is there anything that is both the essence of art, what makes art, art, and absolute?......But I claim art has this foundation......Art has this, I say. It is called the aesthetic......Propositions are inherently defeatable........ words all carry their own begation... — Constance

The problem is, how can the idea that "the essence of art is as an aesthetic" be expressed but not in propositional form, if as you say that "propositions are inherently defeatable" and "words all carry their own negation" ?

the essence of art — Constance

Language is not part of the essence of a modernist artwork.
I don't want to give the impression that I think that linguistic descriptions are part of the fundamental essence of a modernist artwork. Descriptions and definitions (succinct descriptions) may be helpful in the viewer's understand of the artwork but any such description is external to the artwork.

Though language is important in understanding the artwork
For example, when looking at a Classical Greek sculpture such as Laocoon and his Sons, admired by Hegel for its form and content, a deeper understanding of both the artwork and artist may be gained by knowing that for Hegel formal qualities meant "a unity and harmony of different elements in which these elements are not just arranged in a regular, symmetrical pattern but are unified organically" and content meant "an expression of freedom and richness of spirit".

Language is part of the essence of a postmodernist artwork
Language in postmodernism has a different function to that of language in modernism.
In postmodernism, there has been a blurring of the lines between art and language, where language itself has become a part of the artwork and where through the text the viewer is invited to directly engage with political and social issues within contemporary life. In postmodernism, the artwork is not an end in itself, but is an instrument by which the viewer is directed to political and social concerns held by the artist.

Modernism is more profound than postmodernism
Modernism (whose essence is aesthetic form of pictographic representation) enables a profundity not present in postmodernism because the viewer's interpretation is not restricted by having to comply with any language imposed on the artwork by the artist, as would be the case within a postmodernist artwork (where the aesthetic has been deliberately excluded and whose essence is symbolic representation).

IE, modernism is democratic in allowing the viewer a free interpretation, whereas postmodernism is authoritarian in directing the viewer's interpretation by means of the language imposed by the artist.

art — praxis

If I could suggest a description for your next Venice Biennale exhibit : "Located somewhere between a fantastical reality and the political chaos of modern life, praxis' sculptures weave together multiple narrative threads. As a keen observer of complex social dynamics, he subverts conventional codes of representation through the language of narrative sculpture. Magnifying issues of inequality and political uncertainty, the picturesque beauty of his vivid landscape belies a sinister reality in which the collision of sumptuous detail and subtle colour provides an insight into the social mores and political ideologies of the working postman.

In my opinion, equal if not better than Teresa Margolles 2019 Venice Biennale exhibit.

art theory — Constance

There are different approaches to a definition of art

1) Definitions as universal - @Pop wrote: "Art is an expression of human consciousness" - "consciousness unifies and integrates information, and I postulate - in a creative process. It seems consciousness is creativity" (y)

2) Definitions as abstract - @Constance wrote: "And: in the end, all concepts are open. Art is just among the most intractable. The only way to pin it down is to move into metaphysics. This is not impossible, I claim." (y)

3) Definitions as particular - @RussellA wrote: "the two main approaches to art are modernism and postmodernism. In modernism, the artwork is more important than the artist, the aesthetic is of equal importance to the representation and the representation is pictographic. In postmodernism the idea of the artwork is more important than the physical artwork, any aesthetic has been deliberately removed and any representation is symbolic rather than pictographic. (y)

4) Definitions as unhelpful - @Banno wrote: "definitions are not all that helpful, but further, any definition of art will immediately encourage any sensible artist to produce something that does not meet that definition" (n)

5) Definitions as futile - @TheMadFool wrote: "Art has been allowed to explore the world on its own for too long - it's a wild animal now and taming it, which a definition is, is futile." (n)

Definitions are important in understanding modernism

In postmodernism the meaning of art has become meaningless as anything can be art, such as Warhol's Brillo Boxes, so any attempt at an underlying definition becomes pointless.

However, in modernism, it is the case that some objects have artistic value, such as Matisse's Dance 1910, and some don't, such as Warhol's Brillo Boxes. If some objects within modernism have artistic value and some don't, there must be objective and subjective reasons. As modernist artworks have great social, cultural and intellectual value, intellectual curiosity requires an attempt to discover reasons why they hold such important meaning.

IE, definitions, as succinct summaries of complex ideas, are an important aspect in the understanding of modernism.

Definitions can communicate subjective experience

As with Mary in Mary's Room, Mary may know all the objective facts about the colour red, and yet never had the subjective experience of the colour red.

The value of a modernist artwork, its essence, is in its particular subjective experience. The idea that definitions are unhelpful in communicating the nature of art assumes that definitions can only describe objective facts and not subjective experiences. But definitions do more than this. Definitions communicate between people by describing the whole - "aesthetic form is unity of parts within a varied whole" - and naming the parts - "unity", etc. Linguistic communication depends on agreed public names having private subjective meanings.

IE, as definitions are able to communicate the subjective essence of an artwork by naming rather than describing, definitions are invaluable in any discussion about art.

Definitions are not futile

If definitions were futile, then we would be deep in a postmodernist Alice in Wonderland world where any word can mean whatever the speaker wants it to mean. This would result in the breakdown of communication, such that when I talk about my car I mean a small vessel for travelling over water, propelled by oars, sails, or an engine, and when I talk about my boat I mean a four-wheeled road vehicle that is powered by an engine

Definitions are not unhelpful
If definitions about art were unhelpful, the Tate would not write that "Performance Art is artworks that are created through actions performed by the artist or other participants, which may be live or recorded, spontaneous or scripted".

Or why the SEP have a 10,000 word long article on "The Definition of Art" - including Kant's definition as “a kind of representation that is purposive in itself and, though without an end, nevertheless promotes the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication”

Or the Minnesota State University's web site linking to Tolstoy's definition of art as "a means of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and progress toward well‐being of individuals and of humanity."

IE, Even if there is no agreement as to a single definition of art, definitions are helpful in attempting to understand the meaning of art.

Summary

Any underlying definition of art is pointless in postmodernism, as anything can be art, but in modernism, definitions are an important aspect in understanding the great social, cultural and intellectual importance of modernist artworks.

