and the point about that particular case is that no clear meaning has been assigned to "direct". — Ludwig V

Though the Merriam Webster dictionary does narrow down the definition of "direct" when used as an adverb to:
a) from point to point without deviation, by the shortest way - flew direct to Miami
b) from the source without interruption or diversion - the writer must take his material direct from life
c) without an intervening agency - buy direct from the manufacturer

When I look into the night sky and see the planet Mars, I am able to see Mars because of the photons of light entering my eye. These photons had previously travelled the 380m km through empty space after leaving the planet.

So when I say "I directly see Mars", as there is no information within these photons that their source was Mars, I am using the word "directly" in a figurative rather than literal sense.
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But if we try to understand that non-verbal reality we find ourselves unable to do so. — Ludwig V

Until whilst walking through a town someone driving in a car runs over my foot.
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A microscope will discover many things, but never a star. — Ludwig V

Yes, stalemate. Ayer's method pre-determines what he will discover and Austin's method pre-determines what he will discover.

This is perhaps why on the Forum for a Thread to come to an agreed conclusion is probably as rare as hen's teeth.

As Austin wrote:
In these lectures I am going to discuss some current doctrines (perhaps, by now, not so current as they once were) about sense-perception. We shall not, I fear, get so far as to decide about the truth or falsity of these doctrines; but in fact that is a question that really can't be decided, since it turns out that they all bite off more than they can chew.

Perhaps the moral is that one doctrine cannot criticise another doctrine based on its own particular foundational beliefs.

As the sense-data theory cannot show that OLP is invalid, OLP cannot show that the sense-data theory is invalid.

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

The following is my understanding, but am ready to be persuaded otherwise.

Is Austin really an OLP?

I see a bent stick and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing a bent stick or ii) seeing a straight stick in water. I see an ellipse and know that my perception could have been caused by either i) seeing an ellipse head on or ii) seeing a circle at an angle.

The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word "see" includes i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility.

Ayer, as an Indirect Realist, is using the word "see" in both ways. He is seeing as in perceiving by the eye a bent stick and is also seeing as in imagining the possible cause as either i) a straight stick in water or ii) a bent stick.

In Ayer's terms, seeing as in perceiving by the eye an effect can be called sense-data and seeing as in imagining the possibility can be called the material object.

But Austin in Sense and Sensibilia is saying that Ayer is wrong, in that we don't see sense-data but do see the material object.

My only conclusion from this is that Austin is saying that using the word "see" as to perceive by the eye is invalid and using the word "see" to imagine the possibility is valid. But this position is against the meaning of the word "see" as set out in the Merriam Webster dictionary as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language .

As OLP is the position that philosophy should be carried out using words as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language, and Austin appears not to be following the tenets of OLP, as shown by the Merriam Webster Dictionary example, this suggests that in fact he cannot be described as an OLP.

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, — Antony Nickles

The particular method used to obtain an object will pre-determine any object discovered

According to the IEP article Ordinary Language Philosophy -
Ordinary Language philosophy, sometimes referred to as ‘Oxford’ philosophy, is a kind of ‘linguistic’ philosophy. Linguistic philosophy may be characterized as the view that a focus on language is key to both the content and method proper to the discipline of philosophy as a whole (and so is distinct from the Philosophy of Language).

According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, "method" can typically mean a procedure or process for attaining an object: such as a way, technique, or process of or for doing something.

OLP is clearly not a just a method of philosophy, as its chosen method of focusing on language will inevitable pre-determine any conclusions it reaches.

OLP is the belief-system that philosophical enquiry must focus on language.

A method of philosophy that focuses on language will necessarily come to different conclusions to a method of philosophy that doesn't focus on language.
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but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here. — Antony Nickles

As you said "because the truth will “turn on… the circumstances in which it is uttered.”(p.111)"

True. If I said to someone "you are truly hot", this would have several possible meanings dependent upon context. Some literal and some figurative.

As you said "But Austin also shows how “reality”...............is a manufactured idea".

True. The concept of "reality" is manufactured within language.

OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example — Antony Nickles

OLP cannot be unbiased about sense-data as the Christian cannot be unbiased about Atheism

OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" in favour of a philosophy based on ordinary language used by competent speakers of that language. Philosophers should instead ask what does it mean to say that "is it true that it is raining in Paris" and "this perfume has a fine essence".

Any movement that believes that philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations is obviously biased against philosophers who have grand metaphysical aspirations.
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I am not talking about the “metaphysical problem” (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysician’s use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case. — Antony Nickles

The metaphysician interested in the sense-data problem removes linguistic context because the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object" is independent of language

Yes, OLP believed that philosophy should lose its grand metaphysical aspirations and stop trying to understand words in terms of the universal and abstract, such as "what is truth", but concentrate on understanding words as they are used in ordinary language by any competent speaker, such as "is it true that it is raining in Paris".

This approach follows from Frege's Context Principle, In his book The Foundations of Arithmetic he changed the metaphysical question "what are numbers" into the linguistic question what does it mean to say "the number of horses is four"

The Indirect Realist is asking the metaphysical question "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object". Metaphysical because such a question cannot be answered by the sensations alone but only from reasoning about the sensations.

