This chain of logic is one of the reasons I'm not a materialist. Materialism leads to absurdities like:
Pushing rocks around on an endless plain in some "special" way can simulate a universe of conscious beings. — RogueAI

I'm not a materialist either, and I know enough about the ole "hard problem of consciousness" schtick to know we can't come to any agreement. And, yes, I really loved the comic you linked to.

If you're claiming that people passing notes back and forth CAN give rise to a conscious moment, I need an explanation for why I should consider that a plausible possibility, instead of something that is near impossible. — RogueAI

You've already stipulated that an electronic device, a computer, can simulate mental processes. What is a computer? It is a device with many connections. If I may be allowed to drastically oversimplify, the action of the computer is to pass signals back and forth through those connections. Those signals transmit information. How is that different than passing notes, i.e. signals containing information, back and forth. I recognize that the computer will be much faster. For logistical reasons, there is no possibility that any but the simplest computer consisting of people passing notes can ever be implemented, but we are in the world of hypotheticals, so we can ignore practical considerations.

He notes that Knowledge is not isolated particular facts, but must be "networked" into a "web of beliefs" (your "body of knowledge"). The non-empirical mystery of knowledge is how we go from direct perception of real things & events, to the feeling of knowing that is sometimes described as "aboutness". His primary concern is with "making knowledge visible", like a sensation. He says, "at the heart of the difference [known vs knower] is explicitness". — Gnomon

Sounds interesting. I looked the book up on Amazon and Tallis up on Wikipedia. The book is on my list for future reading. Thanks.

I suspect the feeling of knowing may be the internal sensation associated with the certainty of belief. Absolute positive certainty is blind faith. But most ordinary beliefs are not that strong, and are subject to skepticism, and open to correction. In Tallis' terms, when your belief is strong, you don't just know "what", but you know "that", which is more precise and assured. — Gnomon

For me, the important part is that it is a coherent, comprehensive experience. There is a feeling of fullness, completeness to it. There is still plenty of room for uncertainty, but that is buffered by the interconnections, and that's appropriate because our decisions don't normally depend on one fact. They typically require a comprehensive understanding of conditions analogous to the BoK I am describing.

People passing notes back and forth aren't going to create an instantiation of consciousness. — RogueAI

He said with no justification.

Anyway, how is that different from pulleys and ropes?

Let's assume we have the computing power to simulate a working human brain. If the simulation isn't conscious, then that's a problem: what did we fail to simulate correctly? Because working brains are conscious (I guess sleep might be an exception to this). If we are convinced we're simulating a working brain perfectly, and it's still not conscious, then we have a mystery on our hands. — RogueAI

It's not really a brain that's conscious. It's the whole body. Of course the mind is an important, the most important, element, but the rest of the nervous system participates along with many other systems, e.g. the endocrine system has a large part. So, you'd have to simulate the whole body. You'd also have to simulate some sort of environment - the input to your simulation. You'd also have to simulate history - minds aren't made, their grown. Who knows what get's loaded into us during development from the sperm and egg to the baby being born? There's a structure of knowledge that already exists in an operating brain.

1. What is it about turning enough switches on and off in a certain way that gives rise to consciousness? — RogueAI

I think this is what is known as "the hard problem of consciousness," which was discussed, is still being discussed, in the "Emphasizing the Connection Perspective," thread. I've come to the conclusion that this may be unresolvable, not because it's really hard, but because people on both sides come up against a brick wall when asked to understand the other groups position. As I've said a number of times "I just don't get it."

2. Why is the pattern of switching operations important? Why does pattern A,B,...C give rise to consciousness, while pattern D,E,...F doesn't? — RogueAI

Well, the pattern is the consciousness, isn't it?

3. If consciousness can arise from substrates like collections of mechanical switches, can it arise in other substrates where particles interact with each other? Say, a rain cloud? Swarm of comets? Sand dune? — RogueAI

Seems to me a certain minimum level of complexity would be required for mental processes. I don't think the systems you describe are anywhere close to that level. Orders of magnitude. One source on the web says there are at least 100 billion neurons and 100 trillion synapses in the brain. That means the number of possible brain states is at least 2^100 trillion assuming each connection can be in each of two states. Is that right?

