Also, I think that when you speak of your awareness of an event which just happened, as part of your experience of the present, I think you need to include your awareness (anticipation) of an event which is about to happen, as part of your awareness of the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can I perceive a duration if I exist within this duration?

I have an experience of the present, and this experience might be a moment of time or might be a duration.

Prior to this moment in time or duration is the past. My memories of past events must be part of my present experience. My anticipation of future events must also be part of my present experience.

I am aware of my existence.

If I existed outside a duration, then I could be objectively aware of it.

In order to subjectively perceive a duration, I cannot exist at only one moment in time, but must exist within this duration.

But if I existed within a duration, then my awareness, which has a duration, cannot be aware of its own duration. My only awareness could be of a timelessness.

It seems that our perceptions may not be of duration but of timelessness.

Try reading the essay carefully. Not only what the paradox is, but its effects. — Amity

That is avoiding the question.

The author describes the Authoritarian Liberty Paradox as, for example, a worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power.

This is what I call the Authoritarian Liberty Paradox: a worldview that denounces power, structure and constraint while glorifying individuals who wield all three.

Nowhere in the article does the author explain how a worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power is a paradox.

It may be hypocritical, it may be nonsense, but that doesn't make it a paradox.

George Bernard Shaw's "youth is wasted on the young" is a paradox, because although initially it seems contradictory, on reflection it makes sense.

"A worldview that denounces power while glorifying individuals who wield power" is certainly contradictory, but also makes no sense.

Can you explain in your own words why it is a paradox?

I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is no moment in time, then I cannot exist at any particular moment in time

If there is a duration of time, then I can only exist within this duration of time.

If I exist within a duration of time, this would explain how I am able to perceive a duration of time.

But how long would this duration of time be?

For example, I have the awareness of an event happening now, the memory of an event that happened 1 second ago and the memory of an event that happened 10 years ago.

Would the duration of time be quite short, such as 1 second, or limitless, which would presuppose there is no time at all.

How can we find out how long this duration of time is?

This is what I call the Authoritarian Liberty Paradox: a worldview that denounces power, structure and constraint while glorifying individuals who wield all three — Moliere

The liberty paradox - more dangerous than mere hypocrisy - is shown in its extreme form. — Amity

I don't understand where the paradox comes from.

If someone denounces power yet glorifies an individual that wields power they could be called a hypocrite or could be said to be talking nonsense.

Where is the paradox?

I have read some of the comments and it might be that an opportunity is being missed

For example, one could ask whether the writing is in fact philosophical writing. Is the content philosophical or is the writing about the content philosophical?

Even if it is philosophical writing, is it a philosophical essay? A philosophical essay is a sub-group within philosophical writing.

Even if a philosophical essay, can it be improved? A philosophical essay has certain requirements. Are these being met?

This exercise is a great opportunity to learn, not only about the nature of philosophy but also about the expression of philosophy within language.

By their actions shalt thou know them. And according to their actions - rather than your imagination or their rhetoric - should you judge them. — Vera Mont

It is not about crimes committed. It is about, as you said:

Why would a man be in a teenaged girls' changing room? — Vera Mont

Have a lot of men pretending to identify as women asked to be in the teenaged girls' dressing rooms? — Vera Mont

It doesn't need to be a lot to make a problem, a few is sufficient.

That there are not a lot of deaths in road traffic accidents in London on a particular day does not mean that deaths in road traffic accidents is not a problem.

As the article in "Feminist Current" writes

In recent years, prisons across the Western world have been allowing men who identify as women to be housed alongside female inmates, leading to sexual harassment, sexual assaults, pregnancies, and complaints from women both in prison and among the general public. These complaints have been mostly ignored by governments and those with the power to do something.

The difficulty is being able to distinguish between someone identifying as something and someone pretending to identify as something, which is one of the themes of this essay "The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox".