I find the idea of a mailbox standing in the middle of a lake rather aesthetically appealing. — praxis

I can see your artwork Mailbox in Lake taking pride of place at the 2022 Venice Biennale. (y)

Again, we can easily imagine a red letterbox out of context. In experience we cannot separate one from its context, — praxis

I agree that I would have difficulty understanding what was going on if I saw an object such as a red letter box out of its normal context in the middle of lake

But I would have no trouble with my subjective experience of the colour red (or aesthetic form) regardless of the object's context - whether at the end of a street or the middle of a lake.

Unless you have perfect pitch you couldn’t hear a musical note and identify it. You could learn how to do this with practice however.
What does it even mean to say that an object can be removed from its external context? — praxis

If I see a letter box at the end of the street, I may have the subjective experience of the colour red.

I don't need to identify what shade of red it is in order to have the subjective experience of the colour red.

The aesthetic form of the object can be removed from its external context
My subjective experience of the colour red is independent of any function the letter box may have. Similarly, my subjective experience of the aesthetic form of the letter box is independent of any function that the letter box has.

post modernism has made a mockery of art — Pop

I agree - the postmodernist "Artworld" with its "institutional definition of art" is destroying any value in the definition of art by pushing the agenda that art is defined in whatever way they deem it to be defined.

Suppose that no human ever bothered to distinguish the color of red from other colors. — praxis

When looking at the world, humans don't decide to distinguish between colours, but instinctively distinguish between colours, without thought or conscious effort.

Remarkably, in that long post you didn't use the word 'context' even once. — praxis

In a previous post I wrote "The aesthetic form of an object is independent of the object's context, as an object's aesthetic is the formal arrangement of the parts within the object, not any external context. The violence of a war can have an aesthetic and be ugly. The serenity of a garden can have an aesthetic and be beautiful".

In this particular post I summarised with the phrase "aesthetic as a formal arrangement of the parts within an object". Although not specifically referring to the context of the object, the phrase infers that the object's context is not part of the object's aesthetic.

The color is not in the object but on the object. — Khalif

Supposing that humans didn't exist, would the colour red still be on the object ?

you seem to have made up your own meaning of aesthetic. I’ll wager that you can’t explain what this is supposed to mean. — praxis

Thinking about the meaning of aesthetics rather than the definition of aesthetics:

The belief that the aesthetic is Uniformity within Variety goes back to at least Aristotle

Aristotle's Poetics is the first surviving philosophical treatise about the theory of drama in literary works. He wrote "Tragedy is a representation of a serious, complete action which has magnitude, in embellished speech, with each of its elements [used] separately in the [various] parts [of the play] and [represented] by people acting and not by narration, accomplishing by means of pity and terror the catharsis of such emotions."

As regards Variety, complex plots have reversals and recognitions, threats are resolved, and many types of art are blended, including language and music.
As regards Uniformity, actions should follow logically from the situation created by what has happened before, poetic narratives are unified by a plot whose logic binds up the constituent elements by necessity and probability.

As Francis Hutcheson wrote in 1725: “What we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety; so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity”.

IE, The belief that the aesthetic is Uniformity within Variety goes back to at least Aristotle.

The aesthetic is in the observer's experience of the object's form, not in the object's form

There are certain objective facts that may be described regarding the meaning of aesthetic, but the subjective experience itself is beyond description as that needs direct acquaintance.

Subjective experiences can include the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the redness of an evening sky, as well as aesthetic form. A subjective experience stands in contrast to a propositional attitude, a conscious visceral experience rather than an intellectual belief about the experience.

Starting with colour as an analogy, an observer observes a wavelength of 700nm. The observer can describe objective facts about the wavelength of 700nm, but cannot describe their subjective experience of the colour red. I can be described objective facts about a wavelength of 700nm, but I must have subjective acquaintance with the colour red.

Although the colour red is not in the object, the object is the cause of the subjective experience of the colour red, in that a change in the object may cause a cause in the subjective experience, ie, from red to blue. Although the object is the cause of the effect of subjective experience of red, the object does not determine that the subjective experience is red rather than blue say. The particular object is the cause of the subjective experience of red, which is external to the object, and not contained within the object.

Similarly, an observer observes a physical object, where the whole object is made up of parts, and the observer observes the parts and the relationships between the parts. The particular object is the cause of an aesthetic experience, which is external to the object, and not contained within the object. The particular form of the object is the cause of an aesthetic experience, and a subjective aesthetic experience is the effect. As effects are not contained in their causes, it is not the form of the object that is aesthetic but rather the observer's subjective experience of the form of the object.

IE, the aesthetic is in the observer's experience of the object's form, not in the object's form.

The aesthetic and Uniformity within Variety are both Kantian a priori knowledge

Kant in Critique of Reason wrote: i) "Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all other intuitions", ii) “any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori”, iii) “in whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them”, iv) "nothing in a priori knowledge can be ascribed to objects save what the thinking subject derives from itself".

Innate human a priori knowledge has been part of the evolution of sentient life since the Cambrian period 541 to 485 mya. Humans are born with significant innate a priori knowledge, such as the instinctive knowledge of the difference in touch between a hot and cold object, knowledge of spatial relationships in knowing whether object A is to the left or right of object B, knowledge of the difference between a red object and blue object, knowledge of the difference between horizontal and vertical lines as well as a rudimentary knowledge of the difference between good and bad, etc. If this were not the case then there would be classes in school teaching the subjective experience of hot and cold, red and blue, etc. However, whilst subjective experiences cannot be taught, the words describing these experience must be taught, whether hot and cold, chaud froid, caldo freddo, etc.

Included within such a priori knowledge is the aesthetic. 10 million people didn't visit the Louvre annually without a desire for an aesthetic experience, nor admire Derain's Collioure, never mind the classic lines of the Mercedes 560SL, the magnificence of the Empire States Building, the complex themes of Cervantes Don Quixote or the timelessness of Sade's Smooth Operator.

What these aesthetic experiences have in common is the observer's consciousness of an inexplicable, undeniable mysterious unity within what at first sight appears chaotic, unintelligible and complex. The conscious mind, in observing a world of seemingly chaotic complexity, is able to self-organise all this maelstrom of information using a priori knowledge of balance, colour, movement, scale, shape, good and bad and mixed with a fundamental morality into comprehensible and intelligible patterns of understanding - an aesthetic Uniformity within Variety.

