Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. — Wayfarer

However, I do think that there is a distinct division between some people who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs do exist in the world, and who may be called Direct Realists, and some who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts, and who may be called Indirect Realists.

As an Indirect Realist I also fully support Enactivism, in that the human mind has evolved in synergy with the world. The human mind is not separate to the world, but is a part of the world. But even so, my Enactivism does not change my belief that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts.
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So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether. — Wayfarer

Even if we stop treating relations as if they were objects, how should we treat them?

Relations may be on a different plane, but where exactly is this plane?

Has anyone ever seen a relation existing independently of the human mind?

What do relations in a mind-independent world actually do? What purpose do they serve?
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Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. — Wayfarer

I agree with Kant's concepts of Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

We may have the subjective experience of seeing the colour red. The scientist may point out that when someone says that they see the colour red, they may be looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The situation is, as you say, a mind-world hybrid. If there was no wavelength of 700nm we would not see the colour red, and we would not see the colour red if there was no wavelength of 700nm.

But a hybrid mind-world does not mean that the colour red, as we subjectively experience it, exists in the world in any way.

We could define a wavelength of 700nm as being the colour red, but this does not mean that a wavelength of 700nm "is" the colour red, where "is" is that of identity.

What we know as the subjective experience of the colour red may exist in the world, but if it does exist in the world, it must exist as a thing-in-itself, and therefore in Kant's terms, unknowable to us.
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So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet. — Wayfarer

I agree that there is an interface where mind and world meet, but there are two different directions, from the world to mind and from the mind to world.

From the world to mind, I cannot know what is in your mind. I cannot know whether your subjective experience of the colour of a red postbox is the same as mine.

From the mind to world, I only know phenomenological appearances. I cannot know what caused those appearances.

There is an interface between mind and world, but it is an interface that blocks the passage of knowledge across it.

You may say, for example, that we have the knowledge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but this knowledge still exists in the mind, not in a mind-independent world.

A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. — Ludwig V

Does this not mean you can be thought of as a Direct Realist, in that objects such as tables exist in the real world.
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What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? — Ludwig V

If relations ontologically exist in the world, then between every single elementary particle and force in the Universe there is a metaphysical relation.

As four things give rise to six relations, there are more relations than there are things.

This means there is a vast number of metaphysical relations in the Universe. A significant over-population of metaphysical relations in the Universe.

I agree that over-population in itself is not problematic.

But what exactly are these metaphysical relations doing? What purpose do they serve? Are they needed? Wouldn't the Universe carry on equally as well if there were no metaphysical relations? By Occam's razor, let's get rid of the ontological existence of relations in the world.
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If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. — Ludwig V

As with Kant's things-in-themselves, if relations existed in the world but not the mind, how could we know about them?
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One could even argue that it (physics) is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc. — Ludwig V

Does the colour red exist in a mind-independent world?

How can the mind ever know what exists in a mind-independent world?

Physics is only a tool of the human mind. If the human mind cannot logically know what exists in a mind -independent world, then neither can physics.

It is not the case that physics is impoverished, but rather the fact that the mind cannot logically know what exists outside itself.
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Where is the design of the table or chair? — Ludwig V

In the human mind.

Are you saying that tables and chairs exist independently of the human mind?

Even if tables and chairs existed independently of the human mind, their design would still exist in the human mind that created them.
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The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary — Ludwig V

I agree. They have different functions.

But these functions are human functions,

Suppose a table and chair existed next to each other in a mind-independent world. Assume that they are made up of atoms (in the old sense of fundamental parts).

What in a mind-independent world would "determine" whether a particular atom belonged to the chair or the table?

Suppose an alien visited from Alpha-Centauri, how would they know that one set of atoms should be related together in what we call a table?

Suppose the table lost one atom, would it still be a table? Who would make the judgement in the absence of the human mind?

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion. — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I would say that tables and chairs only exist as concepts in my mind. They are representations of something in the world, as the word "house" functions as a representation.

I agree that as we cannot compare a representation in our mind with the original in the world. There is no way of knowing whether tables and chairs do actually exist in the world.

You say "But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist"

If we don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them, how do we experience them?