Neither wants to appear authoritarian because in a culture that values freedom and individualism over authoritarianism, that would look ugly. — Harry Hindu

:100:

What would real world examples of radical individualism and radical institutionalism look like? I gave an example of radical individualism as a hermit. How does a hermit's choice to live in the Canadian or Alaskan wilderness affect you the life you choose to live? How does that compare to the influence radical institutionalism would have on your life's choices? — Harry Hindu

Our daily lives are more impacted by radical institutionalism than radical individualism.

The hermit in Alaska, as an example of radical individualism, has little affect on my life. However, the European Union, as an example of radical institutionalism, does have a wide-ranging negative affect on the lives of European citizens.

Radical institutionalism is either authoritarian or very close to it.

Therefore, it is the radical institutions that we should be the most wary of, especially when they present themselves as supporters of the individual.

It is not so much an Authoritarian Liberty Paradox, but rather an Authoritarian Liberty Hypocrisy.

The leaning may now have gone in the opposite direction, that all 'biological males', including those who wish to become women should be viewed as potential 'rapists'. — Jack Cummins

Yes, radical positions are not helpful, whether radical individualism or radical institutionalism. Voyeurism might be a less radical explanation. Even so, 3.8 billion years of life's reproductive evolution on Earth is difficult to ignore.

It seems to me that the answers lie between the two extremes — Harry Hindu

So it seems to me. Neither radical individualism nor radical institutionalism.

Why would a man be in a teenaged girls' changing room? — Vera Mont

Just ask a man!!! :rofl:

The common sense of an authoritarian: Donald Trump signs order proclaiming there are only two sexes. In what Trump's administration has branded a "common sense" order, the government will recognise only two sexes, ending all federal funding or recognition of gender identities. — Amity

Also the Supreme Court in the UK, who have judged that legally the term "woman" means a biological woman.

Baroness Falkner, who heads the watchdog that regulates equality laws, described the judgement as a victory for common sense.

Regarding "the common sense of an authoritarian":

Are you saying 1) Trump is an authoritarian who happens to have common sense about this particular gender issue or 2) Trump is an authoritarian because he has common sense about this particular gender issue?

. It depends whether any flexibility and common sense will apply or simply rigid policies, which may occur within authoritarianism. — Jack Cummins

:100: I agree. Who would want authoritarianism. Common sense is better.

I tend to start with the title. Then the subtitle:
The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox: A Study in Contradictions and Nonsense — Amity

Who could disagree with the title?

Who could not dislike a public figure who says that they support liberty but in practice is an authoritarian. No one likes a hypocrite.

The problem is, the thesis of the essay is contradicted by the body and conclusion of the essay.

The thesis argues that radical individualism is a political philosophy that on the one hand publicly supports the individual against the institutions but on the other hand privately supports the institutions against the individual.

Yet the body and conclusion of the essay argue something totally different, that radical individualism supports the individual against the institutions.

The essay makes no case that radical individualism is an example of Authoritarian Liberty. In fact, it makes exactly the opposite case.

In America, Trump has been harsh in his fundamentalist approach towards trans individuals. — Jack Cummins

Do you have a better example?

Not wanting a man who self-identifies as a woman into teenage girls' changing rooms is more an example of common sense than authoritarianism.

What is the subject of this essay?

The author's thesis states that "This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose"

However, in section 3, the author makes a strong case that radical individualism is a coherent political philosophy.

The individualism examined here is not the moderate liberalism of dignity and mutual recognition. It is a more radical variant: anti-institutional, absolutist in its commitment to negative liberty and rooted in a metaphysical image of the self as a pre-social moral unit. This view rejects collective responsibility and treats the individual as both the source and end of all ethical concern.

The author concludes that radical individualism is a coherent political philosophy, even if it is flawed.

Radical individualism offers a seductive vision. It promises a world without interference, where each person is the sole author of their fate, untouched by history, insulated from obligation and immune to the needs of others. It is, at first glance, a philosophy of dignity and moral clarity. A defence of the self against the claims of society.

The thesis in the introduction is at odds with the body and conclusion.

This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. By examining its philosophical roots and public champions we expose a paradox at its core: the celebration of liberty through authoritarian means.

