'Rational warrant' and 'empirical evidence' are different things. Empirical evidence, as construed by modern naturalism, starts, as a matter of principle, by excluding consideration of anything beyond the natural domain, and then demands evidence to the contrary, having already made the in-principle commitment not to consider it.

You're apparently conflating scientific evidence- constrained by naturalism as a methodological principle- with empirical evidence more broadly. Empirical evidence just means evidence from experience, from observation- it needn't be constrained by naturalism, and so it needn't rule out evidence for theism. And of course what counts as natural is flexible (i.e. Hempel's dilemma), so there's reason to suspect that if divine intervention were real, and that there was observable evidence for it, that it couldn't qualify as natural and so within the sphere of scientific investigation. As jorndoe notes, its more that evidence of this variety is lacking as a contingent matter of fact more than being ruled-out a priori. If there were substantial evidence for theism, obviously there's a great deal about our theorizing about the world that would have to adapt. But there doesn't seem to be, and so it doesn't, at least not at present.

As far as a Plantinga is concerned, belief in God has a rational warrant, on the traditional grounds - anticipated by Plato - that the harmony and intricacy of the natural world bespeaks an intentional creation. The counter-arguments from scientific naturalism, are what seem question-begging from that perspective, because they assume that the order of the cosmos is somehow self-generating or spontaneously occuring

The quintessential refutation of the design/teleological arguments do not come from "scientific naturalism"- as you say, naturalism as a methodological principle rules it out out of hand- but from e.g. Hume, as in his DCNR. The argument's flaws are very real, and not a matter of an a priori rejection. Like the other traditional arguments for the existence of God, its just not a good argument... and thus that half of the problem here- the traditional philosophical arguments for the existence of God are all fatally flawed, and there is no empirical evidence for God's existence, so belief in the existence of God appears to be entirely unwarranted (and therefore unreasonable).

Sure. And hopefully it goes without saying that even spirited disagreement (shall we say) doesn't imply any personal animus (but I'll go ahead and say it nonetheless, just in case).

But its late so I'll respond to the rest of your comment tomorrow.

Again, we're talking quite explicitly about arguments for the existence of God. You know, the causal/cosmological, ontological, teleological, etc arguments. Even if we grant (if only for the sake of argument) that all of e.g. Feser's arguments against naturalism or materialism are sound and persuasive, it would not follow that his or anyone else's arguments for the existence of God are not invalid or question-begging (and so utterly unpersuasive). These two things could both be true. So its irrelevant, unless it was intended as "whataboutism", in which case its just fallacious. And I expect everyone on this board is familiar with your feelings about materialism at this point, so it gets tiresome that you insist on inserting it into every discussion regardless of whether its relevant or not. We get it, materialism= bad, and anyone who says materialism=bad is OK in your book. Great, awesome, whatever- that doesn't mean that the traditional philosophical arguments for God's existence aren't still rubbish.

As I always do I'll just put it out there that I know next to nothing. But this strikes me as absurd. What do you mean "purportedly"? I would personally call my own rationale into question rather than call trained philosophers out for failing to make their arguments valid.

I mean allegedly. Reportedly. I'm not sure how else to put it. They have academic credentials that should prevent the sorts of errors that infest these arguments. Like being able to discern whether a given argument is deductively valid, apart from whether or not they personally happen to accept the conclusion. And indeed in much of their other work they're perfectly capable philosophers (well, Feser and Plantinga at any rate- I'm not convinced WLC is anything but a blowhard and a fanatic). I guess its just something about personal religious commitments that make objective analysis or reasoning highly difficult. And for that reason we should be immediately suspicious of arguments that purport to establish what we already believed as a matter of faith or upbringing, that they are not post-hoc rationalizations that are measured for the conclusion.

And I'm not exactly going out on much of a limb here, I doubt there are many arguments that have been more thoroughly or frequently refuted than these arguments for the existence of God. That they are neither sound nor persuasive is more or less taken for granted at this point, and has been for a long time (by virtually everyone save those philosophers who make a living by formulating such arguments). Heck, in many instances, they still fail for the same reasons documented literally centuries ago by the likes of e.g. Hume. And certainly there are more modern (and rigorous) treatments, not least of which being Sobel's excellent Logic and Theism which gives full formal/symbolic step-by-step breakdowns of these arguments so that one can see precisely where they go wrong (in the cases where they are simply deductively invalid, as in the case of the traditional ontological argument). Moreover, its a pretty predictable result, given just a basic appreciation for how deductive arguments work: you can only get out what you put in, they can't establish any new facts, but merely bring out what was logically contained in the premises. That's ultimately all a deductive inference is. So its almost trivial to say that any/all valid arguments for the existence of God must be question-begging at some level... else the conclusion could not logically follow from that particular set of premises and they would have to be deductively invalid.