It is true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data wants to remove context, as such a metaphysical question is independent of language, and context is an inherent part of language.

It is not true that the metaphysician interested in sense-data is wanting to generalize only one type of case. They are interested in the specific and particular case "do I directly see sense-data or do I directly see an object".

(Wikipedia - The Foundations of Arithmetic)

Moore...................Wittgenstein..................but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants — Antony Nickles

True, but they are a foundation for what Ordinary Language Philosophy wants
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OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position — Antony Nickles

OLP as any method cannot avoid but being biased

OLP is a method, and as with any method, is only able to discover those things that it is structurally capable of discovering. By that I mean, if given a problem, whether scientific or philosophical, the method I choose in order to solve that problem determines any solution that I may discover. For example, I may want to discover the nature of reality, and my chosen method is visual observation. However, the reality I discover will be only be that part of reality accessible to vision. I will be missing that part of reality only accessible to touch, hearing, etc .

As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. OLP is one method amongst many, including Analytic, Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, Scepticism, Common Sense, Verifications, Continental, Aristotelianism, etc, where each will give a different answer biased by the inherent nature of the method itself.

OLP by its very nature of having a specific method can only result in biased conclusions. It is inevitable.
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Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can — Antony Nickles

I would think that the metaphysical use of words is a logical impossibility.

Words can be used to describe Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data. For example, I can say: "when looking at a red postbox, for the Direct Realist the postbox is literally red and for the Indirect Realist the postbox appears red, not that the postbox is literally red".

Ayer's metaphysical problem with sense-data is independent of language and would still happen in a world without language, in that language is not an aspect of the metaphysical situation. When a person looks at a red postbox, is the postbox literally red, or does the person have a private mental sensation of the colour red?

On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. Wittgenstein gave a solution to this conundrum in Philosophical Investigations 293 using the beetle in the box analogy, where we can talk about pain yet cannot describe pain. The private sensation of pain, the beetle in the box, drops out of consideration within the language game. The word "pain" in language is not describing an unknown cause, pain, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, pain behaviour.

Similarly, Austin might talk about "the metaphysics of do we directly see sense-data or directly see the object", but this expression is not describing an unknown cause, whether sense-data or an object, but is describing the known effect of an unknown cause, ie, seeing something.

But if the argument is that God exists and that argument is absurd, until there is another argument, there is no basis for asserting that God exists. No? — Ludwig V

True, in the absence of a good argument that God exists people fall back on faith.

So you believe both positions and that no argument can settle the issue? Basically on the grounds that any argument must be from one position or another and that it cannot therefore address the issue. H'm. That would need some explaining. — Ludwig V

Exactly my problem with Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, in that from the position of linguistics he does take a position on the metaphysics of sense-data.

Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position. — Antony Nickles

I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street.

OLP doesn't reduce philosophy to ordinary words, but proposes that philosophy can better be undertaken using ordinary words. OLP does not reduce philosophy to the person-in-the-street, but suggests that philosophy should be understood by the person-in-the-street. OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in.

OLP looks at words such as direct and indirect and points out it is not possible to make the simple statement that direct and indirect have opposite meanings. Not only does direct have several different meanings dependent upon context but also indirect has several different meanings dependent upon context.

OLP points out that problems arise when ordinary words having commonly agreed meanings are given unusual new meanings by philosophers in their attempt to solve philosophical problems, thereby creating more philosophical problems than they solve

Because of the nature of language, in that the meaning of a word depends on its context within the whole, and between words are family resemblances, OLP tend to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality.

However, Ernest Gellner in Words and Things 1959 made the valid point that as language derives from the communities within which we live, as these communities are ever-changing and unstable, philosophical ideas expressed within our language will also inevitably be ever-changing and unstable.

(Wikipedia - Ordinary Language Philosophy)

OK. But the argument in question here is the argument that we never perceive reality, only sense-data. — Ludwig V

Linguistics and metaphysics are two very different fields of enquiry.

Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is written from the viewpoint of an Ordinary Language Philosopher.

I can understand Austin, as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, making the point that sense-data is not a necessary part of linguistics, which I agree with.

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.

The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language.

The difficulty is that arguments about metaphysics have to be expressed in language. If the (attempts to express) metaphysical argument result in self-contradiction or absurdity, they cannot be correct. — Ludwig V

True, the argument for sense-data theory can only be expressed in language.

However, if the argument results in self-contradiction or absurdity, it is possible that it is the argument that is self-contradictory or absurd, not the topic of the argument.
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I don't believe in God, yet I can tell you what the arguments for and against are. What's the problem? — Ludwig V

Your arguments for the existence of God haven't persuaded you of the existence of God, so they cannot be very persuasive.

I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form — Ludwig V

Before I can comment, it depends what you mean.

Do you mean either i) at one moment in time when looking at an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) at several moments in time when walking around an object I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form.
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I wouldn't say he ignores metaphorical meanings for "apple". He explicitly draws attention to one kind of relevant metaphor in the passage you quote. He also draws attention to the difference between that metaphorical use and the literal use. — Ludwig V

When looking at a radar screen the technician would ordinarily say "I see the enemy ships", inferring that they see the enemy ships directly rather than indirectly. This suggests that the expression "I see the enemy ships" is not to be taken literally but metaphorically.

