So the fact that Trump says that the Constitution ought to be suspended, and that he will purge the public service and jail his critics doesn't bother you? The possibility that America could become a dictatorship isn't a cause for concern? Do you think he's joking when he says he will do that?

if 51% went to Trump, that means 49% of Republican voters picked someone else.

I remain optimistic that Trump is leading his movement off a cliff into the deep blue sea....

I don't think it will matter. — Tom Storm

I may not matter to the rusted-on Trumpistas, but it will still be objectively critical. And as far as the politics goes - will it be a winning strategy?

And actually I think that kind of shrug is just the kind of poisonous miasma that Trump emits. Facts don't matter, right? It's only what people like that matters.

…loses itself in all kinds of irrationalities… — Wolfgang

Fear of religion.

Consider this hypothetical (although it may not be hypothetical for long). Trump is found guilty of the charges he’s facing at the January 6th trial, scheduled to begin in March - charges which will almost certainly bring a jail term (pending appeals process.)

So at the Republican Convention in July in Milwaukee, is it credible that the Republican Party will finalise the nomination of someone who has been found guilty of interfering with the peaceful transfer of power? An action which has already resulted in the desecration of the Capitol and hundreds of jail terms? Even though, and incredibly, there’s no clause in the Constitution which disqualifies a candidate for having had such a conviction, how is that not going to amount to a constitutional crisis? ‘Republicans Nominate Secessionist Felon for President’. How’s that going to work out? I mean, I have no idea, but I can’t see Trump ‘cruising to victory’.

Sure. What was that aphorism - when Chinese Premier Zhou Enla was asked about the impact of the French Revolution, he reportedly replied that it was "too soon to tell."

And from Judaism comes Jesus who will repeatedly quote texts and reference ideas and events from this period to present his worldview. — BitconnectCarlos

The synthesis of Semitic religion and Greek philosophy provided the foundation of Western civilization (even despite the objection 'what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?')

There must be some other "meaning of life" to take its place, and so we seek an answer to the question, — Ciceronianus

We know better now. Or so it is thought. Maybe the problem is that society has its religious roots. After all the great bulk of them were addressed to an early agrarian and semi-nomadic peoples, replete with images of sheep and wheat fields. And the meaning of sacrifice, which was universal in those ancient cultures, which the Crucifiction was supposed to put an end to by being the final sacrifice, but which means nothing to a consumerist culture.

incidentally, and mentioned previously, an excellent series from Princeton on ancient wisdom for modern readers.

Has there ever been a sufficiently explanatory thesis, in which human intelligence is not predicated on relations necessarily? — Mww

No, I think it's fundamental. The reason it seems so opaque is because modernity is so thoroughly embedded in 'the objective consciousness' that it is hard to see it. That is one of the main points of phenomenology, of which Kant was one of the primary sources.

The use of the phrase "object of discussion" is strictly speaking, incorrect, because what you are saying is really "subject of discussion". This type of sloppy usage is what leads to the problem you speak of, where consciousness is considered to be an "object", because it is taken to be an object of discussion rather than a subject of discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, kind of, but the meaning of the general category of 'object' is still abundantly obvious.

Every advancement we have made into the truth has been empirical, even if it be done from an armchair, and never by educated guesses that are not grounded in empirical evidence. — Bob Ross

A great many scientific discoveries are owed to empiricism, to be sure, but the sense in which that constitutes or amounts to 'truth' is a different matter. I think your sentiment would have been better expressed, 'scientific and technological progress has been grounded in empiricism'.

Every win for Trump is a loss for democracy. But the day of reckoning approaches.

I agree - but it’s also because at least some of what was truly worth preserving was written down and carried forward. Those around Plato, for example, obviously realised that what he wrote had to be preserved whilst there must have been many another self-styled philosopher that left no legacy.

Another thing that might be mentioned is the idea of the Axial Age.

‘The Axial Age, a term coined by the philosopher Karl Jaspers, refers to a pivotal period in human history, roughly between 800 and 200 BCE. This era was remarkable for its profound and simultaneous intellectual, philosophical, and religious transformations across various civilizations, including those in Greece, Persia, India, and China.

