Can you say why this next level of reflexivity is needed to make the situation clear? — J

I would put my money on:

p = Pat thinks that the oak tree is shedding its leaves
I think p = Pat thinks about her thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves

Pat thinks about her thought has two meanings:

Meaning one = linguistic, which makes sense.

Meaning two = metaphysical, which gets philosophical. How can one thought think about another thought?

If language is expression of thought, then every statement and proposition you make must be based on "I think" even if you didn't say it out loud. — Corvus

As you say, when I say "Paris is crowded", this infers that I must think that Paris is crowded.

The problem arises with the word "think".

When I say "I think", does this also infer that I must think that I think?

And if so, what does this metaphysically mean?

Isn't it a tautology? When you say P, it already implies you think P. — Corvus

Nearly.

Let "p" = "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall"

When I say p, when I say "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall", this means that "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall."

When I think p, when I think "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall", this has two different meanings.

Meaning one = "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall". A tautology, as you say.

Meaning two = "I think about my thought that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall."

In ordinary language, "I think about my thought that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall" means "I think that the Eiffel Tower is 400m tall, but I am not sure"

In metaphysics, "I think about my thought leads to an infinite regress, so cannot be valid.

It becomes difficult to separate metaphysics from ordinary language.

So with these recent posts, we’re going a bit deeper into the question of “I think p” and its relation to p. — J

p and "I think p"

An interesting post, but I am getting unclear about the meaning of p.

Suppose p = "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

From page 1, Pat said "I think p and am not aware of thinking "I think p""

Therefore, the relation must be between "I think p" and "I think "I think p"", not the relation between "I think p" and p.

The relation between "I think p" and p is the relation between "I think the oak tree is shedding its leaves" and "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", which is not what the OP is about.

Am I right in thinking that p = "the oak tree is shedding its leaves"?

p and I think p. — J

Let p = the thought that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

When I think, it must be about something, as all thoughts must be about something.

"I think" necessitates a self that is conscious of thinking. "I" is synonymous with the self.

Possibility one = p is external to the self, internal to the self but not a part of the self or accompanies the self. If this were the case, the self would have no way of knowing about p.

Possibility two = p is part of the self. If this were the case, the self is the thoughts it has.

In other words, I am my thoughts. This solution avoids the infinite regress of the Homunculus problem.

Am I able to think of these two entirely unrelated things at the same time? I would think so — Patterner

:100:

Am I thinking about leaves falling from the tree and the height of the Empire State Building when I say, 'The leaves are falling from the tree, and, when you include the antenna, the Empire State Building is 1,454 feet (443.2 m) tall"? — Patterner

Possibly yes.

When thinking about "The leaves are falling from the tree" you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of leaves, allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

When thinking about "the leaves are falling from the tree and the Empire States Building is 443.2 m tall", you are thinking about two things connected by the common thought of height, also allowing you to think about them both at the same time.

There are many different things we can think about at the same time, such as the speed of my car and how many pedestrians are on the road, the price of a restaurant meal and when I was last paid, writing a post knowing that dinner is waiting on the table, etc.

And you pointed out that it is (what might be called?) a compound lower level thought. — Patterner

The question was whether it is possible to think about two things at the same time.

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" — Patterner

The compound lower level thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" shows that it is possible to think about two things at the same time, "the oak tree" and "is shedding its leaves"

Do the quotes around "I" mean that there is literally no self without thoughts, or only that the "I" of philosophy, so to speak -- the self-conscious cogito -- is constructed from our thoughts? — J

As I see it, there could be no self without thoughts. The self doesn't have thoughts, the self is the thoughts that the self has.

If you had no thoughts, would it be possible for you to have a self?

How could you express your self without thoughts?

As regards the word "constructed", in the same way that a wooden table is constructed of wood, the self is constructed of thoughts. The self is neither external to, internal to or accompanies thoughts, but rather the self is the thoughts that the self has.

Whereas "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is a combination of two lower level thoughts. — Patterner

But you have said that "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" is the lower level thought.

Is it possible to think ‛I think that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.’ without thinking ‛The oak tree is shedding its leaves.’? The words are actually in the sentence, after all. The higher level thought cannot exist without the lower level thought. — Patterner

So then is the question "Can you think A and B at the same time?" rather than "Can you be A and B at the same time?"? — Patterner

As you say:

I can think the lower level thought without the higher. — Patterner

The lower level thought is "the oak tree is shedding its leaves". Let A be "the oak tree" and let B be "is shedding its leaves"

Then yes, one can think A and B at the same time.