However, there is more to it than that, in that within Austin's Ordinary Language Philosophy the words within the metaphor are to be taken literally rather than figuratively. This is in the same way as described by Donald Davidson in his article What Metaphors Mean.

In Ordinary Language Philosophy, the expression "I see the enemy ships", although classified as a metaphor, is intended to be taken literally, in the same way that a Direct Realist when saying "I see a red postbox" means not only that they see a red postbox but that the postbox is literally red.

This leads into the debate between Direct Realists who argue they directly see an object in the world and the indirect Realist who argue that they directly see the sense-data from an object in the world.
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As it happens, in the example you cite, "I" am perceiving by the eye (in future, I will write "see" instead of this cumbersome form) two dimensional forms which I know give me information about the three-dimensional world. I can't see any important metaphysical questions from this. — Ludwig V

The relevance is linguistic, in that the word "see" has several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".
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It is perfectly possible for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the existence of God that deserves to be taken seriously. — Ludwig V

True, but it would be more difficult for someone who believes in God to formulate an argument for the non-existence of God.
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Ordinary Language Philosophy is a method of evaluation and he is using it to evaluate Ayer's argument and he comes to the conclusion that the argument is invalid. — Ludwig V

An Ordinary Language Philosophy as a philosophical methodology would be agnostic about Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory, but Austin's Sense and Sensibilia is clearly more than a philosophical methodology as it concludes that Ayer's metaphysical sense-data theory is wrong.

Austin and Ayer hold two independent positions. Austin, as the name Ordinary Language Philosophy suggests, that of linguistics, and Ayer that of metaphysics. The problems of linguistics are different to and independent of the problems of metaphysics.

Ordinary Language Philosophy is about the meaning of an expression such as " I see an object in the world", whereas sense-data theory is about whether we see an object in the world directly or do we see the sense-data from that object directly. These are two very different things and shouldn't be conflated.

I believe that sense-data are metaphysically true, and I also believe that sense-data is irrelevant to linguistics. For linguistics to try to prove or disprove the metaphysical theory of sense-data is like asking a person to describe something they don't know about.

Linguistics and metaphysics are two independent fields of study, and the existence of one neither proves not disproves the existence of the other.
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You seem to be saying that the sense-data theory is irrelevant. — Ludwig V

I agree that from Austin's Ordinary Language point of view the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

If you know that there's another side to the apple, you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object, so you are not seeing in two dimensions. — Ludwig V

In what sense are you using the word "see".

From the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word "see" can have several meanings, including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine a possibility".

You say that because you know that you are looking at a three-dimensional object then you are not seeing in two-dimensions.

By this, do you mean either i) you are perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or ii) you are imagining a three-dimensional form?

The problem with Austin

The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary.

As he wrote: For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'

For Austin, "I see an apple" is all one needs to know. However, for Ayer, it is an important metaphysical question when looking at an apple whether I am perceiving by the eye a three-dimensional form or I am imagining the possibility of a three-dimensional form.

I thought that helping each other to understand Austin's text was the point of the thread. — Ludwig V

That's why I included my understanding of Austin's position regarding sense-data in page 5 of this thread, which has neither been supported nor opposed.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

Which use is literal and which is metaphorical? — Ludwig V

Clearly, the first is meant literally and the second metaphorically.

If "see" means literally "to perceive by the eye", when standing in front of an object such as an apple I can only see the front of it. If "see" means metaphorically "to imagine a possibility", when standing in front of an object such as an apple, I can also see the back of it.

Is there anyone who thinks that we can literally "see the future", "see into her mind", "see the solution", "see what you mean", "see the end of time", "see the other side of the Universe", "see atoms", "see evolution happening", "see Caesar's dilemma" or "see gravitational waves".

But how does this help us understand this topic? — Ludwig V

I'm not here to help you understand Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, I'm here to specifically respond to @Banno by pointing out that different meanings of the word" see" shouldn't be conflated.

Though, as an aside, as a Christian author could write an article evaluating Atheism and unsurprisingly find it wanting, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting. From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, I may well agree that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

There was a recent, very odd discussion in the Case for Transcendental Idealism thread - ↪Gregory, ↪Corvus and ↪RussellA apparently insisting that they see only in two dimensions, only imagining the third... I couldn't make sense of it. — Banno

As Oscar Wide said:"There is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.”

It depends what you mean by "see".

According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, two possible meanings of "see" are i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine as a possibility.

Therefore, both the following statements are true: "I can only see in two dimensions" and "I can also see in three dimensions", dependent on whether the word "see" is being used literally or metaphorically.

Metaphors are a legitimate part of language. In What Metaphors Mean, Donald Davidson wrote:"Metaphor is a legitimate device not only in literature but in science, philosophy, and the law; it is effective in praise and abuse, prayer and promotion, description and prescription."

Yes, as Davidson points out, language is full of inherent ambiguities, when he wrote: "Another brand of ambiguity may appear to offer a better suggestion. Sometimes a word will, in a single context, bear two meanings where we are meant to remember and to use both."