IE, the aesthetic and Uniformity within Variety are both innate parts of the structure of the brain as Kantian a priori knowledge.

Summary

As the aesthetic as a formal arrangement of the parts within an object has been discussed since at least Aristotle, I would have thought the more difficult problem would be to give an example of an aesthetic that didn't depend on the formal arrangement of the parts within the object.

Part of the problem when discussing "art" are problems with terminology. As I see it:

There are two meanings of aesthetics
Aesthetic as a verb means the study of beauty.
Aesthetic as a noun means a particular formal unity of parts within a complex and varied whole

There are two main definitions of art
Art as modernism, where aesthetic form and pictographic representative content have equal roles. An art going back the Lascaux cave paintings and beyond.
Art as postmodernism, where aesthetic form is deliberately excluded and the representation is symbolic. An art that originated in the 1960's.

Art as modernism can be further subdivided into Modernism, Expressionism, Baroque, etc.
Art as postmodernism can be further subdivided into Conceptual, Contemporary, Performance, etc.

There are two meanings of modernism
There is the modernism as an approach going back to the Lascaux cave paintings and beyond.
There is the Modernism of Monet and the Impressionists where the representation was of contemporary society rather than historical subject.

There are two meaning of contemporary
A contemporary artist can mean any artist currently living and who can be working in a variety of styles.
A Contemporary art is a subdivision of postmodernism, where artists from the 1960's onwards wanted to reconnect art with contemporary life.

There are two meanings of "an artwork has value"
It can mean that there is an object that can have aesthetic value independently of any observer.
It can mean that objects cannot have aesthetic value independently of any observer, but only in the mind of an observer.

The meaning of words can change with time
When today we use the word aesthetic, Kant in the 18th C would have used the term "free beauty"
When today we use the word beauty, Kant would have used the term "adherent beauty".

Things are complicated when contemporary commentators on Kant replace the term "free beauty" by "beauty"

The aesthetic and beauty have different meanings
The aesthetic form of an object is independent of the object's context, as an object's aesthetic is the formal arrangement of the parts within the object, not any external context.
The violence of a war can have an aesthetic and be ugly.
The serenity of a garden can have an aesthetic and be beautiful.

The "Artworld" is not "The Art World"
The "Artworld" has been hijacked by the postmodernists. This can be dated back to Arthur Danto's The Artworld, which gave the "institutional definition of art", defining art as whatever art schools, museums, wealthy collectors and the media say it is.
"The Art World" is the world of most everyday practising professional and non-professional artists, predominantly working in the modernist style .


IE, in discussions about art, as with philosophy in general, communication can break down when different contributors attach different meanings to the same words.

aesthetic value — praxis

You are right. Similarly, when I am in the presence of any object, even though all objects have a temperature, I am not always appreciating that object's temperature.

Every observed object has aesthetic value - but not all aesthetic values are equal
If the aesthetic is understood as Hutcheson's "compound ratio of Uniformity and Variety", then every observed object has an aesthetic, and every observed object is an artwork. An observed object could be Derain's Bridge over the Riou or the Golden Gate Bridge. (y) @Constance

From the fact that every object has a temperature, it does not follow that all objects have the same temperature. The Mercedes AMG F1 W12 E Performance and the Skoda 1100 R are both cars, but it does not follow that they are the same. Warhol's Brillo Box and Rembrandt's Self Portrait are both artworks and both have an aesthetic, but it does not necessarily follow that they have the same artistic and aesthetic quality.

As the aesthetic experience originates in the observer and not the observed object, the aesthetic experience is subjective rather than objective, and it follows that there cannot be an absolute measure of aesthetic value. But even so, there may be general agreement between different observer's as to the aesthetic value of a particular object.

IE, even though every observed object has an aesthetic value, some observed objects have a greater aesthetic value than others.

Of what use is the aesthetic
One could ask of what practical use is Kirchner's Alpleben. It just sits on the wall doing nothing. At least with a car I can get from A to B, and at least with an oven I can cook evening dinner. The Kirchner gives me nothing practical, and yet for me the aesthetic value of the kirchner outweighs anything that is mundanely practical.

As the aesthetic experience is a qualia (apologies to Banno - although it is a useful word), in the same way as the pain of a headache, the taste of wine or the redness of an evening sky, it is a Kantian a priori intuition, and therefore beyond being able to be described.

As the value of tasting red wine is in the experience itself, the value of the aesthetic is in the experience itself.

Aesthetic intuition doesn't give specific knowledge, but it does point to the possibility of discovering greater knowledge. An aesthetic of "Uniformity and Variety" gives the promise of being able to to discover and understand patterns within a seemingly chaotic mass of unconnected information. The experience of the aesthetic points to the conscious organisation of seemingly chaotic information into comprehensible patterns. (y) @Pop

The engineer who designs a bridge and the child that makes a car of lego are both using their imagination and understanding in creative acts, though only the child's parents or the postmodernist would say that their creations have the same value. A Rembrandt Self-Portrait and a Warhol Brillo Box both have artistic and aesthetic value, but their artistic and aesthetic values are not comparable. It is better to strive for the sophistication of a Rembrandt than a simpleness of a Warhol.

IE, the aesthetic experience points to the possibility of discovering the "Uniformity" of patterns within a "Variety" of information.

Summary
Every observed object is an artwork and has an aesthetic, but the aesthetic value of some artworks is higher than others.

Does a work not provide the observer's mind with something to consider? — Tom Storm

Yes. Derain in 1905 created the object Estaque which provides the observer's mind with something to consider, thereby allowing the concepts meaning and quality to be applied.

But could an object have either meaning or quality if no-one ever had knowledge of its existence ?

"Does the quality of an artwork reside in the art work itself, or in the mind of the observer, or artist?" — Pop

I agree with Pop "the quality of the art work resides in the mind of the artist, or observer" and Constance "I would put the entire enterprise of art creation in the mind. An object in the world is nothing at all until it is invested with meaning by an interpretative agency." (y)

As I see it, today in the West, there are two main approaches to the practice of art, what I may as well call the postmodernist and the modernist.

A background to postmodernism
The postmodernist approach began in about the 1960's and includes artworks such as Warhol's brillo boxes, Carl Andre's bricks and Tracy Emin's unmade bed. Major aspects include i) the idea of the artwork is more important than the physical artwork ii) any aesthetic has been deliberately removed iii) any representation is symbolic rather than pictographic.

