We know one thing for sure, that matter went from being inanimate to animate in this universe at least. — kindred

God breathed life into the dust, in the Biblical myth, which is at least an evocative allegory.

People seem to be saying that animal behavior, like human behavior, shows evidence of being influenced by some level of that animal's thoughts. Thinking, conceptualizing, wanting and choosing leading to actions. I disagree, for many reasons. — Fire Ologist

:up: As do I.

...something that might anecdotally be termed a sixth-sense. — javra

I rather fancy the idea that there might really be a kind of field effect, analogous to but different from electric fields, that is only detectable to organisms. Maybe something like the akashic field, or the morphic field.

do other animals laugh? — Athena

I think the key issue here is repeatability. The capacity to reproduce a similitude of the experience (the observation), commonly known as the repeatability of an experiment, induces the conclusion that the observed phenomenon is understandable. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what Scheler is driving at, but I don't really agree that 'For the modern thinker, only those experiences that can be proven in a rational or logical manner are true or evidential experiences' really captures it. What should be said is, 'only what can be demonstrated empirically and/or proven logically or mathematically is taken to be evidential'. Here 'empirically' means 'validated by sensory observation' (including observation amplified by instruments).

Later in the same article we find 'For Scheler, the experience of the holy or of the absolute is not given through rational proof, but in the distinctive evidential mode of revelation'. What I think he's wanting to describe is 'transcendent insight' or gnosis. But the use of the term 'revelation' is problematical, in my view. 'Revealed truth' is generally understood to be a prophetic vision or communication by and from the deity. Again, I think I understand what he's driving at, but I would express it differently. But in the Western lexicon, there are many terms for what Buddhists and Hindus would describe as 'Jñāna' (or gnosis). It's invariably understood in terms of revelation rather than insight.

And I don't know if I agree that such insights are 'unique' in the sense of only pertaining to one individual. Consider the lineages of Mahāyāna Buddhist orders, which have for many generations practiced the transmission of the teaching from teacher to student, and recorded the sayings and teachings of its adepts in a recognisable framework of principles and practice. There are recognised stages of realisation in Buddhist literature (see for example the Ten Bhumis). There's really nothing synonymous in Western culture to my knowledge.

I'm thinking more along the lines of James' classic The Varieties of Religious Experience. In that book, there are many examples of various kinds of religious or spiritual insight. But of course that is all 'behind the firewall' as far as our culture is concerned. It doesn't amount to admissable evidence of anything save the subjective experience of individuals.

The point about many kinds of scientific observations, is that they often occur within a highly specified set of circumstances - the lab or the workshop. They are contrived to generate very specific kinds of evidence. Whereas a deep philosophical insight might not depend on any apparatus or any specific situation whatever. It might arise in a mind that is especially attuned or sensitive to a high level of insight, but that doesn't necessarily mean that this is subjective, in the sense of pertaining only to an individual. 'Transcendent' is neither subjective nor objective.

Deep issue, I guess.

I take it that you have in mind the ability to see, hear, etc, in the same ways as we do (roughly) and with all due deference to any possible sixth sense. So my dog can see (and recognize) me and respond appropriately to my return home, can hear her meal being prepared in the kitchen and present herself in good order, and so forth. Would that be fair? We can agree also that it shows intelligence (in the more generic sense of "understanding"). But what grounds are there for withholding the accolade of rationality? — Ludwig V

Try explaining the concept ‘prime number’ to her.

I can only agree with you that it would have been helpful if someone had paid more careful attention to what you said. — Ludwig V

Why that’s very courteous of you! An anecdote: the first undergrad essay I ever submitted was in psychology, on the subject of intelligence testing. I wrote an essay along the lines that intelligence was not something that can be tested. I got an F with the comment ‘wrong department’ (the implication being it was a philosophy essay.) It was the only essay I ever failed. Served me right, too.

So the rabbits screamed in agony. In an effort to be objective, they described this behaviour as vocalizing. The public thought differently, and controls on vivisection were, eventually, strengthened. — Ludwig V

I know about that story - but what is the point? I've never claimed anywhere in this thread that animals are insensitive, or even that they lack intelligence. What is at issue is whether they're rational. And despite all the bluster and whataboutism, very little is being said about that by yourself or the other defenders of the view that they are.

There's a book I'm aware of, although I haven't read all of it, by Noam Chomsky, the famous linguistic philosopher, and Robert Berwick, a computer scientist, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The first point to note is that Chomsky is adamant that only humans possess language (hence the title!) I've found an online presentation by Berwick who presents a synopsis, and he points to something called "Wallace's Problem". This refers to the issue raised by Alfred Russel Wallace, co-discoverer of the theory of natural selection, concerning the apparent disconnect between human intellectual abilities and the evolutionary pressures that could have led to their development. Wallace argued that certain uniquely human traits—such as higher reasoning, artistic creativity, complex language, mathematical and abstract thought—seemed to far exceed what would have been necessary for survival in the early human environment.

Wallace believed that natural selection could not fully explain these advanced cognitive faculties because they seemed disproportionate to the practical demands of survival in hunter-gatherer societies. He speculated that some form of higher intelligence or spiritual intervention might be responsible for these traits, which led to a divergence from Charles Darwin, who maintained that natural selection alone could account for the full spectrum of human abilities (see his Darwinism Applied to Man). This was one of the factors that caused a rift between Darwin and Wallace, with the former wishing to stick to a strictly Enlightenment-rationalist account, while Wallace fell into Victorian spiritualism.

In any case, Chomsky's book does acknowledge that the development of language is a very difficult thing to account for in naturalistic terms, but this is what the book tries to do. In pointing to what is unique about human language (and I think this applies to reason also). From a review of his book:

The starting point is a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on “linear order,” whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. ...

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky (already mentioned) was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

Berwick and Chomsky develop a theory about a genetic mutation that enabled an ability called 'merging' which is enables the kind of heirarchical syntax decribed above. I'm not able to summarise that, as it's quite an intricate theory. But the main point remains, which is that they see a difference iin kind between human and animal communication.

