This is a false dilemma: either everything has a reason or nothing has a reason. Deniers of the PSR do not claim that nothing has a reason; only that not everything has a reason. Most people accept the laws of logic, and accept logical inferences as valid reasons. But they might still also believe that some brute facts exist without reason. — A Christian Philosophy

1) Some people believe that for any thing that exists or is true, there is always a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people support the PSR.

2) Some people believe that some things that exist or is true have a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true, and that some things that exist or is true there is no sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people are ambiguous towards the PSR.

3) Some people believe that for any thing that exists or is true, there is never a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true. These people deny the PSR.

If 3) is true, and there is no sufficient reason why a lamp turns on, and there is no sufficient reason why a lamp turns off, then there is no sufficient reason for the lamp not turning on and off contemporaneously, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction.

Are you claiming that there are reasons that do not involve explanations? — Fooloso4

Suppose someone said that the reason a rock falls to the ground when released is because of gravity. Is "gravity" an explanation as to why the rock falls to the ground when released when "gravity" means no more than a rock falls to the ground when released.

Similarly:
The reason he is ambitious is because he is driven
The reason it is chilly this evening is because it is cool.
The reason the job was complex was because it was complicated.
The reason she is an advocate for three-yearly driving tests is because that is something she supports.
The reason the tree is in a state of decay is because it is rotten.

From the OP — Fooloso4

What are you saying?

In accord with the OP it means that there is an explanation. Did you mean 'petitio principii', begging the question? — Fooloso4

The OP describes the PSR as "For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true."

There are different definitions of "reason"

The Merriam Webster gives one definition of reason as "a statement offered in explanation or justification" and another definition of reason as "a rational ground or motive".

Using the SEP article on PSR:

As regards "reason", i) Archimedes attributed the fact that equal weights at equal distance remain in equilibrium because there is no reason why either side of the balance should move up or down and ii) Leibniz wrote: “This is rightly observed, and agrees with what I am accustomed to saying that nothing exists but that for whose existence a sufficient reason can be provided”.

As regards "ground", i) Hegel argued for the Principle of Sufficient Ground, and ii) Dasgupta proposed that the PSR can be reformulated in terms of grounds.

There are different type of PSR.

In the Unrestricted PSR, every fact requires an explanation.

In the Restricted PSR, various restrictions can be placed on the PSR, such as i) requiring a sufficient reason for every true proposition or ii) requiring a reason only for the existence or non-existence of entities.

Example One
Why does a rock fall to the ground when released. The reason is gravity. What is gravity. Gravity is something that causes a rock fall to the ground when released. An example of petito principii.

Example Two
A stone hits a window and the glass shatters. As I see it:

As regards cause, a cause is something in the world that is prior to an event, such that the cause of the glass shattering was a stone hitting the glass.

As regards reason, a reason is something in language that describes an event in the world, such that the reason the glass shattered was that it was hit by a stone

As regards ground, which is not cause, ground is contemporaneous with the event, in that there is an event with constituent parts. For example, glass of a certain thickness and a stone of a certain kinetic energy. According to Dasgupta, this avoids the Agrippan Trilemma of circularity, infinite regress and dogmatism because the event is autonomous and independent of anything prior to the event.

Example Three
4 = 2 + 2.

As 4 is contemporaneous with 2 + 2, the 4 was not caused by the 2 + 2, no more than the 2 + 2 was caused by 4.

The reason 2 + 2 = 4 is linguistic, as numbers don't exist in the world.

4 is grounded in 2 + 2, which is neither cause nor reason, because autonomous and independent of anything prior.

And (C1) - our inability to conceive how something can come from nothing marks a limit of our thinking, but should we assume that our limits are the measure of reality or possibility? — Fooloso4

Yes, it would be unrealistic to assume that our limits are the measure of reality.

As a cat may never understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans may never understand the nature of reality. But then again, as a cat doesn't need to understand the symbolism within The Old Man and The Sea, humans don't necessarily need to understand the nature of reality.

I may believe that everything has a reason, even though I have no concept of what these reasons are. For example, I believe that a stone when released falls to the ground for a reason, even though I have little concept of the nature of gravity.

It depends on the meaning of "reason" (Using SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)

Does "reason" mean 1) "an explanation of why a stone falls to the ground when released", an Unrestricted PSR and a rejection of brute or unexplainable facts.

Or does "reason" mean 2) that "when released a stone falls to the ground" in the sense of Petito Principii, doing no more than duplicating the fact.

It is more likely the case that "reason" is being used in sense 2, where "gravity" means no more than "when released a stone falls to the ground".

There are several conclusions that might follow from not being able to answer a question. They include the possibility that: C1 - Reason and our capacity to understand is limited. C2 - The question itself is the problem. C3 - Any conclusion that follows is questionable. — Fooloso4

All those things are true:
C1 - I could try to explain Hemingway's novel The old man and the sea to my pet cat until "the cows come home" without any glimmer of understanding on the cat's part. In the same way, a super-knowledgeable alien could try to explain the nature of the universe to a human, also without any glimmer of understanding on the humans' part
C2 - As Dr Lanning's Hologram in the film I, Robot says "I'm sorry, my responses are limited. You must ask the right questions"
C3 - As with a dictionary definition, even if a question is answered, the answer in its turn may be questioned, ad infinitum.

However
C1 - The fact that my cat cannot understand The Old Man and the Sea does not mean that the book isn't understandable
C2 - The fact that a question is the wrong question doesn't mean that there isn't a right question
C3 - The fact that every answer can be questioned doesn't mean that there isn't an answer.