A background to modernism
The modernist approach goes back to the first art created in the stone age between 300,000 and 700,000 years ago, and includes artworks such as Monet's Impressionism, Casper David Friedrich's Romanticism, Classical Greek sculpture and the wall paintings in the Lascaux caves. Major aspects include i) the artwork is more important than the artist ii) the aesthetic is of equal importance to the representation iii) the representation is pictographic.

The definition of "art" has been hijacked by the postmodernists
Even though postmodernism in art has existed for only the last 60 of the 700,000 years that humans have practised art, and probably 80% of contemporary artists work in the modernist rather than postmodernist style, the definition of "art" has unfortunately been hijacked by the postmodernists who now run the "Artworld". This is the same nihilistic doctrine of Derrida's postmodernism that dominates the humanities and media and rejects the established structure of Western civilization and culture.

Where does meaning reside in artworks
As modernist artworks are fundamentally aesthetic form of pictographic representation, and as postmodernist works are fundamentally symbolic representations, the question whether meaning resides in the artwork or the observer may be reduced to asking where meaning resides in i) aesthetic form ii) pictographic representation and iii) symbolic representation.

Where does meaning reside in aesthetic form
An aesthetic is a particular variety in balance. As Frances Hutchinson wrote “What we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety; so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity”

The aesthetic is in the relationship between the parts. This raises the question of the ontology of relationships in the world - do relationships exist in the world or do they only exist in the mind of the observer. FH Bradley argued against any reality of relations between things in his regress argument. He presented the dilemma to show that external relations are unintelligible. Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them. Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.

Either relations do or do not exist in the world.
a) If relations don't exist between things in the world, then the aesthetic, which is a particular relationship between things cannot exist in the world within the artwork, and therefore can only exist in the observer's mind.
b) If relations do exist between things in the world, then there would exist relationships between every single part of the object presented as an artwork, and beyond countable, meaning that an aesthetic - understood as a particular relationship between particular parts - would become indistinguishable from every other set of possible relationships.

IE, an aesthetic cannot exist within the object presented as an artwork, but only in the mind of the observer.

Where does meaning reside in pictographic representation
Pictographic representation can vary from the photorealism of Ralph Goings 1970 McDonalds Pickup representing American culture, to the abstracted water-lilies of Monet and to the drum in Ghanain art representing goodwill and diplomacy.

Taking the abstracted water-lily of Monet as an example, a patch of pale blue contained within a circle of dark blue, the question is, can the shapes on the canvas have a meaning independently of any observer. Pictograms are a language, where the individual shapes within a pictogram are like the letters within a word. Taking the analogy of language, does the word "house" have a meaning independent of any observer. Clearly no, as a German, for example, could never discover any meaning in the letters by themselves, as words have to be learnt.

Similarly, do the symbols of a patch of pale blue within a circle of dark blue have any meaning independently of any observer, or does the meaning have to have learnt. If the shapes have meaning independently of any observer, then the fact that a mass of pale blue represents a water-lily must be internal within the mass of pale blue. But, a patch of pale blue can represent anything the observer wants it to: water, a sky, the feathers of a bird, the concept of peace, etc. Therefore, the fact that the patch of pale blue represents a water-lily cannot be within the shape itself but only in the mind of an observer.

IE, the meaning of a pictographic representation is not within the representation but within the mind of the observer.

Where does meaning reside in symbolic representation
Taking the example of Joseph Kosuth's One and Three Chairs 1965, consisting of a chair, a photograph of a chair and a dictionary definition of a chair, where the observer is invited to philosophically question in the spirit of Plato the nature of reality and the observer's place in society.

Any observer entering the gallery and seeing a chair could never discover from any inspection of the chair the artist's intended meaning, but only by reading about the artist's intentions.

IE, in such an artwork, the meaning of a symbolic representation cannot be discovered in the object itself, but only in the mind of the artist, and through a textual description then into the mind of the observer.

Summary
For both postmodernism and modernism, as the meaning of any artwork resides in the mind of the artist or observer and not the artwork, and as quality is a mental concept, then the quality of the artwork resides not in the artwork but in the mind of the artist, or observer

Art is an expression of human consciousness — Pop

"Art" is expressed in human consciousness
My belief is that "art" is a combination of an aesthetic and representation. As "aesthetic" and "representation" are human concepts, then "art" is also a human concept. As humans are conscious of their concepts, then humans are conscious of "art" as a concept. IE, I agree that "art" is expressed in human consciousness.

But - every observed object is an "artwork"
As everything observed has some degree of aesthetic and representation, then everything observed is an artwork - a Rembrandt, a leaf on the ground, a sunset, a Renault Kangoo, a Derain, a computer keyboard, a Falcon Heavy, a sunset, a tin of baked beans, an unmade bed, a Picasso.

Though - artworks don't even need to be physical objects
Artworks can exist as an idea or a concept. My description of a sunset over a Norwegian forest is also an artwork. In 1960, the artist Stanley Brouwn declared that all the shoe shops in Amsterdam constitute an exhibition of his artwork. In conceptual art, the idea or concept behind the work is more important than the finished art object.

However - all artworks have a quality as all objects have a temperature
I am following previous comments to make my point.
TheMadFool - "Yet, someone can present anything under the sun as art"
Praxis - "If art is anything an artist presents as art then anything can be art, and by extension, anyone can be an artist"
Tom Storm - "it interests me how often the question 'what is good art?' is often mistaken for the question, 'what is art?"
T Clark - "There can be low quality art".

As every observed object has an aesthetic and representation, the terms aesthetic and representative are not binary, but rather have a subjective "quality". IE, as every object has a temperature, and this temperature can range from extreme heat to extreme cold, a Derain has a greater aesthetic than two sticks on the ground artistically placed, and a Thomas Cole has a greater representative content than two sticks on the ground in the shape of a mountain.

However - an artwork's quality is subjective
I agree that as aesthetic and representative content is subjective, there can never be an absolute standard by which artworks are judged, and there will always be argument as to the quality of an artwork. However, this being said, the degree of aesthetic and representative content does vary between artworks, even if there can never be any absolute agreement as to which of two artworks is the better.

