The brain processes (computes) organic information, and the mind processes (computes) experiential and metacognitive information.

...cognitive psychology rests on the theory that the mind is a computer. — AJJ

Cognitive Psychology is the study of mental processing using a computational approach.

Michon, John A.; Jackson, Janet L.; Jorna, Rene J. 2003. Psychosemiotics: Semiotic Aspects of Psychology. Chapter 141 in Posner R.; Robering, K.; Sebeok, T. (Eds.). 2003. Handbuch der Semiotik/Handbook of Semiotics (Vol. 3, pp. 2722-2758). Berlin: W. de Gruyter.

According to Wolfgang Hofkirchner, a multi-disciplinary concept of information has been developing based on Emergentist Systemism (an integrationist approach to complex systems), having Physics as its point of departure.

Hofkirchner, Wofgang. 2017. Introduction: Information from Physics to Social Science. Eur. Phys. J. Special Topics 226, 157–159. EDP Sciences, Springer-Verlag.

At least that would be consistent with good entertainment.

Just Google, "the neurophysiology of intention" and you will find plenty of credible research. — Harry Hindu

Thanks for the links.
At first glance, I noticed that the subject of each paper is intention, not volition (will).

1) Haggard, Patrick. 2005. Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition. Trends Cognitive Sci. 2005 Jun;9(6):290-5.
From the Abstract:
"Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation."

No surprise there.
Neuroscience also rejected neuroplasticity prior to research conducted by neuroscientists in the 1960s.

"Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference."

This says nothing about the anatomical location or neurophysiological state of intention, much less volition (will).

2) Zschorlich V.R., & Köhling R. 2013. How Thoughts Give Rise to Action – Conscious Motor Intention Increases the Excitability of Target-Specific Motor Circuits. PloS ONE, 8 (12) PMID: 24386291.
From the Abstract:
The present study shows evidence for conscious motor intention in motor preparation prior to movement execution. We demonstrate that conscious motor intention of directed movement, combined with minimally supra-threshold transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the motor cortex, determines the direction and the force of resulting movements, whilst a lack of intention results in weak and omni-directed muscle activation.

Which also says nothing about the anatomical location or neurophysiological state of intention, much less volition (will).

3) Aigbedion, Andrew Ewanlen. 2016. Understanding the Neural Basis of Intention. Current Research in Neuroscience. Volume 6 (1): 23-27.
From the Abstract:
"The neural mechanisms and basis of forming, maintaining/deactivation, execution/implementing remains a fundamental issue unresolved which is the focus of this review."

No, not as stated, although most any empirical situation is susceptible to manufactured moral/ethical implications, re: the various and sundry renditions of the trolley problem. — Mww

Fair enough. Cheers!

Oh, sorry! You’re asking about ‘freewill’? No thanks :) — I like sushi

I second that sentiment.

What: ......the manifestation of pure practical reason in rational agents, employed as a faculty of choice under the auspices of the fundamental human condition of morality; — Mww

Is this to say that every product of reasoning (e.g., resolving to tie my shoe because it is untied) has ethical implications?

As such, it's located at our brains. It only occurs when our brains are in specific states. — Terrapin Station

Cite credible scientific research.
Hint: this is a matter of logical, not empirical, investigation.

Volition (Will) is the resolve which sustains intention (descriptive and/or causal purpose). It is a function of motivational intensity (which varies along a linear continuum between high and low).

As with all mental events, it does not have spatial extension, but criterial evidence in terms of observed behaviour establishes that it exists.

That's what I figured. Cheers!

I see, you are defining it from the perspective of a theist. Personally, I don't believe there exists a soul or spirit. — Relativist

Why are your beliefs relevant to the task undertaken by the OP? Generally, beliefs hinder the careful exegesis of a text; like putting the cart before the horse.

Actually, the standard definition in philosophy--which you'll find primarily under the auspices of philosophy of biology, a subdiscipline of philosophy of science, is very similar to the standard scientific definition, which is based on phenomena such as cell division, metabolism, etc. — Terrapin Station

Being standards, it shouldn't be difficult for you to provide said Philosophy of Biology and Scientific definitions of life. Also, it would be helpful if you could provide a list of texts which comprise the Canon of Biological Philosophy.

The scientist define life in terms of DNA but could not define it in its entirety. — Vipin

Can you cite an example?

I am forced to define life while commenting on the gospel of John. In my attempt to study life and define it, I understood some important concepts about the life.

The life has three tiers: Biological life, physiological life and spiritual life. The greek philosophers have understood it and they have words for each tier and they are Bios, Psyche, Zoe. — Vipin

The concept of life found in the Gospel of John will be based on Biblical hermeneutics, and have a spiritual dimension, whereas; the concept of life found in Biology will be based on empirical investigation, and have organic dimensions.

What is the difference between biological and physiological life? Is there such a thing as anatomical life?

Do you mean to equate bios with Biological life, psyche with physiological life, and zoe with spiritual life?

The religions attempt to define life in terms of free will. — Vipin

Can you cite an example?

I need to find better terms for “state of being”, “inner abilities” and “outer abilities”. — Vipin

Spirit, mind, and body?