4. Is electricity a necessary condition for consciousness? Or can you have consciousness arise from really strange collections of things? Say, for example, a bunch of ropes and pulleys? — RogueAI

I remember reading about a hypothetical computer made with people passing notes back and forth. There's have to be a lot of people. I guess 100 billion, which is about the number of people who are living or have ever lived. It would also be very slow.

This is an over-simplistic description of why time is considered a dimension. I just happened on this essay by Ethan Siegel. He has a regular column - "Starts With a Bang" in "Forbes" magazine. I found it on "Real Clear Science." Check out RCS. It has some useless stuff, but a lot of it is really interesting. Here's a link to the Siegel article:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2019/08/27/this-is-why-time-has-to-be-a-dimension/#74d98caf3646

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I think this is a pretty good description of the impasse we find ourselves at. All I can say is "I don't get it." Biology doesn't describe subjective experience, that's what psychology is for.

The way I put it is that, yes, humans evolved to have the capacity for language and abstraction, but those capacities can't be reduced to or understood in biological terms.

And co-incident with that - maybe a cause, maybe a consequence - is self-awareness, self-consciousness, the awareness of oneself as a separate being with his/her own identity. — Wayfarer

As I've said, I disagree with this statement.

Claim: A red ball exists in this box
Fact (if you’re taking what he’s saying as true): If a ball existed in this box, it would be blue
Conclusion: The claim is false (although a ball can still exist in the box) — khaled

Yeah, but there's still a ball in the box. No, no. Wait. Forget that. I don't want to get into another one of our nitpicky arguments about this. I made my point. I got started in this thread just because of the distaste I feel for the kinds of arguments @Gnostic Christian Bishop was making, if you can even call them arguments.

the Christian god is all good. If you confirm god, if he exists is not good, then whatever god may or may not exist is not the Christian god. Or the god of any of the Abrahamic religions. Or any other religion that claims god is all good. — khaled

I don't find that a convincing argument.

It has everything to do with whether or not the Christian god exists though. — khaled

Explain please.

By pointing out that the God depicted in the Old & new Testaments commits horribly cruel acts, Hitchens was simply highlighting one of the most glaring inconsistencies in standard Christian version of God. — EricH

That's a good point, and true to a point. What struck me in Hitchens's essay, and in the posts from @PoeticUniverse and @Gnostic Christian Bishop, among many others, is the hatred they have for God and religion and the contempt they feel for those who believe.

Thought you and @PoeticUniverse might like this. These are lyrics from one of my favorite Randy Newman songs - "That's Why I Love Mankind." God is singing.

Man means nothing he means less to me
Than the lowliest cactus flower
Or the humblest Yucca tree
He chases round this desert
Cause he thinks that's where I'll be
That's why I love mankind

I recoil in horror from the foulness of thee
From the squalor and the filth and the misery
How we laugh up here in heaven at the prayers you offer me
That's why I love mankind

It's a wonderful song.

My only intention is to make Christians think of the prick they are idol worshiping and recognize that such a prick is not a worthy god. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

So, your answer is yes, your only intention is to insult God and the people who worship him. As I said, that doesn't have anything to do with whether or not he exists.

God, it seems to me, has screwed up creation and wants to blame the creation for his own
incompetence. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

I had read a lot about Christopher Hitchens, how good an essayist and thinker he was. He was well known as an atheist, but he was considered a public intellectual with a very broad range of interests and expertise. I decided I would read something by him to see if he had anything to offer. I choose one of his atheism essays, I can't remember the title. It was very obviously a vigorous polemic, which I didn't object to. It was the quality of his argument I was interested in.

Among all his expected arguments against God's existence ; lack of evidence, no falsifiable predictions, unwillingness to consider legitimate alternative explanations, dependence on suspect historic sources, inconsistencies in different parts of the bible etc. etc.; he tossed in an argument that surprised me. God has done such terrible things - he claims to be merciful but sends people to hell for eternity for technical violations, he tells people to kill their sons, he makes a bet with the devil to torture one of his followers. How could people believe in such an evil entity.

Well, I stopped reading at that point and I've never been tempted to read anything else by him. He's supposed to be so smart but uses what he must know is an intellectually dishonest argument that has nothing to do with the subject being discussed. Whether or not God is good has no impact on whether or not he exists.

So, what's my point? I judge your argument by the same standards. Whether or not the things you say are true, that has no bearing on whether or not there is a God. Or was your only intention to insult God?