Do you think that tables and chairs exist in a mind-independent world?
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The concept of a table is not a table. — Ludwig V

I agree.
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I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. — Ludwig V

But you said that "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?"

Doesn't that mean that navigators have "direct experience" of the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world?

How can the navigators know about the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world if they don't have "direct experience" of them?
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That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. — Ludwig V

Perceive can mean i) perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive Mary is bored" ii) perceive through the senses, as in "I perceive a loud noise".

I agree. For the Indirect Realist, that we can perceive through the senses appearances of things-in-the-world does not mean that these things-in-the-world exist in the world. For the Indirect Realist, the concept of tables exists in the mind even if tables don't exist in the world.

However, in order to perceive the appearances of things-in-the-world, something must exist in the mind.

This relates to the homunculus problem. A machine making an image of an image would lead into infinite regress. I agree that the machine does not need to form an image of an image in order to recognise it. Similarly with humans, in that I don't need to form a representation of a representation in order to perceive it.

Are you saying that can we perceive things-in-the-world without something needing to exist in the mind?
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To be continued:

Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

Presumably, "to be" is referring to the world

But there are two main meanings of "perceive". Something in the mind "I perceive that Mary is bored" and something through the senses "I perceive a loud noise". From Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" may mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of ii) to become aware of through the senses

Is "is to be perceived" referring to something in the mind or something through the senses?

Problems arise if "is to be perceived" is referring to something in the mind rather than through the senses.

Just because I perceive something in my mind doesn't mean that it is a fact in the world. I perceive that Mary is bored and I may be right or I may be wrong. There is no logical reason to believe that just because I perceive something in my mind then it must be a fact in the world .

It seems more likely that "is to be perceived" is referring to something through the senses.

The answer depends on what you mean by your question......................................However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. — Ludwig V

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Are the relations we perceive perceived only in the mind or perceived of the world through the senses?

Do relations exist in the mind, the world or both?

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world.

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up.

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs.

The Direct Realist needs the ontological existence of relations in the world, whereas the Indirect Realist doesn't.

If it can be shown that ontological relations don't exist in the world, then Direct Realism is no longer a valid belief.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations.

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind.

You ask "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?" The colour red exists as a subjective experience in the mind but not the world. Scientists point out that when someone says they see the colour red, in the world can be a wavelength of 700nm, and in a wavelength of 700nm no colour red can be found. A driver sees a red traffic light and stops. Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights.

You say "I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them." This raises one problem. How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces.

Therefore your proposed analogy is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably. My basic idea is sound, but I am making a hash of explaining it. I will take a break and have a re-think. :smile:

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5".

Berkeley's Absolute Idealism
"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Abstract perceptions in our minds, such as "I have an indescribable inchoate feeling", may be made concrete by perceptions through our senses, such as "I feel I am aimlessly drifting". Making the abstract concrete is a function of the metaphor.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low".

We understand the abstract concept of 2+3=5 by the concrete picture of 2 pebbles next to 3 pebbles and seeing a total of 5 pebbles. We can formalise the addition of pebbles on the ground using set theory, such that {2} + {3} = {2 + 3} = {5}.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor.

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover

The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5.

do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon

If fundamental particles and forces did not exist in the world, there would be no concept of "table" in our mind.

Our mind projects our concept of "table" onto the material of the world, as you project the concept of the letter "E" onto a set of points.

The letter "E" does not exist in these points, though you would not see the letter "E" if it were not for these points.

Similarly, the table does not exist in the fundamental particles and forces, but you would not see the table if it were not for these fundamental particles and forces.

right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? — flannel jesus

I'm trying to distinguish between the word "table" which exists in language and a table which I don't believe exists in the world.

I believe that what does exist in the world are fundamental particles and forces, such as electrons and photons.

Similarly, I believe that the word "photon" exists in language and photons exist in the world.

It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

As with Berkeley's Absolute Idealism, ideas exist in the mind and the material world only exists as ideas in the mind.

You mentioned multiplication. Addition is also a fundamental concept in mathematics, and as a concept only exists in the mind.

What does "+" mean?

It doesn't literally mean +, as this would be a tautology. It must mean something other than it is. The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets.