We focus on three figures: Elon Musk, Donald Trump and Jordan Peterson. Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. Yet each depends on immense institutional power. Musk benefits from public subsidies and corporate scale, Trump commands state machinery and nationalist rhetoric, Peterson draws authority from platforms and institutional critique.

Within this writing are two distinct and independent topics.

Topic one is saying that radical individualism as a political philosophy is both flawed and dangerous, and in section 3 a strong case is made for this claim.

Topic two is saying that Musk, Trump and Peterson are hypocrites in pretending that they don't believe in institutions whilst in fact making use of them, for which no evidence is given.

Topic one is basically a philosophical essay. Topic two isn't.

The problem is that these two different topics are jumbled up into one piece of writing, making it difficult to unpick them.

This writing, "The Authoritarian Liberty paradox", is basically a philosophical essay that does include evidence about radical individualism jumbled up with an attack without any evidence on Musk, Trump and Peterson.

Have you ever read a philosophical essay before? — Jamal

Is this a philosophical essay?

A philosophical essay makes a claim and then defends it. Where does the author defend their claim? Where does the author make a counterargument?

There is no Aeneas without the Trojans and future Romans. He is an exceptional individual. A hero. The son of a god. Yet his desires are continually subservient to the needs of the whole, and shaped by the destiny of the whole. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox

There seem to be three main points in this essay.

Point 1. The author is opposed to Nozick's Entitlement Theory, which he calls radical individualism. The author is in favour of the individual as being part of a society.

As the author puts it:

Real freedom is not the absence of others. It is the presence of shared conditions in which dignity, voice and action become possible. It is built not in retreat but in relationship. If we continue to treat liberty as a solitary performance rather than a shared foundation, we will not only mistake inequality for merit but we will also hollow out democracy itself. The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox is not just an intellectual contradiction; it is a political danger. One we must name clearly and confront together.

As you put it:

This is, for instance, not what one gets even looking at the old heroic epics. There is no Aeneas without the Trojans and future Romans. He is an exceptional individual. A hero. The son of a god. Yet his desires are continually subservient to the needs of the whole, and shaped by the destiny of the whole. Without the whole, he wouldn't be a hero.

Point 2. The author says that there are some people who pretend that they believe in radical individualism but are in fact using this to disguise their Authoritarianism.

Point 3. The author says that Musk, Trump and Peterson are examples of people referred to in Point 2.

As regards Point 2, I am sure many examples of such people can be found both in current and past administrations.

As regards Point 3, the author gives no evidence to support their claim. A philosophical essay makes a claim then defends it. The author has made this claim but neither defends it nor makes a counter-argument.

As regards Point 1, he is setting up a radical position few would probably agree with. He even calls it "radical individualism", almost a pejorative term, rather than a more mainstream term such as Libertarianism, which would have wider support.

Nozick's Entitlement Theory, radical individualism, I would suggest, would have minimal support (as the name suggests). I am sure that many figures in public life are hypocrites. The author does not defend his claim that Musk, Trump and Peterson pretend to support radical individualism yet are at heart Authoritarians.

That's pretty much the point. Institutions brought them fortune, power and fame and they're busily attacking and tearing down those institutions, in order to deprive other people of the protection they offer. — Vera Mont

Do you have any evidence that they are attacking and tearing down those institutions that brought them fortune, power and fame?

I am always willing to change my opinion if there is something that I don't know about.

[TPF Essay] The Authoritarian Liberty Paradox

I have the following comments just on the introduction to the paper.
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This essay argues that radical individualism is less a coherent political philosophy than a theatrical pose that conceals its reliance on collective institutions, rationalizes inequality and rebrands domination as personal freedom. — Moliere

The essay starts with a straw man fallacy (an argument that misrepresents an opponent's position and then attacks it). Radical individualism as a coherent political philosophy does not rely on collective institutions and domination, though it may rationalise inequality. If there is a coherent political philosophy that does rely on collective institutions, domination and rationalises inequality, then it is not radical individualism.

Logically, I cannot disagree with the idea that if Radical Individualism as a political philosophy is not about radical individualism, then it is not Radical Individualism.