I tried to google the connection, but was unsuccessful in finding any theories. Why do you think we have musical and mathematical abilities ?

If neither confer any survival value (eg: we don't have to compute the laws of gravity in order to dodge falling objects) are there any plausible explanations out there as to why we have these abilities? — 3017amen

I think this is relevant. I hope so. Stephen Jay Gould, my favorite non-fiction writer, wrote an essay called "Mozart and Modularity," which was published in his book "Eight Little Piggies." I found it on the web here:

https://books.google.com/books?id=_kOoVw0SIhUC&pg=PA260&lpg=PA260&dq=stephen+jay+gould+mozart&source=bl&ots=IUglTGuPSD&sig=ACfU3U2jeFUo86EFulOEkzahjmzw6mjq9Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwik3YLy4qjkAhXhm-AKHX6hBScQ6AEwBXoECAkQAg#v=onepage&q=stephen%20jay%20gould%20mozart&f=false

The modularity Gould is talking about is the manner in which our minds seem to be made up of a bundle of abilities and faculties all of which seem to be relatively independent of each other. It's possible for a person to be exceptional in one area but mediocre in most others. I think of myself - I am strongly verbal and I have good math skills, but I have little in the way of a musical or visual imagination. Gould's article is about a journal article written when Mozart was a boy. The writer observed Mozart and saw a normal, unexceptional boy with one bold streak of genius.

It's worth a read.

for themselves, I assume you mean. Sure. But T Clark doesn't know what Khaled needs for justification. Khaled asked him for the source of the theories. That presumably is within the abilities of T Clark. It is not, as T Clark made it seem, like being asked to walk him through the research. It is asking for someone to specify. IOW then Khaled would have a similar amount of justification as T Clark. Right now, he has been presented with an abstract non-specific 'theories'. He has less justification that TC, or let's say, he has less view of what justification led to T Clark drawing a conclusion.

Also part of the context was T Clark saying: you can't know this. I think the answer for most of us would be, no, I don't. But here's why I have this belief. Perhaps he meant the response to implictly acknowledge this, but I don' t think it's clear. — Coben

I've mostly dropped out of this discussion because I think I've probably said all I have to say without repeating myself. I have dropped in from time to time just to see if anything interesting was happening. Now, here, I find my name being bandied about and my words being misrepresented again.

Let's go back to how this started:

• The late lamented Klinko - Science has no theories, hypotheses, or even speculation about the biological nature of consciousness.
• T Clark - That is not true. I have read about this subject. It is my understanding there are theories, hypotheses, and speculation by reputable scientists.
• Coben/Khaled - Hey, you aren't justified in saying that. Your justification is just hearsay. Unless you've got a PhD in cognitive science, you have nothing to say. And your mother is ugly.
• T Clark - Hey, leave my mother out of it.
• Coben/Khaled - Ok.

We discussed my justification. I thought we'd agreed that it is acceptable given the limited nature of what I was trying to show. I gave you the name of the primary source of my understanding. I thought we'd agreed that, without going into the details of the subject, that source was adequate, again, given the limited nature of what I was trying to show and the small consequences of me being wrong.

I don't remember ever questioning @khaled's justification. Did I? What I do remember questioning is the necessity for some intermediary process between biological and mental processes. I tried to make it clear that I don't think such an intermediary is needed. To me, there's no mystery. I think biological processes in the human nervous system are enough to explain mental processes, including consciousness. As I said previously, I think the reason that's hard for some people to swallow is that they see consciousness as something special, fundamentally different from other phenomena. I don't see it that way.

I understand your position but there's a quite understandable reluctance on forums like this this to engage on constructive theorising because virtually nobody here has any genuine interest in such a process. T Clark has been here way longer than me, but even I am already weary of the "what are your sources" > "oh, those sources are flawed" dance, hence my sympathy with T Clark's position. — Isaac

Yes, this is exactly the reason I didn't want to get into specific sources. My point was that the theories, hypotheses, and speculation exist, not that they are necessarily correct, although I did say that Damasio's explanations seem plausible to me.

Now, hows about we leave T Clark out of the mix from now on. At least use the @ function so I know my name is being used in vain.

Thanks - finally we can nail the whole consciousness thing once and for all — Isaac

I thought we had. When @khaled admitted he was wrong, I thought we were done.

