookies like to be eaten by puppies.

I am lost when it comes to qualia. — Tobias

Yes. If I had 383 wishes, the 246th would be that anyone who uses that word would get kicked in the ass. Not too hard.

Jargon is just a tool, right a short hand. — Tobias

Before I retired, I was an environmental engineer. There were lots of technical words we used, but a lot of what we wrote was intended for non-technical readers. We had to find a balance. You need to be able to say technically precise things but at the same time keep it understandable to intelligent non-professionals.

We are very much on the same page I think. — Tobias

Yes, I think we are.

He says that 'consciousness is a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel'. — Wayfarer

This is like saying "Apples are the mystery that human intelligence will never unravel." I answer by picking up an apple and taking a bite. Apples aren't a mystery and neither is consciousness. It's a concept, it's human-made.

Phenomenology became aware of the objectively-unknowable nature of mind and the unstatable presence of the subject, for example. Husserl said 'Consciousness is not a thing among things, it is the horizon that contains everything.' — Wayfarer

This is the kind of thing you say when you're sitting around the campfire with a flashlight under your chin trying to scare the other campers. Ooooohhh! What's that noise? It's making too much of something that is as everyday as apples. People always want to make too much of consciousness. They want to act as if, believe that, it's special, mysterious. It must be special or I'm not special. And we're not.

what is 'really there' is assumed to be the objects amenable to scientific analysis (because if they're not amenable to that, then how can we know them? — Wayfarer

And they are amenable to scientific analysis, but that's not the only way they can be known. It's not even necessarily the best, or at least the best in all possible situations.

Which is basically 'the hard problem' again, and it's not a pseudo-problem! — Wayfarer

It is.

But it is precisely the 'objective stance' which has been called into question by the discovery of the 'observer problem' or 'measurement problem' in early 20th C physics, hence opening the door to contemplation of the role of the subject. — Wayfarer

Again, this is mixing up physics and metaphysics.

And also generally by 'the rediscovery of the subject' which has also happened in more recent philosophy. And that is a momentous change in perspective, and also a cultural change, that we're actually living through, albeit in fits and starts, in today's culture. — Wayfarer

I'm skeptical. If there's a positive change that's needed in science, it's not a rediscovery of the subject, it's a recognition that everything's connected - an ecological understanding of the world. I'd say "holistic" but that has too many associations with mysticism - mysteries and magic. New age "philosopy."

The world is the world. I'll use one of my favorite quotes again - Franz Kafka. Horrible, depressing books. Great aphorisms.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet.

Why is your culturally relative evaluation of reality relevant here? Are you presenting an argument based on that? — Hanover

If you care enough to follow the chain of posts back to how this started in a response to a post by Tobias a few pages back, you can find how the questions arose in the context of this thread. I don't imagine you want to do that, so let's leave it there.

That is different from saying that 'metaphysical positions have no truth value'. That is very much the line of the 'vienna circle positivists' for whom metaphysics are nonsense. Collingwood's concern is more with interpretation: how are we to interpret metaphysical statements, so as to better understand those who made them? It's not dismissive of metaphysics in the way the positivists were. — Wayfarer

You're right. Collingwood was not dismissive of metaphysics and neither am I. Recognition that metaphysical statements, i.e. absolute presuppositions, are not true or false is fundamental to an understanding of how reality and our knowledge about it work.

I don't think Collingwood's concern was with interpretation, I think it was with identification and recognition. Absolute presuppositions are often, usually, unacknowledged, unrecognized by those who make them. The purpose of metaphysics is to bring those unacknowledged, unrecognized assumptions out in the open.

As Collingwood says, metaphysical positions are not true or false. They have no truth value.
— Clarky
:up: — 180 Proof

A bit simplistic. That belongs more to Carnap than Collingwood, of whom SEP says: — Wayfarer

Seems you are commenting on my comment about Collingwood. This is from "An Essay on Metaphysics."

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

This is because they are never answers to questions; whereas a proposition is that which is stated, and whatever is stated is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being peculiar to propositions...

...Hence any question involving the presupposition that an absolute presupposition is a proposition, such as the questions ‘Is it true?’ ‘What evidence is there for it?’ ‘How can it be demonstrated?’ ‘What right have we to presuppose it if it can’t?’, is a nonsense question.

I don't think we are in a survival prison. There is more to life than eating and shitting. — Jackson

I'll say it again - I'm not saying that our concept of reality shouldn't include an understanding of quantum mechanics and other phenomena that can't be seen directly. I am saying that it should also include our everyday understanding of reality as more than an afterthought.