This is why I pointed back to the Aristotelian notion of 'nous' (rational intellect). The philosophical point is that reason is able to grasp universal terms, such as 'man' or 'dog' or 'energy'. That itself relies on the ability to abstract, to grasp that very disparate objects belong to a class or group. Of course that comes so naturally to us, it is so innate to how our minds work, that we don't notice (and don't need to notice) that we're doing it. But that ability to abstract particulars into general forms, is also a key differentiator of the human intellect from animal sensiblity.

And most of the objections to that are, as I say, mere sentimentality. As if it's cruel or discriminatory to say that humans are capable of a kind of intelligence that animals are not.

And, for what it's worth, I agree with Alfred Russel Wallace, against Darwin. Not that there is a literal 'spirit' guiding evolution, but that evolutionary and neo-Darwinian theory does not account for the higher intellectual, artistic and contemplative achievements available to h. sapiens. Darwinism does not, in other words, account for a Mozart. Terribly non-PC, I acknowledge, but a position I'm quite happy defending.

However, I do have serious trouble attributing these concepts to bacteria and amoeba. Insects also seem to me to be too mechanical to qualify — Ludwig V

Another point - I'm coming around to the view that organic life is 'intentional' from the get-go. The quotes are because it's not intentional in the sense of acting in accordance with conscious intent, as rational agents do, but that as soon as life exists, there is already a rudimentary sense of 'self' and 'other', as the first thing any living organism has to do, is maintain itself against the environment, as distinct from simply dissolving or being subsumed by whatever processes are sorrounding it. So right from the outset, living organisms can't be fully explained in terms of, or reduced to, physical and chemical laws. This is an idea I'm trying to explore through a couple of difficult books, Terrence Deacon's 'Incomplete Nature' and Evan Thompson's 'Mind in Life'. (Pretty slow going, though :yikes: )

Someone who doesn't see rationality in animals will define it in one way, likely by appealing to "language", which is assumed to apply only to languages of the kind that humans speak. Someone who empathizes with animals will be more inclined to a more flexible definitions. — Ludwig V

Sentimentality, you mean ;-)

These efforts are a far cry from the work of 9/11 and 1/6. — Paine

Yes the thought occurred that if a professional had been involved, DJT would have been long gone. But many of the usual suspects would rather see him prevail.

Hi wayfarer thanks for your post. The question boils down to inevitability, possibility and actuality. Working in reverse we know that life (intelligence) has emerged which means it was possible. Now the last step is whether it was inevitable and since it was both possible and currently actual then it must follow that it is inevitable in an eternal universe. — kindred

Paul Davies has some writing on that:

Given a random distribution of [gravitating] matter, it is overwhelmingly more probable that it will form a black hole than a star or a cloud of dispersed gas. These considerations give a new slant, therefore, to the question of whether the Universe was created in an ordered or disordered state. If the initial state were chosen at random, it seems exceedingly probable that the big bang would have coughed out black holes rather than dispersed gases. The present arrangement of matter and energy, with matter spread thinly at relatively low density, in the form of stars and gas clouds would, apparently, only result from a very special choice of initial conditions. Roger Penrose has computed the odds against the observed Universe appearing by accident, given that the black-hole cosmos is so much more likely on a priori grounds. He estimates a figure of 10 raised to the power of 10 raised to the power of 30 [ie 10^10^30] to one...

...The upshot of these considerations is that the gravitational arrangement of the Universe is bafflingly regular and uniform*. There seems to be no obvious reason why the Universe did not go berserk, expanding in a chaotic and uncoordinated way, producing enormous black holes. Channeling the explosive violence into such a regular and organised pattern of motion seems like a miracle. Is it? Let us examine various responses to this mystery:

1. HIDDEN PRINCIPLE:

One could envisage a principle (or set of principles) which required, for example, the explosive vigour of the big bang to exactly match its gravitating power everywhere, so that the receding galaxies just escaped their own gravity...

Unfortunately, it cannot be that simple. If the Universe were exactly uniform, then no galaxies would have formed anyway. According to present understanding, it seems that the growth of galaxies from the primeval gases can only have occurred in the time available since the creation if the rudiments were present from the outset... If a fundamental principle does exist, it seems that it must allow just enough deviation from uniformity to permit the growth of galaxies, but not so much as to produce black holes. A delicate and complicated balancing act indeed!

2. DISSIPATION:

One possible explanation for the uniformity of the cosmic expansion is to suppose that the Universe started out with a highly non-uniform motion, but somehow dissipated the turbulence away...

...Two objections have been raised against this scenario. The first is that, however efficient the dissipation of primeval turbulence may be, it is always possible to find initial states which are so grossly distorted that a vestige will remain, in spite of the damping. At best one can only succeed in showing that the Universe must have belonged to a class of remarkable initial states.

The second objection is that all dissipation generates entropy. The violence of the primeval turbulence would be converted into enormous quantities of heat, far in excess of the observed quantity of the primeval heat radiation...

3. ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE:

Because a Universe full of black holes, or turbulent large scale motions is unlikely to be conducive to life, there is clearly room for an anthropic explanation of the uniformity of the Universe... One may envisage an [infinity] of universes covering every possible choice of initial expansion motion and distribution of matter. Only in the minute fraction which comes close to the arrangement in the observed Universe would life and observers form...

4. INFLATION:

Very recently (as of 1983) an entirely new approach to the cosmic uniformity problem has been suggested. It originates with the grand unified theories, and depends crucially on a number of assumptions about ultra-high energy matter which are debatable, and in any case hard to verify. Nevertheless it vividly demonstrates how an advance in fundamental physics can change our whole perspective of the origin of order in the Universe...

5. GOD:

If the grand unified theories fail, and if the anthropic argument is rejected, then the highly uniform nature of the Universe on the large scale might be advanced as evidence for a creative designer. It would, however, be negative evidence only. No one could be sure that future progress in our understanding of the physics of the early Universe might not uncover a perfectly satisfactory explanation for an orderly cosmos...