Well, there are definitely things that happens to people that are not good and are not primarily physical. I don't think anyone was denying that. But calling it 'mental illness' is to suggest that it is a certain kind of thing - like a physical illness, only mental. — csalisbury

I agree.
Terminology is key to:
1) Accurately describing a problem.
2) Determining how a problem is understood within a social group.
3) Affecting the self-esteem of social group members who are labelled as having a problem.
4) The selection of a problem-solving method (e.g., a Bio-Psycho-Social approach).

The underlying problem relevant to this thread is: the mental conditions which produce maladaptive (unproductive) behaviour. There are degrees of (mild to severe) maladaptive behaviour.

Maladaptive behaviour is perceived to be a problem, because it:
1) Prevents individuals from conforming to social norms (social group rules concerning appropriate and permitted behaviour), resulting in social exclusion and/or marginalisation (stigmatisation).
2) Impedes social cohesion (a measure of the extent of agreement between social group members).
3) May be a risk to personal and/or public safety.

The mental conditions which produce maladaptive behaviour may be described in terms of:

1) Illness: corporeal and/or mental condition which entails discomfort and dysfunction ("and" being the operative word).
a) Mental Illness: mental condition which entails mental discomfort and mental dysfunction. This is consistent with the ICD-10.V definition of disorder, and implies treatment.
b) Mental illness becomes a matter of public health, involving the regulation of therapeutic practise in certain jurisdictions. Therapy type (e.g., psychosurgery, brain stimulation, medication, psychotherapy) depends on mental illness type.
c) Mental illness may be curable or incurable.
d) Symptomatic treatment may be effective or ineffective.

2) Conformity: behaviour in accordance with social norms.
a) Non-Conformity: behaviour not in accordance with social norms.
b) Non-conformity becomes a matter of social control.
c) Social norms are enforced formally and/or informally.
d) In addition to corporeal and/or mental disability-disorder, other causes of non-conformity include: creativity, eccentricity, dissidence, and criminality.

So, I agree with ICD-10.V that mental disorder should not be defined in terms of "social deviance or conflict alone, without personal dysfunction."

3) Typicality: an independent variable within 1.96 standard deviations from the mean of a normal distribution.
a) Mental Atypicality: mental condition greater than 1.96 standard deviations from the mean of a normal distribution.
b) Mental atypicality becomes a matter of diversity within a social group.
c) Mental atypicality is a conventional measure which should have cross-cultural validity, like intelligence.

So, if a condition entails dysfunction, but not distress or discomfort to the person who has it, it should probably not be defined in terms of illness or disorder, but rather in terms of atypicality or diversity within a population.

Thanks for the links.

There has been a push to refer to “mental illnesses” as “brain disorders/malfunctions” instead. — I like sushi

By whom?

The term "disorder" is used throughout the classification, so as to avoid even greater problems inherent in the use of terms such as "disease" and "illness". "Disorder" is not an exact term, but it is used here to imply the existence of a clinically recognizable set of symptoms or behaviour associated in most cases with distress and with interference with personal functions. Social deviance or conflict alone, without personal dysfunction, should not be included in mental disorder as defined here. — ICD-10, Chapter V, Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, Clinical descriptions and diagnostic guidelines, p.11.

There is inductive evidence in terms of physiological correlates, and criterial evidence in terms of observed behaviour, which establish the relations between body, mind, and behaviour. Mind and behaviour have causal relations, whereas; mind and body (i.e., nervous systems) have correlative relations.

That being the case, and given appropriate medical indications, it seems reasonable to expect that psychotherapy would be more effective than psychosurgery, brain stimulation, and medication, however; there is apparently not sufficient data available to make that determination.

That's great. Thanks for the elaboration.

Thing is, what this demonstrates is that there is no essential difference between mental illness and social stigma.

Now suppose the profession were to actually bite this bullet. Then we could stop talking about illness, and simply talk about distress as a manifestation of broken relationship. — unenlightened

What kind of social environments produce autism and catatonia?

Also, if there are anatomical and/or physiological causes of atypical behaviour, and there is not a widely accepted general definition of the noun phrase "mental illness", would it be more appropriate to refer to neuro-behavioural typicality and atypicality?

Clarify — Anaxagoras

Say, "please."

Thoughts? — Anaxagoras

Frequently, but not obsessively.

I think the underlying question of this thread is "can we have scientific knowledge about spirit?"

By this, I mean, can we investigate rigorously and reproducibly matters of the spirit? — Louco

If Science of Mind (Psychology), then why not Science of Spirit (Pneumology)?

Of course, many will object that Psychology is a soft science which is experiencing a replication crisis, and that a Science of Spirit would be no different.

Paul Bloom has an interesting reply to the replication charge here.

If the OP determines that this question is off-topic, it would at least be interesting to discuss in a new thread.

I agree (you have not misinterpreted me).

Sure.
Thanks for providing the opportunity to refine some ideas.

Even as a post to this thread is criterial evidence of mind, the ethical quality of that post is criterial evidence of spirit.