In summary - the definition of art should include a reference to "quality"
As with Wittgensteins' "game", I agree with Wheatly that "I don't think Art (with a capital 'A') can be boiled down to a definition." As every observed object is an artwork, the definition "Art is the expression of human consciousness" is far too broad to be useful. The next step in improving the definition would be to include reference to a major distinguishing feature of art, ie, its quality. This is easier said than done, as, for a Modernist quality in art means one thing, and for a Postmodernist quality in art means something totally different.

IE, improving any definition of art by including reference to quality is perhaps where the task of defining art gets a bit tricky

“Art is an expression of human consciousness. Art work is information about the artist’s consciousness.” — Pop

There are many different definitions of "Art", of which the above is more relevant to the Post-Modernism that arose in the 1960's.

This definition doesn't relate to Modernism and Pre-Modernism

For example, "Art is an expression of human consciousness" is not referring to Kirchner's Expressionism, where the artist expressed their inner feelings, not their consciousness.

"I am however, saying that being beautiful or ugly are optional elements of art" is clearly not referring to the Modernism of Monet's Impressionism, which is about the aesthetic arrangement of representative forms.

"Art work is information about the artist’s consciousness” surely does not apply when looking at the Mona Lisa , which seems more about Lisa Gheradini's self-conscious reflections within the Lombardy countryside than any reference to the artist.

"Art is information about the artist's evolving process of self organization" certainly does not apply to a landscape by Thomas Cole, where no information is given about the process of the artist. It the landscape itself rather than the artist that is the subject of self-organization.

This definition relates more to Post-Modernism

If Art is about consciousness, then any conscious act can be art, such as the Post-Modernist Andy Warhol's Oxidation Series 1977, where he invited friends to urinate onto a canvas of metallic copper pigments, so that the uric acid would oxidize into abstract patterns.

If Art is about consciousness regardless of quality, then this would fulfil the Conceptual Art of Tracey Emin, where the concept or idea involved in the work take precedence over traditional aesthetic, technical, and material concerns.

If Art was about expressing the consciousness of the artist, this would include Cut Piece 1964 by Yoko One, a performance in which people were invited to cut away portions of her clothing.

If Art was about expressing the consciousness of the artist through the ideas and concepts of language, this would include the Language-based art of Joseph Kosuth, such as his 1997 work Titled Quotation (for L.C.) consisting solely of the text "SORRY, NO IMAGE AVAILABLE"


IE, the above definition relates more to that of the Post-Modernism that arose in the 1960's, where the artist has become more important than the artwork, rather than any definition of art that preceded it.

Art is an expression of human consciousness — Pop

Does creativity originate in the brain, mind or consciousness.

There is some kind of relationship between the brain, mind and consciousness. There is the question of where creativity originates: the brain, mind or consciousness.

Consciousness cannot exist independently of a brain/mind, whereas a brain/mind can function independently of consciousness. IE, the brain/mind can be creative independently of consciousness. Art is one example of brain/mind creativity.

I agree that there is the question of whether my brain/mind would be creative, such as in creating art, without the driving force of consciousness. But even so, even if consciousness is the driving force, creativity still originates in the brain/mind.

After randomly imagining several marks of varying colours, sizes and shapes, I choose to paint that mark which is, for me, the most aesthetically pleasing. I am only conscious of whether a mark is aesthetically pleasing after having imagined it. IE, I am conscious of my brain/mind's creativity, not that my consciousness is creative.

The expression "art is the expression of human consciousness" seems to infer that art is a creation of consciousness, rather than, as I see it, consciousness being a "passenger" on the brain/mind's creativity.

IE, rather than say "art is an expression of human consciousness", one could perhaps say that "art is the conscious expression of the creativity of the brain/mind"

learn philosophy — DesperateBeing

1) Use the Philosophy Forum as a means of learning philosophy.

2) Find any thread you are interested in - eg "Complete vs. Incomplete Reality"

3) Find any topic you are interested in - eg "I toy with the idea that there are many important phenomena in the world, which play a crucial causal influence in the way we view the world, but which we utterly fail to detect because we are human beings and not God (or angles, or intelligent aliens)"

4) Make an argument supporting or opposing the topic - whether 50 or 500 words.

5) Structure your reply along the lines of a "How to write a Philosophy Paper" - eg https://philosophy.fas.harvard.edu/files/phildept/files/brief_guide_to_writing_philosophy_paper.pdf

6) Support your argument with strong evidence - ie, incontrovertible logic or any established philosopher.

7) Find a source relevant to the topic - whether Plato, Wittgenstein or whoever - print-off a few relevant pages - highlight in yellow relevant ideas - try to include a few of these ideas.

8) Use a spell-checker

9) Post your reply - get feedback.

10) If no-one accepts your argument, then try again.

space with nothing in it — Amalac

Is Kant referring to the whole of space or only a part of space

Kant wrote "One can never forge a representation of the absence of space, though one can quite well think that no things are to be met within it."

I agree with Mww, who wrote "By empty space, Kant refers to only that space which would bound the extension of a possible object."

However, whether Kant is referring to the whole of space or only a part of space is irrelevant to the point that he is making.

Kant's position is important because it is at odds with Leibniz and the relationist claim that the idea of space existing independently of objects is incoherent.

IE, Kant is making the point that space can exist independently of there being any object within it, regardless of whether this is the whole of space or just a part of space.

Can one imagine a space with nothing in it

(Defining space as a continuous area or expanse which is free, available, or unoccupied rather than everything beyond the Karman Line.)

Russell wrote: "I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it"

If Russell is correct in saying that we cannot imagine a space with nothing in it, as space has by definition nothing in it, then it follows that Russell was saying that we cannot imagine space.

Because, if Russell is correct in that we cannot imagine space, then it would follow that when we observe the world we would observe all objects touching each other.

However, this is clearly not the case

IE, when we observe that in the world that there is space between objects, then it follows that we must be able to imagine a space that has nothing in it.

So if you imagine there being nothing in the table, then space would still not be empty — Amalac

Continuing Russells' " The second metaphysical argument maintains that it is possible to imagine nothing in space, but impossible to imagine no space".