It was.

It was intended to be... but it turned out it wasn't. And hence my comment about it being unintentional. But you not only effectively conceded the point, you put it in stronger terms than I had- i.e. God as lacking evidence for his existence, as a (necessary) matter of definition, rather than a contingent fact of experience. Like I said, I'm happy to grant this because its perfectly consistent with what I've said; if transcendent entities cannot have evidence for their existence, by their very definition, then by their very definition belief in their existence can never be rationally warranted.

I'm not at all inclined towards Craig, I don't his personality or argumentative style. Plantinga and Feser I read. I find them quite competent philosophers, but then, I'm not a convinced atheist; I don't share their religious convictions, but I think their philosophical arguments against naturalism and materialism are quite sound, on the whole.

We are quite explicitly talking about arguments for the existence of God, not arguments against naturalism or materialism or anything else. Not sure why you brought this up.

That's something I often say about Daniel Dennett.

That's nice. Also not relevant to the present topic, but thanks for the bit of personal trivia, I guess?

Worth noting that none of the medieval 'proofs' were remotely considered as anything like a proof in the modern or scientific sense. There was a long-gone blog post which showed that these were mainly understood as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful, never as rhetorical or polemical devices for unbelievers.

Agreed. Which is why someone like Aquinas had a good deal more sense than his modern counterparts- e.g. William Lane Craig, Edward Feser, Alvin Plantinga and so on- who somehow believe that these invalid or question-begging arguments are sound or persuasive, despite purportedly being professionals (or at least trained) philosophers! Aquinas at least was aware of the nature of his project, and its limitations, as other fideists have been before and since.

I should also protest, on behalf of those who profess a faith, even if I'm not necessarily amongst them, that 'faith' is not 'clinging to nonsensical propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary'. For those with a religious faith, when asked for what constitutes 'evidence', they will simply gesture towards the fact of existence.

Who are you quoting here? I never defined faith as "'clinging to nonsensical propositions in the face of evidence to the contrary". Faith in the relevant sense is believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence/warrant. This quote here doesn't even make sense- how can you have evidence to the contrary of a nonsensical proposition? If its genuine nonsense, how could you tell what would count as evidence for or against?

I wasn't saying that it was unintentional that you made a good point- I don't doubt you're perfectly capable of making good points and do so quite frequently- the part that I suspected might be unintentional was that you gave the impression that the bit about transcendent deities lacking evidence as a matter of definition/necessity was intended as an objection or counter-argument to what I said.. when in fact its a point I'm quite happy to grant. If I misinterpreted the thrust of your comment I apologize.. but I don't think I did.

And so similarly, "beyond" or "beneath" is a distinction without a difference here, since God's existence escaping rational evaluation rules out positive belief every bit as much as negative disbelief (and by the same token). Either way its a maneuver the theist is welcome to, though I expect few have the stomach for it if knowing what it entails- it basically amounts to sawing off the branch they're sitting on.

(so say what you will about the fideists, at least they're honest with themselves on this count)

Agreed. It seems pretty clear that on the whole, the available evidence (the problem of evil, miracles, other scriptural truth-claims, etc) is far more consistent with the non-existence of God, and highly inconsistent with His existence. And as I said, the sharper/more insightful theists have been aware of this, and thus their emphasis on faith as a necessary condition for theistic belief: there is no sufficient rational or evidential basis. Thus we see Thomas himself- he of the celebrated arguments for the existence of God- say things like

The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ... Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all.
(Summa, Secunda Secundæ Partis, Q1 A5)

or that

It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason... For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God... And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.(Q2 A4)

and of course, despite the oft-quoted canard to the contrary, absence of evidence is evidence of absence (indeed, this is a theorem of probability theory). So there is an asymmetry here between the theist and the atheist.. its just not the one EnPassant claimed: the evidence strongly favors atheism and disfavors theism.