...There is, however, more to Nature than its mathematical laws and its complex order. A third ingredient requires explanation too: the so-called fundamental constants of Nature. It is in that province that we find the most surprising evidence for a grand design.

Let us look at a simple example due to Freeman Dyson. The nuclei of atoms are held together by the strong nuclear force whose origins lie with the quarks and gluons... If the force were weaker than it is, atomic nuclei would become unstable and disintegrate. [In deuterium, the link between the proton and the neutron] would be broken by quantum disruption if the nuclear force were only a few percent weaker. The effect would be dramatic. The sun, and most other stars, uses deuterium as a link in [the fusion reaction]. Remove deuterium and either the stars go out, or they [must] find a new nuclear pathway to generate their heat.

Equally dire consequences would ensue if the nuclear force were very slightly stronger. It would then be possible for two protons to overcome their mutual electric repulsion and stick together... In a world where the nuclear force was a few percent stronger, there would be virtually no hydrogen left over from the big bang. Although we do not know why the nuclear force has the strength it does, if it did not the Universe would be totally different in form. It is doubtful if life could exist.

What impresses many scientists is not so much the fact that alterations in the values of the fundamental constants would change the structure of the physical world, but that the observed structure is remarkably sensitive to such alterations. Only a minute shift in the strengths of the forces brings about a drastic change in the structure. Consider as another example the relative strengths of the electromagnetic and gravitational forces in matter. Both forces play an essential role in shaping the structure of stars...

...[Two types of stars, blue giants and red dwarfs] delimit a very narrow range of stellar masses. It so happens that the balance of forces inside stars is such that nearly all stars lie in this very narrow range between the blue giants and the red dwarfs. However, as pointed out by Brandon Carter, this happy circumstance is entirely the result of a remarkable numerical coincidence between the fundamental constants of Nature. An alteration in, say, the strengths of the gravitational force by a mere one part in 10 40 would be sufficient to throw out this numerical coincidence. In such a world, all stars would either be blue giants or red dwarfs. Stars like the sun would not exist, nor, one might argue, would any form of life that depends on solar-type stars for its sustenance...

...It is hard to resist the impression that the present structure of the Universe, apparently so sensitive to minor alterations of the numbers, has been rather carefully thought out. Such a conclusion can, of course, only be subjective. In the end, it boils down to a question of belief. Is it easier to believe in a cosmic designer than the multiplicity of universes necessary for the weak anthropic principle to work?... Perhaps future developments in science will lead to more direct evidence for other universes, but until then, the seemingly miraculous concurrence of numerical values that Nature has assigned to her fundamental constants must remain the most compelling evidence for an element of cosmic design — Paul Davies, God and the New Physics

* The 'baffling regularity' of the universe’s initial conditions, as described by Paul Davies and the astronomically low probability that Roger Penrose estimates, connects to what is known as the "naturalness problem" in physics.

The naturalness problem refers to the question of why certain physical parameters in the universe appear to be extremely fine-tuned or balanced in ways that seem highly improbable or unnatural, given the expected outcomes of random initial conditions. In the case of cosmology, this problem often arises in discussions of the early universe's smoothness, the distribution of matter and energy, and the apparent low entropy at the start of the Big Bang, which Penrose and others have pointed out should be overwhelmingly unlikely if chosen randomly. The same issue appears in particle physics, where the values of constants (like the cosmological constant or the Higgs boson mass) seem fine-tuned to allow for a universe like ours.

Davies and Penrose both highlight the improbability of our universe’s configuration, suggesting that a random distribution of matter would have led to a universe filled with black holes rather than one with stars and galaxies. This tension between the "expected" outcome and the "actual" outcome is central to the naturalness problem, prompting physicists to explore deeper explanations, such as multiverse theories, anthropic principles, or as-yet-undiscovered physical laws.

In any case, the upshot of all of this is that the notion that the universe exists as it does 'because of chance' holds no water.

I don't have my own suspicion as to the strength of their argument because, to me, consciousness is physical. As in atomic. As in leptons. The fluidity of our own experience is physical. — L'éléphant

Curiously, physics itself is largely mathematical in nature. The standard model of particle physics is understood in purely mathematical terms. But mathematics itself is not physical, but conceptual. How would you account for that?

The evidence I've followed contradicts that assertion. — Vera Mont

You've yet to cite any.

The definition of reason and rational thought does not include language as a prerequisite.

Reasoning:
the action of thinking about something in a logical, sensible way. Oxford
the process of thinking about something in order to make a decision. Cambridge
It [rationality] encompasses the ability to draw sensible conclusions from facts, logic and data. In simple words, if your thoughts are based on facts and not emotions, it is called rational thinking. Rational thinking focuses on resolving problems and achieving goals. — Vera Mont

I agree that these are the definitions of 'rational'. But I'm also saying that rational and conceptual thought and language are strongly related. Animals and other organisms plainly exhibit problem-solving behaviours etc, but I don't agree that they rely on abstract thought and reasoning to do so. If we can impute that to them, it's because we ourselves rely on it for explanations of all manner of phenomena. In saying that, I'm not denying that animals communicate, as they do so by all kinds of means. But they lack language in the human sense, which is based on an hierarchical syntax and the ability to abstract concepts from experience. Crucial distinction.

To believe that only humans are capable of any rational thought requires not believing one's own eyes. — creativesoul

But doesn't that contradict what you've said here?:

We know that no other known creature is capable of knowingly looking forward to Thursday. We cannot check to see if that's the case. But we can know that it is.

That kind of thought/knowledge requires naming and descriptive practices. All naming and descriptive practices are language. Deliberately, rationally, and reasonably looking forward to Thursday is an experience that can only be lived by a very specific type of language user. Us. Knowing how to use the word is required for having the experience. — creativesoul

Language less rational thought must be meaningful to the thinking creature. The process of becoming meaningful must be similar enough to our own in order to bridge any evolutionary divide between language users' thought and language less creatures' thought( — creativesoul

What is the evidence that there is any such thing? What, about animal behaviour, cannot be described in behaviourist terms, i.e., when confronted by such and such a stimuli, we can observe such and such behaviour.