Possible to imagine nothing in space
It is true that the space above the table is bounded by the table, but being able to imagine the space above the table having nothing in it means that I can imagine "a space" with nothing in it.
So, if I can imagine "a space" of 1m size with nothing in it, there is no reason why I cannot imagine "a space" of 1km size with nothing in it, or "a space" of 1 light year size with nothing inside it. In fact, there is no reason why I cannot imagine "a space" of any size with nothing in it.

In this sense - "it is possible to imagine nothing in space"

Impossible to imagine no space
"Red" exists in two ways. There is the "red" that exists as 650nm independently and externally of the mind and there is our subjective concept of "red".
In the same way "space" exists in two ways. There is the "space" that exists independently and externally of the mind and there is our subjective concept of "space"
As we know that our subjective experience of "red" is different in kind to the physical nature of "red" outside our mind, we should expect that our subjective experience of "space" to be different in kind to the physical nature of "space" outside our mind.

As we are born with an innate concept of "red", we are born with an innate concept of "space", ie, we don't need to learn either of them.
As Kant wrote: "Space is a necessary a priori representation that underlies all other intuitions"

Being born with an innate concept of "space", our concept of "space" is subjective.
As Kant wrote: "Space is not something objective and real, nor a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; instead, it is subjective and ideal, and originates from the mind’s nature in accord with a stable law as a scheme, as it were, for coordinating everything sensed externally". Inaugural Dissertation Ak 2: 403

Kant is not saying that we don't observe the world (as he uses the words "sensed externally" and "intuition"), but he is saying that what we think we observe is determined by the innate nature of our brain.
Kant wrote: "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings.

Regardless of the degree of correspondence with any "space" existing independently of us, as we are born with an innate concept of "space", it would be impossible for the brain to ignore something that was a part of it's own structure.

In this sense, it is "impossible to imagine no space"

I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it.

Russell wrote "I should emphatically deny that we can imagine space with nothing in it"

However, in the space above the table in front of me there is no apple.

In order for me to know that there is no apple in this space, I must also know that there is a space in which there is no apple.

If Russell was correct in saying that we cannot imagine space with nothing in it, then it would necessarily follow that it would not be possible to imagine that there is no apple within this space.

And yet, I know that there is no apple in the space above the table in front of me.

If I can imagine that there is no apple in the space above the table, then it necessarily follows that I must also be able to imagine the space in which there is nothing.

IE, Russell was wrong in saying that we cannot imagine space with nothing inside it.

origin of meaning — Voidrunner

I would suggest that rather than meaning being an inherent part of the world, it is rather an inherent part of sentient life, believed to have begun during the Cambrian period.

Taking the specific example of the mollusc, which evolved about 541 to 485 million years ago. The mollusc's behaviour is extremely diverse, and light plays a critical part in its life cycle.

In our terms, bright light to the mollusc means heat and dryness and shade means desirable damp and shelter

One could discuss whether such behaviour is innate or intelligent, and whether conscious or not, but regardless, as light is part of the mollusc's phenomenological perception of reality, light must have significant meaning to the creature.

IE, meaning existed pre-language.

Non-existence can't exist — Derrick Huesits

The proposition "non-existence can't exist" is a linguistic curiosity and not a path to an ontological truth

Because words happen to be in the form of a proposition, it does not necessarily follow that they have any meaning, at least no more than Carroll's - 'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves. Did gyre and gimble in the wabe".

A further consideration is the philosophical problem regarding the proposition "non-existence can't exist". As our knowledge of the world is about "existence" (ie, avoiding the problem of referring to non-existent entities), how can a proposition - a set of words - enable us to transcend to knowledge about "non-existence" ?

Non-existence can't exist -so, there must be infinite existence in all directions for all time — Derrick Huesits

Space-time is being conflated with existence

Itemising the argument in the first part of the OP :
i) there cannot be non-existence - therefore existence is infinite.
ii) space-time = existence
iii) therefore space-time is infinite.

Regarding item ii), space-time is being conflated with existence, rather than existence being a property of space-time.

If existence is a property of space-time, then there can still be existence in the absence of space-time.

In which case, item iii) does not follow. IE, space-time need not be infinite, and if not infinite, then not omnipresent.

I would argue there is a sense where "That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language." does not exclude us from discussing the form, or sense, or the picture, or what is concealed — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein and what cannot be said

Wittgenstein wrote in TLP 6.421 "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental". Russell wrote in the introduction to the Tractatus "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit".

The apparent paradox of talking about subjective truths

The question is how is it possible to connect private subjective truths to a public word.

Using colour as an example of a private subjective truth. I observe an object in the world. I experience various private subjective truths about this object - (green, circular, opaque). I observe that public words are attached to this same object - "opaque, green, circular"

Several instances may be required, but using inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events, ie, that of my private subjective truth (green) and the public word "green", I may infer that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green).

Note that the link is between my private sensation and the public word, not between my private sensation and someone else's private sensation. IE, my private sensation of "green" may or may not be the same as someone else's private sensation of "green", even though we share the same word.

Note that there is no information within the public word "green" that describes any person's private subjective truth. However, that being said, the public word "green" can describe my private subjective truth of (green) to me.

My inference that the public word "green" is linked to my private subjective truth (green) may eventually turn out to be wrong, in that I am using inductive reasoning, but pragmatically, for the time being, it is probably good enough.

Conclusion

I can use the public word "green" to describe my private subjective truth (green) because of my inductive reasoning about constantly conjoined events.

Wittgenstein's TLP 1 "The world is all that is the case" needs to be translated before it can be interpreted

As I see it, normally when reading a sentence in another language, such as "der Apfel liegt auf dem Tisch" we use a two step process. First we translate it into English "the apple is on the table" and then we interpret it (the apple is on the table).

However, with writers such as Wittgenstein, it is often the case that a three step process is needed. For example:
1) First, TLP 1 "Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist" is translated into Standard English "The world is all that is the case"
2) Then we translate the Standard English "The world is all that is the case" into common usage "the world that exists independently of any human consists of a combination of simple and unalterable objects in space and time"
3) Finally, we interpret it - (within the world that exists independently of any human observer there are objects existing in combination within space and time, where such objects are unalterable and simple, ie, having no proper parts).

Once interpreted, one can then make a comment. Such as - Wittgenstein's "objects" are logical objects rather than physical objects.