No, not out of hand. The only things that can be dismissed out of hand are trivialities- i.e. logical falsehoods, self-contradictions. But evidence for scriptural claims, instances of miracles, etc would indeed be one candidate here, i.e. evidence for the existence of God, the absence of which undermines theism (which is precisely what we find, and thus the irrationality of theism).

But you do make a good point here (although it may not have been intentional)- it may well be that belief in (non-trivial) transcendent entities is inherently irrational, since evidence of such things may well be precluded as a matter of definition. But theism is rarely consistent in this respect so its mostly moot, as the God of western monotheism is causally active in the world- not only in the initial creatio ex nihilo, but in the perpetual sustenance of the world, and periodic interventions therein (e.g. the person of Jesus Christ, miracles, etc.) and is thereby distinguished from deistic deities.

You cannot seriously compare theism to flat earthism. Some of the best minds in history have presented very reasonably arguments for theism. It is a reasonable viewpoint.

I stated on what basis I did so, and I stand by it. And some of the best minds in history have presented arguments for theism that are, without exception, invalid or question-begging (e.g. the causal/cosmological, ontological, teleological, moral, transcendental, etc. arguments or so-called "proofs" of God's existence). Being among the best minds in history doesn't mean ones arguments are necessarily sound (see: well, virtually any philosopher you care to pick, from Plato to Wittgenstein or anyone in between- they're all still human, and so not immune to error).

But since the philosophical arguments for God's existence are all invalid or question-begging, and there is no substantial amount of empirical evidence for the existence of God, theism is without sufficient rational warrant- it is not reasonable. Which the smarter/more insightful theists (e.g. Aquinas, Luther, Paul) have often conceded, emphasizing faith as a necessary condition for theistic belief (and faith, in the relevant sense, just is belief in the absence of sufficient evidence). But then, lacking sufficient warrant places it in the company of other rationally disreputable views, such as those that I mentioned. As they say, the truth hurts... but that doesn't mean its not still the truth nevertheless.

Theism is not dependent only on faith. It is a reasonable viewpoint.

If only this were true, eh? Unfortunately, utterly lacking in evidence as it is (and the arguments for God's existence being, without exception, either invalid or question-begging), it is dependent (almost completely) on faith, and is not a reasonable (i.e. sufficiently warranted) viewpoint. If it were, then for consistency's sake it would have to follow that pretty much anything is a reasonable viewpoint (regardless of the absence of positive evidence, or abundance of contrary evidence), and that anything goes- young earth creationism, flat earthism, moon landing denial, anti-vaxxism, and so on. But its not a reasonable viewpoint, and so we're not committed to such an unfortunate consequence (thankfully).

You can't have it both ways. Either its a realistic standard, such that its lack is a problem and therefore a meaningful objection... or its not. I think its very clearly not, since empirical/factual/scientific claims can never reach absolute certainty (even in principle), by their very nature, but I suppose YMMV.

its not even an opinion, its just a blatantly/trivially false factual claim.What poor NOS here is claiming political correctness has nothing to do with, is literally the very definition of political correctness, as well as how it manifests in practice in the vast majority of cases (obviously like anything else there can be abuses.. but these are exceptions, not the rule)

(that's good - but then a lack of certainty ceases to be a meaningful objection)

Nah. Its literally what the phrase means in English. As you can see if you check any dictionary or encyclopedia entry. And of course, the anti-PC dipshits real problem with political correctness is that they want to make bigoted categorical statements about particular groups (e.g. Muslims, etc) and basic decency- political correctness- looks down upon it. And hence your crybaby tantrums about the tyranny of political correctness, basic decency, and simple common sense. Which is of course why no one likes you or takes you seriously. When you stake out things like basic decency as partisan or controversial, you're only removing yourself from adult conversations.

Black holes and other astronomical bodies can be deduced to exist by reason alone

Um, no. The existence of black holes was deduced as a theoretical consequence of the theory of relativity- as a valid solution to the relativistic field equations for catastrophic gravitational collapse of massive bodies- a theory about the physical world that had been confirmed observationally. This deduction could only be interpreted as a claim about the physical world (rather than merely about the consequences of a particular mathematical construction) once relativity had been empirically corroborated. As always and as we've known for quite some time, reason alone can never establish any non-trivial existence claims, and so there is no asymmetry here between the theist and the atheist. Which is of course why all the various forms of the ontological argument are such complete failures. You can never tell what exists in the world, without looking at the world to find out (and unfortunately, theism fares no better in that regard either, which is why theism is untenable on any rational or empirical basis, and so is only held as a matter of faith).