During the Axial Age, there was a significant shift in thought patterns, moving away from mythological frameworks towards more rational and abstract reasoning. This period saw the rise of some of the world's most enduring philosophies and religions: in Greece, the emergence of classical philosophy with figures like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; in Persia, the rise of Zoroastrianism; in India, the development of Buddhism and Jainism, as well as critical developments in Hinduism; and in China, the foundational teachings of Confucianism and Taoism.

The Axial Age is considered crucial in the history of humanity as it laid the foundational structures of thought and belief systems that continue to shape cultures and societies around the world.’

Most of what is considered ‘ancient wisdom’ is rooted in this period. And it endures.

. I also find very little sensible use for the objective/subjective distinction, although Searle has recently convinced me that it may be rightfully applicable in certain contexts — creativesoul

I find the distinction between object/objective and subject/subjective quite intelligible. The main issue in the context of the discussion of physicalism is the emphasis on objects and objectivity, and also on what is measurable. The basis of scientific method is the identification of the measurable attributes of objects. That is what has been referred to as the 'supremacy of quantity'. Whereas states of being are qualitative by nature - they're characterised by feeling (among other things).That is the whole 'hard problem' issue in a nutshell. I don't think it is unclear.

For an in depth discussion of this and related issues see my threat on the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

Is that a Freudian slip? ;-)

I will add that there is a concept, derived originally from Indian philosophy, but now also found in the 'embodied cognition' movement, maybe because of Francisco Varela's incorporation of Buddhist principles in the book The Embodied Mind. An example of that is given in a talk by philosopher of science, Michel Bitbol, 'It is Never Known But It Is the Knower - Consciousness and the Blind Spot of Science' (link to Academia article.)

There, you were spot on. That seems an unbridgeable divide between Way and myself. He insists that consciousness does not exist, and to me... that makes no sense. — creativesoul

I get it, I really do! I'll have another go at it. What I'm saying, and it's an important qualification, is that consciousness does not exist as an object. We can, of course, speak of it as an object in the metaphorical sense - an 'object of discussion' - but the mind itself is not an object in the sense that all the objects we see and interact with are objects. I say that is why the 'eliminative materialists' can't acknowledge its reality - precisely because it's not objectively existent.

(There's another distinction that I make between 'what exists' and 'what is real', but it's a very difficult distinction to unpack. But what got me started on that was the distinction between intelligible objects, such as numbers and logical principles, and empirical objects, such as apples and chairs. I think that is preserved in the distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge although it's very much fallen out of favour in Anglo philosophy.

I'm of the view that there was at least an implicit distinction recognised between empirical and intellectual objects in pre-modern philosophy. So, empirical objects are phenomenally existent - that is, they appear as objects of sense (bearing in mind that 'phenomena' means 'what appears'.) But logical principles, numbers and the like are not 'phenomenal objects' in that sense - they are 'objects of thought' (which is nearer the original meaning of ‘noumenal’, pre-Kant). I'm of the view that this is an important epistemological distinction that has been lost in the transition to modernity. But it's the first point that is most relevant.)

It would be very helpful in your replies if you might indicate who you're responding to. Have a look at How to Quote.

please spare the Nietszche refs. I hate Nietszche. :rage:

Descartes idea of efficient causation is worth taking a look at. Mental circumstance can be traced to brain state but any change in mental circumstance will change brain state. So mental circumstance is driving brain state. It's a difficult idea to explain. Anyone, please take a try at it if you can do better or explain if you think it's something else. — Mark Nyquist

I believe that comment is based on the review I mentioned, which says

The only thesis of Descartes that withstood critical objection was his claim that “explanation at the neurophysiological level will be in terms of efficient causation” (p.27). In this respect, Bennett and Hacker remind us that “Descartes contributed substantially to advances in neurophysiology and visual theory” (p.27). — Review of Phil. Foundations of Neuroscience

I believe the point here is that Descartes pursued and encouraged the study of cause-and-effect relationships in medicine and anatomy, which is relevant to neurophysiology and visual theory; like others of his day, Descartes was a polymath, with very broad interests, including medicine. But just above that passage, they also make the point 'Descartes reconceived the soul “not as the principle of life, but as the principle of thought or consciousness” (p. 26), a thesis which led to the idea that the mind was separate from the body in all respects." This is what they believe has had negative consequences, which I agree with; it reduces the state of being to a 'thinking thing', the very existence of which is impossible to demonstrate objectively. Yes, I know that I am, because I am; but what am I, an ethereal thing somehow attached to the body?