I still hold that the relevant propositions must have "at the same time" added to them — A Christian Philosophy

It could be that the phrase "at the same time" is crucial to the argument defending the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Parmenides pointed out that if the world had come into existence from nothing, there is no answer to the question as to why the world didn't come into existence earlier or later than it did. From this he concluded that the world has always existed (Edit - From this he concluded that the world did not come from nothing) (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)

P1 - Let event 1 be a lamp on the table turning on and event 2 be the same lamp turning off.
P2 - The Law of Non-Contradiction states that the lamp cannot turn on and off "at the same time"
P3 - Assume that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, and the lamp turns on and off for no reason.

C1 - If there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp turns on earlier or later than the lamp turning off.
C2 - However, if there is no reason why the lamp turns on, then there is no reason why the lamp cannot turn on "at the same time " as the lamp turning off, other than the Law of Non-Contradiction.
C3 - Therefore, it cannot be the case that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not valid, as there is a reason limiting when the lamp turns on and off, and that reason is the Law of Non-Contradiction.

By the Law of Non-Contradiction, a fact/event cannot be other than it is at the same time.
Suppose true randomness exists such that event 1 occurs without reason. Still, by the law of non-contradiction, event 1 cannot be something else at the same time. But it still occurred without reason. — A Christian Philosophy

I agree that by the Law of Contradiction, a fact/event cannot be other than it is at the same time. For a fact to be other than it is at the same time is a contradiction in terms. For example, the fact that apple A is on the table is a different fact to the fact that apple A is on the floor.

P1 - Let there be an event which could be either event 1 or event 2, where event 1 and event 2 are different.
P2 - The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that if event 1 occurs there must be a reason.
P3 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could not have occurred.
P4- Suppose event 1 occurs without reason.

C1 - From P4, if event 1 occurs then event 2 could have occurred.
C2 - C1 and P3 are contradictory.
C3 - Therefore, if the Law of Non-Contradiction is valid (P3), then events occurring without reason is invalid (P4).

Thus, while the uniformity of nature is not known with certainty, it is still known beyond reasonable doubt. — A Christian Philosophy

From the SEP article Principle of Sufficient Reason: the PSR may be formulated as "For every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case."

I agree that although the uniformity of nature is not known with certainty, it is still known beyond reasonable doubt.

Does this mean that the PSR should be re-formulated as "For every fact F, there is probably a sufficient reason why F is the case."
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one can imagine an event without a cause...............This is expected because the test of imagination is associated with logic, and the PSR (which includes causality) is not derived from logic. — A Christian Philosophy

In other words:
P1 - We can imagine a fact/event
P2 - The test of imagination is associated with logic
P3 - The PSR states that given a fact/event there must be a reason/cause
P4 - The PSR is not derived from logic
C1 - We can imagine a fact/event that doesn't have a reason/cause

In particular:
P1 - We can imagine a unicorn
P2 - We can test that the unicorn we imagine is true or not using logic.

P1 - I imagine a unicorn in my mind
P2 - I have never seen a unicorn in the world
C1 - Therefore, it is possible that unicorns only exist in my mind
C2 - Therefore, it is possible that unicorns may or may not exist in the world.

P3 - True
P4 - Depends what is meant by "derived"
In logic, conclusions follow from premises based on the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content. (Wikipedia - Logic).
An attempt may be made to prove the PSR using logic

P1 - If there can be a fact/event without a reason/cause, then the fact/event could have been other than it is.
P2 - By the Law of Non-Contradiction, a fact/event cannot be other than it is
C1 - Therefore, a fact/event must have a reason/cause

The PSR may possibly be proved using logic, even though there is no logical necessity that a fact/event has a reason/cause.
C1 - We can imagine a unicorn in our mind even if unicorns don't exist in the world.

We can imagine a unicorn in our mind even though there is no unicorn in the world. Does this mean that there is nothing that has caused us to imagine a unicorn in our mind?

For any thing that exists or is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to exist or to be true.............................We observe that our reasoning works in 2 ways: deduction and induction — A Christian Philosophy

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) proposes that for every fact F, there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason)

We use deduction and induction when reasoning.

Hume's critique of causation challenges PSR. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume considers the idea that whatever begins to exist must have a cause, but he finds this open to doubt. Since cause and effect are distinct, one can imagine an event without a cause. Hume said that induction gives truth only if nature is uniform, and if we do use induction, we are presupposing the uniformity of nature, which may or may not be the case (SEP - Principle of Sufficient Reason).

However, this introduces an inevitable circularity as induction and deduction presuppose a uniformity in nature, which may or may not be the case. Therefore any reason we come up with for a fact based on induction and deduction may or may not be the case.

It follows that given a fact, as we can never know whether any particular reason is or is not the case, we can never know whether for any fact there is a reason or not.

We could only say that for every fact there must be a sufficient reason why F is the case if we knew that nature was uniform. But we don't know that nature is uniform. We know that many aspects of nature are contingently uniform, but we don't know that they are necessarily uniform.

Counter-Argument against the PSR: Quantum Physics — A Christian Philosophy

In addition, something that nobody understands cannot properly be used as a counter-argument against anything.

As Feynman said "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics"

You pour out your soul here and you're met with blank stares — Dominic Osborn

Welcome to the Forum !!!

While a functioning brain is undeniably necessary for reasoning, it doesn't follow that reasoning is reducible to or explainable as neurophysiological processes — Wayfarer

Useful post.

But think of the brain as a computer.



There needs be no vicious regress between reason and neurology if reason is the purpose of the neurology. In the same way, there is no vicious regress between the truth that 1+1=2 and a logic gate that calculates the sum of 1+1 if the purpose of the logic gate is to calculate the sum of 1+1.