Even the word "set" in set theory is a metaphor. In set theory a set is a collection of distinct objects considered as a whole.

As a metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, a collection of distinct objects refers to these distinct objects being considered as a whole.

The concept of addition can be used outside mathematics, as in "it doesn't add up" but can also be used within mathematics, as in addition is the combining of sets.

The only way a set of distinct objects can be thought of as a whole is metaphorically.

I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. — flannel jesus

My belief is in Nominalism, in that "table" only exists as the name of a concept.

My belief is also in Realism, in that there is something in the world that caused us to see a "table", and this something is real, and is made up of elementary particles, such as electrons.

sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract. — flannel jesus

But then again, the concept of a table may be an abstract thing, but the content of the concept is a concrete thing, a table.

So give me an example of something material. — flannel jesus

If the meaning of the concept "table" is about something material, then the meaning of the concept "thought" is about something immaterial.

This fits in with the Merriam Webster definition of material as "relating to, derived from, or consisting of matter" and immaterial as "not consisting of matter".

Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something.

Words need boundaries. Words without boundaries are usually words without meaning. If everything is immaterial, the designation "immaterial" has no weight. — flannel jesus

In a language of abstract concepts, there are still boundaries, Such as between chair and non-chair, material and immaterial.

As with Derrida's "différance", the meaning of "material" arises from its relationship with "immaterial".

Sure, BUT if you're calling photons "immaterial" as if to compare them to something abstract, I think that's a mistake. Matter or not, mass or not, they're a part of physics. — flannel jesus

But "photon" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract.

The sense of a concept is abstract. Its reference may be concrete, even if we never know the concrete reality.

From SEP - Concepts

An alternative conception of concepts takes concepts to be abstract objects of one type or another.

I think "photon" is a concept created in an attempt to explain the photoelectric effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the nature of language, where concepts are about the sense of things in the world rather than refer to things in the world (Frege).

Scientific language is full of figures of speech. Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes the point that even Newton's second law is probably a metaphor.

"In his article on the use of metaphors in physics (November issue, page 17), Robert P Crease describes several interesting trees but fails to notice the wood all around him. What is a scientific theory if not a grand metaphor for the real world it aims to describe? Theories are generally formulated in mathematical terms, and it is difficult to see how it could be argued that, for example, F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense. Scientific metaphors possess uniquely powerful descriptive and predictive potential, but they are metaphors nonetheless. If scientific theories were as real as the world they describe, they would not change with time (which they do, occasionally). I would even go so far as to suggest that an equation like F = ma is a culturally specific metaphor, in that it can only have meaning in a society that practices mathematical quantification in the way that ours does. Before I'm dismissed as a loopy radical, I should point out that I'm a professional physicist who has been using mathematical metaphors to describe the real world for the last twenty years!"

In other words, "force" is purely conceptual. It is only one of a number of conceptions which can be applied toward representing the effects of gravity, but not the only one. "Force" doesn't represent gravity, it is a method of categorizing the effects of gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are two ways of looking at it.

One way is that "gravity is a force". "Gravity" and "the force of gravity" are synonyms, as the hotness of a body is the motion of its constituent parts.

The other way is that "gravity has a force". Gravity can be quantified by a force, as the hotness of a body can be quantified by temperature.
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I made no conclusion about God. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that the following is still relevant to Berkeley's Idealism and ‘esse est percipi’.

A photon is an example of a massless particle.

A massless particle may be defined as immaterial.

I agree when you say "and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial"

I believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But you also said "In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition."

So, both photons and God are immaterial, where immaterial means the same thing.

But if a person believes in the real existence of photons then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But if a person believes in the real existence of the immaterial, and God is immaterial, then should not a person believe in the real existence of God?

That article also says unambiguously that photons are STUFF, like matter. So if we're going by that article, photons are material, as are electrons and protons and neutrons — flannel jesus

Yes, Strassler's article says that photons are material (stuff).

But energy is not itself stuff; it is something that all stuff has.
Photons are stuff; energy is not.

But, today, matter is commonly defined as something that has mass, meaning that a photon must be immaterial.