Because if you only thought A, "the oak tree", then you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves", and if you only thought B, "is shedding its leaves", then also you couldn't have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves".

To have the thought "the oak tree is shedding its leaves" requires thinking about not only "the oak tree" but also "is shedding its leaves" at the same time.

Or is there another response that seems better? — J

The easiest solution is that I am what I think, in that "I" am my thoughts. None of 1 to 4 apply.

I am neither external nor internal to my thoughts, nor accompany my thoughts, in that I am my thoughts. If I had no thoughts, "I" would not exist. "I" could not exist if I had no thoughts.

"I" am the thought that the oak tree is shedding its leaves.

Our subjective thoughts "I think p" cannot be about objective facts "p", as objective facts are unknowable, and are in Kant's terms, unknowable things-in-themselves. P, that an oak tree is shedding its leaves, exists in the mind as a thought, where "I" am the thought p.

This idea goes back to at least Aristotle's Material Cause, where, for example, if a table is made of wood, the wood is the Material cause of the table. The wood is neither internal nor external nor accompanies the table, but rather the table is wood.

Similarly, what is being thought about is the Material Cause of the thought. A thought is neither external nor internal nor accompanies what is being thought about, but rather the thought is what is being thought about.

I am what I think.

Anyhow, most of the phenomenology I am familiar with attempts to rebut Kant, not support him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The OP is whether without 1, 2 could not exist. But exist where? In the mind or in a world outside the mind. This leads into the question of phenomenology.

When talking about phenomenology, it depends whether we are referring to the disciplinary field in philosophy or the movement in the history of philosophy (SEP - Phenomenology).

Phenomenology as a study of thought, stretching back several thousand years, may well be at variance with Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena. However, Phenomenalism as a 20th C movement may well not be.

Phenomenology as a movement got underway in the first half of the 20th C because of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. (SEP - Phenomenology)

Plotinus and Aquinus
Therefore, for Plotinus (204/205 CE to 270CE) and Aquinus (1225 - 1274), phenomenology was still a discipline studying experience and consciousness.

Sokolowski
It is perhaps not a surprise that Monsignor Robert Sokolowski (b. 1934), a Roman catholic Priest, rebuts Kant's dualism, and considers that Indirect Realism and Representationism are misguided (Wikipedia - Robert Sokolowski)

Whilst it is true that Sokolowski wrote Introduction to Phenomenology, explaining the major philosophical doctrines of phenomenology, this does not mean that he is a proponent of Phenomenology as a modern movement. I don't know whether he is or isn't, but would suppose that he isn't, and therefore cannot be held as an example of a Phenomenalist who rebuts Kant's dualism (Wikipedia - Sokolowski)

I would guess that half of those on the Forum today reject Indirect Realism in favour of Direct Realism, thereby rejecting Kant's Representationalism.

Hegel
Hegel was interested in phenomenology as the study of experience and consciousness, but was neither a Husserlian Phenomenologist nor supporter of Kant's dualism between thought and being. For Hegel, in order for a thinking subject to be able to know its object, there must be an identity between thought and being, otherwise the subject would never have access to the object (Wikipedia - Absolute Idealism)

Husserl and Phenomenology
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) was the principal founder of the movement of Phenomenology.

Husserl's Ideas, Volume One.(1913) is the true foundation of Phenomenology. In this book Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In part this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of “transcendental idealism”, looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond phenomena. (SEP - Phenomenology)

For example, when I see a tree, I don't need to concern myself with whether he tree exists or not, my experience is of the tree, not whether such a tree exists. As Husserl writes, we "bracket" the question of the existence of any world around us.

The word "phenomenology" has two uses
I am sure that Phenomenology as a movement founded by Husserl doesn't rebut Kant's dualism of phenomena and noumena, whilst I agree that phenomenology as a general discipline stretching back thousands of years, studying experience and consciousness, is more than likely to both support and oppose Kant's "transcendental idealism".

Isn't that the essence of deductive logic, where premises necessitate a conclusion? Isn't this arguably a form of "mental causation" ? — Pantagruel

Depends on what you mean by "cause".

There could be Aristotle's "Material Cause", where a table is made of wood, and the wood is the material cause of the table.