The author is attacking a political philosophy for something it is not.
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Though differing in style and domain all present the image of a self-legitimating individual opposed to collective authority. — Moliere

Hardly accurate, when Musk's companies employ about 110,000 people worldwide, Trump in the 2024 US election gained 77,302,416 votes to Kamala Harris's 75,012,178 votes and Peterson is Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Toronto.

The use of the word "present" is ambiguous. Is the author saying that these three people deliberately present themselves as individuals opposed to authority, or is the author's subjective opinion.
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At its heart lies a contradiction between rejecting institutions in theory and relying on them in practice. — Moliere

I find it very hard to believe that Musk, Trump and Peterson reject institutions in theory, as each of them clearly depend on institutions for their livelihoods.

Is the author arguing that these three want to return to a time before there were any Institutions?
===============================================================================

In the world shaped by these figures, from techno-utopianism to populist grievance to self-help transcendence, the individual is imagined as sovereign, institutions as suspect and freedom as a solitary conquest. — Moliere

I am sure that most would agree that the individual is sovereign and institutions are suspect. Institutions were created for the benefit of the individual. The individual is not there for the benefit of the Institution.

I what way would the author disagree with John Stuart Mill about the individual as being sovereign?

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. … In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

===============================================================================

What makes this paradox politically dangerous is not just its incoherence but its corrosive effect on democratic norms and public solidarity — Moliere

Any paradox in radical individualism is a construction of this essay. There is no paradox in radical individualism as a coherent political philosophy.

There is only a paradox when the paper describes radical individualism as something it is not.

There is only a paradox when the paper describes Musk, Trump and Peterson as holding opinions that they in fact don't hold, such as the dismantling of democracy. Where is the evidence that this is something they have promoted?

I have made the essays public, as promised. — Jamal

:100: After all, we are not a secret society.

I did very much like the paper, but this statement of the thesis (which occurs a few times) actually strikes me as somewhat ambiguous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I also liked the paper, and liked that it was clearly written. As Prof. Adrian Piper wrote in his article "Ten Commandments of Philosophical Writing" Thou shalt not obscure thy ideas with turgid prose.

Being clearly written then allows me to understand what the author is trying to say, even if I disagree with the author's premise that "ungrounded certainties enable knowledge", and even if I find parts of the author's essay ambiguous.

The author is standing their ground in being clear in what they are saying. This enables the reader to properly engage with their argument, even if the reader then disagrees with the author's argument. It is then up to the reader to explain why they disagree with the author's argument, thereby moving the philosophical debate forwards. Philosophy should be a dialogue, as Adrian Piper says in his article "Ten Commandments of Philosophical Writing".

A clearly written philosophical essay is the hinge upon which new philosophical knowledge may be gained.
===============================================================================

The problem I see, which Joshs gets at, is that B seems to risk equivocating re many common and classical definitions of "knowledge." A critic could say that knowledge is about the possession of truth simpliciter. It is not about possession or assent to "what is true given some foundational/hinge belief" (which itself may be true or untrue). This redefinition seems to open the door on "knowing" things that are false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As you say, to say that hinges give knowledge is not generally how we understand the word knowledge, as being something that is universally true.

For the animalist, all things, including animals, plants and rocks, possess a distinct spiritual essence. For the animalist, their hinge proposition may be "this plant possesses a spiritual essence". This gives them the knowledge that this plant possesses a spiritual essence.

For the atheist, no thing possesses a distinct spiritual essence. For the atheist, their hinge proposition may be "this plant doesn't possesses a spiritual essence". This gives them the knowledge that this plant doesn't possesses a spiritual essence.

The animalist sees a plant and knowing that all plants possess a spiritual essence knows that the plant they are looking at possesses a spiritual essence. The atheist sees the same plant and knowing that no things possess a spiritual essence knows that the plant that they are looking at doesn't possess a spiritual essence.

As you say, this is not how we understand knowledge, being something universally true.

The hinge proposition imposes itself on the world. We then observe this world. This enables us to confirm that the hinge proposition is true. The hinge proposition confirms its own truth self-referentially.