In classical physics and general chemistry, matter is any substance that has mass and takes up space by having volume (Wikipedia - Matter)

Whether a photon is material or immaterial depends on one's particular viewpoint.

If matter just is energy then, then photons are material. Are electrons, protons and neutrons material in your opinion? — Janus

I don't know.

Some physicists say that matter is just stable energy. For example, Wilhelm Ostwald regards energy as a form of substance.
https://readfeynman.blogspot.com/2017/04/section-41-what-is-energy.html

Other physicists say that matter is categorically distinct from energy. For example, Matt Strassler.
https://profmattstrassler.com/articles-and-posts/particle-physics-basics/mass-energy-matter-etc/matter-and-energy-a-false-dichotomy/
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That would be an invalid inference. — Janus

This is my point.

So we have two very different ways to conceive what you call "gravitational force". One is as a force, the other as a property of spacetime. The latter is distinctly not "a force" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there are at least two ways to think of gravity. One is as a force and one is as the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass energy.

The NASA article refers to the first way

Gravity is the force by which a planet or other body draws objects toward its center. The force of gravity keeps all of the planets in orbit around the sun.

The article on General Relativity refers to the second way

Gravity isn't a force, it's the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass-energy.

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Can you agree that a person can know one's past and cannot know one's future, and because of this we ought to conclude that there is a real difference between past and future? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, there is a real difference between past and future.
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I don't think those two examples constitute two different meanings. They are applying the same definition of "immaterial" to refer to different things......................................And if such things are believed to be real, independent and not merely conceptual, then we'd have a belief in the real existence of the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are are making a logical leap too far.

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "immaterial" as "not consisting of matter".

As photons don't consist of matter, they can be considered immaterial.

The article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material.

Premise 1 - God is immaterial
Premise 2 - Photons are immaterial
Premise 3 - Photons have a real existence

Conclusion - as some immaterial things have a real existence and as God is immaterial then God has a real existence.

If a human observer cannot know the future, but can know the past, this implies a real difference between future and past. How can a determinist adequately account for this difference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Even someone who believes in Determinism may know their past but cannot know their future.
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If the determinist laws (the laws of physics which support one's belief in determinism), are not believed to extend to all parts of the universe, then how is the belief in determinism supported — Metaphysician Undercover

In the same way that mathematicians have a belief in the axioms they use, statements assumed to be true as a starting point for further reasoning.
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Wouldn't it be possible that nondeterministic activity reigned in some part of the universe, and there could be some interaction between the various parts? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is possible, but so far science does not seem to have found such nondeterministic activity.
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The question is, what supports the belief that the supposed hidden variables are deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not a physicist, but I do know that there are some physicists that I trust, such as Sabine Hossenfelder, who do believe in Superdeterminism.
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A person who believes in free will, and the reality of the immaterial in general, does not allow that Newton's first law extends to a living body moved by final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the one hand, some believe in Physicalism, that everything is physical, and there is nothing beyond the physical realm.

On the other hand, some believe in the immaterial.

It depends what is meant by the word "immaterial".

The article What Sorts of Things Exist, & How? writes

But the immaterial things are the philosophically more interesting. These include consciousness, thoughts, words, meanings, concepts, numbers, emotions, intentions, volitions, moral principles, aesthetic experiences, and more. What would philosophy be without them?

However, the article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material. In other words, God is not made of any kind of matter, material, or substance which entails that he cannot be seen.

There are different meanings to "immaterial".

What causes the stone to fall is gravity. "Force" is not an independent thing in the world which causes anything. "Force" is a mathematical concept, how we quantify the effects of things like gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ describes the position of a stone above the ground dropped from rest with time under gravity.

We could say "gravity causes the stone to fall".

We can quantify the force of gravity. On Earth, the average gravitational force is about 9.81 m/s². On the Moon, it is about 1.63 m/s².

However, if gravity had zero force, 0.00 m/s², the stone would not fall.

So we cannot say that it is gravity per se that causes the stone to fall, but rather it is the force of gravity that causes the stone to fall.

So really, "it is the force of gravity that causes the stone to fall".

Actually that's untrue, because without ontological commitment to universal quantification over absolute infinity, one cannot distinguish the hypothesis of determinism from its anti-thesis. — sime

I have the belief that ontological Determinism is true, in that all events in the Universe can occur in only one possible way.