Whereas the Aristotelian idea that was displaced, was that the soul was like the animating principle of the body (literally 'the soul is the form of the body' where 'form' is like 'principle'.) It's a very different kind of metaphor, a different kind of consciousness, even.

Scientists study particular things, but Philosophers study general & holistic concepts. That approach is what came to be known as "Metaphysics". Literally, "in addition to physical Reality" (i.e. Ideality), not necessarily super-natural, or un-real. Unfortunately, Catholic theology tainted that aspect of Philosophy by association with dubious religious dogma. — Gnomon

Thanks for the mention! That essay is yet to get any kind of attention (a solitary clap) but I felt it needed saying.

This division is a consequence of the cultural dialectic between reason (so-called) and faith (so-called). Deep historical currents percolating beneath the surface which underlie the culture wars we're experiencing. I still say that many earnest advocates of scientific reductionism are animated by the fear of religion, which is why I refer to Thomas Nagel's essay on that topic so frequently.

Catholic theology absorbed much of what was profound and noble in the ancient tradition, and then tied it to the oath of fealty to the Church, so that with the rejection of the Church, much of ancient philosophy is rejected along with it. Hence the flatland of secular culture, dominated by relativism, scepticism and instrumental utility. Reconciling that has been my major interest.

So tell me, according to current science, what does ultimately exist?

Yes, agree. Anil Seth is still rather too 'scientistic' for my liking, the 'hard problem' is not a problem to be solved, but a rhetorical device to point out the limitations of objectivism in philosophy.

That said, I love Claude Shannon, in the OP there's a reference to a documentary about him, which I watched back then https://thebitplayer.com/ . He was really a genius polymath engineer and also an endearingly eccentric individual.

Glad you found it helpful. As said, haven't, and probably won't, read it all - massive book - but the reviews and excerpts I've encountered seem on the mark, and it has been quite an influential book, I believe.

For example:

Francis Crick is one neuroscientist who wants to reduce the mental to the physical. His “astonishing hypothesis” that we are “no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 3 (1995)) is a good example of the sort of explanatory account of human action that Bennett and Hacker reject as metaphysical nonsense.

In the course of reducing the mental to the physical, the normative dimensions of social life are lost. Consider this example. Suppose I place my signature on a document. The act of affixing my signature is accompanied by neural firings in my brain. The neural firings do not “explain” what I have done. In signing my name, I might be signing a check, giving an autograph, witnessing a will or signing a death certificate. In each case the neural firing may well be the same. And yet, the meaning of what I have done in affixing my signature is completely different in each case. These differences are “circumstance dependent,” not merely the product of my neural firings. Neural firings accompany the act of signing but only the circumstances of my signing, including the intention to do so, are the significant factors in explaining what I have done.

This applies equally to a lot of what is written about the so-called 'neural correlates of consciousness'.

Basically, I'm simply arguing that whatever exists, always exists for some mind. The sense in which it exists without reference to a mind is simply unintelligible and incoherent. That is the mistake that creeps in for mistaking the assumption of mind-independence, which is all very well within the context of science, for a metaphysical principle, which it is not.

In context it is as follows:

...There is no need for me to deny that the Universe is real independently of your mind or mine, or of any specific, individual mind. Put another way, it is empirically true that the Universe exists independently of any particular mind. But what we know of its existence is inextricably bound by and to the mind we have, and so, in that sense, reality is not straightforwardly objective. It is not solely constituted by objects and their relations. Reality has an inextricably mental aspect, which itself is never revealed in empirical analysis. Whatever experience we have or knowledge we possess, it always occurs to a subject — a subject which only ever appears as us, as subject, not to us, as object....