I've seen cats, for example, gauging whether they can make a leap up a height or across a stream. They'll pause for a few seconds, their eyes will dart about, sometimes moving back and forth a little. They'll be weighing the leap up before acting. But I don't see any justification to say that this implies they're thinking.

The question I have is…has intelligence always been around before this world was created prior to the Big Bang or was it simply an emergent phenomenon thereafter ?

In my opinion intelligence must have been pre-existing and manifested (or re-manifested) itself in life and nature and through us human beings. — kindred

I'm sympathetic to this line of thought, probably more so than others. But philosophically speaking, there's an issue with the question of the sense in which such an intelligence, were there one, could be said to exist.

Consider the idea of 'laws of nature'. It is naively assumed that these laws exist, but that has been called into question by philosophers of science (for example Nancy Cartwright, 'How the Laws of Physics Lie'.) Others will argue that there are such laws, or at least natural regularities that are law-like. But without going into the intricacies of those arguments, notice that the question of the existence or non-existrence of those laws or regularities, is of a different order to what can be predicted and explained by virtue of such laws. Taking the regularities of physics as an example, these allow for incredibly accurate predictions and explanations which are at the basis of much of the success of modern science. But why the laws of physics are as they are - why F=MA or e=mc² - is of another kind of question. Explanations on that level, if there are to be any, must be meta-scientific or metaphysical.

So what I'm arguing is that the nature of the order which is essential to and assumed by science, is not itself a scientific question. Science relies on there being an order, but does not, and need not, explain why there is. And accordingly, statements about whether a designing intelligence or divinely-ordained order pre-exists or exists, are by their nature metaphysical statements. Which is not to say they're wrong, but that they are not subject to scientific analysis or demonstration. But claiming that these influences or entities [i[exist[/i] you're inviting the question, 'how can you show that or demonstrate that?' And I doubt that question can be answered in terms of the criteria of those who have a commitment to not believing it (who are legion!) You're essentially trying to bring a transcendent order of being down to the level of what can be said to exist.

I was perusing the SEP entry of a second-tier German philosopher that I hadn't heard of until recently, Max Scheler. He has this to say about religious experience:

According to Scheler, the modern worldview harbors a prejudice with respect to what counts as an experience or what is evidential. For the modern thinker, only those experiences that can be proven in a rational or logical manner are true or evidential experiences (GW V, 104). The prejudice is not that matters of faith or religious experience are not meaningful, but that they are not subject to rigorous scientific or critical investigation. Because they lie outside the bounds of reason, we are, as Wittgenstein would say, to remain silent. — SEP

Speaking from long experience, I think you will find that describes the majority view, at least on this forum.

(See also God Does Not Exist, Bishop Pierre Whalon.)

It's quite readable. But I'm with you on preferring to read philosophy in physical form, for the most part. — Manuel

I will definitely have a look at it. That said, I find 17th philosophy quite challenging to read, as the style is difficult. But from what I've read of the Cambridge Platonists, they're definitely 'kindred spirits', so to speak. Someone with the appropriate scholarly skills would do well to publish an updated 'Cambridge Platonist Reader', in my view.

The case I've been attempting to make is that words have ideology-neutral meanings, and are not defined by "philosophical stance". — Vera Mont

:chin: I thought the issue was what you are calling 'human exceptionalism', that is, you are contesting the view that the human capacity for reason and language entails a categorical distinction between humans and rest of the animal kingdom. Myself along with several others are saying that there is a real distinction to be made, that h.sapiens are fundamentally different in some basic respects to other creatures. The precise point we're at right now, is whether animals, such as dogs, can form concepts in the absence of language. I'm saying that conceptual thought is dependent on language. I thought you were saying that it is not dependent, and I was questioning you on sources for that contention.

I'm not here to win a contest for my knowledge of philosophy — wonderer1

Probably just as well ;-)

What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?
— Wayfarer

Probably lots. I only checked Oxford, Collins and Webster and they don't mention language. — Vera Mont

C'mon. You're making the case, it requires more specifics, don't you think?

Chimps are more aggressive than Bonobo. They look the same but they are totally different creatures, as are wolves and domesticated dogs different. — Athena

That chimps are aggressive wasn't the point of the Nim Chimpsky experiment. It was an attempt to teach chimps language, and it failed. I now find the experimenter, Herbert Terrace, wrote a book on it, 'Why Chimpanzees Can't Learn Language and Humans Can'. The cover blurb says 'Initially, Terrace thought that Nim could create sentences but later discovered that Nim’s teachers inadvertently cued his signing. Terrace concluded that Project Nim failed—not because Nim couldn’t create sentences but because he couldn’t even learn words. Language is a uniquely human quality, and attempting to find it in animals is wishful thinking at best.' And that is directly relevant to this dicussion.

Dogs (I'll stick to the concrete example, if I may) have concepts, but not language. Their concepts are shown in their (non-verbal) actions - as are ours, if you recognize meaning as use. — Ludwig V

I think a case can be made that concepts must be able to be expressed in symbolic form (e.g. linguistic or arithmetical) if they are to be considered as such. Certainly we (and dogs, cats, etc) have innumerable non-verbal skills and intuitions, but concepts proper are the prerogative of language-using beings. A dog might have a memory or association with an object or person and as a consequence be scared of it, but I would argue this is still explainable in terms of stimulus and response rather than with reference to conceptual thought. (This is why I presented the passage earlier from Jacques Maritain.)

concept /ˈkɒnsɛpt/ noun: an abstract idea.
"structuralism is a difficult concept"
Similar:
idea notion conception abstraction conceptualization theory hypothesis postulation belief conviction opinion view image impression picture
* a plan or intention.
"the centre has kept firmly to its original concept"
* an idea or invention to help sell or publicize a commodity.
"a new concept in corporate hospitality"

Language is a prerequisite to rational thought only according to one particular philosophical school of thought, not according to the meaning of the word. — Vera Mont

What, pray tell, is the school of thought that says that language is *not* a prerequisite to rational thought?