Another example. Let my hinge proposition be "the sun always rises in the east". In the event that I observe the sun rising in the east, this confirms my hinge proposition. In the event that I observe what I think is the sun rising in the west, then it cannot be the sun, thereby again confirming my hinge proposition.

A hinge proposition such as "here is one hand" gives knowledge that here is one hand. But this is self-referential knowledge, which is not how we generally understand knowledge as being universally true, as you say.

"This paper argues that ungrounded certainties enable knowledge, rather than undermining it, and that hinges and Gödel's unprovable statements serve a similar purpose."

If only all philosophy writing was as clearly written as this essay.

How do axioms and hinges relate to knowledge?

Let the axiom be "the sun rises in the east". This axiom can never be proved true. If one day the sun rose in the west, then the axiom is false. The axiom "the sun rises in the east" is not knowledge, as it can never be proved true.

Let the hinge be "the sun rises in the east". This hinge is a certainty. If one day what we think is the sun rises in the west, then what we see cannot be the sun. The hinge "the sun rises in the east" is knowledge regardless of what we observe.

Whereas hinges enable knowledge, axioms don't serve a similar purpose, as they can never be knowledge

So, taking for granted that it takes a few brief moments to say the word “instant”, then the moment “instant” is said, we have a duration long enough to find infinity. — Fire Ologist

Yes, it is hard to imagine that if time exists there would be any reason for it to end.

A moment of time, since it is “of time” must have some duration, and once you have a duration you see the infinite. — Fire Ologist

Suppose a stationary snooker ball on a snooker table is hit by a snooker cue at position zero and travels 1 metre in 2 seconds.

When the snooker ball passes through a location exactly 50cm from where it was hit, the time will be exactly 1 second.

As the ball can be exactly at 50cm, the time can be exactly 1 second.

There is no duration of time the moment, the instant, the ball is at 50cm.

Since the moment we first clocked the first moment,
We touched infinitely in all directions, before and forever after, all at that first instant of time. — Fire Ologist

Doesn't this lead to a logical contradiction? In an instant of time, by definition, there is no before or after. That is why it is an instant of time.

The mind not only causes subjective time but also causes the physical (this is discussed in my other thread here), so it is no surprise that there is synchrony between the passage of subjective time and changes in physical. — MoK

P1) Physical and experience exist and they are subject to change
P2) Experience is due to the existence of physical and the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience.

I agree with P1)

As regards P2), "experience is due to the existence of physical", I can understand that I may experience happiness because of the physical existence of my dog.

I can understand the existence of an experience is due to the change in state of physical, in that the existence of my experience of sorrow is due to the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead.

But as regards P2) "the change in the state of physical is due to the existence of an experience", I don't understand how the change in the physical state of my dog from living to dead is due to my experience of sorrow.

That is what I dispute (ie, I see a tree persisting through time). We can only see at the moment of the present, so that there is something there which persists through time, a tree in your example, is a conclusion drawn with the aid of memory.....................That's not true (ie, I can only be conscious of my present), because we have memory. So we are conscious of the past. Also, we anticipate the future, so we are conscious of the future too. — Metaphysician Undercover

The question is, whilst there is probably general agreement that we can perceive (see) a tree at one moment in time, can we perceive (see) a tree persisting through time, what Bergson calls "duration"?

Is what Kant calls the Transcendental Unity of Apperception a valid concept, where we can have a unity of consciousness about successive moments in time.

At this moment in time in the present I see a tree and a clock showing 2pm, and I have the memory of seeing the tree in the past when the clock showed 1pm.

I agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of my memory of the tree in the past, but this is not to agree that at this moment in time I can be conscious of the tree in the past

It seems to me that we exist at one moment in time, including our mind and brain, as well as everything else in the world, including trees, tables and chairs.

That being said, I also feel that I am conscious of the persistence and duration of time. This raises the mysterious metaphysical problem of how a duration of time can exist at a moment in time. Kant thought it could, and he called it the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

The Transcendental Unity of Apperception does not mean that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the tree in the past. It still means that at the moment in time in the present I can be conscious of the memory of the tree in the past. But it does mean that at this moment in time I perceive that time persists and has a duration.