Keep reading CPR. The answer is in it. — Corvus

Of its 785 pages, can you narrow it down a bit?

The only way that can be done is by Reason reflecting on itself. — Corvus

How?

The whole part of CPR is about reason reflecting on itself via critical thinking. — Corvus

Impossible.

Reason can reflect on objects of reason. An object of reason can include the definition of reason as "a logical thought about something", but an object of reason cannot include what is doing the reasoning, which would be a logical impossibility.

The object of reason can also include such things as God, the soul, freedom, immortality, virtue, happiness, causality and morality.

As Kant was a Rationalist, he held the epistemological view that "regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge". It is not the case that reason in itself is able to provide new knowledge, but rather, reason enables new knowledge to be discovered.

Reason is an a priori structure within the mind, and together with the Categories, give logical structure to objects of empirical experience and thereby plays a Discursive role in making sense of phenomenal experiences.

Reason in the CPR looks outwards to objects of reason not inwards to itself, which would be a logical impossibility.

Reason can reflect on itself. — Corvus

Dangling pronouns cause problems

The problem is the word "itself". We can replace the expression "reason can reflect on itself" by the expression "reason can reflect on reason". The question then becomes, what does the first use of the word "reason" refer to and what does the second use of the word "reason" refer to.

There is no problem if the first use refers to reason as a thought in the mind, and the second use refers to reason as a definition, such as "a logical thought about something".

However, there is a problem if both the first and second use refer to a thought in the mind. Reason cannot reflect on itself because of the problem of infinite regression. If I reflect it must be about something and if I reason it must be about something. "To reflect" can mean to think about something. I can reflect on something in the world such as a table. "To reason" means to think about something logically. I can reason about something I observe in the world such as a table, such as, why does it have four legs rather than two. The question is, can I reason about the something that is reasoning about something. The problem is, that if reason could reflect on itself, then if I reason about something, and this something is reasoning about something, then one ends up with an infinite loop.

IE, reason as a thought can reflect on reason as a definition, but reason as a thought cannot reflect on reason as the same thought.

In other words, before making, or, in order to make, experience possible at all, there has to be these structure in place just due to an analysis of what experience is. — Astrophel

Yes, in the same way that we are able to see the colour red and not the colour ultraviolet because the ability to see red is an innate part of the structure of the brain.

the innateness is not out there, — Astrophel

Yes, if the word "innate" is limited to sentient beings, then innateness does not exist in a world external to sentient beings. Causality may then be said to be intrinsic within a world external to sentient beings.

But to affirm what is not brain, you would have to step out of one. — Astrophel

Do you mean "brain" existing as a word in language or brain as a physical thing existing in a world outside language?

For the phenomenologist, reality is just reality, it is exactly s it appears, — Astrophel

Yes, when the Phenomenologist sees the colour red, they are interested in the colour red as it appears to them within the context of their other experiences. Their interest in not in making assumptions about a possible cause in an external world.

Kant wasn't dismissed because he was essentially wrong. He was dismissed because he had been worn out, — Astrophel

Yes, Kant started a conversation and new knowledge gained in the 200 years since his death doesn't make what he said any less relevant.

Does it leads to a conclusion that modern QM is basing some of their theories and hypotheses on Kant's Thing-in-Itself? — Corvus

Not necessarily, but it does show that good ideas are universal.

But of course, you know this is miles from Kant. — Astrophel

Yes. Kant, who died in 1804, was not aware of what is described today as Enactivism and Innatism. However Philosophers working today in 2023 should be aware of these concepts, and should take them into account when contemplating about non-propositional knowledge.

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This whole structred conception of evolution itself is just this, a phenomenological consturction, leading right into Kantisn thinking's hands, which is that the true source of rational thought is transcendence. — Astrophel

Transcendence has different meanings. It depends what you mean by transcendence. For Kant, "I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied, not with objects, but with the way that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. (Wikipedia - Transcendence (philosophy). Kant does not explain how we can know objects before we experience them. Today, however, because of the concept of Innatism, we are able to explain how we can know objects before we experience them.

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Localizing the apodicticity of what we call causality in a brain's structure suggest that outside such that this the principle would not apply. — Astrophel

Why? Why should it follow that because the understanding of causality is innate within the brain the principle of causality would not apply outside the brain? The concept of Enactivism shows that an understanding of causality is innate within the brain precisely because the principle of causality applies outside the brain.

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Therefore, the brain is a construct of the brain. — Astrophel

It depends what the word "brain" is referring to. Yes, in the sense that the "brain" as a word in language is a construct of the brain as something that physically exists in the world.

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But how does brain generated anything produce a reality that is anything but brain generated somethings? — Astrophel

For the Idealist, reality only exists in a mind, meaning that the reality the mind perceives has been created by a mind. For the Indirect and Direct Realist, there is a reality outside the mind which the mind relates to. This reality outside the mind has not been generated by the mind, but how the mind relates to this reality is generated by the mind. For the Indirect Realist, the reality they perceive is a representation of the reality existing outside the mind. For the Direct Realist, the reality they perceive is the reality existing outside the mind.