I could generally go along with that statement. But now the tricky part... how could one relate that to the concept of spirit? — 0 thru 9

Not tricky at all.
I explained that here: "From such criteria, evidence in terms of observed behaviour may be sufficient to posit "spirit", or similar concepts."

Doesn’t the experience come before the writing? — 0 thru 9

Experience is an awareness event.
Perception and cognisance are the complements of awareness.
In other words: what you know affects what you perceive.

Gregory, Richard. 1987. "Perception" in Oxford Companion to the Mind (ed. with Zangwill, O.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 598–601.

I could say virtually anything. — Isaac

Which says nothing. Congratulations.
We are done here.

As far as I know, the writings of the World's major book religions and systems of moral philosophy are the only source of information about "spirit", or similar concepts. — Galuchat

Why would 'information' about "spirit" be limited to those two sources, why not your own feelings, for example, or those of your neighbours? — Isaac

Considering that this thread was posted in the Philosophy of Religion category, and that the OP and subsequent posts contain the words, "God", "soul", "supernatural", "the Force", "Taoist philosophy", "transcend", "worldview", "belief", and "afterlife", it seems reasonable to conclude that "spirit", as used herein, has religious and/or moral connotations.

However, it is obvious that a religious/moral discussion makes many people uncomfortable and combative. For them, it is more comfortable to re-frame the question in terms of psychology, fantasy, or the paranormal.

So, I would welcome information about "spirit" which is based on "your own feelings, for example, or those of your neighbours."

Do you have any you can share?

Please define spirit.

To start simply, with something that is (or might be) part of our nature... SPIRIT. Does such a thing exist? Is so, what could it possibly be? Is it by nature mostly undefinable, or only partially “knowable”? Is matter, energy, both, neither? Does the mind, body, actions, and spirit of a person intersect in some way?

And for those feeling adventurous, compare and contrast the idea of “spirit” with that of “soul”. Could a thing or animal be thought to have a spirit, if perhaps not a soul? — 0 thru 9

Body (organic mass-energy) has spatiotemporal extension. Mind has temporal, but not spatial, extension. Mind consists of organism events (conditions, actions, and processes) which produce automatic and controlled acts.

As far as I know, the writings of the World's major book religions and systems of moral philosophy are the only source of information about "spirit", or similar concepts.

From such criteria, evidence in terms of observed behaviour may be sufficient to posit "spirit", or similar concepts. It is a philosophical, not empirical, question. So, questions of fact and nature (including the supernatural) are irrelevant.

I could (but would not, due to its controversial nature) incorporate a notion of spirit within a model of cognitive psychology as follows:

1) Like mind, spirit has temporal, but not spatial, extension.
2) It is a moral condition-action feedback loop.
3) Body, mind, and spirit have correlative, but not causal, relations.
4) Soul is mind.
5) Animals possess a soul, but not a spirit.

I think I'll leave you two authorities to have at it.
Cheers!

I thought you were a psychiatric patient, not a Psychiatrist.

Google Argument from Authority.

I'm not saying I'm an authority of psychiatric because again, like I said, I'm not a medical doctor. — Anaxagoras

Finally! Thanks for admitting that.
It feels like I'm becoming an authority on pulling teeth. But just for the record: I'm not a qualified dentist.

Google Argument from Authority.

My research background plus being a member of the APA very much makes me an authority. — Anaxagoras

APA?
Aberdeen Performing Arts? — Galuchat

American Psychological Association — Anaxagoras

And that makes you an authority on Psychiatry, not.
Sorry.

My research background plus being a member of the APA very much makes me an authority. — Anaxagoras

APA?
Aberdeen Performing Arts?

Google Care in the Community.

If it weren’t for psychiatry, I wouldn’t be allowed to live in the community. Make whatever assumptions you will from this. — Noah Te Stroete

For all I know, maybe you shouldn't "be allowed to live in the community".
Britain's Care in the Community policy has not been an unmitigated success.

So, you don't "professionally work in the psychiatric field".
In fact, according to this post, you have a doctorate in Clinical Psychology, but work "professionally as a Social Worker", because you are not licensed to practise Clinical Psychology in your State.

No wonder you can't provide specific information on the practise of Psychiatry. That's fine, as long as we are all clear on the point that you cannot be considered an authority on Psychiatry.

As a person that professionally works in the psychiatric field... — Anaxagoras

Your apparent reticence (no answer to this question) causes me to suspect that you're not actually familiar with the practise of Psychiatry.

So, @Chisholm's complaint is valid, to wit:

I have yet to hear from any psychiatrists as to what it is exactly that the profession of psychiatry has to offer, AND what it is, that is unique to psychiatry alone (as opposed to the various therapeutic technologies of psychologists, social workers, family therapists, community workers, etc. etc.), other than psychotropic medications and the pathological labels of the DSM. — Chisholm

Absent such information, the only conclusion I can come to is that psychiatric practise is inexplicable and/or indefensible.

Perhaps you could elaborate upon anatomical and/or physiological causes of behavioural atypicality (if not per DSM, then per ICD-10, Chapter V), and what psychiatrists do to eliminate these from consideration in arriving at a diagnosis?

You have quoted me out of context, and misrepresented my further comments; cheap tricks. So we are done here.