The brain is required for reason, as the logic gate is required for the truth of its calculations.

The computer is indifferent to the truth of its calculations, yet the purpose of the computer is to arrive at the truth.

The logic gates have an intentionality, which is to arrive at one consistent output when given two inputs

Edward Feyser wrote that brain processes are devoid of meaning, yet our thoughts have meaning , concluding that thoughts cannot be identified with brain processes. Yet his argument is circular, in that he starts by assuming that the brain is separate to meaning and concludes that the brain is separate to meaning. As the meaning of a logic gate is the process it undertakes, the meaning of a neurological process is the very process itself.

Thomas Nagel wrote that one can only understand reason from within reason, meaning that one cannot understand reason from outside reason, ie from neurology. Yet again his argument is circular, in that he starts by assuming that one can only understand reason from within reason and concludes that one cannot understand reason from outside reason, ie neurology. As the reason for a logic gate is the process it undertakes, the reason for a neurological process is the very process itself.

As the logic gate is necessary for logic, logic is a product of the logic gate. Similarly, as the brain is necessary for reason, reason is the product of the brain.

(Leaving whether transcendental or not for another day)

3. Thus, according to Berkeley, a mind had to exist before or come to existence simultaneously with ideas. — Brenner T

It depends on the relationships between mind, perceiving, sensing, ideas and thoughts.

For example, for Berkeley, what exactly is the relationship between mind and ideas.

Is it the case that the mind has ideas or is it the case that the mind is ideas. For example, is it the case that an object has extension in space or is it the case that an object is an extension in space.

As an object having no extension in space would be a contradiction in terms, for a mind not to have ideas would perhaps also be a contradiction in terms.

Does the mind have intentionality about ideas, or is the mind intentionality of ideas?

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. (SEP - Intentionality)

For Berkeley, what is the relation between the mind and ideas.

It does not follow from the fact all sciences of reason contain synthetic a priori judgements as principles, that instances of particular relations of particular conceptions, are all principles in themselves................................If you wish to stipulate that Kant’s synthetic a priori is the principle that….that’s fine, but I doubt it’s what Kant intended for it. — Mww

Kant writes that the term "principle" is ambiguous.

B356 The term "a principle" is ambiguous, and commonly signifies only a cognition that can be used as a principle even if in itself and as to its own origin it is not a principle.

Kant writes that on the one hand there are "principles absolutely" as used in the a priori concepts of the Categories, and on the other hand there are "principles comparatively" as used in the theoretical sciences.

B358 Thus the understanding cannot yield synthetic cognitions from concepts at all, and it is properly these that I call principles absolutely; nevertheless, all universal propositions in general can be called principles comparatively.

Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in the Introduction to the CPR talk about "synthetic a priori principles", presumably as "principles comparatively".

page 13 - At this point in the Critique Kant has completed the largest part of his constructive project, showing how synthetic a priori principles of theoretical cognition are the necessary conditions of the application of the categories to sensible data structured by the pure forms of intuition.

page 85 - Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles' in all theoretical sciences of reason.

I agree that the Categories are "principles absolutely"

I could change the wording of my belief to "Kant's synthetic a priori is the universal principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency".

Synthetic a priori is not itself a principle; it is the condition of principles, unities, conceptions and anything else to which it applies, in which representations relate to each other in a certain manner, re: synthetically, and, representations are of a certain origin, re: a priori................If you want to say certain forms of representations adhere to the synthetic a priori principle, you haven’t in the least said anything about those forms, other than give them a name, without anything about what it means to be so. — Mww

The relation between thought (a priori) and being (synthetic)

Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in the Introduction to CPR explicitly say that synthetic a priori principles can be established, meaning that there can exist synthetic a priori principles.

The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience.

Yes, "synthetic a priori" is the name of a principle, not a description, in the same way that "the conservation of energy" and "the conservation of momentum" are names of principles.

Kant's "synthetic a priori" is the name of a principle that relates the synthetic to the a priori.

My original point is that B276 can be read as a transcendental argument, not in the sense of transcendental used by Kant in CPR A2, but in the sense as used by the Britannica.

CPR A2: "I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy."
Britannica transcendental argument: "a form of argument that is supposed to proceed from a fact to the necessary conditions of its possibility."

In B276, The Refutation of Idealism, are the two statements which come under the Britannica definition of transcendental rather than the A2 definition.
1) The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
2) Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.

This is why I originally proposed that “Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency".

Since then we have been discussing my expression "Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that....."

You have been making the case that "synthetic a priori isn’t a principle", whilst I have been making the case that ""Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that....."

This needs to be resolved before continuing with the remainder of my statement that "we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency".

.synthetic a priori isn’t a principle, it’s a relation of the content of certain kinds of conceptions to each other — Mww

You said synthetic a priori is a principle; Kant says synthetic a priori judgements are principles. — Mww

Kant writes about synthetic a priori unity (B264), synthetic a priori concepts (A220), synthetic a priori about appearances (B217), synthetic a priori cognitions (B19) and synthetic a priori judgements (B19).

Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in the Introduction talk about synthetic a priori principles.

The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience.

At this point in the Critique Kant has completed the largest part of his constructive project, showing how synthetic a priori principles of theoretical cognition are the necessary conditions of the application of the categories to sensible data structured by the pure forms of intuition.

Of course the synthetic a priori is a principle.

synthetic a priori isn’t a principle, it’s a relation of the content of certain kinds of conceptions to each other; — Mww

Just taking your first point.

Kant writes in CPR B14 section V that a synthetic a priori judgement is a principle of reason.

"Synthetic a priori judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason."

