Thanks for pointing this out - I think it’s more purposiveness or intentionality, rather than a specific, definable purpose. This relates to Kant. We have purpose, we are purposeful in our actions, but I agree that
don’t appear to have ‘a purpose’ as such. Likewise, there is meaning to life - a meaningfulness to living - but not a definable meaning as such. Nevertheless, I should point out that by ‘conscious subject’, I’m referring to those animals whose consciousness we may reliably assume, but who lack the capacity (that we can ascertain) for self-reflection and language. We define a conscious subject by attributing purposiveness to their perceived limitations as a living being - much of evolutionary theory is an example of this, as are the judgements we make of assumed intentionality against us. A conscious subject with no concept of self is not only incapable of distinguishing between meaning and value, but distinguishes between one value-meaning (purpose) and another only by attributing them as properties of objects in the environment in relation to that subject’s own intentionality (of which it is unaware). The attribution of value-meaning without distinction to a conscious subject defines the existence of that conscious subject by an assumed (if uncertain) purpose.
A self-conscious existence has the capacity to recognise that values vary in relation to meaning. But we tend to assume that we ‘create meaning’ from our perception of value/potential - and most of our language structure is built on this assumption, including the way we define abstract concepts. The way I see it, we hypothesise and test meaning from a limited perception of value/potential in relation to a perception of our own value-meaning (self). It is only when we account for our limitations and correct for prediction errors that we will recognise our position in the dimensional relation between value and meaning (eg. a limited observation of the solar system perpetuated the geocentric model, despite unavoidable prediction errors).
I apologise if this seems confusing. The challenge I often encounter in explanations at this level is with language and logic, which assumes a subject-object relation, value/conceptual structure as the container of existence, and meaning to be subsumed under concepts. A six-dimensional metaphysics considers meaningfulness (what matters) to be the container of existence, inclusive of all possible relations, conceivable or otherwise. This has the unsettling effect of de-centring and deconstructing perception of the ‘self’ as subject, and allowing for conception of a reality in which a self-conscious existence is valid and purposive, yet ultimately unnecessary in itself - it matters in how it relates within all possible existence. Like other principles of relativity, it isn’t where we operate in day-to-day interactions, but I find it improves understanding in dealing with the bigger questions...
-PossibilityThanks for pointing this out - I think it’s more purposiveness or intentionality, rather than a specific, definable purpose. This relates to Kant. We have purpose, we are purposeful in our actions, but I agree that
don’t appear to have ‘a purpose’ as such. Likewise, there is meaning to life - a meaningfulness to living - but not a definable meaning as such. Nevertheless, I should point out that by ‘conscious subject’, I’m referring to those animals whose consciousness we may reliably assume, but who lack the capacity (that we can ascertain) for self-reflection and language. We define a conscious subject by attributing purposiveness to their perceived limitations as a living being - much of evolutionary theory is an example of this, as are the judgements we make of assumed intentionality against us. A conscious subject with no concept of self is not only incapable of distinguishing between meaning and value, but distinguishes between one value-meaning (purpose) and another only by attributing them as properties of objects in the environment in relation to that subject’s own intentionality (of which it is unaware). The attribution of value-meaning without distinction to a conscious subject defines the existence of that conscious subject by an assumed (if uncertain) purpose.
-PossibilityA self-conscious existence has the capacity to recognise that values vary in relation to meaning. But we tend to assume that we ‘create meaning’ from our perception of value/potential - and most of our language structure is built on this assumption, including the way we define abstract concepts. The way I see it, we hypothesise and test meaning from a limited perception of value/potential in relation to a perception of our own value-meaning (self). It is only when we account for our limitations and correct for prediction errors that we will recognise our position in the dimensional relation between value and meaning (eg. a limited observation of the solar system perpetuated the geocentric model, despite unavoidable prediction errors).
I apologise if this seems confusing. The challenge I often encounter in explanations at this level is with language and logic, which assumes a subject-object relation, value/conceptual structure as the container of existence, and meaning to be subsumed under concepts. A six-dimensional metaphysics considers meaningfulness (what matters) to be the container of existence, inclusive of all possible relations, conceivable or otherwise. This has the unsettling effect of de-centring and deconstructing perception of the ‘self’ as subject, and allowing for conception of a reality in which a self-conscious existence is valid and purposive, yet ultimately unnecessary in itself - it matters in how it relates within all possible existence. Like other principles of relativity, it isn’t where we operate in day-to-day interactions, but I find it improves understanding in dealing with the bigger questions...