Suppose you are correct and we can only see a moment of the present. Let us say that in this present moment we see a tree and a clock showing 2pm and we have the memory of a tree and a clock showing 1pm.

How do we know that the tree we see at 2pm is the same tree we saw at 1pm?

It is a general problem. How do you know that the chair in your memory is the same chair you are now looking at. Only by inference, and if only by inference your inference could be wrong.

This is Hume's problem where we have to infer they are the same tree because of constant conjunction.

Kant's solution is we know that they are the same tree because we are conscious of the persistence of time, what Bergson calls the duration. Kant called it the Transcendental unity of Apperception.

You say that we can only see a moment in the present, which I agree with, but even so, even in this moment in the present, don't you feel the persistence of time?

What is perceived is change, not persistence..................................But it may be the case that this persistence is only within me, and projected onto the outside, creating the illusion of a thing outside me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what is meant by perceive. It can mean to see something, such as "I perceive a tree in the distance". It can mean to know something, such as "I perceive that you are curious." Kant in B276 of the CPR talks about perceiving a thing outside me that is persistent, inferring by perceiving he means seeing rather than knowing.

It is not the case that I see a tree and a moment later I see the same tree, but rather I see a tree persisting through time.

The tree doesn't need to change in order to be persistent through time.

But I only exist at one moment in time, meaning that I can only be conscious of my present, my "now". It follows that it would therefore be impossible to project my consciousness of the persistence of objects onto the world outside me.

Therefore, the consciousness of my existence in time is possible only by the persistence through time of actual things outside me, thereby proving the existence of objects in space outside me.

You might want to read the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason for a close look at the way Kant thinks. It has to be understood that whatever one can say about objective time presupposes subjective time. — Astrophel

There is the metaphysical problem of the possibility of subjective duration in the mind within an objective moment in time in the world. In Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of perception, a unified and simultaneous consciousness derived from different and successive experiences.

There is the necessity to clarify the meanings of objective and subjective time.

As regards what I call objective time, this is time external to any observer, and therefore not subjective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B276 The Refutation of Idealism

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.

As regards what I call subjective time, this is time internal to an observer, and therefore not objective time. This is the time referred to by Kant in B140 of the CPR.

However, when he refers to the objective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a priori within the mind, the pure form of intuition in time and the pure synthesis of the understanding. When he refers to the subjective unity of consciousness, he is intending the a posteriori representations and appearances, also within the mind, the empirical synthesis and the inner sense.

One problem with the CPR is that Kant states what is the case, but not how it is the case. We may agree that it the case that we do have a transcendental unity of apperception, but we also want to know how this is the case.

Anyway, in the everyday sense of the terms, things are taken differently in different contexts, but Heidegger does ontology, which is meant to be the analytic context where things are understood in their "equiprimordiality" — Astrophel

There is the metaphysical problem as to how a subjective duration can exist in an objective instant.
Equiprimordial means that two or more different equal phenomena can only be understood in relation to each other, and are not based on another common fundamental phenomena.

It is true that duration and instant are different phenomena that can be understood in relation to each other, in that duration and instant are mutually contradictory, and that a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant.

But they do have something in common and that is they are both temporal events, so in this sense are not equiprimordial.

However, what is more important is the law of non contradiction. By this law, a temporal event cannot be both a duration and an instant. It follows that it is logically impossible for a subjective duration to exist in an objective instant

Then how to explain Kant's Transcendental Unity of Apperception?

1) This present indeed corresponds to an instant in objective time—the “now” that can be measured.
2) Yet, this present is not simply that isolated instant. It is formed through the passive synthesis of past and future moments, which are contracted and integrated into it. The synthesis constitutes a continuous temporal flow within the present; it is making it not just a single point but a dynamic duration where moments are interconnected and experienced as a unified flow of time. — Number2018

From 1), the present is an instant. From 2), the present is a duration.