The Merriam Webster Dictionary includes "a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption" as part of its definition of "principle".

It is true that "synthetic a priori judgements" relate the synthetic with the a priori, but it is also true that a synthetic a priori judgement is a principle that may be used, for example in mathematics (B14)

Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that relates the synthetic to the a priori.

Kant also refers to other principles, such as the principle of contradiction (B14), principle that all things as appearances are in time (B52), principle of the ideality of our sensible intuitions (B70), principle of the unity of manifold of representations (A117), principle of the unity of apperception (A112), etc.

Over the course of seven days, you’ve included B276 in every single one of seven consecutive responses to my posts to you, but never say any more than the text itself. — Mww

Apart from my ongoing justification, based on the text, that "Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency".

One must not overlook the significance embedded in propositions such as, consciousness of determinations of existence in time. — Mww

Kant starts his proof in CPR B276 with "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time", and continues with his proof that "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

I agree with the significance of the passage of time as central to Kant's refutation of Problematic and Dogmatic Idealism.

While that is the case, it is merely beside the point. It needs be shown why external objects as considered by the established idealisms of the day were conceived without proper regard for what came to be posited as transcendental conditions, the foremost being, of course, time. — Mww

In what way is Kant's proof in CPR B276 besides the point, ie "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me".

Berkeley's Dogmatic Idealism declares that space and all the things in it are impossible and things in space are imaginary (CPR B275)

Kant wanted to show that his idealism is a formal idealism rather than Berkeley's subjective realism, and therefore included in the second edition his Refutation of Idealism (Introduction to CPR).

In the Refutation of Idealism (CPR B276), Kant attempts to prove not only the existence of things outside me, but also that our inner experience of these things outside me is immediate, and we are only conscious of our own existence in time because of the existence of things outside me.

In Practice, it would be difficult fr Berkeleyan Idealism to prove the non-existence of things outside me.

Kant isn’t proving the existence of things as much as he’s proving the material idealist’s denial or doubt of things, is improperly justified. — Mww

In B276, Kant starts with the theorem: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

He then follows this by his proof: "Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me."

In B276, Kant seems to be proving that objects in space and time exist independently of our experience of them, regardless of any belief of the Transcendental Idealist.

But naturalism then presumes that the mind which knows it, is the product of that process it only knows metaphorically. — Wayfarer

That's my question. Are scientific explanations literally true or metaphorically true? Is F = ma literal or metaphorical?

According to Britannica articles:
" naturalism, in philosophy, a theory that relates scientific method to philosophy by affirming that all beings and events in the universe (whatever their inherent character may be) are natural."

"scientific method, mathematical and experimental technique employed in the sciences. More specifically, it is the technique used in the construction and testing of a scientific hypothesis."

"scientific hypothesis, an idea that proposes a tentative explanation about a phenomenon or a narrow set of phenomena observed in the natural world."

Certainly we can imagine the early universe, devoid of organic life, but that imagined universe still contains a perspective and a sense of scale provided by the observing mind. — Wayfarer

It depends on the viewpoint.

We can imagine a sense of scale in an early universe devoid of life from our viewpoint, but we can't imagine a sense of scale in an early universe devoid of life from the viewpoint of an early universe devoid of life.
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Nothing will ever lead me to understand what a nebula, which could not be seen by anyone, might be. Maurice Merleau-Ponty — Wayfarer

It's a question of logic.

Something can be only be named if an observer knows what that something is.

If there is no observer to know what a something is, then it cannot be named.

Therefore, for something to be named "nebula" when there is no one to know what that something is is a logical contradiction.
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We cannot step outside the life-world, because we carry it with us wherever we go. — The Blind Spot - Adam Frank, Marcelo Gleiser, Evan Thompson

The Direct Realist would disagree. I would estimate that 50% of those on the PF believe in Direct Realism.

For the Direct Realist, the world they see around them is the real world itself. Things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

If a Direct Realist sees an apple on a table, for the Direct Realist, the apple and table exist in the world exactly as they perceive it independently of being perceived.

The Direct Realist does believe that they can step outside the life-world.
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Whereas, I think you're taking what you understand as the scientific picture of the world as being real independently of any observer, attributing with a kind of absolute or taken-for-granted reality. But then you can't see where 'mind' fits in, because that picture is purportedly 'mind-independent'! — Wayfarer

As an Indirect Realist, I agree that I cannot know the early universe independently of my mind, as I can only know the early universe using my mind.

I cannot literally know the early universe, but I can metaphorically know it.

The book Metaphors We Live By 1980 by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggests that metaphor is a tool that enables people to use what they know about their direct physical and social experiences to understand more abstract things like work, time, mental activity and feelings.

It can be argued that language, including the language of science, is more metaphorical rather than literal.

Metaphors are commonly used in science, such as: evolution by natural selection, F = ma, the wave theory of light, DNA is the code of life, the genome is the book of life, gravity, dendritic branches, Maxwell's Demon, Schrödinger’s cat, Einstein’s twins, greenhouse gas, the battle against cancer, faith in a hypothesis, the miracle of consciousness, the gift of understanding, the laws of physics, the language of mathematics, deserving an effective mathematics, etc.

For example, Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes the point that even Newton's second law is a metaphor, in that it is difficult to see how it could be argued that F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense.

As I understand gravity using the metaphor of a heavy ball on a sheet of rubber, I understand an early universe metaphorically rather than literally.
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Also see How Time Began with the First Eye Opening — Wayfarer

Those who like mythological interpretations may take the birth of Kronos, the youngest of the Titans, as a symbol of the moment here referred to at which time appears, though, indeed it has no beginning; for with him, since he ate his father, the crude productions of heaven and earth cease, and the races of gods and men appear upon the scene - Schopenhauer

Our understanding is more metaphorical than literal, whether figure of speech, myth as noted by Schopenhauer, analogy or symbolism. After all, language is a symbolic system.