Yes, @khaled, I’m joking.

I'll consider restoring it minus the link. Steve is staying banned though. — Baden

I would appreciate restoration of the thread. As usual, I try to have no position on bannings and, in most cases, I succeed.

Is that why the whole "Emphasizing the Connection Perspective" thread was deleted? It was a really interesting and valuable one for me. — T Clark

And, as usual, I was brilliant.

I just asked this question over on The Shoutbox.

Is that why the whole "Emphasizing the Connection Perspective" thread was deleted? It was a really interesting and valuable one for me.

Taleb and Nobel laureate Myron Scholes have traded personal attacks, particularly after Taleb's paper with Espen Haug on why nobody used the Black–Scholes–Merton formula.
— alcontali

You have referenced Taleb many times. I admit, having not read his books, I had always seen him as a charlatan like Malcolm Gladwell. You've convinced me to give him a try. I've downloaded one of his books, "Antifragile" from the library. I'll get back to you with my impressions. — T Clark

I started reading "Antifragile" and got about 25% through before I gave up. If you look at the three star reviews in Amazon, the mostly say the same thing - Taleb has some good ideas but they are covered over with six coats of smarty pants self-aggrandizement, name dropping, and insults and character attacks on people who disagree with him. Worse, his ideas are presented in a vague and confusing manner overlain with references to Greek myths and other cultural features that don't seem to have much to do with his point, which it is often hard to get to. Case in point - a table comparing aspects of what he calls fragile, robust, and antifragile systems. As many of the Amazon reviews noted, it seems like he could present his ideas in a 10-page article.

So, does that 10-page article exist? I'd like to give his ideas a fair chance. It seems like he has something to offer.

Not really, not as much as I'd like. — Isaac

I suggest you take a look at the Tao Te Ching. You can read the whole thing in an hour and it's broken up into 80 short verses. Free on the web. Look for Stephen Mitchell's translation. It's very American.

First verse:

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name. The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. Free from desire, you realize the mystery.
Caught in desire, you see only the manifestations. Yet mystery and manifestations
arise from the same source.
This source is called darkness. Darkness within darkness.
The gateway to all understanding.

That was not what he asked for. He asked to see those theories. This is a request to see the theories - writing by experts that convinced you - or research - that you did read in your limited reading. He's asking to see what your sources are. — Coben

In case you haven't seen it, in another response I told Khaled that my primary source was "The Feeling of What Happens" by Antonio Damasio.

yclept - Named. By the name of.

Yes. That is exactly the alternative. The world is seamless sea of atoms (or waves, whatever) along what lines it is carved up into individual things is entirely arbitrary human invention. — Isaac

Based on what I read here, your understanding of the nature of reality and consciousness's role in creating it is the closest to mine I've encountered on the forum. From your point of view, I'm not sure if that's a good or a bad thing. It's a hard sell to others, though. It just doesn't work well with the way people see existence, being, reality.

Although I come from science and engineering, I got to my understanding with some help from Lao Tzu. Any eastern philosophy in your porfolio?

They don't have only one data point. That's only the case if you define consciousness as being the feeling you have. If you define consciousness as the term for the collection of phenomena we see displayed in others, then we have more than one data point. — Isaac

I've been thinking of bringing this up, i.e. that human consciousness is not just internal experience. It also manifests as observable behavior. I think it's fair to say that consciousness primarily manifests as observable behavior. Only one seven billionth of our evidence for consciousness comes from introspection.

Damasio says things like "A feeling arises when the organism becomes aware of the changes it is experiencing as a result of external or internal stimuli". — SteveKlinko

Woody Allen said "I took a speed-reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes. It involves Russia." Why did I think of that when I read your post? (That's for you, @Serving Zion - a rhetorical question. We'll see how well it works).

That's no Explanation for the Feeling itself. If we ask the question: "How does Neural Activity produce the Experience of Redness?, Damasio has no answer. — SteveKlinko

We clearly are not convincing each other. I don't think we will. I'll give my understanding one more time.

Human mental processes develop directly out of human biological and neurological processes. There are no intermediate steps or additional explanations or factors. None are needed. In my opinion, the hard question of consciousness is an illusion brought about by an inability or unwillingness to accept that our experience of ourselves is nothing special.