A corollary of this is that ‘existence’ is a compound or complex idea. To think about the existence of a particular thing in polar terms — that it either exists or does not exist — is a simplistic view of what existence entails. This is why the criticism of idealism that ‘particular things must go in and out of existence depending on whether they’re perceived’ is mistaken. It is based on a fallacious idea of what it means for something to exist. The idea that things ‘go out of existence’ when not perceived is really their ‘imagined non-existence’– your imagining them going out of existence. In reality, the supposed ‘unperceived object’ neither exists nor does not exist. Nothing whatever can be said about it.

There's a supporting quotation for this point in the original essay that the OP links to, from the Pali Buddhist texts.

‘By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “non-existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, “existence” with reference to the world does not occur to one.’ — The Buddha, Kaccāyanagotta Sutta

IN that respect, I acknowledge my indebtedness to Buddhist philosophy, and also a book which was crucial in my early philosophical education, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, T R V Murti, which has extensive comparisons between Kant and the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy of Nagarjuna. That passage is one of the sources of Madhyamaka.

Plato often implied that "the good" is not what the majority would agree to. The vast majority of men are like children who want candy, totally ignorant of what is truly good for them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Plato is not the only source for that idea. The parable of the burning house from the Lotus Sutra concerns a wealthy man with a magnificent house full of valuable toys. The house catches fire, and the man wants to save his three beloved children who are inside, playing with the toys and unaware of the danger. He entices them to leave the burning house by offering even better toys outside. Once they are safe, he gives them the ultimate treasure, a precious carriage (representing the Mahayana teaching). The parable teaches that the Buddha skillfully leads people to enlightenment, using various means to guide them from the cycle of suffering to ultimate liberation.

I'm someone who avoids the word metaphysical. — Mark Nyquist

You're far from alone in that.

FYI, there's a rather influential book that was published about 20 years ago, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, Bennett and Hacker. Bennett is a neuroscientist, Hacker a philosophy professor and eminent interpreter of Wittgenstein. I'm never going to read the entire book, which is pretty specialised, but there's a detailed review here. I think their 'mereological fallacy' - the attribution of agency to parts instead of beings - is on the mark.

Since our brains/minds seem to be capable of believing anything, true or false, having some grounding in the physical basis might keep us from getting off track. — Mark Nyquist

I keep saying this, but the problem is that culturally, we've rejected or destroyed many frameworks for thinking about the issue other than the physical. Because metaphysics generally is associated with religion - we've already seen this association made numerous times in this thread - then you're left with only the physical as an explanatory framework.

These ideas are very much in the air. I've been listening to Bernardo Kastrup's lectures, he's all in on analytic idealism (mind you, I'm not all in on Kastrup, although favourably inclined toward him.) The whole 'mind creates reality' meme is pretty much alive and well on the Internet.

Well, the point is, I am at pains to differentiate myself from that iteration of idealism, as I say at the outset. I also suspect that it is rather a straw man version of what idealist philosophy really means.

In any case, thanks for you comments, appreciated.

There is this whole huge area of Catholic philosophy that sits sort of free floating from the rest of academic philosophy. It tends to be far more focused on ancient/ medieval philosophy, but unlike secular academic philosophy re ancient/medieval philosophy, it is also intent on updating these for modern times.

This camp does produce a lot of good philosophy. E.g., Nathan Lyons "Signs in the Dust," is the best theory of pansemiosis I've found, and is far more grounded in the natural sciences and much less "heavily continental," than anything else I've seen attempt this sort of thing. Sokolowski's "Phenomenology of the Human Person," a blend of Aristotle and Husserl, that also takes the natural sciences and modern linguistics seriously is another example. It's one of the better articulations of a "(more) direct realism." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for those tips. I've been delving into some the neo-Thomists. They both look excellent books but I have no more space in the backlog presently. In any case, I'm very much in agreement that classical philosophy conceives of the telos of mankind in cosmic, rather than social, terms.

That without mind, matter is not scattered about in space in any way at all. — hypericin

So, you're saying that according to idealism, if there were no mind, then matter would not exist? (Sorry for being picky but really want to clarify this point.)