There could be Aristotle's "Efficient Cause", where a sculptor chisels away at stone to make a statue, and the sculptor is the efficient cause of the statue.

Material cause is contemporaneous and efficient cause is sequential in time.

However, today, in general language, using cause as material cause is an archaic use of the word, and what people mean today by cause is efficient cause.

Deductive logic:
P1 - All dogs have ears
P2 - golden retrievers are dogs
C1 - therefore golden retrievers have ears.

The above is an example of cause in the sense of material cause, but not a cause in the sense of efficient cause.

Therefore, in today's' terms, the above example of deductive logic is not an example of causation.

However this isn't the place to address that as we are veering OT for this thread — Pantagruel

The OP asks whether 1 causes 2.

The first thing to work out is where 1 and 2 exist, in the mind or in a world outside the mind.

The answer as to whether 1 causes 2 depends on where 1 and 2 exist.

To be able to answer this question, I am sure that topics such as Phenomenalism and Enactivism, Kant and Collingwood, are relevant.

My belief is that 1 and 2 only exist in the mind.

The enactivists I am aware of tend to be harsh critics of Kantian representationalism. It gets offered up as a way to avoid Kant's problems, not a way to recreate them. The article you're citing mentions phenomenology as a means of dissolving the very Kantian dualism you are claiming this approach represents. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Phenomenology
Kant is a dualist when he makes a phenomenal-noumenal distinction, between Appearance and the Thing-in-itself.

Kant's approach seems similar to that of Phenomenology, where we have knowledge of Appearance but not of Things-in-themselves.

From SEP - Phenomenology

Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience..................... When Descartes, Hume, and Kant characterized states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were practising phenomenology.

In this sense, Phenomenology is supporting rather than dissolving Kant's "Transcendental Idealism".

Enactivism
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism)

The key phrase is "dynamic interaction between".

Enactivism is not the position that cognition arises from direct contact between an organism and its environment.

For Enactivism, there is an indirect contact between an organism and its environment mediated by a dynamic interaction.

For Kant also, cognition is mediated by Appearance, which stands between cognition and Things-in-themselves.

Actually that is exactly what embodied-embedded cognition implies, represents a definition of knowledge as much as anything. — Pantagruel

Embodied cognition is knowledge of interactions with the environment, not knowledge about what in the environment caused those interactions

Embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition (SEP - Embodied Cognition)

This is why embodied cognition has been inspired by the phenomenological tradition

Another source of inspiration for embodied cognition is the phenomenological tradition. (SEP - Embodied Cognition)

Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. (SEP - Phenomenology)

In Collingwood's terms, it is knowledge about the sensations, not whatever in the world caused those sensations.

In Kant's terms, it is knowledge about Appearances, not knowledge about Things-in-themselves.

In language, the clause "that Lydia sang" is embedded within the clause "Wanda said that Lydia sang". The embedded clause "that Lydia sang" gives no information about the clause it is embedded into, "Wanda said that Lydia sang"

In geology, silver may be embedded in copper. The embedded silver gives no information about the copper it is embedded into.

Embodied cognition has knowledge, but knowledge of thoughts and sensations, not knowledge about what in the world caused those thoughts and sensations.

He is the metaphysical grandfather of the idea of the embodied mind. — Pantagruel

Do you have a source for this?

That an organism is embodied in the world does not mean that the organism necessarily has knowledge about the world.

True. Except that he relentlessly fuses these: — Pantagruel

The fusing of thought and sensation. A seemingly Kantian approach, where the principles of pure understanding allow the very possibility of experience (CPR B293).

Collingwood writes in Speculum Mentis

Again, when I speak of a sensation, imagination, thought, or the like, I sometimes mean an
object sensated, sometimes the act, habit or faculty of sensating it, and so on.

Such thought and sensation exist in the mind, rather than outside the mind as things-in-themselves.

Collingwood writes "Mathematics is thus the one and only a priori science", inferring that, for Collingwood, numbers, as part of mathematics, exist in the mind rather than outside the mind.

I don't really subscribe to this idea of the sublime (awe and wonder?).........................The experince is not transcendental. It's a personal reaction. — Tom Storm

There is no one meaning of the word "sublime". From Wikipedia - Sublime (philosophy)

For 1st C AD Longinus, the sublime is an adjective that describes great, elevated, or lofty thought or language, particularly in the context of rhetoric.

In an early work (of 1764), Immanuel Kant made an attempt to record his thoughts on the observing subject's mental state in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. He held that the sublime was of three kinds: the noble, the splendid, and the terrifying.