And also Richard Burthogge - extremely, extremely interesting - An Essay Upon Reason — Manuel

Listed on Michael R. Thompson Rare Books for US$4,600 :yikes: It would want to be interesting! (Although that is for a first edition.) Nevertheless I will persist in looking around for a bootleg copy.

For example, things I have said to you, that I would expect to result in a raging response if directed towards a grandiose narcissist, have coincided with you taking long breaks from the forum. Such behavior on your part fits the characteristics of covert narcissism, rather than grandiose narcissism. — wonderer1

You flatter yourself. You evince no evidence of learning in philosophy beyond a smattering of popular neuroscience.

not before Trump turns it into a souvenir tea-towel and fund-raises off it.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/09/15/republicans-react-apparent-assassination-attempt-trump-florida/

Sure. Interesting idea for discussion but probably another thread.

I'm very cautious about transcendence. — Ludwig V

Our culture and philosophy generally lacks the language within which to interpret the word. It is usually treated as synonymous with religious dogma and rejected on those grounds.

I presume that shooter understands that he’ll spend most of the rest of his life in federal prison. What a fool.

Since we're on a philosophy forum, no other animal - great ape, dolphin, or elephant, for example - can comprehend the concepts we can when addressing the many diverse philosophies that have occurred. Thereby, again, making us of a distinctly different kind from all other lifeforms of which we know. — javra

Right. That's what I've been arguing for, and also, why is it that it seems such a hard thing to grasp. Apparently that makes me a pathological narcissist, although of course I don't possess the insight to see it.

Incidentally, speaking of animal awareness of death, there was a spooky and touching story about 15 years ago, concerning a fellow named Lawrence Anthony, who had devoted his life to helping and caring for elephants in southern Africa.

Back in March 2012, Lawrence Anthony, a conservationist and author known as "The Elephant Whisperer", passed away.

Anthony, who grew up in rural Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, was known for his unique ability to communicate with and calm traumatized elephants. In his book 'The Elephant Whisperer: My Life with the Herd in the African Wild', he tells the story of saving the elephant herds, at the request of an animal welfare organization.

Anthony concluded that the only way he could save these elephants, who were categorized as violent and unruly, was to live with them - "To save their lives, I would stay with them, feed them, talk to them. But, most importantly, be with them day and night".

When Anthony died of a heart attack, the elephants, who were grazing miles away in different parts of the park, travelled over 12 hours to reach his house. According to his son Jason, both herds arrived shortly after Anthony's death. They hadn't visited the compound where Anthony lived for a year and a half, but Jason says "in coming up there on that day of all days, we certainly believe that they had sensed it". — CBC

Work that one out!

Yes, and.....?

I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view. — javra

I’ve already said, I don’t deny that the so-called higher animals (including some birds) are intelligent. But rationality in the sense h.sapiens possess it displays a kind or level of intelligence that they don’t, even if it is present in them in a rudimentary degree. This is based on abstract reasoning and language (see for instance Terrence Deacon The Symbolic Species). It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what I’m taking issue with. Maybe what I’m arguing for could be described as a question of philosophical anthropology, a philosophical view of what is significant about humankind. I know this is a very non-politically-correct argument, so a lot of what I’ve been trying to spell out in this thread, is what I see as the motivation for the currently popular view that we’re no different to animals.

Also in relation to AI, I’ve used ChatGPT since day one, I run a lot of ideas by it and use it for all kinds of things. It’s truly amazing. But are large language models beings? That’s another thing I question. I put it to ChatGPT which responded as follows:

The question of whether large language models or AI in general qualify as "beings" touches on deep philosophical and ethical issues. From a philosophical standpoint, it connects to topics like consciousness, personhood, and agency, all of which are traditionally considered key aspects of what makes a being.

In the case of large language models like me, while we're able to process language, respond meaningfully, and simulate conversation, we don't have consciousness, intentionality, or subjective experiences. So from a metaphysical or philosophical point of view, most would argue we're not "beings" in the traditional sense. However, this opens up debates about how we define terms like "being" and "intelligence."

It sounds like a lively thread—did the mention spark any follow-up questions or reactions?

I said I’d provide updates ;-)

I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit — Athena

You should have a read of the story of Nim Chimpsky. He was born and raised like a human child with the hope that he could be taught to communicate like humans.

As chronicled in the 2011 documentary "Project Nim," [Columbia University psychology and psychiatry professor Herbert S.] Terrace decided to see if Chimpsky could learn human language by placing the infant monkey into the home of one of his former students, Stephanie LaFarge. The goal was to see if Chimpsky could acquire human-like language if he was raised like a real human being. Starting in late 1973, Nim Chimpsky began his life/experiment — but controversy soon arose. Despite being treated kindly, Nim Chimpsky showed unexpected aggression toward his human caretakers. His behavior was so sporadically violent that, after he attacked one of the people taking care of him in 1977, Terrace moved Nim Chimpsky back to a regular laboratory. At that point, Terrace called off the experiment.

Additionally, Terrace and his colleagues reached a disappointing conclusion: Although Chimpsky had appeared to learn language — he moved his hands and body in a manner consistent with American Sign Language, using over 120 combinations, in order to seemingly ask for things like food and affection — the evidence indicated that he was simply mimicking the behavior of the humans around him. It is possible that Chimpsky understood at least some of the "words" he was forming, but it is also very, very far from being proven.

"Nim learned to sign to obtain food, drink, hugs and other physical rewards," Terrace later explained to Columbia University. "Nim often got the signs right, but that was because his teachers inadvertently prompted him by making appropriate signs a fraction of a second before he did. Nim's signing wasn't spontaneous. He was unable to use words conversationally, let alone form sentences." — Salon

When the experiment failed, the poor little chimp was then packed off to a home for retired lab animals, where he was reported to seem very depressed. Ends up being a sad story.

why would the dog go mad — javra

I would say because of cognitive dissonance. I don't find it hard to see that many higher animals could experience that.