But I am not committed to my belief and have not suspended any scepticism towards my belief, because I accept that tomorrow someone using a persuasive argument may change my mind. I doubt it, but who knows.

However, for the moment, for me, ontological Determinism is a good working hypothesis.

Yes, that is perfectly reasonable as an informal description of gravity when describing a particular case of motion in the concrete rather than in the abstract — sime

In language, one can justly say that "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". Some of these words are figures of speech, some are concrete and some are abstract.
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as Russell observed, in such cases the concept of causality can be eliminated from the description. — sime

In physics, one can justly write that ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$. This equation predicts the position of the stone with time under a gravitational force. The concept of cause within the equation is redundant.

But a sentence and an equation are very different things. The sentence is about why something happens, "why did the stone fall towards the ground, because of the force of gravity". The equation is about how the stone falls towards the ground, ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$.

It is true that the concept of causality may be removed from an equation, but not true that the concept of causality can be removed from language.
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But determinism takes the causal "determination" of movement by gravity literally, universally and outside of the context of humans determining outcomes — sime

From Britannica - Determinism

The thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

There is a difference between what happens and why it happens. Equations are about what happens not why it happens. Equations are about predictions not causes. It is true that Determinism, as Britannica notes, is the thesis that all events are casually inevitable, universally and outside any human observation.

The equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is about what happens, not why ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$.

Why ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is, according to Determinism, causally inevitable.
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and in a way that requires suspension of Humean skepticism due to the determinist's apparent ontological commitment to universal quantification over generally infinite domains. — sime

That all events in the universe are causally inevitable is the thesis of Determinism. A thesis is an hypothesis, not an ontological commitment. As a thesis, it accepts that it may be proved wrong, in the same way that the equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ may be proved wrong. A thesis does not require a suspension of scepticism, which is why it is a thesis.

Both Determinism and the equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ may be thought of as axioms, statements taken to be true or self-evident, and serve as a premise for further reasoning.

The distance (amount of space) between any two things at some "point in time" is not dependent on perception, even though the measurement of that distance can be said to be so. — Janus

As regards the second point, yes, the actual measurement of distance between two points in space is dependent on human observation.

But as regards the first point, what is the true reality of the space between two points?

What is empty space?

Even if there is no empty space and every part of the universe contains fluctuating energy fields, what is the nature of the space that contains these fluctuating energy fields?

Was Newton right, that space is an absolute existing independently of any objects within it, or was Leibniz right that space is only defined by the relation of objects within it?

How is "several possible futures" consistent with determinism? — Metaphysician Undercover

My intention was that from the viewpoint of a human observer, even in a deterministic world, they cannot know the future.
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Meanwhile, "God's Will" is a sound theory, supported by the experience of every human being who makes choices. And "superdeterminism" is just the pie-in -the-sky clutching at straws of deluded determinists. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends on whether one believes that there is a divine entity or there is nothing over and above the physical.
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On the other hand, we can say that Newton's first law applies only to the aspects of the universe which our sense capacities allow us to observe................................we have no reason to believe that it behaves in the same way as the part which we can observe. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't need to know whether Newton's Laws apply to those parts of the Universe that we don't observe, we only need to know that they apply to the parts of the Universe that we do observe.
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That sounds just like "God's Will". However, there is one big difference. "God's Will" is consistent with human experience of choice, free will, the known difference between past and future, and our knowledge of final cause, while "superdeterminism" is not. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Determinism, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the past.

It seems that in In God's Will, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the final cause, the unmoved mover. A human's will is free providing they use their will to move towards this final cause, this unmoved mover.

a commitment to determinism looks like a metaphysical commitment to the objective existence of intentional forces of agency (i.e. spirits) that exist above and beyond the physically describable aspects of substances. — sime

A stone falls to the ground under gravity.

Materialism was the old term that just referred to matter, the stone and the Earth. Physicalism is the new term that refers to both matter and force, gravity. Though sometimes Materialism and Physicalism are still used interchangeably (Wikipedia - Physcialism)

The movement of the stone is determined by the force of gravity.