For Schopenhauer, the feeling of the sublime, however, is when the object does not invite such contemplation but instead is an overpowering or vast malignant object of great magnitude, one that could destroy the observer.

Not only is it a personal reaction to which definition of the word "sublime" one accepts, but even if accepting one particular definition of the "sublime", it remains a personal reaction to one's experiences of the "sublime" as defined.

The long quote I made from Collingwood is its own best evidence and equates with my claims. — Pantagruel

Collingwood also says:

Mathematics is thus the one and only a priori science. It has nothing to do with space or time or quantity, which are elements of concrete experience ; it is simply the theory of order, where order means classificatory order, structure in its most abstract possible form.

This seems to suggest that for Collingwood, numbers, being part of mathematics, exist in thought rather than sensation.

Obviously there is not a unique set of two "proto-digmatic" entities.........................On the other hand, any pair of things can exist in a state of "two-ness" given the appropriate abstraction. — Pantagruel

I don't know what a "proto-digmatic" entity is.

Does two-ness exist in the world or in the mind of the observer?

Suppose two-ness exists in the world.

If two-ness exists in the world, then so must one-ness.

Suppose an observer sees two things in the world that are spatially separate.

What determines whether there is one two-ness or two one-nesses?

IE, if two-ness exists in the world, how does a particular thing in the world "know" whether it is related to another thing or not?

each member being simply another instance of the universal..............This indeterminate multiplicity is the mathematical infinite (RG Collingwood). — Pantagruel

There are an infinite number of possible numbers, such as 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.111, etc.

If numbers exist in the world, they must exist either as abstract entities, such as 1, 2, 3, etc or concrete entities, such as 1 atom, 2 atoms, 3 atoms, etc.

Suppose 2 exists as a concrete entity, such as 2 atoms. As there an infinite number of possible numbers, but only a finite number of concrete entities in a finite world, then there are some possible numbers that cannot exist in the world. In this event, a mathematical infinite in the world is not possible.

A mathematical infinite can only exist in the world if numbers exist as abstract entities, independent of any concrete entities. This raises the question as to what relates the number 2 to 2 atoms rather than relating the number 2 to 5 atoms, for example?

Without 1, 2 could not exist, though the reverse doesn’t hold. Since it is because of the existence of 1, or one thing, that there can be 2, or two things, then the former can be said to be the cause of the latter. — Pretty

Without meringue, the Australian dessert containing meringue, whipped cream and fruit couldn't exist.
The Australian dessert containing meringue, whipped cream and fruit is named Pavlova.
Therefore, without meringue, the Pavlova couldn't exist.
The Pavlova couldn't exist without meringue, because by definition, a Pavlova contains meringue.

Without 1, 1 + 1 couldn't exist
1 + 1 is named 2
Therefore, without 1, 2 couldn't exist
2 couldn't exist without 1, because by definition, 2 is 1 + 1

As "Pavlova" is a name, "2" is a name.

As meringue didn't cause the Pavlova, 1 didn't cause 2.

"Sherlock Holmes" is also a name. That something has a name doesn't of necessity mean that it exists in the world. We can talk about "Sherlock Holmes" even though "Sherlock Holmes" doesn't exist in the world. We can talk about 2 even though there is no necessity that 2 exists in the world.

That we can talk about 2 does not necessarily mean that 2 exists in the world.

Wouldn’t gravity be a perfect example of one? — Pretty

No, not at all. Ontological relations and gravity (and forces in general) are two very different things.

Wikipedia - Gravity

In physics, gravity is a fundamental interaction primarily observed as mutual attraction between all things that have mass.

SEP - Relations

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

There may be a relation between 1 and 1 without there being a force between them.

Aristotle speaks of a certain priority in which two things exist contemporaneous to each other yet still have a causal-effective relationship — such as the existence of a thing and an affirmation of that thing. — Pretty

As regards Aristotle's Material Cause, which is an intrinsic cause, for example a table is made of wood and a statue is made of bronze.

I agree that the table is contemporaneous with the wood it is made from, and is described by Aristotle as a cause.

Aristotle also describes an Efficient Cause, which is an extrinsic cause, for example a sculptor who chisels at a block of marble to transform it into a statue.

The OP asks "Is the number 1 a cause of the number 2?"

There are different meanings to the word "cause", whether intrinsic cause or extrinsic cause.