IE, even when reading the Tractatus in English, it is as much a case of translation as interpretation.

language easily misleads us — dimosthenis9

TLP 1. The world is everything that is the case

It certainly is the case with Wittgenstein. As the SEP article on Wittgenstein wrote: "The Tractatus is notorious for its interpretative difficulties", of which the correct interpretation of the word " world" is one example.

For example, when Wittgenstein first uses the word "world", I am sure that only he knows what he means by it, certainly not the reader. It is not so much that he is using a private language of the kind as described in PI 243 "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language", but rather he is envisaging that the meaning that he intends the word to have will later become clear to the reader within the full context of the article.

It seems that Wittgensteins' approach is that the complete meaning of any particular word comes from its context rather than any pre-determined definition.
PI 21 - Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game.
PI - 22 - Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.

However, there remains the problem with such a language game of the danger of circularity of meaning, in that, if the meaning of the word comes from the game and there are minimal links from the language game to an external reality, then there is the problem of how to choose between different games.

It seems that Wittgenstein does not always follow his own advice, when he writes:
TLP 4.112 - "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts"

1. The world is everything that is the case — Banno

1. The world is everything that is the case

As 1. "The world is everything that is the case" begins the Tracataus, it is probably especially important to understand its meaning, and I am trying to ensure that I've got hold of the right end of the stick.

The statement 1. "The world is everything that is the case" is initially confusing because Wittgenstein is using words in a way different to everyday usage and which can only be properly understood in context with the rest of the Tractatus, as others have already mentioned.

As a note, the Tractatus may be interpreted as espousing realism - the independent existence of objects, states of affairs and facts.

It seems to me that:
1) Wittgenstein's "world" is that which exists independently of any human observer, ie, the Earth and Universe in general. It therefore excludes human experiences of ethics, aesthetics, the experience of colour, the pain of a hot stove, etc. However, in common usage, the "world" would include both the human observer and the world they live in.
2) Wittgenstein's "case" has a meaning specific to the Tractatus- a fact - an existence of a state of affairs. However, in common usage we would say "it is the case that aesthetics is important"

"Tell me about something which cannot be put into words."

This raises the point as to how Wittgenstein is able to write about things that cannot be put into words.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

Bertrand Russell in his introduction to the Tractatus wrote - "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit"

As regards the exit, when Banno asks ""Tell me about something which cannot be put into words.", what appears to be a paradox is solved by the nature of language, in that the answer is simply "I cannot put into words my private experience of the colour red".

Summary

When Wittgenstein writes "the world is everything that is the case", what he means is very different from what would be meant in common usage.

The nature of language is such that it allows Wittgenstein to talk about things that, in a sense, transcend language.

"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world"

The meaning of "my world"

I would suggest that as Wittgenstein is using the term "my world" in a way that is not commonly accepted this contributes to any confusion in interpreting his intended meaning.

The original German was "meiner Welt, so it does not seem to be a problem of translating German to English.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein discusses what language can and cannot do.
He argues that there are some aspects of life, such as ethics, that are beyond the limits of language, in that they transcend language.
5.6 - "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" ?
6.421 - It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
7 - "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"

Wittgenstein links language to "my world" not by representing the world but by displaying its logical form.
4.001 - "The totality of propositions is language"
4.121 - "Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it."
1.1 - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"
1 - "The world is everything that is the case"

As with Mary in Mary's Room, Mary may know everything about the science of colour but may never have experienced the sensation of colour. Mary's world (in the sense of the world that Mary lives in) includes both those things within the limits of language - the science of colour - and that which transcends language - the experience of colour. The same is also true that for each of us, in that our worlds include both that which can be described and that which is beyond description.

However, Wittgenstein is limiting the term "my world" to only that part which can be described in language.

IE, when Wittgenstein writes "my world", he is using the term "my world" in a more restricted sense than is commonly accepted, contributing to any confusion in interpretations of his intended meaning.

(1) is invalid.

With good reason, the pollees believe that a Republican will win the election, not that a Republican might win the election, meaning that (1) is invalid.

IE, it is (1) that is not part of a valid modus ponens, rather than the case that the modus ponens is not valid.

Trying to work out how to upload an image.
When dragging from computer, get message "You do not have permission to upload files"

Understanding "what a word means, and how a word means"

As regards "what a word means, and how a word means", a word such as "ndege", for example, is a group of symbols, and as a group of symbols has no intrinsic meaning. Any meaning a word has is external to the word and established by a link to a fact in the world.

In the spirit of the Tractatus, I am sure that most people would straight away know the meaning of "ndege" from just five pictures.



As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus 4.022: "A proposition shows its sense", meaning that the word "ndege" shows its sense by a link to a fact in the world, where the link has been agreed by the society within which the word is being used.

As Benjamin wrote in The Translator's Task (translated by Steven Rendall): "In "brot" and "pain", the intended object is the same , but the mode of intention differs", meaning that different languages may use different words, but they all have the same intended object, the same fact in the world.

The answer to "what a word means" is that words have no intrinsic meaning. The answer to "how a word means" is that there is an external link from the word to a fact in the world, where the link has been agreed by the society within which the word is being used.

So Logic is more like a mental Theory about Reality, than a material Thing in the real world — Gnomon

Logic is empirical

A field of study must study something. Ornithology studies birds, aesthetics studies aesthetics, psychology studies the mind, physics studies physics. Similarly, logic studies logic.

As with the word "aesthetics", the word "logic" has two distinct meanings. First as a verb, a doing word, "to study". Second as a noun, the thing that is studied.

Logic (as a verb) is the study of the logical relationships between propositions, leading to the acceptance of one proposition (the conclusion) on the basis of a set of other propositions (premises). A proposition is a combination of nouns and verbs that is either true or false, such as "all elephants are grey".

The truth or falsity of a proposition is determined by the T-sentence, such that
"all elephants are grey" is true iff all elephants are grey. The T-sentence sets out the equivalence between the word and the world. Therefore the propositions that logic (as a verb) studies have an equivalence through the T-sentence to facts in the world.

When looking at the world, we directly observe logic (as a noun) in the world. For example, we observe a particular rock as a single thing, something that is itself and not something else. We observe the same characteristic in other things, a bird, a tree, etc. IE, we directly observe the idea that x = x. This idea is an fact in the world discovered empirically.