A couple of paragraphs:

According to Cudworth, Descartes’ mistake was that his conception of the soul was too narrow. Descartes thought that animals’ inability to speak or think reflectively like humans was explained by their not having souls and thus being purely physical machines, but Cudworth saw a problem with this: animals might not speak or reason, but they still do an awful lot. As Cudworth saw it, anyone who can look at the incredible variety and complexity of animal behaviour and decide that it is all merely physical mechanism “will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls” (The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678, p.44). In other words, if animals feel and move and communicate as they do purely because of their physical makeup, then there’s no reason to introduce a special, immaterial soul to explain human behaviour. If Descartes is willing to explain the behaviour of all animals as resulting from nothing but ‘blood and brains’, why shouldn’t he draw the same conclusion about us?

For a seventeenth-century Platonist, that’s a surprisingly modern insight; in fact, it’s not unlike the sort of argument many materialists would use to refute Descartes’ dualism today. But Cudworth was not a modern man, and like Descartes, he accepted the orthodox assumption of his time that conscious minds are souls. As we have seen, he was also committed to bridging Descartes’ radical gap between human and animal life. And so, instead of showing that neither animals nor humans have souls, he tried to show that animals have souls too. And although Cudworth thought that animal souls were less perfect and less conscious than human souls, he believed that nevertheless, their existence gives us moral responsibilities towards animals that we do not have towards soulless, mindless objects. So for Cudworth, the specialness of human souls does not entail the worthlessness of animal ones: rather, animals are simply less complex, less developed examples of the same sort of thing that humans are.

Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point.

None of which vitiates the arguments I've been presenting on the matter.

Ralph Cudworth - right! He was one of the Cambridge Platonists. @Manuel has mentioned him several times. I'll read that with interest later.

Do you see how you keep making my point?

Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views? — wonderer1

And I see how you consistently fail to understand mine, probably due to lack of basic education in philosophy and cultural history.

The word 'violentily' doesn't imply actual violence, but rather a 'strongly held opinion' which has been expressed forcibly any number of times in this thread.

I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. — Vera Mont

I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. I think he was mistaken in this respect, but understanding why he would think such a thing is an important point.

I'll make clear, I believe intentional action is fundamental to all forms of life from the very inception, and also that feeling and sensation are fundamental to sentient organisms, even very basic ones. (I'm currently reading Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, which explores these subjects in depth.) I recognise the continuity between human life and animal life in an organic sense. But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying.

Presenting an argument on the cultural background of philosophical attitudes has nothing to do with discussing 'the psychology of others'.

I'll recap the arguments I've presented in this thread.

Aristotle's distinction between the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul. He distinguishes h.sapiens as 'the rational animal' on the basis that humans can recognise universal concepts through the faculty of intellect or 'nous' (a seminal word in the Western philosophical tradition.) I acknowledge that Aristotle's is an ancient philosophy, but point out that some of his foundational concepts remain part of philosophy of biology to this day, and also to the foundational role of the 'ideas' in Plato's and later philosophy (1)

I then go on to argue that the human abilities of language, abstraction, tool use, and so on, also introduce an existential dimension to the question of human reason (2). The existential dimension arises with the sense of self and self-consciousness in paleolithic culture, as illustrated by the passages quoted from Norman Fischer (3). He links this with the arising of religion, which is posited as a means to ease or rationalise the sense of 'otherness' and alienation that is part of the self-conscious condition. I also remark that the Biblical myth of the Fall is an allegory for this condition.

Finally I argue that the modern insistence that 'we are no different from animals', is based on a subconsious longing for return to one-ness. We want to see ourselves as part of nature, and believe that evolutionary biology shows that we are. Hence any suggestion of human exceptionalism is violently rejected, as it calls this belief into question.

If you want to demonstrate that these arguments are based on my 'narcissism', knock yourself out. ;-)

This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent. — wonderer1

Nonsense. I don’t see myself as ‘special’. I have presented a specific argument based on a number of sources in this thread. I understand the argument I’m pursuing is a difficult one to both articulate and understand, especially in the kind of fragmented format that forum conversations tend to assume. I don’t see any indication that you (and for that matter other participants) have understood the gist of the argument. It is not because I’m ‘special’, it has nothing whatever to do with it. Your statements here are ad hominem, how about you try and respond the actual specifics of what I’ve been arguing for, if you want to take issue with them.

Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of. — Ludwig V

Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture. One example is Julian Huxley, of the famous Huxley family, a direct descendent of "Darwin's Bulldog", Thomas Henry.

Julian Huxley said 'As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-‐awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universe—in a few of us human beings' - a sentiment I endorse.

I prompted ChatGPT for other examples, which gave this list:

Carl Sagan – Sagan was not only an astrophysicist and science communicator but also a strong advocate for scientific skepticism, ethics, and the use of science for human betterment. His emphasis on a "cosmic perspective" incorporated a deeply humanistic vision, stressing both our smallness and responsibility in the vast universe.

Jacob Bronowski – A polymath known for his series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski combined a deep appreciation for the achievements of science with an equally strong concern for the ethical dimensions of human knowledge, particularly in the wake of the atrocities of World War II.

Albert Einstein – Though more widely known as a physicist, Einstein was also a humanist who believed in the moral and social responsibilities of scientists. He spoke frequently on issues like disarmament, civil rights, and the need for global cooperation.

Bertrand Russell – A philosopher and mathematician, Russell advocated for the application of reason and science to address social and ethical issues. His humanism was deeply intertwined with his pacifism, atheism, and commitment to improving society through rational inquiry.

E. O. Wilson – An evolutionary biologist and naturalist, Wilson emphasized the importance of biodiversity and advocated for what he called consilience, the unity of knowledge across the sciences and humanities. His work explored the ethical implications of our connection to nature and argued for environmental stewardship.