There are different opinions as to the source of one's perceived reality.

Where does it exist? — Corvus

As @mww wrote "For their place in transcendental philosophy, they are transcendentally deduced conceptions, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain things that appear to sensibility."

In a sense, muons are things-in-themselves, postulated as empirical existences necessary to explain what is observed.

Philosophers today tend away from this kind of thing, which suggests some kind of non propositional knowledge of red that is there prior language and naming. — Astrophel

There needs to be some flexibility in what we mean by knowledge. For example, I have the innate ability to see the colour red but not the colour ultraviolet. The distinction between knowing how and knowing what is relevant here, a distinction that was brought to prominence in epistemology by Gilbert Ryle who used it in his book The Concept of Mind. (SEP - Knowing-How and Knowing-That). I am born with the innate knowledge of how to see the colour red even if I don't have the innate knowledge of what the colour red is.

In today's terms, we can account for our a priori knowledge by Innatism and Enactivism, given that life has been evolving in synergy with the world for at least 3.7 billion years. We are born with a brain that has a particular physical structure because of this 3.7 billion years of evolution.

Enactivism says that it is necessary to appreciate how living beings dynamically interact with their environments. From an Enactivist perspective, there is no prospect of understanding minds without reference to such interactions because interactions are taken to lie at the heart of mentality in all of its varied forms. (IEP - Enactivism)

Innatism says that in the philosophy of mind, Innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism. (Wikipedia - Innatism)

Innatism and Enactivism explain our non-propositional knowledge of red.

His question really is, how are apriori synthetic judgments possible? Take causality — Astrophel

We see a snooker cue hit a stationary snooker ball and see the snooker ball begin to move. It is not our ordinary experience that snooker balls on a snooker table are able to spontaneously move. Whenever we see a snooker ball start to move we have seen a priori cause, either another snooker ball or a snooker cue.

Where does our belief in causality come from? For Kant, our knowledge of causality is a priori because the Category of Relation includes causality. In today's terms, our knowledge of causality is a priori because of the principle of Innatism, in that the principle of causality is built into the very structure of our brain. The brain doesn't need Hume's principle of induction to know that one thing causes another, as knowing one thing causes another is part of the innate structure of the brain.

Suppose we perceive the colour red, which is an experience in our minds. As we have a priori the innate knowledge of causality, we know that this experience has been caused by something. We don't know what has caused it, but we know something has caused it. We can call this unknown something "A", or equally "thing-in-itself."

The fact that we know "The most distant objects in the Universe are 47 billion light years away" does not mean that we know 47 billion light years. The fact that we know "for every effect there has been a prior cause" does not mean that we know priori causes. Both these statements are representations, and the fact that we know a representation does not mean that we know what is being represented. Confusion often arises in language when the representation is conflated with what is being represented. What is being represented is often named after the representation. For example, Direct Realism conflates what is being perceived when we say "I see a red post-box" with the object of perception, a red post-box.

So what exactly is "thing-in-itself" describing? When we say "our experience of the colour red has been caused by a thing-in-itself", the thing-in-itself exists as a representation in our mind not something in the world.

This is a new concept to me. As far as I know, neither Austin nor Wittgenstein recognize this classsification. Since they are both what one might call no-theory theorists, — Ludwig V

The fact that a philosopher may not attach a label to themselves does not mean a label cannot be attached to them.

As the IEP in its article John Langshaw Austin (1911—1960) writes:

Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his ‘linguistic phenomenology’, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts and ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, “to say something is to do something”).

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It seems plainly absurd, however, to claim that language is the world, if you mean that cats and dogs are linguistic objects of some kind. — Ludwig V

Perhaps one should look at Dunmett, Sellars, Wittgenstein and Austin who are making this kind of claim.

Wittgenstein wrote in 5.62 of Tractatus "The World is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) means the limits of my world."

Sellars is known for his Inferential Role Semantics. His most famous work is "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956). In it, he criticizes the view that knowledge of what we perceive can be independent of the conceptual processes which result in perception. He named this "The Myth of the Given," attributing it to sense-data theories of knowledge. (Wikipedia - Wilfrid Sellars).

Dummett is known for his Semantic Antirealism, also known as Semantic Inferentialism, a position suggesting that truth cannot serve as the central notion in the theory of meaning and must be replaced by verifiability (Wikipedia - Michael Dummett).

Austin warns us to take care when removing words from their ordinary usage, giving numerous examples of how this can lead to error. He argues that all speech and all utterance is the doing of something with words and signs, challenging a metaphysics of language that would posit denotative, propositional assertion as the essence of language and meaning (Wikipedia - JL Austin).

Austin is promoting an ordinary language philosophy with the aim of removing what he argues are false distinctions made by classical philosophy, resulting from the misuse of words such as "direct" and "indirect". He proposes going back to the ordinary use of a word rather than its metaphorical use.

Those metaphors "at the centre" are presumably shorthand for something and need a bit of explaining. — Ludwig V

Using an analogy (allowed within ordinary language), an author may write an article comparing and contrasting Atheism and Christianity in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, a Christian author may also write an article evaluating Atheism, and would unsurprisingly find it wanting.