I've taken my best shot. I'll leave the last word to you if you'd like it.

I think that is the real crux of my investigation: whether the hearer has the right to respond 'out-of-turn' as it would be, and if we consider that rhetorical questions are not to be answered, then it seems to be an oppression of sorts upon a hearer (where I am being a righteous judge of the hearer's right to be heard). — Serving Zion

I think you're making too much out of this, although we could probably say that about 95% of the threads on the forum. A rhetorical question is just that, rhetorical. It's intended to persuade. If they didn't work, they wouldn't be around. I use them and like them. They seem effective to me in appropriate situations. I don't think that listeners are being treated unfairly. They generally know how these things work.

LOL! Ok I'll offer two different examples/ propositions viz. our consciousness and maybe you'll be able to answer them:

The ball is red and the ball is green. Is that logically impossible?

Love is an objective truth. Is that a true statement? — 3017amen

I don't really want to get in a discussion of LEM unless it has something to do with the issue being discussed, which is....something to do with consciousness or whether I'm justified in saying something about consciousness or something.

I think the discussion has run out of steam, at least for me.

From the pov of 'the committee nature of self', such questions are aspects of internal dialogue. — fresco

I don't know what "the committee nature of self" is, but I like your idea. Going a bit further in the same direction, I like the idea of a rhetorical question being one the speaker is suggesting listeners ask themselves.

The English version is: What is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence and is attributed to the famous atheist late Christopher Eric Hitchens (13 April 1949 – 15 December 2011).

I would like an analysis of this purportedly rational stance on, possibly, all matters under the sun.

Personally, I think it has a flaw because it doesn't allow, in fact stifles, rational inquiry. — TheMadFool

I believe this saying was used specifically to argue that assertions of the existence of God do not have to be taken seriously, although it certainly could be applied to other situations. I think he was talking about phenomena claimed to exist in the "real" world, i.e. outside our minds. I don't think it applies to logical or mathematical entities. If I'm wrong, please somebody set me straight.

The language (it seems to me) is as if there were an already existent thing "self-awareness" and we're surprised to discover that the experience humans have falls into that category "why would it do that?" being the question.

But that's not how language and concepts work. We first experience a thing which we determine, entirely subjectively, to be separate enough from other things to have its own name. We then call that thing "self-awareness". So the question "why are we self-aware? " makes no sense at all. We are "self-aware" because 'self-aware' is the word we decided to give to the thing we are. — Isaac

Are all of you as tired of my responses as I am of writing them?

I agree with what you've written, but I think you and I are missing something that bothers @khaled and others. Apparently it's the jump between biology and mentality. They seem to think there's another step required. I don't understand why that would be so. Seems like you don't either.

By the way, I think I'm all caught up. If anyone wants to respond, it's all clear.

Speaking of logic, how do you explain that consciousness defies the law of excluded middle (our ability to do two things at once-conscious and subconscious cognition) ?? Is there an exceptional formula that explains that phenom? Or is it existential and just is. — 3017amen

I can juggle and whistle at the same time. Does that violate the Law of the Excluded Middle? Actually, I can't juggle. Also, LEM applies to propositions, not the physical world.

In humans, it’s a meaning process. That’s what makes human consciousness different. — Wayfarer

I don't see any reason to believe that human consciousness is any different from any other mental process. Meaning isn't something inherent in mental processes, it is created by them.

I'm just showing that what you presented isn't scientific evidence, it's opinion. — khaled

Not to be flip - ok, ok, to be flip - I think there is pretty good scientific evidence that all the people in the world are not chatbots.

biological processes are sufficient for consciousness not that they are necessary. — khaled

You and I seem to be disagreeing on something, but I want to make sure I know what it is. We've agreed that biological activity in the human nervous system, including the brain, is sufficient to explain how mental processes, including consciousness, arise. Is that correct? That means there are no additional factors that have to be taken into account.

If what I've said in the above paragraph is correct, where do we disagree? What is the hard problem?

