The larger puzzle is this: How is it the case that, no matter what definition we use, we discover these regularities between math/logic and the world? — J
But that doesn't make Q2 a linguistic problem, since we've stipulated what an "object" will be in this question. — J
But what about the problem posed by the question itself, now disambiguated? -- presumably you'd say "No, it can't be divided evenly" and so we want to know whether this is due to a mathematical fact or a fact about the world. — J
Q4: Why can’t my cat be on my lap and in Paris at the same time? (constraint: I live in Maryland) — J
I don't just see a bunch of atoms grouped together- I see a type of object. — schopenhauer1
Q2. Why are 23 objects not evenly divisible into three collections of whole and unbroken objects? — J
The metaphysical problem with your scenario though, is that if past events are contingent on future events, then this either implies that the past event doesn't come into existence (because its future dependency doesn't exist) or it just does away with the idea of contingency. If the past event doesn't come into existence because it is contingent on some future event is in a "loop" with, then neither events exist and there is no loop. — Hallucinogen
(1) Existence is a series of entities and events.
(2) For all series, having no 1st term implies having no nth term.
(3) The universe has an nth term. — Hallucinogen
I believe the speed of light is also a concept. — Carlo Roosen
In accordance with what I say above I think the idea of consistency loses its meaning in that context, both because fundamental reality is presumably not something conceptual and because there is no second thing for it to be consistent with even if it were conceptual. — Janus
If fundamental reality wasn't consistent with what? Life? If fundamental reality wasn't consistent with life life couldnt exist? Profound! — Janus
, it forms empirical evidence of the consistency of fundamental reality.. — Carlo Roosen
..............that with a concept in our mind we can do all kinds of tests to confirm that concept in fundamental reality........................So the concepts still *apply* to fundamental reality..............................You rely on fundamental reality every moment. — Carlo Roosen
I believe my terms work better because they take away the unease of things not being real. — Carlo Roosen
Who started saying that we cannot talk about things? — Carlo Roosen
Indirect realists, unlike idealists, believe that our ideas come from sense data acquired through experiences of a real, material, external world. In any act of perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is only a sense-datum that represents an external object.
The earliest reference to indirect realism is found in Aristotle’s description of how the eye is affected by changes in an intervening medium rather than by objects themselves. He reasoned that the sense of vision itself must be self-aware, and concluded by proposing that the mind consists of thoughts, and calls the images in the mind "ideas."
If this is a paradox, I don't think it is a very complicated one.............Of course, it's impossible to talk about them yet here we are talking about them. — T Clark
You can only recognise something "out there" if you already have a concept available "inside"...When you know what you are looking for, fundamental reality gives all the evidence. — Carlo Roosen
But if we would listen to Kant, he says we cannot understand fundamental reality. — Carlo Roosen
You will agree that our conceptual detection system is at work and recognizes this as a pattern forming the letter E. — Carlo Roosen
How do you engage with philosophy — Jafar
My belief is in "Innatism", the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs (Wikipedia Innatism)
Assuming by thing-in-itself we mean the object qua itself (independently of our experience of it), it sounds like you are denying that you cannot have any knowledge of the things-in-themselves; which cannot be true if there is an a priori structure by which your brain intuits and cognizes objects (which you equally affirmed). This doesn’t seem coherent to me. — Bob Ross
===============================================================================In medieval philosophy, direct realism was defended by Thomas Aquinas. Indirect realism was popular with several early modern philosophers, including René Descartes, John Locke, G. W. Leibniz and David Hume.
There’s one part of the whole transcendental idealism which poses a threat to the entire enterprise and of which I would like to explore with this forum: the paradoxical and necessary elimination of knowledge of the things-in-themselves via particular knowledge of thing-in-themselves — Bob Ross
Theorem. The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.
To me, I would agree that the best explanation, given experience, is that there are objects impacting our senses: but that is derived from empirical data from (ultimately) our experience itself. — Bob Ross
But then the thought occurred to me, why would they be motivated by ‘winning’? — Wayfarer
Barr was quite serious; watch the video. — Art48
It's just beautiful. Like, I look out my bedroom window. I can't believe it, I see all these gorgeous little tiny baby deer in my yard eating the grass around my pool. I's so fantastic you know, because I can pull out my AR-15 and blow them just to Smithereens, legally.
In most major cities around the world, communities of ordinary people – nurses, bar staff, secretaries – are drinking human blood on a regular basis. The question is, why?
In the French quarter of New Orleans, John Edgar Browning is about to take part in a "feeding". It begins as clinically as a medical procedure. His acquaintance first swabs a small patch on Browning’s upper back with alcohol. He then punctures it with a disposable hobby scalpel, and squeezes until the blood starts flowing. Lowering his lips to the wound, Browning's associate now starts lapping up the wine-dark liquid. “He drank it a few times, then cleaned and bandaged me,” Browning says today.
There are thousands of people drinking blood in the US alone.
[Actress Roseanne Barr] says people are eating babies and drinking their blood. Oh, and she says she's not crazy. — Art48
Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross
I think Kimhi believes that something can have force (not assertoric force) without being asserted. — J
I think the ND review gets it right about Kimhi's debt to Wittgenstein, which he acknowledges. He sees Wittgenstein as a fellow "psycho / logical monist". Is a there a Wittgensteinian response about assertion here that you could offer? (In this context, assertion isn't the same as "reference.") The Indirect Realist challenge is interesting, but I'll leave it alone as my own metaphysics is much closer to direct realism. — J
We shall now enquire into the Sense and Reference of a whole assertoric sentence. Such a sentence contains a thought. Should this thought be seen as its Sense or as its Reference?