It is part of the nature of language that many words are being used as figures of speech rather than literally, such as "determined". Also included are metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, irony and idiom.

What is a table to you, is a meal to a termite, and a landing place to a bird. — Wayfarer

True. As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that tables exist in a mind-independent world, but only exist in the mind as a human concept.

However, some do believe that tables exist in a mind-independent world, and as such are objects rather than relations.

Without wanting to wade into the endless quantum quandries...................................But it seems irrefutable nowadays, that at a fundamental level, physical reality is not fully determined. — Wayfarer

Neither do I. I am sure that science in the future will look back at current knowledge on quantum mechanics as we look back to alchemy.

But today not everyone agrees. Some believe in Superdeterminism, in that there are hidden variables that we do not yet know about.

Superdeterminism - Why Are Physicists Scared of It? - Sabine Hossenfelder

Newton's laws cannot account for the reality of free will, where the cause of motion is internal to the body which accelerates. — Metaphysician Undercover

True. When thinking about the equation f=ma, in determinism force is a physical thing whereas in free will force is a mental thing.

In determinism there is no place for Aristotle's final cause, whereas in free will there is.

In determinism, an object moves because of a prior physical cause whereas in free will an object moves because of a future mental goal.

There is only one past, one present and several possible futures.

In determinism, the one past determines the one present.

In free will, as there is only one present, one of the several possible futures must have been chosen, and it is this choice that determines the one present.

Even in fee will, the present has been determined.

The mind does make mistakes, but it is a lot cleverer than that. It judges the size of distant objects by comparing their height with other objects in the field of vision. It knows the actual height of the other objects, so it can work out the height of the unknown object.
So, yes, it creates a perception, but not necessarily a false one. — Ludwig V

If object A is 1.8 metre in size and object B is 1.7m in size, then there is a relation between their sizes. Does this relation exist in the mind, the world or both?

Every object in the Universe has a size, from a quark to a galaxy, so there is a relation between every possible pair of objects in the Universe.

If there were only 2 objects in the universe there is one relation. If there were only 3 objects in the universe there are 3 relations. If there were only 4 objects in the universe there are 6 relations. IE, in the Universe, there are more relations than objects.

If relations do exist in an ontological sense in the world, then there are more relations than actual objects.

Where did these extra relations come from?

The relation just is the amount of actual space between them. That is, if you allow that space exists mind-independently, which I find it most plausible to think. — Janus

Suppose a table exists mind-independently. A table is an object, not a relation.

Suppose space exists mind-independently. As with the table, then isn't space an object rather than a relation?

And did it occur to you that your understanding that she is bored might be erroneous? — L'éléphant

Exactly.

"Esse est percipi" is translated as "to be is to be perceived".

But does this mean perceived through the sense, I perceive a loud noise, or perceived in the understanding, I perceive Mary is bored.

In my mind I perceive Mary to be bored. Therefore, from "esse est percipi", if I understand Mary to be bored, then in the world Mary's state of being is that of being bored.

But my understanding may be erroneous, as you say, and in the world Mary's state of being may not be that of being bored.

So I cannot depend on my understanding to know the true state of being in the world.

Therefore, "perceive" in "to be is to be perceived" cannot refer to the understanding but only to the sensibilities.

The point is that universals are not “in the mind” — not mere thoughts or conventions. — Wayfarer

As a Nominalist I disagree. But I don't think we will be able to resolve the debate between Universals and Nominalism in this thread.

There is a spatial relation between a particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy.

The relation cannot be in a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the space between the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and our Sun.

Then where is this relation?

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations. — Ludwig V

When someone says that they perceive the colour red, science may discover that they are looking at an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered?

Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). — Ludwig V

The mind is a mysterious expression of the brain, but we know the brain has spatial extension. We know of no example of a brain that has no size.

If the physical brain was removed, we know of no example where a mind would remain.

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations.
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But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. — Ludwig V

In the world are two people of the same height, one standing 10 metres away from an observer and the other standing 100 metres away.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world?

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world.

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. — Ludwig V

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world.

The fact I perceive a spatial relation between Glasgow and Edinburgh does not mean the spatial relationship exists in the world.

But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. — Ludwig V

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world.