The quoted section is only a synthetic judgement based on a pure a priori intuition. — Mww

CPR B276
Theorem = The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
Proof = I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.
All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception.
This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing.
Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existenceb of actual things that I perceive outside myself.
Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination:
Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination;
i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Being conscious of my existence must be prior to any perception of persistence
Kant wrote "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time"

For Kant, we have a priori pure intuitions of time and space. These intuitions are non-empirical, singular, immediate, objective and conscious representations.

The unity of consciousness is central to Kant's transcendental deduction of the Categories, which are a priori pure concepts.

Consciousness of my existence cannot be a consequence of perceiving something persistent, but must be prior to perceiving something persistent.

Therefore being conscious of my existence must be prior to any perception of persistence.
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The quoted part is a pretty good definition of sensation. The assertion as a whole is false, insofar as experience is not of things perceived, but representations of them. — Mww

Kant is trying to prove the validity of Realism
Kant wrote "Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself."

Kant wrote "actual things that I perceive outside me".

This is the purpose of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, an attempt to prove the existence of objects in space outside a representation of them.
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Maybe YOUR a priori pure intuitions according to your transcendental argument, but if Kant with his means for humanity in general the only two are space and time, and they are the necessary conditions for possible experience, it is the other way around from yours. — Mww

Kant seems to be using a Transcendental Argument
Kant writes
a) I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.
b) All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception.
c) Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
d) Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.

In other words
1) My consciousness of existence must be prior to being able to perceive a persistence
2) My perception of a persistence is only possible because of things outside me
3) It is the things outside me that determine the consciousness of my existence

This seems to be a transcendental argument.

What things do we not know through their effects/acts? How could we know anything immanent if not through its effects/acts? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, so let's take this as a starting position.
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The dividing line is at the eye because the mind/brain is assumed to be the dividing line between the world and the observer. Yet one could make the same sort of case for any dividing line one wants to defend. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, in that there have been many different carriers of the information we have in our consciousness about the Andromeda Galaxy. Each change in carrier may be called a dividing line.

One question is, does the change in the carrier of information of necessity require a change in the information carried?

For example, the information about a red star is carried as an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm through space and an electric current up the optic nerve.

Is it logically possible to maintain exactly the same information when changing from a carrier of oscillating electric and magnetic fields to a carrier of charged particles moving along an electrical conductor?

If it is, the Direct Realists have a persuasive argument that the world we see around us is the real world itself, where things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

If not, then the Indirect Realists have a persuasive argument that things in the world are perceived indirectly.
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How unknown is it if you know what it causes and that it is red? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree when you say: "What things do we not know through their effects/acts? How could we know anything immanent if not through its effects/acts?"

We perceive as a sensory experience the phenomenon that we understand as a red postbox.

We believe that something has caused our sensory experience, in that we don't believe our sensory experience has generated itself.

Regardless of whether we do or don't know the cause of our sensory experiences, we can name the cause "a red postbox".

The name "red postbox" is not the name of a thing-in-itself in a world outside our mind, but rather is the name of the cause of a known sensory experience

In the same way, i) we name the cause of an acrid smell something that is "acrid", as in "acrid smoke from a bonfire", ii) we name the cause of a bitter taste something that is bitter, as in "angostine bitters", iii) we name the cause of a sweet taste as something that is sweet, as in "a sweet apple", we name the cause of a silky feel as something that is silky, as in "silk" and finally v) we name the cause of crackling sound as something that crackles, as in "a cracking fire".

IE, we can name the cause of our sensory experiences after the known sensory experience, meaning that we can even talk about an unknown cause as "the cracking fire giving off acrid smoke".
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This seems to be equivocating between different sorts of mind-independence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In one sense, in philosophy-speak, "the early universe" is not mind-independent, in that "the early universe" are words which only exist in language, and language only exists in the mind. As "the early universe" only exists in the mind, by definition, it cannot be mind-independent.

In another sense, in ordinary language, "the early universe" was clearly mind-independent, and can be affirmed by every non-philosopher, by every person going to the supermarket or waiting at a bus stop,

For those philosophers that do believe that "the early universe" is not mind-independent, then logically no referent of any expression can be mind-independent, including expressions such as "tables and chairs". This which would be a problem for Direct Realists, as they do believe that things like tables and chairs do exist independently of the mind, that they are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

That appearances are the necessary antecedent occasions for their employment, it does not follow they are derived from them, and in accordance with the theory, they are indeed, not, nor can they be. — Mww

Kant writes in CPR B276 on the Refutation of Idealism: "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time............................Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself."

"I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" is an a priori pure intuition.

"The existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" is a posteriori empirical experience.

Therefore "Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" can be read to mean that my a priori pure intuition is possible only by means of a posteriori empirical experience.

This is a transcendental argument.

I'd rather say the relationship between some red object and someone seeing that object as red is essentially of the same sort that exists between two meteors colliding in interstellar space — Count Timothy von Icarus

I perceive as a phenomenal experience a red object, and believe that there is some unknown thing the other side of my senses that has caused this phenomenal experience. For convenience, I call this unknown thing a red object.

As two meteors collide, something the other side of my phenomenal experiences has caused my phenomenal experiences.
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Yet causation, information, energy, etc. seem to flow across the boundaries of animal bodies as if there was no boundary at all, so I see no reason to presuppose such a dividing line. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that information flows across these boundaries, but would add that the carrier of the information changes across such boundaries, meaning that there is a dividing line.