1) As logic (as a verb) studies relationships of propositions, and as propositions have an equivalence with facts in the world, therefore, logic (as a verb) studies facts in the world.
2) As logic (as a verb) studies logic (as a noun), therefore, logic (as a noun) are facts in the world.
3) As facts in the world are empirically discovered, logic (as a noun) is empirically discovered.

In conclusion, i) logic (as a verb) is the study of something and logic (as a noun) is that which is being studied ii) logic (as a noun) is empirically discovered . In answer to Hilary Putnam's question in 1968, "Is logic empirical ?", the answer is yes.

Virtual Particles are imaginary objects created from logical reasoning to explain otherwise puzzling empirical observations — Gnomon

I agree that metaphor is a critical part of understanding.

My money is on the causal (energy) and substantial (matter) effects of Generic Information (EnFormAction) in the natural world — Gnomon

I can imagine the metaphor of the path of a particular rock in an avalanche.

I see neither intentionality nor teleology, as the rock has insufficient information as to where it will land up at the moment the avalanche is initiated.
The chances of the rock landing on one pre-determined spot is one in billions, however, the chance of the rock landing somewhere is one in one.
As the rock moves along its path through time and space, interactions between forces and particles, energy and matter, are not random but determined by the laws of nature.
During its path, any change in position of the rock is caused by the instantaneous interaction of energy and matter.
As the rock changes position, the information within the avalanche that the rock is a part of changes.
The final position of the rock is not pre-determined by either its start position or its final position but is determined by the integration of the set of particular situations it passes through along its path.
Given the same initial conditions and the same conditions along its path, there is not an infinite number of possible destinations but only one possible destination.

I perhaps understand that EnFormAction is about energy acting on a form causing an action.

But as regards Information Integration, the rock has to end up somewhere. In a sense its final resting position cannot be said to be due to "disorderly randomness", as its final resting position has been "organised" by the deterministic laws of nature. However, I don't understand the mechanism for teleological "intention".

If Logic was empirical — Gnomon

I would argue that logic is empirical, as logic cannot exist in an empty domain.

Reason one - the human mind is incapable of thinking about logic in an empty domain

The human mind cannot imagine a logical truth independent of something represented by the logical truth, regardless of whether one assumes Idealism or Realism.

For example, the human mind can only imagine the logical truth - If object A is the same as object B, then object B is the same as object A - by representing objects A and B.

IE, the human mind is only able to think about logic through empirical observation of objects about which logical truth may be applied.

Reason two - logic corresponds to the world

There is no instance where a logical truth doesn't correspond with the world.

For example, is has never been observed that object A is not the the same as object A.

Possibility one is that the fact that logic as a study of valid rules of inference corresponds with logic discovered in the world is coincidence.
Possibility two is that the logic invented in the rational mind and the logic empirically discovered in the outside world are two aspects of a common logic existent in nature.

IE, ignoring coincidence as an answer, logic is empirical because logic is an intrinsic part of nature.

as a "logical object", a Virtual Particle seems to be an Empty Domain — Gnomon

There seem to be many measurable physical effects that seem to point to the existence of virtual particles, but "virtual particles" are not the only possible explanation of these measurable effects.

Possibility one - the idea of a dimensionless point particle may simply be a way to explain why interactions are localised at dimensionless points, in that there are not particles but fields, and it these fields that interact at these dimensionless points.

A dimensionless particle is a problematic thing if one wants to give it properties such as mass or charge, in that the mass and charge of a particle will then have to be infinite. The same problem as a singularity at the centre of a black hole, where the laws of physics cease to exist as we know them.

Possibility two - one must distinguish between the mathematical formulation of a quantum field and how the quantum field is interpreted. A "virtual particle" may be a mathematical formulation but only a metaphorical interpretation. Such as Schrödinger's cat, The Uncertainty Principle, Evolution by natural selection, Black Holes, The Butterfly Effect, etc.

IE, the true nature of a "virtual particle" is unknown

the human mind can "see" logical relationships between imaginary "objects" — Gnomon

"See" may be used two ways.

i) The human mind can empirically observe using scientific instruments measurable physical effects of "virtual particles", but cannot directly observe the "virtual particles" themselves, regardless of what a "virtual particle" is.
ii) The human mind can imagine the cause of these measurable physical effects as metaphorical "virtual particles"

IE, the human mind can imagine the relationship between imaginary objects, but cannot observe the relationship between imaginary objects.

In conclusion, as the true nature of "virtual particles" is unknown, one cannot argue that that this is an example where an object may exist in a empty domain

Logic is not a physical object — Gnomon

Logic as a study of valid rules of inference
Logic is the systematic study of valid rules of inference, in that there are particular relations that lead to the acceptance of one proposition (conclusion) on the basis of a set of other propositions (premises).

For example, taking the modus ponens as an example, the rational rule of inference "if X happens, then Y will happen" ii) "X happens" iii) "therefore, Y happens" is valid because the empirical rule of inference i) "if X happens, then Y will happen" ii) "X happens" iii) "therefore, Y doesn't happen" is never observed.

As the validity of the rational rule of inference is determined by a correspondence with an empirical rule of inference, rules of inference must empirically exist in the world.

Logic as a relationship of an object
Whether logical truths entail the existence of any entities, or whether logical truth is independent of what exists is debated.

If logical truths hold no matter what the representation is about, then they hold in any domain, including empty domains. And if that is true, then logical truths cannot imply that anything exists.

But, on the other hand, if logical truths hold in any domain, then any domain has to contain the logical objects. Thus for logical objects there can be no empty domain.

Logic is not neutral with respect to what exists, and logic is not independent of what exists. Logic is not an object but a relationship of the object. If logic is a relationship of an object, then logic cannot exist outside the existence of objects.

For example, the following logical truths would not exist in a domain empty of objects:
i) If object A is larger than object B, object B is smaller than object A
ii) If object A exists, then it is not the case that object A doesn't exist.
iii) If object A is to the left of object B, then object B is to the right of object A.
iv) If object A is the same as object B, then object B is the same as object A.
v) Object A is the same as object A
vi) etc

IE, "logic" can mean either the study of the valid rules of inference, which exist empirically, or a relationship of objects, which also exist empirically.
As with mathematics, logic is an invention that corresponds with what has been discovered