Lol. As per usual, the literal exact opposite of what you just said is the case. Political correctness is, in both definition and in practice, almost entirely about condemning and avoiding derogatory/hateful language and rhetoric towards particular (religious, ethnic, etc) groups.

Exactly. Its not about changing the minds of committed white supremacists- that's going to be an exercise in futility in the vast majority of cases. De-platforming, etc is about preventing these ideas from becoming more mainstream, widespread, or socially acceptable, or having access to a large audience for potential recruitment/indoctrination. Its also about inflicting a social cost on open involvement with white supremacist groups. And such tactics appear to be fairly effective in this respect.

If you close your eyes to the obvious, and deny it when someone points it out to you, what type of philosophy are you engaged in?

Have you stopped beating your wife? C'mon, I'm not answering such an obviously loaded question (which, so far as the philosophic topic is concerned, is plainly question-begging and so not a productive argument either- and of course the continued refusal to engage in the topic without simply assuming your conclusion strongly undermines the anti-physicalists here.. is that really the best you can do?)

(though I do appreciate the emotive and rhetorical nature of these sorts of melodramatic "the sky is falling" pronouncements- but still, its just unnecessary)

No, not really. Thus the amusingly hyperbolic/melodramatic nature of your previous comment. Dial it back a few notches, no need to be Chicken Little over something fairly common-sensical.

:lol: still hopelessly lost, poor little guy.. stick to what you know- in your case, splashing around in the kiddie pool. "100% legit", what a rube.

No one was talking to you junior. Stick with the kiddie pool.

This frightens me greatly. Not just because of the mob, but because the entire corporate apparatus is behind it. If you're not woke you're ostracized and the very idea of free speech comes from privilege.

This is sick. This is a nightmare. Somebody talk me down, tell me this isn't happening.

I don't think you've achieved maximum melodrama/hyperbole here, I think you still have room for even more- go big or go home! :lol:

Yeah no one actually believes that nonsense about "erasing history". Obviously statues and monuments are not how we document or learn history (that's what history books and history classes are for), but how we celebrate and honor certain individuals (or events).. but its politically/socially problematic to just come out say that you support the celebration and valorization of e.g. confederate traitors/slavers/etc, so you talk about "erasing history" instead, as if that was what any of this was about. But of course documenting history doesn't entail celebrating racists, so that doesn't hold any water whatsoever. And many of these statues and named buildings are far more recent, and were acts of defiance in light of legal losses by schools or other organizations trying to resist civil rights, de-segregation, and so on. So the entire argument against removing/renaming is completely disingenuous.

And the hand-wringing over "cancel culture" is absolutely hilarious. As if any of these idiots has a right to have a massive platform, or for people to buy their books or watch their shows. If you want these privileges, its simple common sense to avoid saying dumb, offensive stuff, and if you can't manage that you should expect this sort of backlash.

I'm not sure their claim about the lack of consensus is even accurate in the first place. I suppose it depends on who they're referring to. At least among philosophers, physicalism appears to be the majority view. That's what the last PhilPapers survey showed at any rate. And I'd be pretty surprised if the situation was much different in the cognitive sciences (if anything, its probably an even stronger majority). Not that that settles the substantive question (i.e. if something like physicalism is true) or anything, but worth noting nonetheless (since people have made claims about the lack of such a majority).

The fact that the gap between what is believed by materialists, and what is believed by idealists, continues to widen, is clear evidence that progress has not been made

This is an obvious non-sequitur, even if the premise is true (which it very likely isn't). So, another extremely sloppy argument/comment. Par for the course on this thread/topic I'm afraid.

Heh, not quite as poetic as the Genesis version, but at least this one has the benefit of potentially (probably?) being true.