For example, on the other side of the eye, the carrier of the information is a wavelength of 700nm travelling through space, and on this side of the eye the carrier of the information is an electric signal travelling up the optic nerve.
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Well, presumably the number 700 doesn't exist outside minds either, right? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Exactly.
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How do we reconcile this seeming multiplicity (the Many) with the equally apparent unity of being (the One)? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We perceive complex patterns, whether inorganic, such as the rhombic dodecahedral crystal of a garnet, or organic, such as the stripes on a tiger.

But within such patterns we perceive a unity. Kant calls this "transcendental apperception". But how "transcendental apperception" is possible is beyond my understanding. How can the mind be conscious of a unity outside of time and space (the One) when the parts are separated in time and space (the Many)?
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But thought is obviously something with being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, we cannot think about "being" without thoughts, but we can also think about "being" existing outside the mind. Otherwise we come to the conclusion that the Universe didn't begin 13 billion years ago, but only began 200,000 years ago when humans developed language.
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I don't think solipsism is good philosophy.....................My take would be that we experience the things we do for reasons, due to causes, etc. and such reasons do not bottom out in the inaccessible and unintelligible as soon as we leave the confines of our own discrete phenomenological horizon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree, because of my belief beyond doubt that some of my phenomenal experiences have been caused by something the other side of such phenomenal experiences.

My belief is that my belief beyond doubt in causation is a consequence of life having evolved for 3 billion years in dynamic interaction with its environment, ie Enactivism, resulting in my belief in causation having become part of the physical structure of my brain, ie Innatism.

I think you're wrestling with a real conundrum inherent in modern culture and philosophy. — Wayfarer

When driving in a city and see a red traffic light, I know what to do, which is to stop the car.

Do I need to know more than what I have directly perceived, a red traffic light, or do I need to worry whether a prior cause was a wavelength of 700nm?
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Kant maintains that the structures of cognition, like time and space, are necessary preconditions that shape any experience we might have; and that they are not derived from or contingent upon empirical experiences. — Wayfarer

The relevance of Kant
The OP asks "Can thought explain being?..................What we really want is an explanatory structure that preserves both of the seemingly ineluctable realities – of logic and of being."

Kant's synthetic a priori in the CPR seems appropriate to the OP, where the synthetic is about knowing the being of a world outside the mind and the a priori is about thought and logic inside the mind.

The relationship between a priori logical necessity and a posteriori empirical experience
Kant in CPR A2 discusses the transcendental nature of the relationship between a priori inner necessity and empirical experience.

Kant in the CPR proposes that we have a priori pure intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the Categories.

As you say: "The a priori nature of space and time is fundamental to Kant’s project, establishing these as the conditions that make empirical knowledge possible in the first place."

One question is, how does Kant explain the origin of these a priori pure intuitions and a priori pure concepts?

There are three possibilities. Either i) we are born with them, or ii) from self-causation or iii) from empirical observation.

As regards i), we know that from birth babies have an awareness of the pure intuitions of space and time and the pure concepts of the Categories, yet Kant was critical of the Rationalist version of Innateness (SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness).

As regards ii), as Causation is a Category, causal explanations rather than non-causal explanations are part of the CPR.

As regards iii) there are two reasons to support this.

First, Kant was aware of Newton and necessary mathematical laws derived from empirical observation. As you say "Modern mathematical physics is full of examples where mathematical reasoning anticipates empirical confirmation, from the countless 'Einstein proved right, again!' headlines to Paul Dirac's prediction of anti-matter, which, as he famously said, 'fell out of the equations.'"

Second, from the text of B276, the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant writes:
i) I am conscious of my existence as determined in time.
ii) Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.
IE, the a priori "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" is a consequence of the a posteriori "existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself.", and is a transcendental argument.

For the above reasons, it seems to me that the CPR only makes sense if a priori necessity has transcendentally derived from a posteriori contingency.

Where in the pertinent text might I find support for such an assertion? — Mww

Synthetic a priori knowledge is central to the thought of Immanuel Kant, who argued that some such a priori concepts are presupposed by the very possibility of experience (Britannica - synthetic a priori proposition)

In CPR A2, Kant starts by explaining transcendental philosophy. He separates a priori cognitions, universal, independent of experience and having an inner necessity from a posteriori cognitions, dependent upon empirical experience.

Therefore, there is a priori necessity and a posteriori contingency.

However Kant is not an Innatist, in that a priori necessity is not something we are born with. He uses a transcendental argument that although cognition of inner necessity is prior to a posteriori empirical cognition, such a prior cognition has in fact been determined by a posteriori cognition.

Kant gives an example of a transcendental argument in CPR B276 in his Refutation of Idealism. For example, my consciousness of my existence in time depends on perceiving an actual thing outside me, which depends on my consciousness of my existence in time.

For Kant, a prior necessity can be transcendently deduced from a posteriori contingency.

The term does invite confusion as it stands. — J

:up:

Enactivism, by contrast, is focused on dissolving the strong subject-object dualism that is presupposed by the division of thought from being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree that life evolved through a dynamic interaction between itself and its environment over billions of years, such that life is an intrinsic part of of its whole environment.

There is thought and being.

The question is, how is it logically possible to overcome the dualism between thought and being when life only knows about being through thought?

If all the contents of experience cannot be said to "exist in the world" in virtue of "only existing in the mind," I don't see how that isn't denigrating the relationships that exist between things and thinking beings as in a way "less than fully real." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I know that I perceive the colour red and feel pain.

I believe that neither the colour red nor pain exist in the world.