If ontological relations don't exist in the world, then 2 cannot exist, meaning that there can be no cause of 2 whether intrinsic or extrinsic.

If relations do exist, taking the example of Material Cause, as a table is made of wood, 2 is made of the relation between 1 and 1.

The next question is, are there any good reasons for supposing that ontological relations do exist in the world?

But I wonder also whether the quest to identify the 'really real' might not just be a secular replacement for god. — Tom Storm

I wonder whether even if we knew that the ultimate truth about reality was God, would we be any more knowledgeable than knowing that the ultimate truth about reality was 42.

reality — A Realist

What reason do you have for assuming that we can ever know the ultimate truth about reality?

Without 1, 2 could not exist, though the reverse doesn’t hold. Since it is because of the existence of 1, or one thing, that there can be 2, or two things, then the former can be said to be the cause of the latter. — Pretty

Presumably "exist" is referring to existing in the world rather than existing in the mind.

2 is the relation between 1 and 1.

The question to ask is, do relations ontologically exist in the world.

If relations don't ontologically exist in the world, then there is no relation between 1 and 1. This means that there is no 2. As there is no 2, the concept of did 1 and 1 cause 2 is not applicable.

If relations do ontologically exist in the world, then there is a relation between 1 and 1. However, such a relation is contemporaneous with 1 and 1. On the one hand, the relation between 1 and 1 didn't exist prior to there being a 1 and 1 (as the relation is between 1 and 1) and on the other hand, the relation between 1 and 1 didn't exist subsequently to there being a 1 and 1 (otherwise for a moment in time there would have been no relation between 1 and 1). As the relation between 1 and 1 is contemporaneous with 1 and 1, the concept of cause is not applicable.

Either way, whether relations do or do not ontologically exist in the world, the concept of cause is not applicable to numbers.

Do you mean that we can measure 'sweet', but we cannot measure 'sweetness'? — Mapping the Medium

Taking wine as an example, the more residual sugar there is in a wine the sweeter it will be. For example, a dry wine could have 1 gms/litre of residual sugar whilst a sweet wine could have 45 gms/litre of residual sugar. The amount of residual sugar defines how sweet a wine is. ( www.wineinvestment.com).

We can measure how sweet a particular wine is. For example, a wine may have 20 gms/litre of residual sugar. This gives us a concrete fact.

We also know that the sweetness of wine varies between about 1 gms/litre and about 45 gms/litre of residual sugars. Any wine will lie within this range. This gives us another concrete fact.

Therefore, how sweet a wine is is a concrete concept, tangible in the same way that apples and chairs are concrete concepts.

The sweetness of wine is an abstract concept, in that it is not tangible as apples and chairs are.

However, both "sweet" and "sweetness" are measurable. "Sweet" is measurable as 20 gms/litre of residual sugar. "Sweetness" is measurable as lying between 1 and 45 gms/litre of residual sugar.

Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation in logic that transforms a predicate into a relation. For example, "Honey is sweet" is transformed into "Honey has sweetness". — Mapping the Medium

I have no access to what Peirce wrote about hypostatic abstraction, so I cannot comment about what he said.

Can "honey is sweet" be transformed into "honey has sweetness"?

As colour has different hues, sound has different pitches, there are different scales of pain, there are also different intensities of sweetness. For example, a mango can be very sweet, honey reasonably sweet and a watermelon slightly sweet.

In ordinary language we can say "this honey is sweet", meaning that this honey has one particular intensity of sweetness.

When we say "this honey has sweetness", we mean that this honey has a sweetness within the range very sweet to slightly sweet.

"Sweet" is a concrete concept, whilst "sweetness " is an abstract concept.

As the expressions "honey is sweet" and "honey has sweetness" have different meanings, one cannot be transformed into the other.

As the axioms do not contradict each other, it is still true that logic is one coherent system. — A Christian Philosophy

Axioms are assumptions taken to be true.

As there is no logical necessity that assumptions don't contradict each other, there is no logical necessity that axioms don't contradict each other.
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Based on it, we build planes that fly. — A Christian Philosophy

We also build planes that crash.

Beauty (as I see it) generally seems soft and cloying. — Tom Storm

I agree. I think that the distinguishing feature of art is that it has an aesthetic.

Such an aesthetic can either be beautiful, when non-threatening, such as paintings of roses and sunsets or ugly, when threatening, such as paintings of scorpions and war.