Have I succeeded in raising a genuine challenge to Frege — J
3. It begins to look as though the contemporary neglect of the old puzzles rehearsed by Wittgenstein is far less revelatory of the nature of these puzzles than of the current state of philosophy. The groundbreaking lesson of Kimhi's reflections is that this diagnosis may well be sound. Our sense that we have put these old puzzles behind us bespeaks a "misplaced confidence", one that "stems from our present conceptions of logic and language" (2). The task of addressing these puzzles must be confronted anew. Given that the Parmenidean account of the unity of thinking and being lands us in an aporia, what is required is a diagnosis of what stands in the way of an alternative account of this unity
What Kimhi adds to this, in a manner I'm still grappling with, is the unity part: the claim that "the assertion 'p is true' is the same as 'I truly think p'." — J
The proper object of an assertion of falsehood is always a proposition or representation, whereas the proper object of an assertion of truth can be reality itself. — Leontiskos
There was truth in creation before the serpent spoke, and falsehood (and doubt!) only emerged by and through his speaking. — Leontiskos
As for "this sentence is false" or 'this statement is false"... its essentially meaningless because it doesn't actually "state" anything ie stating something requires the subject of the statement to be separate from the statement itself — Benj96
It can also be resolved another way by changing the statement itself from "this statement is false" to something like "this statements grammar false is" in this way it remains self referential but justifies falsity by adding a variable to contextualise its falsity - namely erroneous structure. — Benj96
Or in other words, the logical space of events or state of affairs, that which is, defined, by, again, what something is not. Positive facts are mutually related by negative facts in logical space. — Shawn
Wittgenstein once said that the totality of facts makes up the world. Now, facts are determined from the sum total of counterfactuals determining what are "facts". — Shawn
Where it gets bizarre with Kimhi is his further claim that p itself is syncategorematic. You’re right that he regards p as a fact rather than a Fregean complex, but how then is p used? What is the context we need to provide in order to state a relation involving p? I don’t think that, e.g., joining it with q in ‛p & q’ helps. The problem lies in how facts are asserted – how they’re affirmed or denied. — J
I think Kimhi wants to say something more radical – that the context needed to make use of (syncategorematic) ‛p’ has to involve a monistic understanding of what it is to assert. — J
However, the predominant version of combinatorialism finds its origins in Russell's (1918/1919) theory of logical atomism and Wittgenstein's (1921, 1922, 1974) short but enormously influential Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
All sorts of interesting questions hinge on getting clear about “and”, “or”, “if/IFF”, “can”, “must”, et al. -- well, who knows, maybe we need a better understanding of “on” too. — J
When we give the name "Y" to X, we then say such things as "Y is X". When you give the name "Buppy" to your dog, you then write "Bubby is my dog". When I give the name "The Pentastring" to "This sentence has five words" I then write "The Pentastring is "This sentence has five words"".
You SKIP the examples:
A puppy was born on August 30, 2024 at 8:00 AM in the house at 100 Main Street in Smalltown, Kansas. That puppy was named "Noorbicks". Noorbicks is the puppy born on August 30, 2024 at 8:00 AM in the house at 100 Main Street in Smalltown, Kansas. — TonesInDeepFreeze
Thanks, this helps. "Representing" is describing in words, while "mirroring" is more like ostension or making a picture. I'm not satisfied with how this carries over into logical form
(is "on" really a logical connective?), but that can wait till another day. — J
The distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms was established in ancient Greek grammar. Words that designate self-sufficient entities (i.e., nouns or adjectives) were called categorematic, and those that do not stand by themselves were dubbed syncategorematic, (i.e., prepositions, logical connectives, etc.)
A syncategorematic expression does not add anything (whether content or form) to the sense of any proposition embedded in it. On Kimhi's account, the assertions "Not-p", "A thinks p", "p is true" and, last but not least, "p" itself, do not add anything whatsoever to the sense of "p". None of these expressions stands for a relation. In fact, none of them stands for anything. They all are syncategorematic expressions. That the assertion "p" is itself a syncategorematic unit becomes intelligible once it is realized that the propositional symbol "p" consists in a fact rather than a complex (100).
"This sentence has five words" was named "The Pentastring". The Pentastring is "This sentence has five words". — TonesInDeepFreeze
"London" is a city. (false - "London" is a word, not a city) — TonesInDeepFreeze
Can you say what the difference is between "representing" logical form and "mirroring" logical form? The example of the apple on the table suggests that, while "on" is undefinable without circularity, its logical form can nevertheless be shown through usage. That doesn't sound like the same issue -- or is it? — J
The question we are considering is whether all true sentences are formulable within formalism.
Hmm. Not quite sure I get this. Can you refer us to some passages in the Tractatus? — J
TLP 4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.
TLP 4.12 Propositions can represent the hole of reality, but they cannot represent what they have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it - logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.
TLP 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.
TLP 4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said
Typical statement: “The critical insight -- that any unity in consciousness is essentially self-consciousness of that unity -- is recognized to coincide with the insight that the consciousness of logical activity is inseparable from the capacity to manifest this activity in language.” — J
This is a little tricky. Doesn't it depend on exactly what we mean by "say 'p'"? — J
I can say “It is true that there are a hundred thalers on the table” but this adds nothing to the proposition ‛There are a hundred thalers on the table’. — J