I believe that sometimes my perceptions of red and pain have been caused by something this side of my senses, such as dreams and headaches, and sometimes have been caused by something the other side of my senses, such as the wavelength of 700nm or a thistle.

As I don't believe that pain exists in the thistle, I don't believe that the colour red exists in the wavelength of 700nm.

I believe that the cause of my perceptions is as real as the perceptions themselves, though not necessarily the same, in that the perception of pain is not the same thing as its cause, a thistle.

Do you believe that the colour red and pain exist in a world outside a mind?
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If we're allowing the world to be unintelligible and unknowable why not simply allow that Y (the mind) generates itself as a brute fact? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If that were the case, that there is no world the other side of my senses, and my mind has generated itself, then that means I wrote "War and Peace", composed Symphony No. 9 from "The New World" and developed the special and general theories of relativity.

Of the two hypotheses, that someone else wrote "War and Peace" or I wrote it, the simplest explanation is that someone else wrote it.

Do you think that Idealism is a simpler solution than Realism?

It's this relationship between mathematical logic (DME) and contingent causation that is central to the argument. — Wayfarer

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with much of what you say.

I perceive the colour red even though I believe that the colour red doesn't exist in the world. I perceive pain even though I believe that pain doesn't exist in the world. I perceive numbers even though I believe that numbers don't exist in the world.

@Wayfarer: Mathematics doesn’t require numbers to exist as physical objects.
Numbers, therefore, need not exist in the world to guide explanations of physical forces, provided they symbolically represent the appropriate values.
I think the 'practical problem' you're referring to, is how numbers can be real if they don't exist in a physical sense.

However, even though I believe that the colour red, pain and numbers don't exist in the world, I believe there is something real in the world that has caused my perception of the colour red, pain and numbers, even though I will probably never know what it is.

@Wayfarer: The fact that mathematical reasoning often anticipates empirical phenomena (such as Dirac’s prediction of anti-matter) suggests a deep correspondence between mathematical structures and causal relations in the world.

As I know that my perceptions are real, I believe that the cause of my perceptions are also real, even if I will never know what these causes are.

@Wayfarer: Whatever mathematical system we invent must, by necessity, align with these constraints to be applicable.

The fact that we invent maths does not mean that it is arbitrary, in that it is only useful to us if it corresponds with what we observe.

@Wayfarer: You can't get around it by declaring that mathematics is purely arbitrary, because it ain't.

What does "Contingent causal law" mean?

@J: whether “the facts under question arise from a degree of mathematical necessity considered stronger than that of contingent causal laws.”

There is a difference between the words "contingent" and "nomic".
A "contingent law" would be: "take your shoes off when entering a house in Japan"
A "nomic law" would be: "All bodies attract each other with a force inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them"
Isn't "contingent causal law" a contradiction in terms?

Mathematical logic and contingent causation

I invent Maths A whereby 1+1=3 and subsequently discover that it doesn't correspond with what I observe, so I discard it.
Within the mathematical logic of Maths A, 1=1 is necessarily 3, but doesn't agree with contingent observations.

I then invent Maths B whereby 1+1=2 and subsequently discover that it does correspond with what I observe, so I keep it.
Within the mathematical logic of Maths B, 1=1 is necessarily 2, and does agree with contingent observations.

Even if Maths B does agree with contingent observations, it doesn't logically follow that Maths B is necessarily true, because there is no guarantee that a particular observation will be discovered that it doesn't agree with.

Well, enactivism is generally presented as a counter to indirect realism and representationalism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Enactivism is no counter to Indirect Realism
It would seem that the physical structure of the brain is a consequence of around 3 billion years of evolution, shaped by a dynamic interaction between life and its environment (Enactivism)

Such a physical brain may well be born with "knowing how", such as how to feel pain, how to see the colour red, but not "knowing that", such as the sky is blue, snow is cold. See Gilbert Ryle and his book The Concept of Mind (Innatism)

Even accepting Enactivism and Innatism, it remains true that during its life, this physical brain can only gain new information about any outside world through its five senses, through its sensory experiences (I have seen no evidence for telepathy).

The problem remains, sensory experiences remain representations of what exists the other side of he senses.
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It seems to me that the way we get into trouble here is by positing knowledge of things "in-themselves" as the gold standard of knowledge — Count Timothy von Icarus

As an Indirect Realist, I agree.

When driving through a city, all I need to know is whether the traffic light is red or green. That the thing-in-itself is emitting a wavelength of 700nm or 500nm is of little immediate import.
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I suppose another related issue lies in correspondence theories of truth. One can never "step outside experience," in order to confirm that one's experiences "map" to reality. But this to me simply seems to suggest something defective in the correspondence theory of truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The Correspondence Theory of Truth is a problem for the Indirect Realist, but not for the Direct Realist, who believes that things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.
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One of the claims that is often made by the representationalist position that Sokolowski critiques is that many of the properties of objects that we are aware of do not exist "in-themselves," and are thus less than fully real

I, as an Indirect Realist, don't see it that way.

Indirect Realism, aka Representationalism, holds the position that any world the other side of the senses is fully real. This is why it is called "Realism". However, what we perceive is only a representation of what exists in any world.

The properties we perceive are representations of the properties that exist in the world.

This doesn't mean that the properties in the world as less real, because if they were, we wouldn't have had any perceptions in the first place.

The mind perceives fully real properties, believed to have been caused by fully real properties in the world, which may or may not be the same as what we perceive.

Arithmetic and mathematical reasoning exemplify this because they allow us to grasp necessary truths that, although not sensory, still inform our understanding of the world — Wayfarer

Is 1 + 1 = 2 a necessary truth by definition or because in the world 1 + 1 = 2?