It is amazingly difficult for humans not to procreate. I was watching a documentary the other week about a Filipino village that makes its living picking over an enormous, malodorous pile of municipial waste and extracting a meagre amount of recyclibles to sell for a pittance. And many of them are women, with very young children helping. But they still continue to have children even in those dire circumstances. (Actually there's a strong correlation between electrification and lower birth-rates, interestingly. ) Anyway it's not an easy matter to say that people generally ought to refrain from procreating, even though it might be easy for an individual to make that decision. Humans are borne along by these drives, as Schopenhauer saw.

So, it it were idealist instead of indirect realism, what would be the difference?

I don't think they're nearly so sanguine about it. I think they believe that the odds of obtaining a favourable re-birth, left to their own devices, are vanishingly slight, and that you'll in all likelihood end up in a far worse condition or state, for an unthinkably long period of time. You want to talk about 'pessimism', they have lashings of it.

Buddhism explicitly doesn't 'endorse life's continuation'. In the early Buddhist texts, aspirants were categorised according to the number of lives they were likely to have left, from 'stream-enterers' (i.e. have entered the stream of Nibbana but have some ways to go) Once-Returner, and Never-Returner (Arahant). Mahayana Buddhism extended that, by encompassing the idea that the Bodhisattva could voluntarily take birth for the benefit of sentient beings (Buddhism would likely categorise Jesus as a Bodhisattva on that basis) (source). But Bodhisattvas are said not to be reborn out of any inherent desire to continue existing, else they wouldn't be Bodhisattvas!

I think you're right about that. Stoicism is a way of coping with the vicissitudes of life, Buddhism sets its sights beyond. In that respect, although not at all in many other ways, it has more in common with Christianity.

The chapter one abstract of Pinter, again:

Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds.

Is that ‘indirect realism’?

Fair points, I’ll think it over. But I don’t think it’s indirect realism, as the external world can’t be said to exist outside of or independently of the mind. But neither does it not exist.

Hey nice cherry pick :up:

These are two thinkers out of many others who do not find "naturalism inimical" to (philosophical) Buddhism and its "concerns" as you do — 180 Proof

That’s because they’re generally in line with the ‘naturalized epistemology’ attitude. Fine as far as it goes but the Buddha is designated ‘lokuttara’ meaning ‘world-transcending’ which I don’t think can be limited to that framework. But then Metzinger, Stephen Bachelor et al perform a valuable service presenting Buddhist principles to the secular audience. All as part of a bigger picture.

{See https://inquiringmind.com/article/3102_20_bodhi-facing-the-great-divide/ for a ‘modern traditionalist analysis)

I feel compelled to mention the name of John Vervaeke, author of a series of 51 recorded lectures called Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. Vervaeke is a Professor at University of Toronto the departments of psychology, cognitive science, and Buddhist psychology. Those lectures were given over the course of a year and cover a lot of material. More about Vervaeke here and transcriptions and other materials here.

The old Greek proverb: "count no man happy until he has died," is incoherent in the modern context. Happiness and the good life are disconnected from the original idea of "the Good Life." That is, the term "Good Life," as employed by Saint Augustine wasn't about "being happy and finding meaning," but rather about living the (morally) good life. Meaning and purpose are assumed in "the Good." I mean, it's even hard to make the distinction with our current lexicon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My Indian Philosophy lecturer, Arvind Sharma, noted that when people die in the West, they say he's given up the ghost, while in India, they say he's given up the body.

Agree with your reading of McIntyre, although must confess After Virtue is on my 'must get around to finishing this' list. Interesting that he converted to Catholicism from having been a convinced Marxist. He believes A-T (Aristotelian Thomism) is the only coherent philosophical system in Western culture. I can see why he says that. The point about pre-modern philosophy and religion generally is that it is set against the background of belief in life eternal (or release from Saṃsāra), compared to which the joys and tribulations of worldly life are fleeting and transient. Naturalism is, of course, inimical to such concerns. According to it, we're simply another species (in fact for some on the extreme end of the green left, we ourselves are merely a pestilence.)