Similarly, an author may write an article comparing and contrasting sense-data theory and ordinary language in order to evaluate their similarities and differences. However, in my opinion, Austin, as a believer in Ordinary Language Philosophy, has written an article Sense and Sensibilia evaluating sense-data theory and has unsurprisingly find it wanting.

From Austin's Ordinary Language point of view, it may well be the case that sense-data is irrelevant, but that does mean that the sense-data theory is irrelevant.

You had said he puts mind at the center of reality, and language at the center of mind. That's why I thought the ultimate relationship would be mind to world. No? — frank

When Wittgenstein at the start of On Certainty discusses GE Moore and the statement "I know that here is a hand", perhaps one can say that Ayer's centre of interest is the relationship of mind to world and Austin's centre of interest is the relationship of language to world.

For Ayer, we know of the hand through our sense data independently of language. For Austin, we know of the hand through our language, independently of any world that may or may not exist independently of our mind.

In this sense, there are similarities between Austin and the later Wittgenstein, in that for both of them the main interest is in language. Their interest is not in Ayer's metaphysical considerations of the relationship between the hand that I know exists in my mind to a hand that may or may not exist in a world independently of my mind.

I see. So Austin doesn't want sense data because it interferes with the way he envisions the relationship between mind and world? — frank

Perhaps more the relationship of language to world. Don't you agree? Reference to sense-data is not generally used in ordinary language, as when he writes:
For reasons not very obscure, we always prefer in practice what might be called the cash-value expression to the 'indirect' metaphor. If I were to report that I see enemy ships indirectly, I should merely provoke the question what exactly I mean.' I mean that I can see these blips on the radar screen'-'Well, why didn't you say so then?'

Could you explain what that is? — frank

To my understanding, as Austin's interest is in language, it is not surprising that he challenges the sense-data theory that we never directly perceive material objects, as this is not how language works. In language, we do directly talk about material objects.

Linguistic Idealism may be described as the position that puts the mind at the centre of reality and language at the centre of the mind, and language does not represent the physical world as is often claimed but is the world itself. (www.researchgate.net - Nonrepresentational Linguistic Idealism). Wittgenstein has sometimes been described as a Linguistic Idealist. GEM Anscombe considered the question whether Wittgenstein was a Linguistic Idealist in her paper ‘The Question of Linguistic Idealism’.

Basically, the sense-data theory of Ayer and the linguistics of Austin are different aspects of knowledge, as mathematics and ethics are different aspects of knowledge. That is not to say neither is not valid, but becomes problematic when mixed up together.

He emphasises linguistic usage must be centred from ordinary people's usage, not philosophers' — Corvus

As I see it, in Metaphysics, the Indirect Realism of Ayer is the more sensible approach. In Linguistic Idealism, the Direct Realism of Austin is the more sensible approach. As Austin is speaking from a position of Linguistic Idealism, Sense and Sensibilia should be read bearing this in mind.

I suppose there’s nothing inherently wrong with naming an existence as such. But naming a mere existence doesn’t tell me as much as naming the object of my experience. — Mww

I have an experience which has the name "the colour red". I know that this experience has had a cause, but although I don't know what the cause was, I do know that the cause existed. I can name this unknown cause "A". I can then talk about the cause of my seeing the colour red as "A" and the cause of my seeing the colour green as "B". I don't know what "A" and "B" are, other than that they exist. Something that is unknown yet exists can be named as a "thing-in-itself". Both "A" and "B" are things-in-themselves.

It is true that the names "A" and "B" don't tell me as much as the names "the colour red" and "the colour green", but they do tell me something, that "A" and "B" exist and that "things-in-themselves" exist.

There is also the humoncular regress to consider. If we "see representations" by being "inside a mind" and seeing those representations "projected as in a theater," then it seems we should still need a second self inside the first to fathom the representations of said representations, and so on. Else, if self can directly access objects in such a theater, why not cut out the middle man and claim self can just experience the original objects? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can avoid the homuncular regress by acknowledging that the self is not separate to the representations but the self is the representations.

Questions about freedom are questions about: "to what extent we are self-determining as opposed to being externally determined.".............We can be alien to ourselves...............We can identify with and exercise control over what determines our actions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This raises the question of how we can be self-determining. We say, "I think I will have a coffee rather than a tea". Such a thought did not exist at a prior moment in time, so what caused the thought to come into existence. Either a prior state of affairs, which is Determinism, or the thought itself caused itself to come into existence, which is Free Will.

How can something cause itself to come into existence?

Say it is the case thing-in-itself is a name. What am I given by it? What does that name tell me? — Mww

That it exists.

Not as I understand it.The indirect realist does not and knows it; the direct realist does not but thinks he does.................Yes, which fits with what I just said, but doesn’t fit with both seeing a red postbox......................No human can see with his eyes closed. — Mww

There are at least two aspects to the question of Indirect and Direct Realism, the metaphysical and the linguistic. When considering an expression such as "I see the red post-box" the metaphysical and the linguistic should not be conflated

As regards the metaphysical, Indirect Realism makes more sense than Direct Realism. We know that when an object emits a wavelength of 700nm we see the colour red. The Indirect Realist would argue that the colour red exists in our minds. The Direct Realist would argue that the object is red.