Many words have more than one meaning. For example, "bank" may mean a) a financial institution b) a raised area of land alongside a body of water. "Train" may mean a) a series of connected cars or carriages b) to teach or prepare someone for a specific task or skill.

Linguistically, I agree that in different contexts, the same world may have more than one meaning. In one context, that of the world, "present" may mean an instant. In a different context, that of the mind, "present" may mean a duration.

However, this is a different problem to the metaphysical problem as to how a duration can exist in an instant.

Then the world is turned upside down as one encounters Kant's Copernican Revolution. — Astrophel

The question as to how the subjective duration of time in the mind relates to objective moments of time in the world has been around since at least Kant's Copernican Revolution, and his concept of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

Kant presented the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as a fact in his Critique of Pure Reason without explanation, and the problem is still awaiting an explanation more than two hundred years later.

In the Transcendental Unity of Apperception there is a unity of consciousness resulting from the coherent synthesis of a succession of different contents. This act of synthesis is not experienced. Only the consequence of this acts of synthesis is experienced, the unity of different contents.

Kant in his Transcendental Unity of Apperception is finding a necessary connection between different contents, whereas Hume only found a contingent connection through a constant conjunction of different events.

The problem is in part discovering necessary connections between different contents.

Depends on what you mean by 'present' — Astrophel

There is the present within the mind of an observer. Thinking about present experience, past memories and future implications.

There is the present in the absence of any observer. The Earth as part of a Solar System, preceded by the Big Bang and followed by the Big Freeze.

The present within the mind of an observer exists as a subjective duration. The present in a world absent of any observer exists as an objective instant.

However, the observer, where the present exists as a subjective duration, exists within this world, where the present exists as an objective instant.

One asks how subjective duration relates to objective instant.

Perhaps in order to answer this question, we should take on board Husserl's concept of phenomenological reduction. We should attempt a meditative approach, fully grounded in the present, absent of any preconceptions from our past and absent of any implications about our future.

But yes, you nearly have it here: "these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now"," but for one important matter: The now cannot be understood as a place where all things temporal intersect or settle. — Astrophel

Recollections of the past and implications of the future must exist in the present, in the "now".

But doesn't that mean that it is in the present where all things temporal (recollections, implications, the "now") intersect or settle?

It is not that the present is a dimension of time: the present alone exists. — Number2018

I agree.

In Bergson’s example, when the mind contemplates the sounds of the four o'clock strikes, each stroke or excitation is logically independent of the others. — Number2018

It seems so. When I hear the clock strike for the second time, I have the retention (memory) of the clock striking for the first time and the anticipation (future) of the clock striking for the third time. In objective time, each stroke is independent of the others, in that each successive ‘now’ of the clock contains nothing of the past because each objective moment is separate and distinct. In subjective time, each stroke is also independent of the others, in that we are able to distinguish them.

Unlike any mere memory of distinct elements, we contract them into a living temporal flow that is dynamic and continuous, differing from a mechanical sequence of moments...Both do not simply register a sequence of discrete sensory inputs but synthesize time, creating a continuous living flow. — Number2018

I don't understand Deleuze's explanation of "synthesis". On the one hand, the present alone exists. On the other hand, within this present there is a "temporal flow".

How can there be a flow of time within a single moment in time?

What if reality is not completely determined by physical principles? — Wayfarer

What is the physical reality of time?

Let us start by ignoring quantum mechanics contribution to this problem, because as you wrote "Likewise Roger Penrose and Albert Einstein said they thought quantum physics is radically incomplete."

Consider the equation ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, which very accurately and very successfully predicts the position of a stone falling in a gravitational field .

This equation represents a physical principle, that ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, and the undoubted success of equations such as this strongly suggests that reality is founded on physical principles.

It is not so much the case that reality has been determined by physical principles, but rather that reality is physical principles.

But in what sense is the reality of space understood by "d", and in what sense is the reality of time understood by "t"?

Equations such as the above are part of the undoubted success of science. They are able to very accurately predict future events in the observable world. This naturally leads to the principle of Scientific Realism, the philosophical view that the world of space and time exists independently of any observer (Wikipedia - Scientific Realism). Such a world would also exist independently of any scientific theory developed by these observers in their search to better understand this world.