If I invent a mathematics and define 1 + 1 = 3, then within my mathematics 1 + 1 = 3 is a necessary truth.

If in the world 1 + 1 = 2, then in mathematics 1 + 1 = 2 would be a necessary truth. However, this depends on justifying that numbers exist in the world.

If numbers did exist in the world, then this would require a relation between 1 and 1. But what has not been shown is the ontological existence of relations in the world.

The ontological existence of relations in the world introduces a number of practical problems, suggesting that numbers don't exist in the world.
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I'm simply drawing an analogy to show how there are forms of knowledge, like mathematical deduction, that function beyond sensory input and can help us conceive of Kant’s transcendental structures. Modern mathematical physics is full of examples where mathematical reasoning anticipates empirical confirmation — Wayfarer

Deduction is important in being able to make decisions. For example, i) every day the sun rises in the east, ii) tomorrow will be a day, iii) therefore, tomorrow the sun will rise in the east. Reasoning can anticipate empirical confirmation.

However, deduction cannot change a belief that "every day the rises rises in the east" into knowledge that "every day the sun rises in the east".

In other words, belief cannot transcend into knowledge by reason alone.

Kant's synthetic a priori is the principle that we can discover a priori necessity from a posteriori contingency

Even Kant never justified this, perhaps because it can never be justified.

Well, a question here is what it means to be "independent from observers. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How can an observer observe something that cannot be observed

As an Indirect Realist, I directly know my sensory experiences of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell.

I have an instinctive belief that these sensory experiences have been caused by something rather than being self-generating.

I reason that some causes are this side of my sensory experiences, such as dreams and hallucinations, and some causes are the other side of my sensory experiences, which can be called the mind-independent world.

My belief is in Enactivism, in that life has evolved for about 3 billion years through a dynamic interaction between an organism and its environment.

One can sensibly reason that certain knowledge essential for survival in this environment, such as a belief in causation, have become an integral part of the physical structure of the brain, meaning that my belief in causation is beyond doubt.

I don't know that there is a mind-independent world, but my belief in such a world is beyond doubt.

I know a set of consistent sensory experiences, such as green in colour, without sound, smooth in touch, sweet in taste and slightly acrid in smell and name this set of consistent sensory experiences "apple".

"Apple" is not the name of something in a mind-independent world, but rather the name of a consistent set of sensory experiences.

In answer to the question, how can an observer observe something that cannot be observed, the answer is that they cannot

However, an observer can observe their own sensory experiences, which they can reason have been caused by an unknown something the other side of these senses, which can be called a "mind-independent world".

In other words, the "mind-independent word" is not the name of an unknown thing, but rather is the name for an unknown cause of known sensory experiences.
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I would say the weight of virtually all empirical evidence is that an apple being an apple doesn't depend on us specifically for its existence. When we leave a room, the apples don't vanish. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This takes me back to my previous question.

An observer can see that atom A (metaphorically speaking) has a direct relationship with apple X, and atom B has a direct relationship with apple Y.

But when the observer leaves the room, what is the explanation that the atoms have maintained these particular relationships?

We can ‘see’ things through deductive inference that are not empirically knowable. There’s a sense in which even arithmetic is transcendental in that it reveals aspects of nature which sense could not otherwise discern. — Wayfarer

The problem with transcendental arithmetic.

For example, using deductive inference it is possible to prove that the sum of every two integers is always even, something that is not provable empirically.

Deductive inference requires strong axioms and logic. In the above example, one axiom is that a + b = b + a.

However the axiom has been determined prior to any deductive inference, meaning that any result of the deductive inference depends on the axioms chosen. If a different axiom had been chosen, a different result would have been deductively inferred.

A transcendental situation is where not only i) has the axiom been determined prior to the result of the deductive inference but also ii) the axiom has been determined by the result of the deductive inference.

How would this be logically possible?

So we shouldn't limit a robust correspondence theory to "facts about the world" — J

The question is, where is this "world", inside or outside the mind.

The relationship between the Correspondence Theory and Truth is an enormous subject, as indicated by the SEP articles on Truth and The Correspondence Theory. The Merriam Webster Dictionary has a range of definitions of "truth", and the word "truth" may be used both literally and as a figure of speech.

Even if we adopt the schema "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, which relates something in language to something in the world, the next question is where is this world. The answer depends on individual opinion, whether one is a metaphysical Realist or Metaphysical Idealist, never mind all the sub-divisions of these two positions.

For example, are there infinitely many prime numbers.

Initially, we can use the Schema and say that the proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" is true IFF there are infinitely many prime numbers.

However, Euclid has proved that there are.

Therefore, we can use the Correspondence Theory and say that the proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" is true because there are infinitely many prime numbers.

The proposition "there are infinitely many prime numbers" exists in language.

The next question is, where do these infinitely many prime numbers exist.

In particular, where does the number 23 exist? Some say only inside the mind and some say both inside and outside the mind.

However, regardless of where the prime numbers exist, the Correspondence Theory is still valid.

That is, how can being be in one sense "one," i.e. everything interacts with everything else, there are no truly isolated systems — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, Aristotle considered the Platonic argument that he called "The One Over The Many", whose premiss might be expressed as "Whenever two or more things can be properly said to be F, it is by virtue of some thing, F-ness, that they are properly called F"

In the world are observed numerous atoms (philosophically speaking).

For the observer, atom A and atom B are part of one apple and atom C is part of a different apple.

For me, the problem about objects existing in a world independent of any observer, is, what mechanism is there in such a world independent of any observer that relates atom A to atom B but doesn't relate atom A to atom C?