As regards the linguistic, Direct Realism is more appropriate than Indirect Realism. As Wittgenstein discusses in Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty, words exist within language games, and within language games are certain hinge propositions on which the language game is founded. These hinge propositions are always true within the language game of which they are part. They are not intended to correspond with the world they describe, but create the world that they describe, in that the proposition "I see a red post-box" is true even if in the world is a flying pink elephant.

When considering the proposition " I see the red post" linguistically rather than metaphysically, it should be remembered that any particular world may have many different meanings. For example, according to the Merriam Webster dictionary, the word "see" as a transitive verb may mean:

1 a = to perceive by the eye
b = to perceive or detect as if by sight

2 a = to be aware of : RECOGNIZE - sees only our faults
b = to imagine as a possibility : SUPPOSE - couldn't see him as a crook
c = to form a mental picture of : VISUALIZE - can still see her as she was years ago
d = to perceive the meaning or importance of : UNDERSTAND

3 a = to come to know : DISCOVER
b = to be the setting or time of - The last fifty years have seen a sweeping revolution in science
c = to have experience of : UNDERGO - see army service

4 a = EXAMINE, WATCH - want to see how she handles the problem
b = READ - to read of
c = to attend as a spectator - see a play

5 a = to make sure - See that order is kept.
b = to take care of : provide for - had enough money to see us through

6 a = to find acceptable or attractive - can't understand what he sees in her
b = to regard as : JUDGE
c = to prefer to have - I'll see him hanged first.

7 a = to call on : VISIT
b (1) = to keep company - had been seeing each other for a year
(2) = to grant an interview to : RECEIVE - The president will see you now.

8 = ACCOMPANY, ESCORT - See the guests to the door.

9 = to meet (a bet) in poker or to equal the bet of (a player) : CALL

The word "see" as an intransitive verb may mean:

1 a = to apprehend objects by sight
b = to have the power of sight
c = to perceive objects as if by sight

2 a = to look about
b = to give or pay attention

3 a = to grasp something mentally
b = to acknowledge or consider something being pointed out - See, I told you it would rain.

4 = to make investigation or inquiry
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the direct realist should be able to name the red postbox even if he didn’t even know what a red postbox was. — Mww

As I don't know the Arabic name for "red post-box" without having first learnt it, the Direct Realist cannot name an object without having first learnt its name.
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The indirect realist conceives the color red as one of a multiplicity of properties belonging to the phenomenon representing the thing he has perceived. It takes more than “red” to be “postbox”, right? — Mww

Yes, objects have many properties. The colour red is a useful example to make a philosophical and linguistic point.

As a side point, it is not the case that objects have properties, but rather objects are a set of properties.
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You name it A, but because neither of us know the cause, I’m perfectly authorized to call that same cause, B — Mww

Yes, I can name it A and you can name it B. However, the point is that an unknown thing, a thing-in-itself, has been named.
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. As soon as it is determinable, it cannot be a thing-in-itself. — Mww

True, but until it has been determined, it is still a thing-in-itself.

I don't see why it has to have caused itself. I think it's commonly known as "reflection". — Metaphysician Undercover

Logically, how can something reflect on itself?

If we have a reason for choosing something, then those reasons determine our actions....The "choice," between S1 and S2 has to be based on something for us to do any "choosing."...........................so it seems like we can be free in gradations and we are more free when our choices are "more determined by what we want them to be determined by," not when they are "determined by nothing."..................a sort of recursive self-aware self-determination, as opposed to a free floating non-determinism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I understand you, I agree that if we were totally free to do whatever we wanted at any moment in time, with no constraints on our actions, we might freely decide not to eat or drink, we might freely decide to jump off a cliff or we might freely decide not to get out of the way of a speeding truck.

But this would be unworkable. Sentient life can only succeed if a limit has been placed on the range of choices available to it within any particular situation. Limits not determined by another mind, but determined by the physical nature of the world. Within limits there is freedom to choose a particular course of action. A certain freedom of choice within a restricted range of possibilities seems an effective evolutionary solution for the development of life.

The question is, what is the nature of this freedom. We feel free to choose between a pre-determined range of available possibilities, but is this freedom in fact an illusion. Is it the case that the range of available possibilities is so restricted that in fact our free will is non-existent.

We are at state S2 and prior to that we were at state S1. Either we are free to choose between moving to future states S3 or S4 or our choice has been pre-determined by state S1.

I can understand the mechanics of Determinism, in that our choice at state S2 has been pre-determined by state S1, but the mechanics of free will elude me, causing me to come to the conclusion that the world is Deterministic and our belief that we have free will is just an illusion.

Suppose free will can cause state S2 to move equally to either S3 of S4, meaning that state S2 can spontaneously and without prior cause move of its own accord equally to either states S3 or S4. This gives us the problem of a spontaneous change in the absence of a prior cause that is not random and somehow determined.

What kind of mechanism can explain a spontaneous change without priori cause that is not random and somehow determined.

Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

There are two significant differences between the Indirect and Direct Realist. The Indirect Realist approach is that of metaphysics, whereas the Direct Realist approach is that of Linguistic Idealism.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist see a red post box.