But "t" is not time, it is a letter, a symbol. It is certainly not time as it exists in a physical world, even though it can be successfully used to accurately predict future events .

Cat Gillen in his article "Hossenfelder vs Goff: Do electrons exist?" refer to Scientific Realism, Scientific Antirealism as well as Structural Realism.

Hossenfelder and Goff argued whether electrons exist. Are scientific theories true and show us how the world really is or just useful tools for making predictions about events in the world. Even though Bohr's atomic model can make fantastically correct predictions, as a theory it is incorrect. Scientific Antirealism says that we should not ascribe truth to a scientific theory just because of its predictive success. But this misses an important point, that there must be some underlying truth to a scientific theory that is predicatively successful. Structural Realism may be a better approach, as it argues that even though we may overlay a semantic story onto a scientific theory, there must be an underlying structure from which it gains its predictive abilities. This underlying structure maps with the reality of the world. Both scientific theory and the reality in the world that it predicts must share the same inherent realism.

Superficially, "t" is the semantic overlay to the reality of time in the world, where "t" may be a symbol, figure of speech, metaphor or simile. But in order to account for its predictive success, "t" must share with time an unobserved yet common underlying structure as proposed by Structural Realism.

Therefore, if the symbol "t" and time share an underlying reality, it must be the case that the symbol "t" is able to give us insights about the nature of time.

Because of the predictive success of equations such as ${d = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$, and of scientific theories in general, the reality of time must have consistent and unchanging principles.

Rather, your now always already IS the past and future.........So recollection is the ecstatic unity of the recalled, being recalled in the forward looking of the present event, an event that is continuously on the threshold of anticipating what comes next...................................They are closer to Meister Eckhart's "On Detachment" — Astrophel

In my present, my "now", are not only my recollections of the past, but also my anticipations of the future. In this sense, my "now" does include the past and future.

Meister Eckhart writes in "On Detachment" that God, in his immovable detachment, which he has had since all eternity, has no past and future and does not see in a temporal fashion.

You should also know that God has stood in this unmoved detachment from all eternity, and still so stands; and you should know further that when God created heaven and earth and all creatures, this affected His unmoved detachment just as little as if no creature had ever been created.

But he also writes that man is not God. Not being God, man does not have this detachment, does see in a temporal fashion and does have a past, present and future.

Therefore, if a man is to be like God, as far as a creature can have likeness with God, this must come from detachment.

So man does have a present, a past of recollection and a future of implications.

For man, unlike God, recollection and implication can only exist in the present, can only exist in the "now".

If man can only exist in the present, in the "now", yet can think about recollections from the past and can think about implications concerning the future, then these recollections of the past and implications concerning the future must also exist in the present, in the "now".

You say "your now is always already in the past and future". Perhaps, however, it is more the case that "your past and future is always in your now"?

Yes, but when you speak of 'now' you are simply localizing subjective time, and the concept remains abstract. Analysis shows that what we call 'now' is really an ecstatic relation between temporal categories and there "really" is no boundary at all. — Astrophel

There are articles that describe how meditation can alter how we perceive the passing of time, for example "Meditation May Change the Way We Perceive Time"

New research has found that meditation can change the way that we perceive the passing of time. Researchers published new findings in the journal PLoS One. The studies found that mindfulness meditation increased happiness, decreased anxiety, and also changed people’s perception of time.

I sit staring into space for ten minutes and feel that it was a long time. I read for ten minutes and feel that it was a short time. My subjective feeling about the duration of an objective period of time does change depending upon circumstances.

At the start of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 10.55. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 11.05 will be in my future. At the end of this ten minutes, I am conscious that the clock shows 11.05. This is my present and my "now". The clock showing 10.55 was in my past. Throughout this ten minute period I am only conscious of being in the present, of my being in the "now". I am never conscious of being either in the past or if the future.

If my "now" can never be in the past and can never be in the future, does this not mean that my "now" is a distinct boundary between my past and my future?