Richard Dawkins – Although known for his contributions to evolutionary biology, Dawkins is also a strong proponent of humanism and reason, criticizing dogmatic belief systems while advocating for a scientific worldview that promotes moral responsibility and societal progress.

Steven Pinker – A cognitive psychologist and linguist, Pinker’s work on human nature and his advocacy for reason and Enlightenment values places him in the tradition of scientific humanism. His book The Better Angels of Our Nature explores how science and rationality have contributed to moral progress throughout history.

Isaac Asimov – The celebrated science fiction writer and biochemist, Asimov not only wrote extensively on science but also on humanism and ethics, especially in relation to technology. His Three Laws of Robotics are a famous attempt to think through the ethical implications of technological advancement.

John Dewey – A philosopher and psychologist, Dewey promoted a form of pragmatism that saw science as the best method for achieving human progress. He argued that moral and ethical concerns should evolve in tandem with scientific knowledge, and his views strongly influenced 20th-century educational theory.

I'll go into bat for Russell. I still think his HWP is a good initial text for philosophy because of its historical perspective, and even despite many valid criticisms. I don't much care for his philosophical views, but he was a perceptive writer and good prose stylist on the subject of philosophy.

It sounds to me like you are projecting your own fears. In any case, you are demonstrating a lack of insight into the perspectives of others. — wonderer1

Thanks! and to you also.

Anyways, what are other people's most uninteresting philosopher/philosophy and why? — schopenhauer1

G E Moore's 'here is one hand' must come close. (Maybe if he could extemporise on the sound it makes, it might be more interesting.)

Just had a peculiar thought today regarding how ideas and concepts of God may have developed. — I like sushi

Firstly, 'God' is not a matter for conceptual thought at all. Of course, you or I might have our 'concepts of God' but what the name signifies or stands for is outside the scope of conceptual thought. As T Clark will no doubt recall, the well-known Taoist aphorism 'the Way that can be named is not the real Way'. Much the same can be said here. It is the reason that the name that became corrupted as 'Yahweh' was originally represented as four Hebrew consonants YHWH that literally could not be spoken, as for the profane to speak the name was to corrupt it (although that interpretation is contested.)

Second point - I'm sure pre-moderns, generally, had a completely different sense of their relationship with the world than do we. The world insofar as it was an expression of the sacred, God or the Gods, was not an 'it' but a 'you' to which we were related in an 'I-you' (or I-thou) sense that we nowadays mainly reserve only for our significant others. I think the sense of the whole cosmos as being personalist was intrinsic to the early religions, as was the sense of awe at the vastness and fruitfulness of nature. Thus is was natural to feel that the cosmos (whicn incidentally means 'an ordered whole') was animated or alive, in a way that is quite alien to us moderns, for whom the vast bulk of the universe comprises lifeless matter. Which is not entirely at odds with the way you have put it, although that lacks, shall we say, a certain gravitas.

Incidentally, those last two posts were also addressed to you ;-)

(continued from above)The sense of separateness from nature is, I think, at the heart of the Biblical Myth of the Fall. In that mythological account, 'the Garden of Eden' represents the primeval consciousness of animal existence.

The animal world is a world of pure being, a world of immediacy and immanence. The animal soul is like “water in water,” seamlessly connected to all that surrounds it, so that there is no sense of self or other, of time, of space, of being or not being. This utopian (to human sensibility, which has such alienating notions) Shangri-La or Eden actually isn’t that because it is characterized at all points by what we’d call violence. Animals, that is, eat and are eaten. For them killing and being killed is the norm; and there isn’t any meaning to such a thing, or anything that we would call fear; there’s no concept of killing or being killed. There’s only being, immediacy, “isness.” Animals don’t have any need for religion; they already are that, already transcend life and death, being and nonbeing, self and other, in their very living, which is utterly pure.

[In his book, A Theory of Religion] Georges Bataille sees human consciousness beginning with the making of the first tool, the first “thing” that isn’t a pure being, intrinsic in its value and inseparable from all of being. A tool is a separable, useful, intentionally made thing; it can be possessed, and it serves a purpose. It can be altered to suit that purpose. It is instrumental, defined by its use. The tool is the first instance of the “not-I,” and with its advent there is now the beginning of a world of objects, a “thing” world. Little by little out of this comes a way of thinking and acting within thingness (language), and then once this plane of thingness is established, more and more gets placed upon it—other objects, plants, animals, other people, one’s self, a world. Now there is self and other—and then, paradoxically, self becomes other to itself, alienated not only from the rest of the projected world of things, but from itself, which it must perceive as a thing, a possession. This constellation of an alienated self is a double-edged sword: seeing the self as a thing, the self can for the first time know itself and so find a closeness to itself; prior to this, there isn’t any self so there is nothing to be known or not known. But the creation of my 'me', though it gives me for the first time myself as a friend, also rips me out of the world and puts me out on a limb on my own. Interestingly, and quite logically, this development of human consciousness coincides with a deepening of the human relationship to the animal world, which opens up to the human mind now as a depth, a mystery. Humans are that depth, because humans are animals, know this and feel it to be so, and yet also not so; humans long for union with the animal world of immediacy, yet know they are separate from it. Also they are terrified of it, for to reenter that world would be a loss of the self; it would literally be the end of me as I know me.

In the midst of this essential human loneliness and perplexity, which is almost unbearable, religion appears. It intuits and imagines the ancient world of oneness, of which there is still a powerful primordial memory, and calls it The Sacred. This is the invisible world, world of spirit, world of the gods, or of God. It is inexorably opposed to, defined as the opposite of, the world of things, the profane world of the body, of instrumentality, a world of separation, the fallen world. Religion’s purpose then is to bring us back to the lost world of intimacy, and all its rites, rituals, and activities are created to this end. We want this, and need it, as sure as we need food and shelter; and yet it is also terrifying. All religions have known and been based squarely on this sense of terrible necessity. — The Violence of Oneness, Norman Fischer

I think this is the (unconscious) fear that we're seeking to ameliorate through a kind of scientific interpretation of 'one-ness with Nature', which is where belief in the projected meaning of evolutionary biology fits in. We seek to master nature through science, and also to transcend it, but now through ambitions to 'escape the surly bonds of earth' by way of space technology.