No, it wasn't justified in T Clark's own estimation. He told Khaled that if he wanted answers he would need to talk to someone else. Which means that he cannot justify his own conclusions to himself. — Coben

You're misrepresenting what I said, putting words in my mouth. Bad boy!!.See my previous response:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/320986

I don't see how a philosophy forum benefits from people saying 'consensus science believes X' conversation over. And this would be a lay person analyzing science, and in the specfiic case of T. Clark above, saying that he can't remember that much and hasn't read that much. — Coben

And again, he said this without admitting that he didn't know. What a simple thing to say? You can't no this? No, you're right Khaled, it is my impression from what I read, though it was not a broad reading of the relevent research. — Coben

Again, picking on me behind my back. Boo hoo. And again, misrepresenting what I said. Everybody hates me except @Isaac. I didn't say anything about the consensus of science. I only responded to a specific statement by SteveKlinko:

But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons — SteveKlinko

In response I said "That is not true." In order to justify that statement, all I have to show is that "science" has theories, hypotheses, and speculation about it. I propose all I have to do is show that at least one reputable scientist has. The book I read is "The Feeling of What happens," by Antonio Damasio. Whether or not he is correct in what he thinks, he is a reputable scientist with theories, hypotheses, and speculations. It is my understanding he is not the only one. Again, I am not qualified to give a scientific review of the book, but Damasio's ideas seemed plausible.

What if explaining the science is beyond his ability (apologies if it isn't, — Isaac

No apology needed. The explanation provided in Damasio's book was not difficult and I think I understood it, but I can't present it here off the top of my head.

We are discussing ideas and from perspectives that sometimes scientists are not the only ones equiped to look at, and often also do not have the philosophical tools to see their own assumptions. — Coben

As I've claimed, I believe I am justified in saying there is credible scientific work being done to establish a biological basis for mental processes. I can understand that philosophy may have a role in judging whether the conclusions of that work are adequately justified. Other than that, what role does philosophy have in the process?

And now you are entering this particular exchange and making it seem like that's a stopping point. — Coben

Oddly enough, I welcome Isaac's input. Just because he suggests we may be at a stopping point, that doesn't mean you have to stop.

I suggest you wait to respond to this post. I'm way behind on this thread and I'll have more comments in additional posts. It might make sense to wait till I'm finished to send out your responses.

Also, I'm eating my first bacon, lettuce, and tomato sandwiches of the season with tomatoes from our garden. I may be delayed a bit as I wipe tomato pulp, mayonnaise, and bacon grease from my keyboard.

But that's a separate issue. It's as if you don't need to justify since he hasn't. If he has asserted it comes from other processes or sources, sure, he needs to justify that. But that doesn't take away your onus. Now you both need to justify. — Coben

Apparently you and I have different understandings of what it means to justify something. Here are some from the web:

• to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable
• to defend or uphold as warranted or well-grounded
• to show or prove that it is reasonable or necessary.

It seems clear to me that justification doesn't have to mean absolute certainty. That's not possible. There will always be uncertainty. I would go further. I think the level of justification required varies from situation to situation based on the consequences of being wrong. If people will die if I get things wrong, I need much stronger justification than I will if I'll fail to convince someone on a philosophical forum.

On that basis, I am satisfied that the level of justification I've provided is acceptable. I have been very up-front about the amount of uncertainty involved in my opinion. That gives others the information they need to evaluate what I have to say.

he fact that T Clark finds the existence of scientific conclusions about consciousness to be sufficient to justify his position and Khaled doesn't, does not make T Clark's position unjustified, simply not justified to Khaled's satisfaction. — Isaac

Yes.

I'll take a look. Thanks.

Yup. We can agree those processes are sufficient for mental processes to arise. — khaled

I don't think we do agree. I don't think biological processes are either necessary or sufficient for mental processes to develop. Unless you believe that all living things have mental processes, which I don't, there are lots of biological processes that don't lead to mental processes. So it's not sufficient. Also, I think it's possible that mental processes can develop without biological processes. One possible candidate would be AI. So it seems likely to me it isn't necessary either.

I think you're right, there are systemic reasons why chaotic systems are chaotic, even though (AFAIK) there isn't just 'one thing' which is chaos. Even if the system is sensitive to initial conditions, there has to be a reason for why it's sensitive to them. — fdrake

As usual, I think you know a lot more about this than I do. Reading more about chaos and complexity are high on my reading wish list. Any particular recommendations?

I'm not sure it makes any difference to my primary position - if predicting future states of a system is so difficult as to be practically impossible, I don't think it makes sense to consider the universe deterministic. I think that's what we have been calling "ontologically deterministic."