Sure, like I said, depending on how broadly the terms are defined here the proposition can be fairly uncontroversial: "awareness", if defined as the ability to react to (i.e. be "aware" of) external stimuli is part of the biological definition of life and so common to all living organisms, presumably even the very first ones. If that's all that's meant- no problem. But not much interesting follows from this, as it is trivial/tautologous (true as a matter of definition, rather than as a matter of fact), and it certainly doesn't entail that pan-psychism in any robust sense is true. On the other hand, a far stronger concept- i.e. of "consciousness", as normally defined in the philosophy of mind- renders the OP's proposition (that consciousness was present "in some shape from the very origin of things") false as a matter of fact: the earliest organisms lacked many traits and abilities, including consciousness no less than flight or sight or bipedalism or plenty of other things besides (so far as the evidence tells us, at any rate).

For what its worth, I'm "open" to pan-psychism in the sense that I don't reject it out of hand and that I'd always be willing to consider new evidence or arguments in its favor.. I just think that the OP's isn't a good or sound argument for it, since its either trivial (and its conclusion non-sequitur) or just wrong about how evolution works.

Looks more like you were equivocating and that the argument in the OP falls apart if required to define its terms and then stick to them. Either the proposition is trivial and uninformative, or just factually incorrect as to how evolution works (i.e. its ability to generate and select for novel traits and abilities).

Yes, really, and these things being related (as they obviously are) isn't the same thing as them being synonymous and interchangeable, such that you can swap them out as needed to help your argument. So again, if you are only talking about e.g. the ability to respond to external stimuli, then the proposition is true but trivial/tautologous, but if you are talking about consciousness in a more robust sense, something like the sense we mean in the philosophy of mind, then there's absolutely no reason to think it must have existed "in some shape since the very origin of things" and that it did not emerge at some point like other traits that are lacking in earlier life-forms.

Well but your OP talks of "consciousness", not "feeling and awareness", so it depends on how these terms are defined. If by "feeling and awareness" you mean only the ability to detect and respond to external stimuli, then the statement is correct but trivial (as the ability to respond to stimuli is part of the biological definition of life, and therefore of necessity common to all forms of life past or present). If you mean "consciousness" in something more like the sense we typically use in the philosophy of mind, then the statement becomes highly problematic.

Was just introduced to this group today, someone had posted it on the Mars Volta subreddit and now I can't stop listening to this album-

the problem with the quote isn't a logical one, but a factual one- the idea that a trait or ability "in some shape must have been present at the very origins of things" isn't how we understand evolution to work. Evolution can/does produce novelty: things that are new, things that were not present previously.

I mean, just replace "consciousness" in the quote with something else- say, flight, or sight. Is it true that flight or sight were present "at the very origin of things"? Of course not, the earliest organisms could not see nor fly. And they certainly were not bipedal or able to use tools, like humans. So the quote is just wrong on the facts, as far as how evolution actually works, and so is not a good or persuasive argument for pan-psychism (or anything else) for that reason.

When one opens the door to the idea that spatial dimensions can arise from more fundamental structures...

Isn't this the case in both string theory and LQG, that spacetime is an emergent feature of more fundamental structures (strings, networks, etc)?

Of course, this is a naked self-contradiction, since "the idea of people helping one another" (i.e. in our community, beyond our immediate family) is precisely what is meant by "disrupting the Western-prescribed nuclear family structure requirement"- so one cannot accept one but not the other with consistency. Though I certainly appreciate that logical consistency is not something you're likely to be interested in either.

Unfortunately, by opposing such self-evident goods as the notion that we should care about or support people besides just our nuclear family, that black lives matter, or that transgender discrimination is bad, you're just removing yourself from serious discussions about the present political/social situation in the US. Well, not you specifically since you were never part of them to begin with, but, you know, people in general. If you lack common sense or basic decency, and you're quite explicit about it, people will be increasingly less interested in talking to or hearing from you in any serious or substantive context. Then again, points for honesty, I guess?

How on Earth does this constitute an "objection"? The fact that black lives don't matter to some people is the whole point and the entire reason BLM exists. This is like saying that the fact that some people commit murder is an "objection" to the moral principle that you shouldn't murder anyone.

Not to me.

Heh, no doubt. :grin:

Yeah its the entirely not-crazy idea that care and support should extend beyond the bounds of the immediate family. And of course the other Super Scary Marxist Agenda cited in that post was opposing transgender discrimination. How sinister- what will those diabolical cultural Marxists (lol) think of next?