When a good aesthetic becomes a great aesthetic then it becomes sublime.

The aesthetic, being a certain combination of balance within variety of form can apply to all disciplines, whether painting, dance, music, architecture, as well as the design of cars.

"This is why any rational person will reject determinism." — Metaphysician Undercover

Not many people in history have said that Einstein was not a rational person.

From Einstein’s Mystical Views & Quotations on Free Will or Determinism

Thus, in 1932 Einstein told the Spinoza society:

“Human beings in their thinking, feeling and acting are not free but are as causally bound as the stars in their motions.”

Einstein’s belief in causal determinism seemed to him both scientifically and philosophically incompatible with the concept of human free will. In a 1932 speech entitled ‘My Credo’, Einstein briefly explained his deterministic ideology:

“I do not believe in freedom of the will. Schopenhauer’s words: ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of freedom of will preserves me from taking too seriously myself and my fellow men as acting and deciding individuals and from losing my temper.”

If something is uncaused then it occurs for "no reason at all." — Count Timothy von Icarus

True. For both Free Will and Determinism, there is a reason why at 1pm I choose not to fire my gun.
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What is self-determining is not undetermined. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree
===============================================================================
At 1pm, when I choose not to fire my gun, I have several thoughts, including the innocence of civilians and the orders I have been given by my superiors.

If Free Will is the case, at t seconds before 1pm, where t can be any number, it has not been determined whether I do or do not have the thought at 1pm to fire my gun.

If Determinism is the case, at t seconds before 1pm, where t can be any number, it has been determined that I have the thought at 1pm not to fire my gun.

My question is, if Free Will is the case, is this not an example of spontaneous self-causation.

Spontaneous in the sense that my thought not to fire could not have existed at t seconds prior to 1pm, otherwise my thought would have been determined.

Self-caused in the sense that the thought at 1pm not to fire caused its own existence.

How can a thought spontaneously cause its own existence?

Simply put, "choice" is not an appropriate word in this context, otherwise we'd be saying that water makes choices, rocks make choices, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree.

If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose.

In language, the word "choose" is used in certain ways. Inanimate things such as rocks that don't possess life cannot choose, but animate things such as people that do possess life can choose.

A person may choose between two courses of action, such as whether to stay or to go, regardless of whether they live in a world that is Deterministic or in a world where people have Free Will.

A larger question is, how does Free Will explain the spontaneous self-causation of thoughts and thoughts to act?

So if determinism is true, then someone made the choice for the person? Who would that be, God? — Metaphysician Undercover

As the SEP article on Causal Determination writes

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

If someone happens to be in the middle of a city road and sees a truck directly approaching, they would sensibly choose to move to the pavement.

I agree that some people may believe that God directly told them to move, looking out for their best interests.

Some people may believe that someone else, such as a loved one, telepathically told them to move.

It could be that they move because of an innate instinct for self-preservation, without being consciously aware of what they are doing

It is unlikely that someone other than the person themselves made the choice to move to the pavement.

If Free Will is the case, then they themselves freely made the choice.

If Free Will is the case, and a person's thoughts and thoughts to act come into existence at one moment in time, not having any prior cause, then this is an example of spontaneous self-causation, a metaphysical problem difficult to justify.

If Determinism is the case, their choice had been determined, not by themselves, not by someone else, but by the physical temporal nature of the Universe. A Universe of fundamental particles and forces existing in space and time over which no person has control.

If Determinism is the case, a person has no choice in what they choose. One advantage of Determinism is that it avoids the metaphysical problem of spontaneous self-causation whilst still explaining a person's choices.

Pablo Picasso. Not beautiful, but an aesthetic art, even though ugly.

Thomas Moran. Sublime rather than beautiful.

"Beautiful.", was the first word that came to my mind then. However, what I had felt and seen seemed much more profound than just one word, which I would say only captured/described but a fraction of this moment. — Prometheus2

Another word is "sublime"

From Edmund Burke: Delineating the Sublime and the Beautiful

Edmund Burke, an 18th-century philosopher, is best known for his exploration of aesthetics, particularly his distinction between the “sublime” and the “beautiful.” In his influential work A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Burke examines how these two concepts, though related to art and nature, invoke radically different emotional responses in the observer. While beauty tends to elicit feelings of love, calmness, and attraction, the sublime is linked with awe, terror, and a sense of the vastness that surpasses human understanding.