For the Indirect Realist, as we know that the object emits a wavelength of 700nm when we perceive the colour red, the expression "I see a red post box" refers to a perception in the mind and not a material object in the world.

For the Direct Realist, the expression "I see a red post box" is in effect what Wittgenstein would call a hinge proposition, true regardless of what exists in the world. In fact, even if in the world was a pink elephant flying through the sky, the proposition " I see a red post" as a hinge proposition would still be true.

However, both approaches are valid, and each has its own place in our understanding.

If you see a red postbox, then it is the case the thing comes to you already named, which makes you a direct realist. — Mww

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist see a red postbox.
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If you don’t know the true cause of your representation, how did it get the name red postbox immediately upon you seeing it? — Mww

For the Indirect Realist, the name is of the representation in the mind. For the Direct Realist, the name is of a material object in the world .
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I submit, that when you say you’re seeing a red postbox, it is because you already know what the thing is that you’re perceiving. But there is nothing whatsoever in the perceiving from which knowledge of the perception follows. — Mww

This problem applies to both the Indirect and Direct Realist.
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According to your system, you should be able to name the sound without ever actually perceiving the cause of it. — Mww

True.
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The thing you perceive may indeed end up being named a red postbox, and that for each subsequent perception as well, but the name cannot arise from the mere physiology of your vision — Mww

Very true. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist need things they see to have been named in order to be able to use the name in language.
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Direct realist: one who attributes properties as belonging to the object itself and which are given to him as such, and by which the object is determined;
Indirect realist: one who attributes properties according to himself, such that the relation between the perception and a series of representations determines the object. — Mww

Very true. Even though an object emits a wavelength of 700nm, and we perceive the colour red, the Direct Realist believes that the object is red, whereas the Indirect Realist believes that only their perception of the object is red.
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I submit you don’t see a red postbox. — Mww

Depends on what you mean by the word "see".
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I asked about how the thing-in-itself gets a name — Mww

Suppose we see an affect. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause A

Suppose we see a broken window. We know that if there has been an effect there must have been cause, even if we don't know what the cause was. Let us name the cause of the broken window A.

IE, we have named something even if we don't know what it is.
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A cause doesn’t have to be known, it just has to be such, for an effect that is itself determinable. — Mww

I agree. If I see a broken window, I know that something has broken it.

We know there has been a cause when we perceive an effect.

One can know it by self examination, introspection. It looks like you haven't tried it, or gave up to soon without the required discipline. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this possible?

Is it possible to have a thought about an internal logical process, when the internal logical process has caused the thought in the first place?

In other words, can an effect cause itself?

I forget if I’ve asked already, but assuming I haven’t……how does a ding as sich have a name?...No. Like….how is it called a cup-in-itself. — Mww

Basically, because we name the unknown cause after the known effect.

As an Indirect Realist, if I see a red postbox, which is a representation in my mind, I name the cause of this representation "a red postbox". I don't need to know the true cause of my representation of a red postbox in order to give this unknown cause a name, ie, "a red postbox".

In ordinary language we say "Clouds of acrid smoke issued from the building". This is a figure of speech for saying that the smell is acrid, not that the smoke in itself is acrid.

In ordinary language we say "Eating sugary or sweet foods can cause a temporary sweet aftertaste in the mouth". This is a figure of speech for saying that the taste is sweet, not that the food in itself is sweet.

It is not the case that we believe that effects have causes, but rather that we know effects have causes. In today's terms, Innatism, and in Kant's terms, the a priori Category of cause.

We know the effect, whether the colour red, an acrid smell or a sweet taste because the effect exists in our minds. We know that effects have prior causes. Therefore we know that there has been a prior cause for our perceptions of the colour red, acrid smell and bitter taste.

It is then a straightforward matter, knowing that there has been a cause, even though we don't know what the cause was, to give this cause a name and name it after the effect.

For example, the unknown cause of our perception of the colour red is named "red", the unknown cause of our perception of an acrid smell is named "acrid" and the unknown cause of our perception of a bitter taste is named "bitter".

The unknown cause of our perceptions is in Kant's terms a thing-in-itself. Even though we don't know what this unknown thing-in-itself is, we can name it. We name it after the effect it has on our perceptions, which is known.

The names "red", "acrid" and "bitter" don't describe unknown things-in-themselves, but in Wittgenstein's terms as he describes in Philosophical Investigations, replace the unknown things-in-themselves.

As regards the cup-in-itself, "cup" names what we perceive in our minds, not something unknown that exists independently of our minds.

The point was that people act in ways contrary to their own logical process...The issue is whether people are bound (determined) to act according to what their own logical process dictates. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can we know that. I cannot look at someone and know their internal logical processes. Even I don't know my own internal logical processes.

In any case, talk of screens and other flat surfaces aside, the original point of contention was the idea that our visual field is a two-dimensional image, and I see nothing whatever to support that assertion. — Janus

You agree that a screen in a flat surface. What is the difference between seeing a portrait of a person in an art gallery and seeing a portrait of a person on a screen. Don't both these appear the same in our visual field, ie, as two-dimensional images?