(The essay from which that passage was extracted was written about 9/11, by Norman Fischer, a Zen master and poet from California.)

There's no post delete function for users on this platform (although mods can delete posts. Incidentally I agree with the points you're putting forward here.)

Scientific American 2018 - What Made Us Unique — Ludwig V

Thanks for these links. From the above:

Most people on this planet blithely assume, largely without any valid scientific rationale, that humans are special creatures, distinct from other animals. Curiously, the scientists best qualified to evaluate this claim have often appeared reticent to acknowledge the uniqueness of Homo sapiens, perhaps for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines. Yet hard scientific data have been amassed across fields ranging from ecology to cognitive psychology affirming that humans truly are a remarkable species.

The density of human populations far exceeds what would be typical for an animal of our size. We live across an extraordinary geographical range and control unprecedented flows of energy and matter: our global impact is beyond question. When one also considers our intelligence, powers of communication, capacity for knowledge acquisition and sharing—along with magnificent works of art, architecture and music we create—humans genuinely do stand out as a very different kind of animal. Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.

I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.

A secular age, defined by a naturalist outlook, has developed and is defined in opposition to the religious culture that preceded it. The watershed in European cultural history is generally regarded as the Renaissance and the subsequent 'scientific revolution' which ushered in sweeping changes to the understanding of man and nature. That is the subject of a vast literature and commentary spanning centuries, so it's futile to try and summarize it. I'm only mentioning it as the background to why I think there is such a sense of hostility towards 'human exceptionalism'.

I think the reasoning is existential and cultural.

The other key phrase in that passage is: 'Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.'

'Must be the product of evolution'. And that is because evolutionary biology is believed to define us, both in terms of species, but also in terms of a grounding explanation of human nature, and nature herself. To that extent, and in that sense, it assumes the role of a religion - of course not the supernatural religions of yore, but in the sense of providing an apparently coherent and unified worldview within which we make sense of our identity, of who we are and how we originated. Furthermore, one fully validated by the authority of science - and what other kind is there?

I will add, I myself have never questioned the facts of evolutionary biology. I grew up on a digest of the excellent Time-Life books on biology and evolution and have a keen interest in paleoanthropology and the evolution of h.sapiens . I wasn't even much aware of the 'creation debates' until well into adulthood, as they're not a feature of life in Australia. (Ken Ham, the notorious young-earth creationist, started in Sydney but had to migrate to Kentucky to find an audience.)

But I'm also of the view that there's a lot read into evolutionary biology that isn't actually there. First and foremost by the so-called 'ultra-Darwinists' such as Richard Dawkins and the late Daniel Dennett, among many others, who see evolutionary theory and science as superseding and displacing religion. Of course they're kind of outliers in some ways, but their views are influential and quite consonant with the 'scientific worldview' they espouse.

So, getting back to 'our culture seems to separate us' and the assertion that 'it too must be the product of evolution'. What this does, is offers a resolution to the sense of separateness, of otherness, which is a pervasive undercurrent of our lives as self-conscious individual beings. Hence the fierce adherence to the belief that we're continuous with other species, that we're 'no different' - when on face value, we are obviously vastly different. Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God.

(....to be continued.)

I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes. — Ludwig V

Why does it matter? Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions. We have awesome power, we alone have the means and the ability to literally destroy the Earth, leaving aside whether we will or should. No other species has anything like that power. The fact that this distinction is so easily denied never ceases to dismay as it is the denial of an obvious fact. What I mean by ‘taking responsibility for it’ is acknowledging it as a fact. There is no other species on earth like h.sapiens . Call it 'exceptionalism' if you like, but it just seems utterly implausible to deny it. (I have a theory as to why it is so frequently denied, but I won't go into that here.)

Consider this: there have been searches going on for decades, SETI, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, signs of life on other planets. Some other civilisation that emanates radio waves or some form of signal we could recognise. Signatures of non-natural compounds that can only be produced by artificial synthesis. So far, no luck, but it indicates a clear distinction between objects and forces found in nature, and those that are a result of artifice, things that could only be manufactured by a rational sentient being.

The earth is nowadays polluted by many thousands of chemicals that couldn’t even exist had we not made them. If some other species SETI found signs of those compounds, they would say 'Aha! Rational sentient life exists there!' But yet, ‘we’re just another species’? :yikes:

That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding. — Ludwig V

But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here.

The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it? — Ludwig V

It’s very close. I’m very much in the ‘discovered’ camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat.

But, I do understand your puzzlement, and will try to explain the point I’ve been reaching for with respect to Aristotle. I’ll say again I’m no classics scholar and am not well read in the Greek texts. Many here are better educated in them than am I. But there’s a crucial point I think I’ve discerned in the Platonist-Aristotelian context. This is the reality of ideas. Not the kind of ideas we mean when we speak casually - ‘I’ve got an idea!’ - but formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles. Ideas in the platonic sense as formal principles or structures, eidos. I say these are real, but not material in nature. Not that they're 'immaterial things' - a horrible oxymoron - but they're only perceptible to a rational intellect. They are what traditional philosophy calls 'intelligible objects' (reference). And these are not explainable or reducible to the terms of particle physics or the principles of evolutionary biology. You can't account for syllogisms or the law of the excluded middle by appealing to the laws of physics.

Just as your passage states (and yes, it is highly germane to the topic at hand):

Where and what is this ideal construction? — J. Lukasiewicz, A Wittgenstein Workbook, quoted and trans. by P.Geach

Consider this passage from Bertrand Russell in his chapter, The World of Universals:

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

My bolds. So - this is something that Plato and Aristotle see, which, on the whole, naturalism and much of modern philosophy rejects. It's a deep issue, I agree. But the gist is, the ability to grasp universals just is the kind of 'divine spark' in the human intellect which differentiates humans as 'the rational animal'. I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it.

Point taken. I could have picked a better example.