I think I largely agree with you but I suspect this is because I am not a philosopher or an academic. — Tom Storm

You are as much a philosopher as 95% of us here. You certainly are more well-read than I am, in spite of your aw shucks, I'm just a jumbuck playing my didgeridoo next to the billabong in the outback way of talking about yourself.

So, in the end who (except the hobbyist and academic) really gives a rat's arse about 'noumena' or 'being' or the 'really real'? — Tom Storm

There are aspects of philosophy that impact very strongly on my life. Most centrally - epistemology. I've spent most of my working life caring about what I know and how I know it in a very pragmatic sense. That initial interest attracted me to Taoism, which in turn gave me a strong interest in metaphysics in general.

As I've said before, for me, philosophy is about self-awareness and self-awareness is my purpose in life.

I think that the primitive hunter who masters the art of hurling a stone over a long distance "understands" gravity extremely well. — Pantagruel

Agreed.

but we aren't on the same page either.... — Pantagruel

Do you mean we're not on the same page because you and I understand that Newton and Einstein have changed the way we think about gravity? If so, I'll say ok, but... But the great majority of the time when we have to deal with gravity, we deal with it more like how the hunter did than how a physicist at work would. Even the physicist would deal with it more like the hunter most of the time.

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. Quantum phenomena are utilized for a variety of technical purposes. — Pantagruel

I don't want to overstate my case. I think what we call reality should incorporate the things we learn from science about the world we can't directly experience, but not to the exclusion of aspects of the world that we do experience. For hundreds of thousands of years, people have lived more or less full lives without ever knowing about quantum mechanics. Even today most people don't know much about it. I don't need to know about QM even as I use technologies that depend on quantum behavior to work.

We note only that the concept of normal perceptions have no bearing on reality. — Hanover

Sez you.

My comment about you referenced how I suspected you had a notion of normal, which was in reference to your internal standard. — Hanover

I am a reasonably normal person and I think my understanding of reality is consistent with how most people in my culture see it.

What is the the normal response to hot peppers? Are they really hot or mild? — Hanover

What I like and what I see as real are not the same thing.

It seems to me that phenomenological and postmodern approaches recognize the metaphysical and the real, the formal and the empirical, the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real , the valuative and the factual as two inseparable poles of each moment of experiencing. — Joshs

It's not clear to me what "two inseparable poles" means in this context. Metaphysics is the context of seeing, knowing, experiencing; not what is seen, known, or experienced.

He talks about presuppositions in terms of the space of reasons, and makes use of Sellars’ distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. — Joshs

I looked up Sellars in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The discussion of manifest vs. scientific images looks interesting. I'll read it. Maybe then I'll have more to say in response.

If you define reality as how you see it (and I mean you as in Clarky in particular), then that's that. — Hanover

That isn't what I wrote.

I'm not even sure that is philosophy at all. — Hanover

Even your caricature of my philosophy is still philosophy, whether or not you consider it useful.

Everything you say is true, but that doesn't change the fact that if we exclude how normal people see and understand the normal world on a normal day from what we call "reality," it's goofy. It's philosophy at it's most useless.

But in what way can we disentangle the metaphysical from the factual? — Joshs

I don't think it's always easy. Let's take a look:

[1] Observation of the behavior of particles at CERN - science
[2] Interpretation of observation in terms of current theory - science
[3] Standard Model of particle physics - science
[4] Quantum mechanics - science
[5] Scientific method - metaphysics
[6] Physicalism or materialism - metaphysics

Which of these are facts? Item one certainly. What about Items 2, 3, and 4? I'm not sure. Items 5 and 6 are definitely not factual.

A fact is what it is by virtue of its role within a value system. But the fact doesnt just reside within this system, it also alters this system. There is a reciprocal dependence between the metaphysical and the factual which allows each to change the other. — Joshs

You say "value system," I say "metaphysical system." Facts don't necessarily change metaphysics, but metaphysics may have to change in order for us to see reality in new ways. I'm not sure how that works. It's at the top of my list of things to figure out.

I think the more sophisticated version of the question is, can quantum effects manifest within our "classical" framework and I think the answer is that under certain conditions they can. — Pantagruel

It's not clear to me whether or not you and I are disagreeing with each other.

So would you extend this observation to the ‘facts’ of an empirical science as well? That is, is it a problem that people believe factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality? — Joshs

The claim that "factual correctness in science asymptotically approximates ( through Popperian falsification) an ultimately true reality," is not a scientific fact, it is a metaphysical assertion.

10 Examples of Quantum Physics in Everyday Life — Pantagruel

Speaking scientifically, everything in the universe is a result of quantum behavior, but we experience reality as classical. To say that reality as people experience it is not really reality is goofy.